



## ORIGINAL PAPER

# Legitimizing the „peaceful rise” of the People's Republic of China. A Conceptual Analysis of Official Chinese Discourses and Trends in Academic Publication

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### Abstract:

This article explores the construction of legitimacy for China's global role through discourse. Through the analysis of 60 public speeches using word-frequency analysis and conceptual mapping, the article pinpoints the aspects that have served to create a pattern in which most salient ideas converge, translated into recurring concepts, towards a defensive and cooperative narrative, which frames China's rise as peaceful and normatively-based. The results inform dialogue on China's "peaceful rise" and demonstrate the potential of quantitative discourse analysis for research on policy analysis. Additionally, we can derive a dual discourse system that balances between external legitimation, as well as internal legitimation, so there is a melting point between official speeches and domestic academic publications which serve as the ideal embodiment for further depicting China's discursive governance. While the official discourses under scrutiny in this study tend to stress 'cooperative' and 'co-defensive' narratives including 'shared future' and 'common destiny,' data from CNKI on China's academic publishing indicates that these constructs have been increasingly institutionalized in domestic research agendas and point to the diffusion of official slogans in the academic sphere for the validation of their legitimacy. The results contribute to the analysis of discourse, legitimation and international policy communication, by providing a systematic and replicable way of analyzing political elite language. More generally, the research also serves to provide us with further insights into the power dynamics of discourse as a governance technology in world politics and how language is strategically wielded to mould perceptions, construct legitimacy and alter global policy landscapes.

**Keywords:** *discourse analysis, legitimation, policy narratives, discourse coalition*

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### Introduction

China's ascension to global pre-eminence has been matched in recent years by a careful campaign to mold international perceptions of its rise. From the rhetoric of "peaceful development" and "win-win cooperation" to the more recent push for a "community of common destiny," Chinese official discourses have invariably tried to highlight China as a dependable and positive contributor to international affairs. They are, in other words, not only rhetorical flourish but key strategies of legitimation which serve the purpose of mitigating external anxiety about its rise at a systemic international level and cementing internal normalisation.

The literature on discourse and policy has shown how narratives legitimize politics (Hajer, 1995; Stone, 2012; van Leeuwen, 2007). Some of these studies focus on how the "peaceful rise" (Zheng, 2005), the soft power (Nye, 2004), and the national rejuvenation (Yan, 2014) are represented coming from the Chinese context constructing the identity of China in international relations. Recent analyses further highlight the concept of "community of common destiny" as a normative aspiration of global governance (Duan & Zhang, 2021).

However, in spite of this literature, there has been remarkably little systematic, text-based research into the discourse patterns in an extensive corpus of official speeches. Most of the research available is based on close reading of a relatively small number of pivotal speeches or theoretical extrapolations that have not yet addressed both how consistently some of the themes have been prevalent, and also how they relate hierarchically. Most studies, moreover, fail to link official rhetoric to the practice of Chinese academic publishing, which increasingly constitutes a site of legitimation in its own right.

The present article addresses these lacuna by posing the questions raised by how do Chinese officials discursively legitimize the concept of peaceful rise and to what extent are such narratives consecrated by academic publishing?

### Methodology

To address this question, I used a word frequency analysis and concept mapping based on 60 official speeches delivered by Chinese leaders in the decade between 2013 and 2023, which was after correlated with an analysis of the Chinese publication trends, based on the CNKI database - the largest record database in China comprised of a wide range of content such as journals, dissertations, newspapers, conference papers, yearbooks and statistics, which helps us draw subject distribution charts and see which disciplines or clusters are covered or how publications evolved over time, thus correlating the publishing patterns on CNKI with official speeches, through which we can infer that Chinese academia acts as an echo chamber and it legitimates official discourse and turns it into a broader discursive coalition. This allows for an account of the academic institutionalization of these speeches.

### Literature review

From the distant past to the present day, the analysis of text and talk in policy and international relations has tended to underline the importance of narrative in authorizing and communitarianizing legitimated claims (Hajer, 1995; Stone, 2012). Discourse analysis focuses on the ways in which language does not simply reflect but also actively produces political realities as the symbolic resources for the justification, contestation and stabilization of policies (van Leeuwen, 2007; Schmidt, 2008). Within

# Legitimizing the „peaceful rise” of the People's Republic of China. A Conceptual Analysis of Official Chinese Discourses and Trends in Academic Publication

this tradition, scholars demonstrate the ways that policy narratives and discourse coalitions cohere patterns of thought that justify political action. In the Chinese context, this view has been especially productive in explaining the official rhetoric of “peaceful rise” (Zheng, 2005), the display of soft power (Nye, 2004; Callahan, 2010), and the more recent promotion of “a community of common destiny” (Yan, 2014; Duan & Zhang, 2021).

