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STOIC POLITEIA REVISITED

José María ZAMORA CALVO¹

Abstract: *This article addresses a specific aspect of the political theory of the early Stoics: that of the criticism, or rather the authentic rejection, that the Republics of Zeno and Chrysippus direct to the Platonic conception of the ideal city. To this end, I will discuss a key passage from a skeptic of uncertain date called Cassius, transmitted by Diogenes Laertius (7, 32-33), where the question of the Zenonian Republic is posed sequentially from cynical assumptions in six capital points. The Stoic Politeia does not really intend to replace the cities existing in its days, but to build a universal and egalitarian republic compatible with the community of wise men.*

Keywords: *Zeno of Citium, Republic, Stoicism, Chrysippus, education for virtue, exercise.*

The early Stoics believed that the traditional political constitutions – monarchy, aristocracy, oligarchy and democracy – were bad, and preferred a kind of “mixture of all three”: “They [the Stoics] say that the best constitution is a combination (*miktên*) of democracy, monarchy and aristocracy” (D.L. 7, 131 = SVF 3, 700; LS67U). In comparison to the three classes of Plato’s *Republic*, Zeno’s *Politeia* lacks a dominant minority class of philosopher-kings, although it does not repudiate the notion of a “philosophical republic”.

Although the Stoic state does not differentiate between the classes, it does declare a preference for a monarchical system, in which sovereignty would devolve upon a wise and virtuous man, who would symbolise the rule of reason in the universe and guarantee a “well-organised society” run by a philosopher. However, as Muller (2006, 247-248) contends, it is by no means certain that the political ideas of the Stoics can be applied to a particular national context. In general terms, the Stoic wise man will live in accordance with the laws of his country and will adapt his actions in line

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with the specific circumstances, whether by involving himself in politics or distancing himself from it, as he must always place the best of himself at the service of humankind.

In his treatise titled *On the Fortune or the Virtue of Alexander*, Plutarch describes Zeno's dream (*onar*) of a single community, a single way of life and a single order for all men, governed by a single common law (*nomos koinos*).

“(1) The much admired *Republic* of Zeno [...] is aimed at this one main point, that our household arrangements should not be based on cities or Parishes, each one marked out by its own legal system, but we should regard all men as our fellow-citizens and local residents, and there should be one way of life and order, like that of a herd grazing together and nurtured by a common law (*nomôi koinôi*). (2) Zeno wrote this, picturing as it were a dream (*onar*) or image (*eidôlon*) of a philosopher's well-regulated society (*eidôlon eunomias philosophou*).” (Plutarch, *De Alexandri magni fortuna aut virtute*, 329a8-b5 = SVF 1, 262; LS67A; transl. Long and Sedley 1987, 429).

Zeno's republic would encompass all men and all of the cities, towns and villages in existence. Brunschwig and Pellegin (2001, 553, n. 1) interpret *philosophou* as an adjective denoting a “philosophical republic”, as opposed to the reading of Long and Sedley (1987, 429), which considers it to be a noun: “a philosopher's well-regulated society”. This Stoic “image” (*eidôlon*) of a government and a good philosophical *politeia* seems to suggest a theoretical model for a universal city, which Alexander put into practice (Plutarch, 329b4-5). Thus, Alexander's imperial ambitions brought to life the project of a common government that Zeno could only dream of or imagine.

The utopia of Zeno and Chrysippus, sketched out in the fragments that remain of their respective *Republics*, eschews the Platonic ideal of the tripartite city and instead proposes a “mixed” constitution that clearly differentiates between societies as they are in reality and society as it should be. In this respect, the “mixed” constitution is not built on the quality of its governors, who, as in Plato, are the only individuals who know the Good; rather, it is built on the fulfilment of a certain number of formal conditions: namely, an undifferentiated equilibrium, freedom, equality, the participation of all citizens and the free and mutual consent of all. The authority of reason is thereby guaranteed by the presence of common universal reason within each citizen. Consequently, unlike

specific laws and political regimes, the mixed constitution must imitate the universal city. The Stoic *politeia* is thus conceived along cosmopolitan lines.

Stoic cosmopolitanism implies the transposition into the moral sphere of the universal sympathy found in the natural sphere (cf. Coulmas 1990). The Stoics see the world as one large city ruled by physical laws and governed by *logos*, or common universal reason. Inasmuch as they partake of *logos* and live in the world, human beings are the citizens of this universal physical community (Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis*, 4, 26, 172 = SVF 3, 327; Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations*, 6, 44; Cicero, *De finibus*, 3, 62-69). As such, merely by virtue of being human, all men are each other's countrymen, and no one is foreign. Human beings all form part of one large family, in view of a natural interrelation derived from their shared partaking of a common rational nature that is connected to the idea of *oikeiôsis*. For the Stoics, the world is the common homeland of all men, and as such, all men are fellow citizens and dependent upon one another, like the constituent elements of a single organism (Cicero, *De officiis*, 3, 6, 28; 3, 17, 69; Hierocles, *Elementa Moralia*, 1, 1-4; 1, 31-47; 1, 49-2, 31; 2, 33-45; 3, 19-27; 3, 46-51; Stobaeus, *Eclogae*, 4, 671, 7-673, 11). Stoic cosmopolitanism derives from the rational nature of man, which connects him to his fellow citizens beyond the borders that delimit communities and nations. For the Stoics, no one is alone: rather, everyone forms part of a Whole, which is thus formed of the totality of all men and the totality of the cosmos (cf. Schofield 1991, 93; 141-145).

This theory of a universal egalitarian republic is compatible with the notion of a community of the wise, as the Stoic *politeia* does not aim to replace the cities that are in existence at any given moment; rather, it aims to develop a "utopia" in opposition to Plato's "ideal city" in accordance with the Cynic approach of Diogenes, thereby questioning the laws and regulations that govern traditional cities: "the wise man alone is free, and every fool is a slave" (D.L. 7, 121).

The Stoic theory of action puts forward a radical thesis that, moreover, arouses indignation in its opponents: namely, only that which has moral value is good (*monon to kalonagathon*) (D.L. 7, 101; Plutarch, *De Stoicorum repugnantibus*, 1038d; SVF 3, 26). In a political sense, this thesis means that only those who are "excellent" or "virtuous" can be citizens.