**Table 1.** Hierarchical representation of the main discursive themes identified



A limited number of studies have systematically analysed a larger set of speeches, using text-mining methods or compared official language trends with Chinese academic publishing trends. This article bridges the ongoing conversation into this gap and locates itself at the crossroads of discourse theory, Chinese foreign policy studies, and computational text analysis.

According to Marteen Hajer, discourse coalitions are groups of actors around a particular set of storylines—overarching tales or shared interpretations—that define how ecological problems are perceived and thus environmental policy is articulated. Such alliances are bound by collective meanings and practices in discourse, which lend social and moral significance to political struggles. It is through the mediation of these common stories, such coalitions work together to fix meanings and practices that affect policy making (Hajer, 1995: 2).

To use Hajer's notion 'storylines' for the clustering of Chinese official narratives such as 'shared future' and 'peaceful rise', these narratives can be considered part of a discourse coalition that has joint far reaching consequences for how China's role and identity are shaped in the world arena. What the narratives in this coalition have in common is that they contribute to a coherent view of and 'claim' of China's behaviours and aspirations, making the narratives legitimate and long-lived in the political dialogue. This model helps us to understand how particular narratives hang-together, sustained by the actors whom champion them and fix their meaning in the wider political landscape.

He also ties discourse to material forms of political action by arguing that political disputes are fundamentally disputes of interpretation, out of which shared narratives or "storylines" create understandings of ecological or political issues. These narratives held by discourse coalitions have implications for who is responsible for what and the roles people play in discourse and, hence, bring social and moral politics to political conflicts. Meanings, practices, alliances and arrangements that are not already given can be thought or voiced in discursive practices, thereby altering conceptions and inclinations: from meanings and conceptions and inclinations, new politics become possible. This framework suggests that the legitimacy of political action involves producing hegemonic discourses that fix meaning and practice against challenge.

Applying this to China's construction of peaceful rise, it is clear that by discourse, China is trying to construct their narration saying that their rise is a peaceful and that harmony was the way in which they will be achieving this goal. Through anchoring this story in Chinese and global discourse coalitions, this narrative is intended to help legitimize China's political behaviour and policies in relation to its rise, helping to manage international perceptions and to contain rivalries or conflict around a spectacular development. This is also consistent with Hajer's perspective that discourse is essential in framing the political legitimacy through common meanings and stories (Hajer, 1995: 3).

Theo van Leeuwen adopts a different approach and distinguishes four principal types of legitimization in discourse and communication, namely *authorization*, *moral evaluation*, *rationalization* (which are further subdivided into *instrumental rationality* and *theoretical rationality*) and *mythopoesis*.

Justification on authority basis, e.g. tradition, custom, law, persons with institutional power. It covers legitimacy of conformity where practices are justified as being done "because that's what most people do" or by explicit appeal to comparisons with what is regarded as acceptable behavior (Van Leeuwen, 2007: 2). Elsewhere, moral legitimization rather than mere subjection to authority is likely to rely on adjectives like "good," "healthy," "normal," or "useful" to imply concepts of "morality" that may be

## Legitimizing the „peaceful rise” of the People's Republic of China. A Conceptual Analysis of Official Chinese Discourses and Trends in Academic Publication

explicitly anchored in identifiable value discourses. addressing the goals, uses, and effects of social action (Van Leeuwen, 2007: 8). Rationalization is one form of legitimation by reference to the purposes, uses, and consequences of social actions, a form which van Leeuwen breaks down into two types: instrumental rationality (justifying practices in terms of their purposes and effects) and theoretical rationality (legitimizing by reference to a natural or scientific order) (van Leeuwen, 2007: 12).

Finally, mythopoesis is transmitted through narratives or tales whose consequences reward and punish right and wrong actions, respectively (van Leeuwen, 2007: 18).

Van Leeuwen's modes of legitimization can be correlated with the discursive strategies of *responsibility* and *common destiny* in Chinese official discourse because they are quintessentially represented by the moral evaluation. This dimension corresponds to *legitimation* with recourse to discourses of value, which is concomitant with responsibility and shared destiny as the moral and value-laden legitimation in the discourse. These devices function through invoking *communal values* and *moral imperatives*, not by appealing to authority or rational ends alone.

From the point of view of the most frequent concepts used in the official Chinese discourses that can be seen in **Table 1**, that best capture the rhetorical devices used in Chinese official discourse, we can see they represent broad thematic areas rather than specific rhetorical devices, the Chinese official discourses often using themes such as: ***national rejuvenation***, ***security cooperation***, ***shared development***, and ***global governance system*** as key rhetorical elements to legitimize policies and actions. Thus, from the conceptual map, categories like **national** (including national rejuvenation, national strength), **security** (security cooperation, national security system), **shared** (shared development, shared responsibility), **global** (global governance system, global community), and **development** (sustainable development, common development) best capture the thematic rhetorical devices used in Chinese official discourse.