In our discussion, we explore the idea that to be a citizen of the Stoic *polis*, one must be virtuous, i.e. one must know the theory and *praxis* of the things that must be done, the things that must not be done, and the things

that make no difference (Arius Didymus, *Epitome of Stoic Ethics*, 5b1 = BS 26.26; SVF 3, 262; LS 61H; Arius Didymus, *Epitome*, 5b5 = BS26.15; SVF 3, 280; LS 61D). However, unlike Plato and Aristotle, the limitations imposed by the fragmentary nature of the Stoics' texts makes it very difficult to establish with any accuracy the details of their political theory and its implications for the subject that concerns us: namely, the *politeia* of the Stoa.

Zeno (334/333-262/261 BCE) was born in the Phoenician city of Citium, on the island of Cyprus. Around the year 312 he arrived in Athens, where he dedicated himself to the study of philosophy and founded the Stoic school (cf. Steinmetz 1994a; Forschner 1996). Zeno's political ideas are linked to those of Plato, and he may have drawn inspiration, at least in part, from certain aspects of Plato's *Republic*. We should not overlook the fact that the word *politeia*, which is traditionally translated as "republic", can also mean "constitution" or "regime" in Greek. Like Plato, Zeno wrote a text titled *Politeia*, of which only a few fragments have survived. Plutarch considered this work to be a direct attack on Plato's *Republic* (Plutarch, 1034e = SVF 1, 260). Cleanthes (331/330-230/229 BCE) also wrote a series of works on the subject: *Politics*, *Laws* and *Monarchy*; while Chrysippus (281/277-208/204 BCE), the third scholarch of the Stoa, wrote a treatise titled *On the Republic* (cf. Steinmetz 1994b). However, as we shall see, a number of Cynic traits that were adopted by the Stoics, such as the acceptance of incest, cannibalism, sexual freedom, the removal of the courts and temples, etc. distanced them from the members of the Academy with regard to certain central tenets of their conception of the ideal city, as described in the fragments of their works that have survived. Consequently, at first glance it seems as though certain aspects of the "Zenonian" *Politeia* are clearly related to Cynicism, and therefore stand apart from the Platonic model.

Although Stoic political philosophy began as an implicit dialogue with Plato (Schofield 1999a, 22-56), the two theories move in opposite directions, to the point at which the Stoic "utopia" can be considered a counterpoint to the Platonic concept of the "ideal city". Although Plato was always on the radar of the Stoics, their foremost point of reference was Socrates, rather than Plato (or more specifically the Platonic Socrates) (cf. Boeri and Salles 2014, 744-745). Indeed, we can identify the "Socratic" traits of Stoic political theory inherited from the "Cynic asceticism" (Goulet-Cazé 2001 [1986]), which the Stoics incorporated into their approach. According to Epicurus, whose testimony comes to us through Diogenes Laertius, Zeno's pupils were initially known as "Zenonians" before later acquiring the name

“Stoics” in reference to the “painted porch” (*stoa poikilê*, or portico of Attalus) in the Agora at Athens, where Zeno gave his lessons. Zeno’s teacher was Crates, and although the Cynics always claimed to be a Socratic school, the “Cynic Socrates” did not always coincide with the “Platonic Socrates”.

Since the days of antiquity, the *Politeia* has been among Zeno’s best-known and most frequently cited works. The majority of the surviving fragments and testimonies of this work are from Diogenes Laertius (D.L. 6, 15; D.L. 7, 4 = SVF 1, 2; D.L. 7, 32-34 = SVF 1, 222, 226, 257, 259, 267, 268, 269; D.L. 7, 121 = SVF 1, 270; D.L. 7, 129 = SVF 1, 248; D.L. 7, 131 = SVF 1, 269), Philodemus (*On the Stoics*, 2, 9, 1-12, 20; 4, 14, 4-15; 5-6, 15, 1-16; 6, 17, 4-10; 7-8, 18, 1-21, 18; *Stoicorum Historia*, 4 = SVF 1, 42) and Plutarch (*Lycurgus*, 31, 1, 1-2, 59a = SVF 1, 263; *De Alexandri Magni Fortuna aut Virtute*, 329a-b = SVF 1, 262; *Quaestiones convivales*, 3, 6, 1, 653e = SVF 1, 252; *De Stoicorum repugnantis*, 2, 1033b = SVF 1, 262; 6, 1034b = SVF 1, 264; 8, 1034e = SVF 1, 260), in addition to a number of Christian writers and theologians such as John Chrysostom (*Homiliae in Evangelium S. Matthaei*, 1, 4, 9 = SVF 1, 262), Clement of Alexandria (*Stromateis*, 5, 12, 76 = SVF 1, 264) and Origen of Alexandria (*Contra Celsum*, 1, 5, 59, 3 = SVF 1, 265): the latter group criticised and reproached Zeno for incorporating into his thought a series of concepts they considered immodest, scandalous, and incompatible with a rigorous and austere set of ethics. Such concepts were also defended by later members of the Stoic school. For Solana Dueso (2015), in Stoic political theory there is a marked opposition between the “abstract and utopian” *Politeia* of Zeno, which contains the seeds of distinct modes of thought that (probably) first materialised themselves in Persaios of Kition (born ca. 300 BCE) and Sphaerus (a student of Zeno), then in Diogenes of Babylon (230-ca.150/140 BCE) and Antipater of Tarsus (d. 130/129 BCE), and finally in Panaetius (d. 110/09 BCE) and Blossius (a student of Antipater). The clear defence of its authenticity mounted by Chrysippus removes any suspicion of a false attribution to the founder of the Stoic school: “That the *Republic* is the work of Zeno is confirmed by Chrysippus in his work *On the Republic*” (D.L. 7, 34 = SVF 3, 203; transl. Mensch 2018,756).

The rhetor Isidore of Pergamon tells of how Athenodorus of Tarsus (1st c. BCE), more commonly known as Athenodorus Cordylion, the Stoic keeper of the library at Pergamon, tried to remove “inconvenient passages” from Stoic treatises; these texts were subsequently returned to the works from which they had been expurgated (Follet 1994). These lurid passages

undoubtedly included some of the key fragments of Zeno's *Republic*, which he wrote, as the contemporary saying went, "on the tail of a dog" (D.L. 7, 4, cf. Plutarch, *De Stoicorum repugnantiis*, 1, 1033d; Solana Dueso 2015, 76, n. 1; Bees 2011, 7), i.e. under the Cynic influence to which he was exposed during the latter period – the "tail" – of his education with Crates (cf. Goulet-Cazé 2003). However, although Zeno's work is thought to share a number of Cynic traits, if we refer to the testimony of Philodemus we will discover that Zeno's *Republic* contains elements that are characteristic of, and particular to, the Stoic tradition (cf. Husson 2011). The key content of Diogenes's *Politeia* was incorporated by the Epicurean philosopher Philodemus of Gadara (1st c. BCE) into his work titled *On the Stoics*, fragments of which – accompanied by an extensive and documented commentary – were published by Dorandi (1982; cf. Dawson 1992, 111-159; Dorandi 1993).

A passage included by Diogenes Laertius in Book VII of his *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* (3rd c. CE) constitutes the most complete basis for a reconstruction of some of the key tenets of Zeno's *Republic* (Schofield 1999a, 3-21; 1999b, 67-76). Nearly all of the annotated material is from the quill of Skeptic Cassius (ca. 1st c. BCE-1st c. CE), who was the personal physician to the emperor Tiberius and a student of the Empiric school (Goulet-Cazé 2003, 40-41). In fact, we may consider Cassius, along with Isidore, as the main source of the "scandalous" material included by Diogenes Laertius in this passage (cf. D.L. 7, 34; Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrrhonianae hypotyposesis*, 3, 245-246 = *SVF* 1, 250; 1, 256; Hahn 1992, 4131-4135).

"There are some, however, including Cassius the Skeptic and his circle, who denounce Zeno on many grounds. They say, first of all, that he declared, at the beginning of his *Republic*, that general education (*egkuklion paideian*) is useless; and secondly, that all persons who are not good are enemies, foes, slaves, and alien to one another: parents to children, brothers to brothers, and kinsmen to kinsmen. Again, in the *Republic*, he claims that only the good are citizens, friends, kinsmen, and free, so that for the Stoics parents and children are enemies, since they are not wise. Also in the *Republic* he holds that wives should be held in common (*koinas*), and at <line> two hundred prohibits the building of temples, law courts, and gymnasia in cities. As for money, he writes as follows: 'We do not think money should be created, either for exchange or for traveling abroad.' He also commands men and women to wear the same clothes and to keep no part of the body entirely hidden." (D.L. 7, 32-33 = *SVF* 1, 226; LS 67B; BS 30.12; transl. Mensch 2018, 755-756).

Although many of the themes in Zeno's *Republic* are Platonic, his treatment of them tends notably towards the ideas espoused by the Cynics (Schofield 1999a, 757-758). However, it is difficult to demonstrate whether Zeno did indeed write his *Republic* as an alternative to Plato's work of the same name. The general themes that are explored in the Stoic text are not always clearly indicated, as the material that has survived to the present day is somewhat disjointed. Nonetheless, we can state that the aim of Zeno's work, which was written on a single roll of papyrus ("around 200 'lines'"), centres on the following six key points:

(1) Convention education is useless, and only the wise can form a political community. Zeno replaced the education-oriented study cycle of the Greek *paideia* with a training or exercise (*askêsis*)-based programme inherited from the Cynics, which he saw as the only true means of accessing virtue (D.L. 7, 104; cf. Goulet-Cazé 1986, 22-24; Laurand 2005, 60-62). Effectively, the Cynics rejected so-called "general knowledge" (*egkuklia mathêmata*): music, geometry, astronomy and other related subjects, they believed, did not help anyone to lead a good life (D.L. 6, 73; 6, 103-104; Rijk 1965). From the Stoic perspective, conventional education may act as an obstacle to the ability to access virtue in the correct manner. However, despite Zeno's arguments, Chrysippus later acknowledged the usefulness of these "conventional" or "general" studies (D.L. 7, 129). Indeed, according to the testimony of Diogenes Laertius, for Antisthenes (who was considered the predecessor of the Cynics), "that virtue is a matter of deeds (*tôn ergôn*) and requires no abundance of words (*logôn*) or learning (*mathêmatôn*)." (D.L. 6, 11; transl. Mensch 2018, 624; cf. D.L. 6,7; 7, 21).

(2) Only citizens, friends, relatives and free men are virtuous: therefore, those who are not virtuous are "abhorrent", "enemies", "slaves" and "estranged from one another". From the very beginning of the school founded by Zeno, whose ideas were adopted by the majority of Stoics – including Cleanthes, the second scholarch – up until Chrysippus, the movement's followers exalted the figure of the wise (*sophos*), virtuous (*spoudaios*), civilised (*asteios*), prudent man (*phronimos*), whom they placed in opposition to the foolish, despicable or contemptible (*phauloi*) (Arius Didymus, *Epitome*, 11g; BS 30.17). The Stoics contended that participation in political life was an appropriate activity for the wise (D.L. 6, 12): however, this commitment to politics did not mean an unconditional acceptance of positive political norms, as these would be placed within the category of "indifferents" (Husson 2009, 128-129). Thus, for Zeno, the

majority of the rules that governed society during his time were what he considered “dispreferred indifferents”. Consequently, all those who were not virtuous, i.e. those he dubbed “abhorrent”, “enemies”, “slaves” and “estranged from one another” were entirely incapable of building a genuine community of citizens (Philodemus, *On the Stoics*, 20, 4-24).

(3) Women are to be shared. This thesis is demonstrably Platonic (*Republic*, 5, 457c-d), although it was also upheld by Diogenes of Sinope, also known as Diogenes “the Dog” (*ho kuôn*) or “the Cynic” (*ho kunikos*) (D.L. 6, 72). “They hold that wives should be held in common (*koinas*) among the wise, so that anyone might have intercourse with any woman, as Zeno says in the *Republic* and Chrysippus in *On the Republic*, as well as Diogenes the Cynic and Plato.” (D.L. 7, 131; transl. Mensch 2018, 824). However, even if the concept of adultery was abolished, marriage was still permitted, although this had to remain compatible with the thesis that women and children were “shared”, or held in common (D.L. 7, 121; 7, 3; Philodemus, *On the Stoics*, 18, 17-18). Likewise, the Stoics permitted incest and freedom of sexual relations, as well as the use of force in sexual relations, and allowed women to instigate sexual encounters (Philodemus, 18, 20-26).