Hajer connects discourse to legitimation of political action through highlighting how governing discourses mould political procedures and validate specific techniques or policies. Hegemonic Dominant Authority Discussing how discourses can change and become a 'hegemonic' as well as impact the involvement of experts and the political tactics adopted, and how rival hegemonic discourses dynamise by erecting fixed meanings and practices in order to solidify themselves from attack. This conceptualization helps in understanding how political actors deploy discourse, not only as justification, but as a means of managing public opinion and institutionalizing their programmatic agenda (Hajer, 1995: 4).

Applied to China's framing of its rise as peaceful, the 'peaceful development' discourse is an argumentation strategy. China applies this discourse to **combat external strategic distrust** against its increasing power and defense spending, to forge a favorable international environment for its economic rise. With notions such as 'new type of great power relations' defined by non-conflict, mutual respect and cooperation, China seeks to justify its rise as non-threatening and peace-loving and earn recognition by other world powers, including the US. This is in line with Hajer's conception of discourse as the legitimation which secures the legitimacy of political action and international relations as the movement of values and narratives.

Stone, on the other hand, refers to policy narratives as stories that construct and challenge policy problems by advancing accounts of how the world operates. These are stories, in fact, that have a beginning, a middle and an end, that involve change or redemption, and that contain heroes, villains and victims. And they have a strong hold on our imaginations and psyches because they provide the promise of a one-size-fits-all answer to difficult problems. In politics, stories are the primary vehicle for creating shared meaning by implicitly defining issues in terms that have emotional and symbolic valence for individuals (Stone, 2012: 164).

Though in the end, Stone's 'storytelling' can also be applied to China's rhetoric on 'peaceful rise' and the 'shared future'. Stone distinguishes between two general story lines that dominate policy politics: **stories of change** (which also involve stories of decline or stories about the upturn) and **stories of power** (which also include stories of helplessness or control). **"Peaceful rise"** of China is **part of a tale of rising**, and China shall play a strategic role in the choice that development is the most important for China to live a peaceful life, rather than unresolved struggles and conflicts. The "shared future" and "community of common destiny" narrative is in consistency with the story of regulation and sharing, mutual respect and win-win international relations. This is why it's useful as a framework for narration of China constructing its own, diplomatic narratives — and the perceptions and their ability to legitimate China's developmental path and global position — work on this particular account.

Storytelling structure by Stone can also be used to explain the Chinese discursive ideas in that it explains how the Chinese discursive ideas have been assembled to **form a logical coherent system narrative which affirms China's peaceful rise**. For instance, development is articulated in terms of peaceful, high-quality, sustainable, green development, focusing on advancement without disputes.

There are also allusions to global governance, to international system that China wants to interact with and gradually reform through win-win, fair and honest cooperation internationally to deal with common challenges is stressed as well.

In terms of term frequency, **global** is the most frequent and reflects global governance, peace, (challenges), community, and the positioning of China as a responsible global actor.

The word **social** emphasises social infrastructure and security social systems, such as homelessness, referring to the social policy impact of the form of supervision.

The term **national** focuses on national rejuvenation, strength, security and unity, being consistent with China's modernization objectives.

**Security** is not being treated only in the sense of traditional security issues, but also in terms of common security, universal security, security cooperation aiming at mitigating both traditional and non-traditional threats.

At the same time, **shared future** is another term that means shared interests, benefits, responsibilities and common aspirations with other countries in order to achieve win-win cooperation.

These **themes constitute a story** - as told through Stone's frame - in which China is an ascending power, dedicated to peaceful development, cooperation and shared global prosperity, not conflict. This is a narrative aimed at reducing external strategic suspicions and create a friendly atmosphere for the stable development of China and its integration into the international system.

Zheng Bijian first presented China's peaceful rise in Foreign Affairs as a new strategic path of modernization that suits her national conditions and conforms to the

## Legitimizing the „peaceful rise” of the People's Republic of China. A Conceptual Analysis of Official Chinese Discourses and Trends in Academic Publication

trend of history. He also emphasized that the rise of China would be peaceful. It was to be accomplished through capital, technology and resources acquired through peaceful means as distinct from war or invasion so much. In another vein, Zheng pointed out that China has taken economic globalization onto itself, opening its market and integrating its economy into the world economy as this peaceful process is proceeding. The author is also calling attention also to the fact that China does not want to be hegemonic but seeks a new international political and economic order accomplished in a step-by-step manner by means of democratization in international relations. The idea is to put an end to suspicions and fears about China's rise and promote an international environment of peace and stability helpful for its continued development (Zheng, 2005: 4).

Today, these ingredients still feature in political discourse coming out of China; but they evolve too. 'Peaceful rise' has been cast as 'peaceful development' to underline an ongoing commitment to nonviolence in growth.' Cooperation and mutual benefit remain just as important and is vigorously promoted through projects such as Belt and Road Initiative to bring economic integration together with neighbours for example SouthEastAsian states.