In contrast to conventional marriage, the purpose of which was procreation, sexual relations between adults had no relevance from a purely moral perspective. Such relations, which were based on mutual consent and designed to achieve sexual satisfaction, could be heterosexual or homosexual in nature and engaged in with both adolescents and adults (*SVF* 3, 743-756). Incest, like that between Jocasta and Oedipus (*SVF* 1, 256), was not considered morally reprehensible (Philodemus, 16, 29-17, 4). “And in his work *On the Republic* he [Chrysippus] says that one can have intercourse with one’s mother, one’s daughters, and one’s sons. He says the same thing right at the beginning of his work *On Things Not Worth Choosing for Their Own Sake*.” (D.L. 7, 189; transl. Mensch 2018, 824; *SVF* 3, 744; cf. Origen, *Contra Celsum*, 4, 45, 16-33). All of the possible permutations were permitted within the context of the family: there was no condemnation of sexual relations with one’s sisters, mother or other female relatives, or even with one’s brothers or sons (Philodemus, 18, 20-23).

In the Stoic city, love is free (Philodemus, 19, 5-12): no one is married and no one is single, strictly speaking, as the concept of “sexual communality” predominates and sexual relations do not imply the existence of matrimonial bonds. In this respect, as in the Cynic city built in accordance

with the laws of nature, there are no slaves, as there is no social stratification (Philodemus, 19, 6-13; cf. López Cruces 2017, 558). Further to the above, there exists a valuable testimony in which Zeno roundly opposes the notion of adultery, based on the argument that, if a rational married man sleeps with a woman who is legally married to another man, this would break up the woman's (or more specifically, her husband's) family and go against both society and nature (Origen, *Contra Celsum*, 7, 63, 12-18; *SVF* 3, 729). As such, it would be difficult to defend adultery in the Stoic city (cf. Bees 2011, 142-148), given that adultery would destroy the principles of friendship (*philia*) and concord (*homonoia*) that had to preside over the republic, according to Zeno, and would go against both community (*koinônia*) and nature (*phusis*) (cf. Boeri and Salles 2014, 747). But how could it be possible for Stoic wise men, the only true citizens, to commit adultery if they believed women should be shared? As in Plato, but also in contrast to Plato, sexual freedom entailed the "sharing" of women and children (D.L. 6, 72; Philodemus, 18, 17-18). Adopting an even more radical perspective than the guardians of Plato's *Republic*, the Stoic view of women and children, in line with the Cynics' approach, was based on the notion of an ascetic community that rejected the conventional practices of the Athenian society of the time and proposed the elimination of gender-based discrimination. In Zeno's *Republic* there is no class-based distinction, i.e. no differentiation between rulers, guardians and producers: rather, there is a complete absence of difference, and "no minority ruling class" (Long and Sedley 1987, 435). Moreover, as children are "shared" or held in common, there is no private property, as everything belongs to everyone. To build the Stoic city, Zeno suggests, one should eschew notions of kinship and social position and instead return to nature, seeking freedom and self-sufficiency through the exercising of virtue.

(4) In the cities there should be no temples, courts or gymnasiums. This theory, which proposes the dissolution of religious, legal and educational/training-oriented institutions, may be interpreted as the Zenonian version of the Platonic idea that there should be no litigation between guardians, and therefore the court system can be eliminated (cf. Schofield 1999a, 757-758). Nor does the city need to be beautified with temples and monuments: rather, it should be embellished by the virtues of its inhabitants, given that no monument is a creation worthy of the gods. "It is a doctrine of Zeno's not to build temples of the gods (*hieratheôn*); for a temple not worth much is also not sacred, and nothing made by builders or

workmen is worth much.” (Plutarch, *De Stoicorum repugnantiis*, 1034b =SVF 1, 264; LS 67C; transl. Long and Sedley 1987, 430; cf. SVF 1, 265). Notwithstanding the above, from another perspective the prohibition on the building of temples, courts and gymnasiums could also be interpreted as a reaction, on the part of the Stoic Zeno, against certain recommendations made by Plato in the *Laws* (755a; 771a; 778c; cf. Chroust 1965, 179, n. 22).

(5) Money must be abolished, as it serves no purpose either for exchange or for travel. This thesis is related to the maxim of Diogenes the Cynic and his “counterfeiting of money” (*paracharattein*) (D.L. 6, 20, 21, 56, 71), a practice which, as well as denoting the opposition between *nomos* and *phusis*, also takes on a symbolic meaning for the Cynic movement (cf. Goulet-Cazé 1992; 1999, 703-704, n. 5; Casadesús Bordoy 2007): Diogenes counterfeited not only the morality, but also the religious, political and even philosophical institutions of his time. Consequently, he proposed the counterfeiting of the customs – *nomisma* means both “money” and “traditions” – as well as the values of the city, in order to replace them with new ones. Thus, as an alternative to commerce based on monetary exchange, the Cynics suggested that knuckle bones (literally bones from sheep and goats) be used instead (Philodemus, 16, 4-9).

A significant element of Stoicism involves the attempt to tame the Cynicism-inspired proposals put forward by Diogenes, who enables the chain of teachers and pupils to be traced from the Stoa all the way to the agora of Socrates. For Goulet-Cazé (2001, 212), the practice of Cynicism is characterised by “a bodily asceticism with a spiritual purpose”. Effectively, Diogenes’s “rhetoric of the body”, which served as the cornerstone of the “invention” of Cynicism, was based on debasing the currency of the time (cf. Branham 1994).

(6) Men and women must wear the same clothes and display their naked bodies (Philodemus, 19, 12-14 and 17-22). This *theoria* refers to the famous threadbare robes (*tribôn*) of the Cynics. According to Antipater of Sidon, Hipparchia of Maroneia (*fl. ca.* 336 BCE), the wife of Crates, renounced the external accoutrements that typified conventional women and chose to adopt the characteristic robe and sack of the Cynics (*Anthologia Palatina*, 7, 413; cf. Zamora Calvo 2018). She also distanced herself entirely from the activities that were traditionally assigned to women in Ancient Greece (D.L. 6, 97), thereby demonstrating her capacity and standing as a female

philosopher who preferred to dedicate herself to education and intellectual pursuits instead of working a loom (D.L. 6, 98).