### Discursive analysis

Chinese officials, particularly President Xi Jinping, adopt discursive strategies to create an impression of shared values and that China is projecting soft power. The idea, according to Xi's speeches delivered in world forums and communiqués, describes an intricate interlocking network of nations bound by dependence on one another. Through this thinking nations would join together for global cooperation and harmonious world management, based on the foundation of human being's shared destiny and united development goals. **Such language paints China as a responsible leader** for world public opinion and at peace with its neighbours, helping to take the edge off widespread concerns about the country's future due rival powers. On the other hand, by describing China's rise in terms of shared destiny and unity values, Chinese officials hope to raise their moral high ground on the world stage and heighten soft power as a result that is appealing to others.

In general Chinese vision Chinese leaders frequently borrow the phrase from Zheng Bijian, a political adviser to the then president, gave it currency in an article that title to this day adorns Beijing's most prominent Party school. Non-threatening China's development is cast into a formula such as this, The Chinese governments have not signed an instance of This narrative aims to dispel fears and suspicions about China's growing influence and military spending. It also presents China as a peacenik power that, seeks mutual respect, cooperation and win-win results in its relations with other countries including the United States. China emphasizes peaceful development and promotes non-conflict, win-win new kinds of great power relations in hope of creating an environment favorable for its economic advancement as well. This view corresponds with Joseph Nye's idea of soft power, which is the ability to attract others by appealing to them and making one's own cause look attractive. Thus, the 'peaceful rise' discourse at the same time helps China construct soft power for itself by portraying a positive image and winning international recognition as an emergent global power.

While the word frequency analysis and conceptual map highlight how Chinese officials deploy discursive strategies to legitimate the notion of a “peaceful rise,” these speeches do not exist in isolation. In China, academic publishing serves as an important arena where official narratives are echoed, elaborated, and normalized. **To examine**

whether the patterns identified in political speeches are also reinforced at the scholarly level, I analyzed data from the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI), the country's largest academic database. This secondary analysis allows for a comparison between official discourse and academic publishing, illustrating how narratives of development, cooperation, security, and community of common destiny are institutionalized across both political and scholarly domains.

### **Discursive Convergence: Political Rhetoric and Scholarly Production**

The results enhance understanding of discourse, legitimation, and international policy communication by providing a rigorous, replicable means of analyzing elite political language. Beyond its own premises, the research more generally draws attention to the function of discourse as a practice of governance in global politics and the strategic use of language in framing categories, constructing authority and impacting international policy making agendas. The hierarchical structure of discursive themes is shown in **Table 1**, applied to the corpus. The visualization (made with the qualitative research tool Nvivo) brings concepts together under higher thematic additions (themes like Development, Cooperation, Security,), showing the discursive building.

Also looking at the publication trends from CNKI, they demonstrate a dominance of domestic scholarship focusing on soft power (文化软实力), cultural confidence (文化自信), core socialist values, hard power vs. soft power debates, Xi Jinping thought, etc. What we can discern from this is that Chinese academia **reprints and magnifies official discursive priorities**, insinuating them into scholarly and policy discussion. While the state rhetoric highlights the notion of 'share future' and 'community of destiny', the CNKI data shows that scholars spend much of their effort exploring scholarly debates over 'cultural soft power', 'cultural confidence' and 'core socialist values', confirming a scholarly underpinning of state legitimate strategies.


If we take a look at **table 2**, most publications are from **culture (23%)**, politics & international relations (**10.6%**), and economics (**6-7%**). Smaller portions go to **education, journalism, ideology**, etc.

In terms of disciplinary distribution, where research on Chinese soft power and the related are concentrated is presented in Table 2 which indicated that the research is mainly in the fields related to culture and politics as well as there is a notable significance of the economic field. This corresponds to the discursive frames of **development, cooperation**, and **cultural legitimacy** found in official speeches, which indicates that political legitimation of China's peaceful rise is established not only politically but also academically in different pivotal knowledge domains.



# Legitimizing the „peaceful rise” of the People's Republic of China. A Conceptual Analysis of Official Chinese Discourses and Trends in Academic Publication


**Table 2.** Where discourse is located by disciplines<sup>2</sup>



If we examine the main subjects distribution data shown in **Table 3**, it is obviously that 文化软实力 (cultural soft power, 37%) and 软实力 (soft power, 27%) are the mainstream subjects, and its proportion have a large lead over other subjects such as 文化自信 (cultural confidence), 社会主义核心价值观 (socialist core values), and even 习近平 (Xi Jinping).

With regard to the subjects, the first category (cultural soft power and soft power in general) is rather dominant among Chinese academic publications, followed by the categories of cultural confidence and socialist core values. These images map onto the legitimating techniques in official discourse, which vacillate between responsibility, values, and shared destiny as the terms through which China's rise is secured as culturally anchored and normatively benign. The rise of 'Xi Jinping' as a keyphrase, moreover, shows how leadership discourse becomes institutionalized in the academy.

**Table 3.** Core concepts by subjects<sup>3</sup>




<sup>2</sup> Available at: <https://oversea.cnki.net/kvisual/article/center?language=EN>

<sup>3</sup> Available at: <https://oversea.cnki.net/kvisual/article/center?language=EN>

In terms of trends over time, if we look at **Table 4** we can see that the publications on cultural soft power and soft power rise sharply after 2007, peak around 2012–2016, and then decline slightly.

Cultural confidence, values, and Xi Jinping rise in the later period (post-2016). Therefore, the publication results presented in Table 4 indicate a tendency of time in academic narratives. While scholarly discussions of soft power and cultural soft power were popular in the Hu Jintao era, their heyday is 2012–2016. From 2017 the emphasis changed to cultural confidence, values and direct references to Xi Jinping, mirroring the official explanation of the ‘community of common destiny’ and the concentration on national rejuvenation. This temporal coincidence indicates that academia follows the marching orders of the changing official narratives, and it contributes to **naturalizing China’s peaceful rise across institutional fields**. The aggregated CNKI data seem to indicate that Chinese academic publishing closely reflects the themes that the official discourse elevates to the podium. While the speeches emphasize development, cooperation, and a shared future, academic research tends to focus on culture as a soft power resource and on values and governance. This suggests a wider discourse coalition of political elites and academia within whose symbolic order China’s rise is legitimized, and whose knowledge production it is implicated in.

**Table 3.** Trends in when and how the emphasis shifted<sup>4</sup>



We can also identify an **outward** vs. **inward** contrast in **discourses**. One important result of this research is the difference between the populations to which 'official' discourse and academic publishing are directed. Chinese leaders' outward-facing speeches are mostly cooperative, defensive, and reassuring, featuring “peaceful rise,” “win-win cooperation” and China’s “global responsibilities.” These narratives are constructed to relieve international apprehension and portray China as a responsible player in global governance. On the contrary, the trends of CNKI academic publications show an internal tendency. Rather, the focus is on “soft power,” “cultural confidence” and the codification of “Xi Jinping Thought” — seemingly less matters of international reassurance than of domestic legitimation. Combined, this dualism indicates that **China’s discursive strategy is bifurcated along two interlinked planes: externally, for**

<sup>4</sup> Available at: <https://oversea.cnki.net/kvisual/article/center?language=EN>

## **Legitimizing the „peaceful rise” of the People's Republic of China. A Conceptual Analysis of Official Chinese Discourses and Trends in Academic Publication**

proliferating goodwill towards its rise among the world community, and **internally**, for consolidating ideological coherence and legitimacy among China's own academic and political echelons.

What we have is a bifurcated discursive strategy. On the one hand, China's official speeches to the outside world stress cooperation, responsibility and assurance, which help to build an image of China as a peaceful and constructive power. Phraseology such as “peaceful rise,” and a “shared future for mankind” seeks to soothe international nerves and legitimate China's emerging global role in the eyes of foreign publics. Inward-facing academic publishing, however, exposes a different orientation, of valorizing the themes of “soft power,” “cultural confidence,” and the institutionalization of “Xi Jinping Thought.” Through these narratives, ideological legitimacy is generated and national identity is reinforced. Together, this double image is a way of showing that China's discursive legitimation performs a two-way work, inside and out: telling the world that it is benign to reassure that it is benign, and domestically just reminding itself of the continuing power and attraction of its political and cultural model.

### **Conclusions**

In conclusion, this paper aimed to demonstrate that Chinese official discourse and academic publication function as two interlocking sites of legitimation. We identified an externally facing unity narrative of cooperation and reassurance organised around four themes, development, cooperation, security and shared future. In contrast, CNKI publication trends indicate an inward-looking orientation, featuring soft power, cultural confidence and Xi Jinping thought institutionalization. The findings are combined to suggest a two pronged legitimation strategy: externally to soothe international audiences around China's peaceful rise and internally to strengthen ideological commonality and cultural credibil