In terms of social roles and division of labour, the Stoic *Politeia* advocated equality between men and women. The Stoics believed that women should perform the same activities as men (Philodemus, 19, 13-17), and should have the same freedom to instigate sexual relations. Indeed, within the Stoa, Eros performed a political function. Athenaeus states that, according to Poncianus, Zeno believed Eros was a god of friendship that played a preparatory role for the achievement of concord. "Poncianus said that Zeno of Citium regarded Eros as god of friendship and freedom (*philiai kai eleutherias*), and the provider in addition of concord (*homonoias*), but of nothing else. Hence in the *Republic* Zeno said: 'Eros is a god which contributes to the city's security (*sôtêrian*).'" (Athenaeus, *Deipno sophistae*, 561c = SVF 1, 263; BS 30.33; LS 67D; transl. Long and Sedley 1987, 430).

The *Politeia* that Zeno designed, on a foundation of Cynic principles and centred on a philosophy of bodily asceticism, corresponds to a kind of "anti-city" (López Cruces 2017, 547). Moreover, Zeno took from the Cynics (specifically Antisthenes) the thesis that true friendship and reciprocal understanding can only be forged between those who are virtuous or wise (D.L. 6, 12). Cassius the Skeptic and some of the others in his circle criticised Zeno on the basis that, if only the virtuous can be considered citizens, then parents, children, friends and relatives must all be one another's enemies, owing to the fact that they are not wise, or at least they are not necessarily wise (D.L. 7, 187-189; Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus mathematicos*, 11, 190-194; *Pyrrhonianae hypotyposesis*, 3, 245-248; cf. Schofield 1991, 3-21; Goulet 1999, 811, n. 5). Only those who are virtuous are capable of establishing social relationships in the strictest sense. Viewed from this perspective, social relationships presuppose a state of harmony with one's fellow human beings; however, for this to be possible, one must possess a correctly developed rationality, which will then enable the forging of genuine relationships of friendship (*philia*) and concord (*homonoia*), which themselves constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for the creation of an authentic political community of a philosophical nature. Therefore, only the virtuous are citizens of the Stoic *politeia*, as only they are able to form and maintain a genuine community (*koinônia*) in which the interests of the individual are no different to the interests of the collective.

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HUMAN MANTIC ART AND DIVINE MANTIC ART. IAMBlichus' CRITICISM ON DIVINATION COMMON FORMS

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Abstract: *Concerned with an ethical and ontological model of man aimed at his fulfilment in divine perfection, Iamblichus criticizes the principal human forms of divination, in order to describe, as opposed to them, the authentic form of divination, namely sacred or divine divination. Its principle is the following: the knowledge of the cause and essence of becoming leads us to the knowledge of the future. The ability to make predictions about the future is only granted to the gods, because they have a universal knowledge, but the gods offer their power to men that are capable to participate in the divine. This sacred divination occurs only in theurgy, which ultimate goal is the union of the theurgist with divinity, and the authentic divination is the crowning of the theurgy.*

Keywords: *human divination, sacred divination, signs of the gods, natural intuition, divine enthusiasm, divine dreams, theophoria, divination by oracles, divination by light, theurgy.*

I. Introductory Remarks

The future has always exercised undeniable fascination on people who have developed in time many ways trying to know what is going to happen before it really happened. Particularly, antiquity seems to be the time when the means of predicting future varied a lot and enjoyed high appreciation not only in ordinary life, but also in the state one, determining the latter to confer them an institutionalized status. As it concerns the Greco-Roman philosophers, have not paid any attention to divinatory practices for quite a long time since they did not believe that they are closely linked to philosophy. The exception was made by the Stoics, due to their view on destiny (lat. *fatum*, gr. *εἰμαρμένη*), who believed in a universal determinism whose mechanism could be known through various divinatory practices. Still, Cicero in his book *De divination*, clearly argued against.

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Yet, the context has changed dramatically starting with the first centuries after Christ, when the influence of the Oriental religions has become so powerful throughout the Roman Empire and when philosophers became irresistibly attracted by the opportunity to combine reason with the irrational in their thinking. Those who have illustrated this tendency greatly in their works were the Neo-Platonic philosophers after Plotinus, starting with Porphyry, and especially Iamblichus.

The latter, in *The Mysteries of Egypt* (gr. *Περὶ τῶν αἰγυπτίων μυστηρίων*, lat. *De mysteriis*)² strives to systematically reject the doubts which Porphyry expressed in the *Letter to Anébon* on the ritualistic cult of gods as a way to raise the soul to divine. Iamblichus' purpose is to justify theurgy (gr. *θεουργία*) from a philosophical point of view and means, being conceived as a complex system made out of a set of practices based on a divine and very accurate science, as a high level of spirituality (acquired in a philosophical manner), and as an exemplary ethical behaviour. In this context, Iamblichus states that the highest practice, crowning theurgy by enabling it to reach its end, is the art of divination (gr. *μαντική τέχνη*).

In order to give credibility to this very special status of divination he had to reverse the usual conception of the nature of divination and criticize the way it was practiced in most of its traditional forms. Thus, Iamblichus argues that there are two types of mantic (gr. *μαντεία* or *ἡ μαντική*) or divination (lat. *divinatio*): one is human and the other one is divine.

II. Human mantic

Human mantic (*ἀνθρώπινα μαντεία*) knows many forms, which abut to the various results in the efforts to know (*πρόγνωσις*) the future (*τὸ μέλλον*). In his book, Iamblichus does not illustrate all these forms, but only the most important or most common, those that express their main categories. The first category is represented by the observation of the entrails of sacrificed animals (*ἱεροσκοπία*), the flight of birds (*ὄρνιθομαντεία*) and the movements of celestial bodies (*ἀστρομαντεία*). To all these practices, Iamblichus confers a certain type of credibility,

² The full title of Iamblichus' book, established by Marsilio Ficino in the XVth century, is the following: *De mysteriis Aegyptiorum Chaldaeorum Assyriorum*.

since he managed to establish a connection between them and the divine will (*βούλησις*).

For example, the examination of entrails sometimes reveals a lack of various internal parts of the body without which life (*ζωή*) is not possible; the flight of birds, and particularly their strange behaviour are mainly directed by gods (*θεοί*); at last, star movements are entirely subordinated to the will of gods, and men can interpret them if they pay enough attention to the sky (*οὐρανός*), and thus guess some of the future events.