## Maria-Mădălina Bulancia

### Appendix 1. List of Chinese Official Discourses Analyzed

No.	Title	Date	Available at
1	<i>Full text of Xi Jinping's report at 19th CPC National Congress</i>	18/10/2017	
2	<i>Xi urges Inner Mongolia to pursue green development</i>	6/9/2023	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20230609/b7db4fe66d674641a2cf5745a99e26dc/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20230609/b7db4fe66d674641a2cf5745a99e26dc/c.html</a>
3	<i>Xi stresses solidarity of Chinese at home and abroad for national rejuvenation</i>	31/07/2022	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20220731/aa9d9b23b3804dbabf79d981b585d0a0/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20220731/aa9d9b23b3804dbabf79d981b585d0a0/c.html</a>
4	<i>Xi stresses forging strong sense of community for Chinese nation and promoting the high-quality development (...)</i>	29/10/2023	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20231029/cee1d7a28409444183d966887252bdd4/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20231029/cee1d7a28409444183d966887252bdd4/c.html</a>
5	<i>Xi stresses building Beautiful China</i>	19/07/2023	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20230718/2d45eb1630564bd3a189eecd8e724451/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20230718/2d45eb1630564bd3a189eecd8e724451/c.html</a>
6	<i>Xi speech at China-Central Asia Summit</i>	19/05/2023	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20230519/cc4d7aceacbb4465a71f3c27d728569b/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20230519/cc4d7aceacbb4465a71f3c27d728569b/c.html</a>
7	<i>Xi sends congratulatory letter to first Forum on Building up China</i>	8/06/2023	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20230608/37660f1ef22b4b05a50478503f01e2a6/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20230608/37660f1ef22b4b05a50478503f01e2a6/c.html</a>
8	<i>Xi makes instructions on work of public communication, culture, 2023-10-09</i>	9/10/2023	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20231009/fb43dc9b5b4546f5a473964f422b5eae/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20231009/fb43dc9b5b4546f5a473964f422b5eae/c.html</a>
9	<i>Xi Jinping's remarks at 13th BRICS Summit</i>	9/9/2021	<a href="http://en.cppcc.gov.cn/2021-09/10/c_659433.htm">http://en.cppcc.gov.cn/2021-09/10/c_659433.htm</a>
10	<i>Xi Jinping writes foreword to the Revitalization Library</i>	27/09/2022	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20220927/aaa2709c58934dfaec3052cdb984ca77/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20220927/aaa2709c58934dfaec3052cdb984ca77/c.html</a>
11	<i>Xi Jinping speech 20th national congress</i>	23/10/2022	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20221023/6088cccfb67c4e938e91d53f2050f47c/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20221023/6088cccfb67c4e938e91d53f2050f47c/c.html</a>
12	<i>Xi Jinping replies to letter from Beijing Normal University students</i>	8/9/2022	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20220908/e81164eb7ef1408895aa288c4a4242d2/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20220908/e81164eb7ef1408895aa288c4a4242d2/c.html</a>
13	<i>Xi Jinping at the welcoming banquet of the Olympic Winter Games Beijing 2022</i>	5/2/2022	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20220205/93c534dec7064aadaa31f391ffb778cd/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20220205/93c534dec7064aadaa31f391ffb778cd/c.html</a>
14	<i>Xi Jinping at the Virtual Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations Between China and Central Asian Countries</i>	25/01/2022	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20220125/3227dd74149e43bf89507f382e1451b4/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20220125/3227dd74149e43bf89507f382e1451b4/c.html</a>
15	<i>Xi hosts High-level Dialogue on Global Development</i>	24/06/2022	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20220624/b373551325e8468c976463eb9e33b9e7/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20220624/b373551325e8468c976463eb9e33b9e7/c.html</a>
16	<i>Xi Focus Xi addresses 3rd Paris Peace Forum</i>	12/11/2020	<a href="http://en.cidca.gov.cn/2020-11/13/c_563442.htm">http://en.cidca.gov.cn/2020-11/13/c_563442.htm</a>
17	<i>Xi calls on National Art Museum of China to develop itself into art venue that enjoys national</i>	23/05/2023	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20230523/318453de11604fff89e2d8712fb67673/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20230523/318453de11604fff89e2d8712fb67673/c.html</a>
18	<i>Xi calls on Communist Youth League to shoulder missions</i>	27/06/2023	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20230627/b09c99ae6bef463ab909610534c97810/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20230627/b09c99ae6bef463ab909610534c97810/c.html</a>
19	<i>Xi calls for more innovations in Party theories</i>	2/7/2023	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20230702/d9a9f9f6255f4cc796480289d8190e87/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20230702/d9a9f9f6255f4cc796480289d8190e87/c.html</a>
20	<i>Xi calls for efforts to pursue harmony between humanity and nature on Environment Day 2022</i>	6/6/2022	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20220606/52fe8db52ac148e2978b0b881bb9d144/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20220606/52fe8db52ac148e2978b0b881bb9d144/c.html</a>
21	<i>Xi calls for efforts to build modern Chinese civilization</i>	3/6/2023	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20230603/197012efecbf4a34992b6df61a05310c/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20230603/197012efecbf4a34992b6df61a05310c/c.html</a>

## Legitimizing the „peaceful rise” of the People's Republic of China. A Conceptual Analysis of Official Chinese Discourses and Trends in Academic Publication