The general explanation for all this success of human divination is that gods use all natural phenomena and all beings (*τὰ ὄντα*) that live on land send signs (*σημεῖα*) to men helping them figure out in a greater or lesser degree of probability the future. The divine signs are everywhere (*περὶ πάντα τὸν κόσμον*), not only in the three types of objects mentioned above, but even in the most simple and humble things of the world, as "little pebbles, rods, or certain woods, stones, wheat, and barley meal"³, thus, expressing any other ways in which human mantic can be exercised.

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...the mode of divination, accomplished by human skill (...) uses certain divine signs that have been perfected by the gods in various ways. From divine signs, in virtue of the relationship of things to the signs shown, the technique somehow draws conclusions and guesses at the divination, inferring it from certain probabilities. The gods produce the signs by means of nature, which is subservient to them for the creation of each thing, both universal and particular, or through the agency of daemons concerned with creation, who, presiding over the elements of the universe and individual bodies, indeed over all living being in the cosmos, guide the phenomena with ease in a manner pleasing to the gods. They reveal through symbols the purpose of the gods, even giving advance notice of the future. (tr. Clarke, Dillon, Hershbell)⁴

...τέχνης ἀνθρωπίνῃ ἐπιτελούμενον τρόπον (...) σημείοις τισὶ τοῦτο θείοις χρῆται ἐκ θεῶν ἐπιτελουμένοις κατὰ ποικίλους. Ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν θείων τεκμηρίων κατὰ τὴν συγγένειαν τῶν πραγμάτων πρὸς τὰ δεικνύμενα σημεία συμβάλλει πως ἢ τέχνη καὶ στοχάζεται τὴν μαντείαν, ἐξ εἰκότων τινῶν αὐτὴν

³ Clarke, E.C., Dillon, J., Hershbell, J., ed. and trans. 2003. Iamblichus, *De Mysteriis*. III 17. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature. 163.

⁴ Clarke (2003) 157.

συλλογιζομένη. Τὰ μὲν οὖν σημεῖα οἱ θεοὶ ποιοῦσι διὰ τῆς φύσεως τῆς δουλευούσης αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν, τῆς τε κοινῆς καὶ τῆς ἰδίας ἐκάστων, ἢ διὰ τῶν γενεσιουργῶν δαιμόνων οἵτινες τοῖς στοιχείοις τοῦ παντός καὶ τοῖς μερικοῖς σώμασι ζώοις τε καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ πᾶσιν ἐπιβεβηκότες ἄγουσι τὰ φαινόμενα μετὰ ῥαστώνης ὅπηπερ ἂν δοκῆ τεοῖς. Συμβολικῶς δὲ τὴν γνώμην τοῦ θεοῦ ἐμφαίνουσι, καὶ τὴν τοῦ μέλλοντος προδήλωσιν. (135.1 – 136.2)

This type of mantic that uses the signs of gods, perceived by various intermediaries, can get more or less significant results based on the human ability to interpret the signs or symbols (*σύμβολα*), without reaching yet this way, real knowledge (*γνώσις*), the only one that guarantees a correct prediction (*ἀψευδής*), doubtless, of the future. But it expresses the best performance that can reach the human mantic. All the others that appeal exclusively to men's mental and intellectual faculties most get to relative, uncertain, doubtful, if not false and mystifying results. For example, there is a human science to predict the future in the art of navigation (*κυβερνητική τέχνη*) and medicine (*ιατρική τέχνη*) of which specialists can anticipate the evolution of the uncertain period of illness (*νόσημα*) or cure, given the fact that they make analogies and inferences in the light of the knowledge given by their profession and their previous experience. We will not interpret the signs of gods below, but only "read" the signs of nature (*φύσις*) or the body (*σῶμα*) and these predictions are always quite problematic, since they are not based on real knowledge, of their causes (*αἰτίαι*).

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Hence, not even if there is, in the arts and crafts (for example, in piloting a ship, or medicine), some degree of knowledge that grasps the future, it is not at all like divine foreknowledge. For the former calculates the future from probabilities and estimates by certain signs, and these are not always trustworthy, nor, in like manner, do they have what is signified properly connected with that of which the signs are evidence. But divine foreknowledge of future events is directed by a firm knowledge, and an unshakeable assurance deriving from the causes, an indissoluble comprehension connecting all things to all, and in the same manner, a power of an always abiding discernment of all things as present and determinate. (tr. Clarke, Dillon, Hershbell)⁵

...ὄθεν δὴ οὐδ' εἴ τις ἐστὶν ἐν ταῖς τέχναις, ὥσπερ ἐν κυβερνητικῇ τε καὶ ἱατρικῇ, προσκοποῦσα τὸ μέλλον μάθησις, οὐδὲν προσήκει τῇ θείᾳ προγνώσει·

⁵ Clarke (2003) 185.

ἐξ εἰκότων γὰρ ἀναλογίζεται τὸ μέλλον καὶ σημείοις τισὶ τεκμηριοῦται καὶ τούτοις οὐκ ἀεὶ πιστοῖς οὐδ' ὡσαύτως συνηρημένον ἔχουσι τὸ δηλούμενον, οὐπὲρ ἐστὶ τὰ σημεία δείγματα. Της δὴ θείας προνοίας τῶν ἐσομένων βέβαιος ἡ εἶδησις προηγείται, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν αἰτίων ἀμετάπτωτος ἢ πίστωσις, συνηρημένη τε πάντων πρὸς ἅπαντα ἀδιαλύτως κατάληψις, καὶ ὡσαύτως ἀεὶ μένουσα τῶν ὄλων ὥσπερ παρόντων καὶ ὄρισμένων διάγνωσις. (163.9 – 164.4)

Another humane method to know the future events is natural intuition (*ἐπιβολή*), which is a special quality innate to some individuals. This is, in fact, a premonition or a presentiment related to natural perception of animals which, due to the acuity of their senses, can feel the changes that take place elsewhere of their place but that will produce soon the effects there.⁶ In any case, these premonitions do not express the human capacity to grasp the supposedly universal sympathy of things (*συμπάθεια τοῦ παντός*) that would allow them to send information between them. At most, they can seize in a dark way and by chance, signs or images of divine knowledge from which they borrow most of their divinatory performance. But these premonitions are blind, without precision and random, since the interpretation they give to the divine signs is confusing and thus reaches only some simulacra of the truth (*φαντάσματα τοῦ ἀληθοῦς*).⁷

It is therefore possible to achieve a human divination (*τὸ μέλλον μάθησις*), based on intuition, analogy (*ἀναλογία*) and probability, on the capacity to evaluate, estimation and deduction from a given situation and using various knowledge obtained above, but it has no precision.

Still, despite their great imperfections, these forms of human mantic mentioned above are able to anticipate to a certain degree future events. But there are others which mislead people by offering them false forecasts. They have no real cognitive basis but they are misleading and entirely harmful. Iamblichus asserts that they are “falsehoods” (*ψευδολογίαι*) made by impostors, who want to convince us that they are into relations with the gods, but are not able to learn and practice the art of contact with them, that is theurgy.

DM. III, 13

However, because of those who put it to bad use, it is not easy to do justice to this form of divination in a single account. But that which is readily accessible

⁶ Clarke (2003) 185. Iamblichus, *DM. III*, 26.

⁷ Clarke (2003) 185-187. Iamblichus, *DM. III*, 27.

and widespread among the vulgar throng, employing falsehood and deceit of an intolerable nature, enjoys the presence of no god, but produces a certain motion of the soul, contrary to the gods, and draws from them an indistinct and phantom-like appearance which sometimes, because of the feebleness of its power, is likely to be disturbed by evil daemonic influences. (...) For there are some who overlook the whole procedure of effective contemplation, both in regard to the one who makes an invocation and the one who enjoys the vision; and they disdain the order of the sacred observance, its holiness and long-protracted endurance of toils, and, rejecting the customs, prayers and other rituals, they believe the simple standing on the characters to be sufficient, and when they have done this for a mere hour, they believe that they have caused some spirit to enter. And yet how could anything noble or perfect result from this? (tr. Clarke, Dillon, Hershbell)⁸

Τοῦτο τοίνυν διὰ τοὺς κακῶς αὐτῶ χρωμένους οὐ ῥάδιον ἐν ἐνὶ λόγῳ περιλαβεῖν. Ἄλλὰ τὸ μὲν πρόχειρον καὶ κακῶς ἐπιπολάζον ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις ψευδολογία τε καὶ ἀπάτη χρώμενον οὐκ ἀνεκτῆ, οὐδ' ὅλως ἔχει τινὸς θεοῦ παρουσίαν, κίνησιν δέ τινα τῆς ψυχῆς ποιεῖται παρὰ τοὺς θεούς, καὶ ἀμυδρὰν τινα ἀπ' αὐτῶν εἰδωλικὴν ἔμφασιν ἔλκει, ἥτις διὰ τὸ ἐξίτηλον τῆς δυνάμεως εἶωδεν ἐνίοτε ὑπὸ τῶν δαιμονίων φαύλων ἐπιταράττεσται (...) Εἰσὶ γάρ τινες οἱ ὄλην πραγματείαν τῆς τελεσιουργοῦ θεωρίας παριδόντες περὶ τε τὸν καλοῦντα καὶ περὶ τὸν ἐπόπτην, τάξιν τε τῆς θρησκευτικῆς καὶ τὴν ὀσιωτάτην ἐν πολλῶ χρόνῳ τῶν πόνων ἐμμονὴν ἀτιμάσαντες, θεσμούς τε καὶ ἐντυχίας καὶ ἄλλας ἀγιστείας παρωσάμενοι, ἀποχρῶσαν νομίζουσι τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν χαρακτήρων μόνην στάσιν, καὶ ταύτην ἐν μιᾷ ὥρᾳ ποιησάμενοι, εἰσκρίνειν νομίζουσι τι πνεῦμα· καίτοι τί ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ τούτων καλὸν ἢ τέλειον; (129.14-131.11)

The dreams (ὄνειροι) that we have during our sleep (ὕπνος) are also misleading (ψευδεῖς) and harmful, although they are considered by the crowd, due to the virtue of their ignorance (ἄγνοια) as dreams sent by gods to reveal the future. But in reality, these dreams arise from the limited capacity of the human soul (ψυχῆ), since they are simply echoes of our diurnal activity, desires, concerns, which are offered as a raw material to our imagination (τὸ φανταστικόν) that plays with them as it pleases. Moreover, these dreams let us know about the future occasionally, only by chance, most of the time they are misleading.⁹

These two forms of divination, although they are realized through human powers, pretend to appeal to gods. But there are others who

⁸ Clarke (2003) 151-153.

⁹ Clarke (2003) 121-123. Iamblichus, *DM*. III, 2.

endow them a real power to know the future without any help from gods, or even have the illusion of subordinating divine forces to them. In this sense, Iamblichus illustrates several points of view mentioned by Porphyry in his *Letter to Anébon*, that highlight some capabilities of our soul and our body which can play the role of real causes for an efficient human divination. But as for Iamblichus, he aims to reject all these points of view as really inconsistent.

For example, one of these theoretical positions asserts that the human soul can successfully achieve an activity of divination when it is captured by passions that trouble and set it in movement, forcing it to get out of itself, transporting it in ecstasy (ἔκστασις) or "divine" delirium (θεῖα παράλλαξις) to see acutely the future events. Passions can be triggered by various sounds and melodies, by dance movements but also by other physical means able to touch and influence the soul.¹⁰ But Iamblichus argues that passion (πάθος) is a lower faculty compared to the intellect (νοῦς) and reason (διάνοια), so its performance is inferior to the results of these; moreover, the passion cannot reach the future, because it remains always in the present (ἐν τῷ παρόντι).

DM. III, 24

Or why is the soul, once of sound reason and constant in accord with its better powers, those of mind and understanding, ignorant of what is to be, but when experiencing disorderly and turbulent motions manages to hit upon the future? For why should emotion be suitable for the contemplation of real beings? Why is this not rather a hindrance to genuine observation? Moreover, if the things in the cosmos were constituted by passions, then something like the passions would have a certain affinity with them; but if they are established by rational principles and forms, the foreknowledge of them will be something different, remote from every passion. Moreover, passion perceives only the present and what already exists, but foreknowledge apprehends things that do not yet exist. Foreknowledge, then, is something other than experiencing passion. (tr. Clarke, Dillon, Hershbell)¹¹

...ἢ τί δήποτε σωφρονοῦσα μὲν ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ ἀτρεπτος οὔσα κατὰ τὰς βελτίονας ἑαυτῆς δυνάμεις τὰς νοεράς διανοητικὰς ἀγνοεῖ τὸ ἐσόμενον, πάσχουσα δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀτάκτους καὶ παραχώδεις κινήσεις ἐπιβάλλει τῷ μέλλοντι; τί γὰρ δήποτε καὶ ἔχει τὸ πάθος οἰκεῖον εἰς τὴν θεωρίαν τῶν ὄντων;

¹⁰ Clarke (2003) 139-141. Iamblichus, *DM*. III, 9.