22	<i>Xi calls for advancing study of Chinese civilization</i>	29/05/2022	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20220529/a6f4d37f3e90465e88922e611b6e3d4c/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20220529/a6f4d37f3e90465e88922e611b6e3d4c/c.html</a>
23	<i>Xi calls for accelerated efforts to build leading country in education</i>	30/05/2023	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20230530/fd324abc7d044e4aae0387990ac1ff1d/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20230530/fd324abc7d044e4aae0387990ac1ff1d/c.html</a>
24	<i>Summit of the 15th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity</i>	12/10/2021	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20211015/C99FC9846160000159DB7DF088B3DD60/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20211015/C99FC9846160000159DB7DF088B3DD60/c.html</a>
25	<i>Statement by Chinese Ambassador ZHANG Yishan at the 58th</i>	31/10/2003	<a href="http://un.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/chinaandun/socialhr/interreligious">http://un.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/chinaandun/socialhr/interreligious</a>
26	<i>Speech By President Xi Jinping At the United Nations Office at Geneva</i>	23/01/2017	<a href="http://iq.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zygx/201701/t20170123_2309166.htm">http://iq.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zygx/201701/t20170123_2309166.htm</a>
27	<i>Remarks by Xi Jinping at the APEC Informal Economic Leaders' Retreat</i>	16/07/2021	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20211015/C99FC9841C200001EC4D16E7A020106D/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20211015/C99FC9841C200001EC4D16E7A020106D/c.html</a>
28	<i>Remarks by H.E. Xi Jinping summit on climate 2021</i>	22/04/2021	<a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-04/22/c_139899289.htm">http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-04/22/c_139899289.htm</a>
29	<i>Remarks by H.E. Xi Jinping global health summit 2021 mai</i>	21/05/2021	<a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-05/21/c_139961512.htm">http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-05/21/c_139961512.htm</a>
30	<i>Remarks by Chinese President Xi Jinping at the BRICS-Africa Outreach and BRICS Plus Dialogue</i>	24/08/2023	<a href="http://en.cidca.gov.cn/2023-08/25/c_931796.htm">http://en.cidca.gov.cn/2023-08/25/c_931796.htm</a>
31	<i>Remarks by Chinese President Xi Jinping at the 15th BRICS Summit</i>	23/08/2023	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20230823/54dbd48e5e4f40f7bc2f15a1a7a3ab59/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20230823/54dbd48e5e4f40f7bc2f15a1a7a3ab59/c.html</a>
32	<i>Remarks by Chinese President Xi Jinping at the 14th BRICS Summit</i>	23/06/2022	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20220623/d001e1a37c0f40a8acf0e77070b8c256/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20220623/d001e1a37c0f40a8acf0e77070b8c256/c.html</a>
33	<i>President Xi voices confirmation in implementing Paris Agreement, improving global climate governance</i>	13/12/2020	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20211015/C99FC9854CC000014AC418004390E2B0/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20211015/C99FC9854CC000014AC418004390E2B0/c.html</a>
34	<i>President Xi Jinping addresses the General Debate of the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly</i>	29/09/2015	<a href="http://il.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/gdxw/201509/t20150930_1876030.htm">http://il.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/gdxw/201509/t20150930_1876030.htm</a>
35	<i>President of the People's Republic of China</i>	17/09/2021	<a href="http://jfm.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zgxw/202109/t20210917_10213883.htm">http://jfm.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zgxw/202109/t20210917_10213883.htm</a>
36	<i>Opening Ceremony of the Third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation 2023</i>	18/10/2023	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20231018/7bfc16ac51d443c6a7a00ce25c972104/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20231018/7bfc16ac51d443c6a7a00ce25c972104/c.html</a>
37	<i>new year address 2022 xi</i>	31/12/2021	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20211231/86de17bebbc1423e824f21fcf9e928be/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20211231/86de17bebbc1423e824f21fcf9e928be/c.html</a>
38	<i>Keynote speech by President Xi Jinping at Extraordinary China-Africa Summit on Solidarity Against COVID-19</i>	18/06/2020	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20211015/C99FC98542300001A39D1CD01A601198/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20211015/C99FC98542300001A39D1CD01A601198/c.html</a>
39	<i>Keynote Speech by H</i>	3/9/2016	<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/topics_665678/2016zt/XJPCXBZCESGJTLDRD SYCFH">https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/topics_665678/2016zt/XJPCXBZCESGJTLDRD SYCFH</a>
40	<i>Jointly Shoulder Responsibility of Our Times</i>	17/01/2017	<a href="https://america.cgtn.com/2017/01/17/full-text-of-xi-jinping-keynote-at-the-world-economic-forum">https://america.cgtn.com/2017/01/17/full-text-of-xi-jinping-keynote-at-the-world-economic-forum</a>
41	<i>Full Text Remarks by Chinese President Xi Jinping at Climate Ambition Summit</i>	12/12/2020	<a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-12/12/c_139584803.htm">http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-12/12/c_139584803.htm</a>
42	<i>Full Text Remarks by Chinese President Xi Jinping at 12th BRICS Summit</i>	17/11/2020	<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/202011/t20201117_678932.html">https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/202011/t20201117_678932.html</a>
43	<i>Full text of Xi written speech at APEC CEO Summit</i>	18/11/2022	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20221118/51aa3b401dba4c72b1ccbb6896517250/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20221118/51aa3b401dba4c72b1ccbb6896517250/c.html</a>

## Maria-Mădălina Bulancia

44	<i>Full text of Xiat Session I of G20 summit in Bali</i>	15/11/2022	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20221115/323e30b92da9488daaa4781d748d3754/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20221115/323e30b92da9488daaa4781d748d3754/c.html</a>
45	<i>Full text of Xi Jinping's speech at Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics and Paralympics review and awards ceremony</i>	9/4/2022	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20220409/75923c661af74afbc6f67d6625b44877/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20220409/75923c661af74afbc6f67d6625b44877/c.html</a>
46	<i>Full text of Xi Jinping speech at China-Arab States Summit</i>	10/12/2022	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20221210/9c4e2500c7da4a6b84f1b57bfb64ef9/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20221210/9c4e2500c7da4a6b84f1b57bfb64ef9/c.html</a>
47	<i>Full text of Xi Jinping Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity</i>	16/12/2022	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20221216/c67723a3dec44ca8936bc1614034c066/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20221216/c67723a3dec44ca8936bc1614034c066/c.html</a>
48	<i>Full text of Xi Jinping</i>	14/08/2022	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20220814/d94f3d1f0d4b4f65aff2553139de54a3/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20220814/d94f3d1f0d4b4f65aff2553139de54a3/c.html</a>
49	<i>Full text of Xi congratulatory letter to first Forum on Building up China's Cultural Strength</i>	8/6/2023	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20230608/da4a7bec1da44e85af268aaf1458fae9/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20230608/da4a7bec1da44e85af268aaf1458fae9/c.html</a>
50	<i>Full text of Chinese president's speech at BRICS Business Forum in South Africa 2018</i>	25/07/2018	<a href="http://english.scio.gov.cn/featured/xigovernance/2018-07/26/content_57825940.htm">http://english.scio.gov.cn/featured/xigovernance/2018-07/26/content_57825940.htm</a>
51	<i>Full text of Chinese president's remarks at BRICS Brasilia Summit</i>	15/11/2019	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20211015/C99FC98534C00001EC4810A719D9D930/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20211015/C99FC98534C00001EC4810A719D9D930/c.html</a>
52	<i>Full text of Chinese President Xi's speech at 17th SCO summit</i>	9/6/2017	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20211015/C99FC98524E0000172D310801A495E30/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20211015/C99FC98524E0000172D310801A495E30/c.html</a>
53	<i>Full text of Chinese President Xi's address at APEC CEO Summit</i>	11/11/2017	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20211015/C99FC9852600000145FB1EC54DD81B67/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20211015/C99FC9852600000145FB1EC54DD81B67/c.html</a>
54	<i>discourse 8th FOCAC ministerial conference Xi</i>	29/11/2021	<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202111/t20211129_10458609.html">https://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202111/t20211129_10458609.html</a>
55	<i>congratulatory letter to forum on civilization and sinology</i>	4/7/2023	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20230704/69dfb928064b402aa3e44c1d93b38dae/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20230704/69dfb928064b402aa3e44c1d93b38dae/c.html</a>
56	<i>Concept Paper Global Security initiative</i>	21/02/2023	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/202302/t20230221_11028348.html">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/202302/t20230221_11028348.html</a>
57	<i>Chinese President Xi Jinping delivered a keynote address at the CPC in Dialogue with World Political Parties High BRICS Summit</i>	15/03/2023	<a href="http://english.scio.gov.cn/topnews/2023-03/16/content_85171478.htm">http://english.scio.gov.cn/topnews/2023-03/16/content_85171478.htm</a>
58		3/9/2017	<a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-09/03/c_136580184.htm">http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-09/03/c_136580184.htm</a>
59	<i>BRF(2023) Full text of Xi Jinping's keynote speech at 3rd Belt and Road Forum for Int'l Cooperation</i>	18/10/2023	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20231018/7bfc16ac51d443c6a7a00ce25c972104/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20231018/7bfc16ac51d443c6a7a00ce25c972104/c.html</a>
60	<i>At the 23rd Meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization xi</i>	4/7/2023	<a href="https://english.news.cn/20230704/c69c87e6ebcc4dfc8b20fe0c0880ea17/c.html">https://english.news.cn/20230704/c69c87e6ebcc4dfc8b20fe0c0880ea17/c.html</a>

## Legitimizing the „peaceful rise” of the People's Republic of China. A Conceptual Analysis of Official Chinese Discourses and Trends in Academic Publication

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