¹¹ Clarke (2003) 179.

τί δ' οὐ μᾶλλον ἐμποδίζει πρὸς ἀληθεστέραν κατανόσιν; ἔτι τοίνυν εἰ μὲν διὰ παθῶν τὰ πράγματα τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ συνίστατο, ἢ ὁμοίως ἂν τῶν παθῶν εἶχε τινα πρὸς αὐτὰ οἰκειότητα, εἰ δὲ διὰ λόγων καὶ διὰ τῶν εἰδῶν ἐπιτελεῖται, ἄλλη τις αὐτῶν ἔσται ἢ πρόγνωσις ἀπηλλαγμένη παντὸς πάθους. Ἐπι τὸ πάθος μόνου τοῦ παρόντος αἰσθάνεται καὶ τοῦ ἤδη ὑφ' ἑσθηκότος ἢ δὲ πρόγνωσις καὶ τῶν μηδέπω ὄντων ἀντιλαμβάνεται· ἕτερον ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ προγιγνώσκειν τοῦ πάσχειν. (156.7 – 157.4)

Other theories claim that ecstasy or delirium, which are identified with the enthusiasm (ἐνθουσιασμός) of the soul, can be caused by various ailments of the body, so by diseases (νοσήματα), such as drunkenness (μέθη), melancholy (μελαγχολία) or madness (μανία), that weakening the body and giving it a similar agitation to rabies, let the soul out of its normal state to pass to another, exceptional. But Iamblichus clearly argues against this idea, since divination requests the fullness of forces not of weakness, while diseases lead to power degradation.¹² Therefore, the philosopher made a clear distinction between the upper ecstasy, which is the real enthusiasm, because it raises the soul toward the divine, and the lower ecstasy, produced by the precarious conditions of human life and simple forces of man, which lead the soul to degraded realities. So these weakened human forces cannot know the future.¹³

Finally, another influential form of human mantic is that practiced by sorcerers. These can subordinate some cosmic forces to their peripheral, physical will, which mingle with the material to influence it in one way or another. Using these forces and the matter the sorcerers produce, images that are considered images of gods, capable to produce effects in the sensible universe, or to reveal the truth (ἀλήθεια) about the future. In reality, these images are simple ephemeral simulacra (εἴδωλα), like shadows or smoke, made of matter, which is perishable, and they are without any similarity with the eternal nature of gods, so they are lies, which offer us only a misleading vision on the future.¹⁴

But the sorcerers claim they can cause the appearance of gods themselves, and sometimes they succeed only in producing the appearance of daimons (δαίμονες), to which they are in communion and which are not always a benevolent (ἄχραντα πνεύματα) but malicious

¹² Clarke (2003) 179-183. Iamblichus, *DM*. III, 25.

¹³ Clarke (2003) 181. Iamblichus, *DM*. III, 25.

¹⁴ Clarke (2003) 189-195. Iamblichus, *DM*. III, 28-30.

spirits (*κακά πνεύματα*). Moreover, these evil and passionless spirits appear instead of gods to those who do not respect the rules of the cult, subjugate them, degrading their personality, asking them to sacrilege, and definitely away the possibility of an authentic divination.

DM. III, 31

These, then, being full of passion and evil, draw evil spirits to themselves because of kinship, and are excited by them toward every vice, and so growing together, just like some kind of circle joining beginning to end, they render in like manner an equal exchange. So, then, of the impious blunders of wickedness, some are introduced in a disorderly manner into the sacred works, while others make a disorderly approach also to what presents itself to them, and sometimes, so it seems, make one god welcome to their feast instead of another, and one occasion cause evil daemons to enter instead of gods, whom they call "anti-gods". (tr. Clarke, Dillon, Hershbell)¹⁵

Οὔτοι δὴ οὖν πατῶν μεστοὶ καὶ κακίας ὑπάρχοντες διὰ συγγένειαν ἔλκουσι τὰ πονηρὰ εἰς ἑαυτοὺς πνεύματα, καὶ αὐτοὶ πρὸς κακίαν πᾶσαν αὐτῶν ἐγειρόνται τε ὑπ' ἀλλήλων οὕτως, καθάπερ τις κύκλος ἀρχὴν τελευτῆ συνάπτων καὶ ἀνταποδίδους τὴν ἴσην ἀμοιβὴν ὡσαύτως. Ἄ τοίνυν τῆς ἀνοσιουργίας ἐστὶν ἀσεβῆ πταίσματα, ἀτάκτως μὲν αὐτὰ προσφερόμενα τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἔργοις, ἀτάκτως δὲ πειρώμενα καὶ τῶν ἐπεισιόντων, καὶ ποτὲ μὲν, ὡς δοκεῖ, θεὸν ἄλλον ἀνθ' ἑτέρου ποιοῦντα ἐπικωμάζειν, ποτὲ δ' αὖ δαίμονας πονηροὺς ἀντὶ τῶν θεῶν εἰσκρίνοντα, οὓς δὴ καὶ καλοῦσιν ἀντιθέους, ταῦτα μηδέποτε ἐν λόγῳ τῷ περὶ τῆς ἱερατικῆς μαντείας τίθεσο. (177.6 – 178.1)

Iamblichus' presentation of the major types of human divination practiced in his time shows us that, to him, this mantic is imperfect. It achieves modest performances in some cases, but in others it is totally mystifying. As a result, it is totally unsatisfactory to be used as an efficient instrument to predict the future. The cause of its inability to achieve this goal is its origin (*ἀρχή*): it is a human mantic. "No, indeed, nothing of the things shaped by human skills are simple and pure."¹⁶ But the true divination is based on what is pure (*καθαρός*), intangible, immutable (*ἄτρεπτος*), impassive (*ἀπαθής*), and in addition, it is made by the one who is in this way. Consequently, it is not a natural but supernatural act, made by the gods.

¹⁵ Clarke (2003) 197-199.

¹⁶ Clarke (2003) 193. Iamblichus, DM. III, 29.

DM. III, 1

...foreknowledge (...) is not one of the things coming into existence, and it does not even behave like a natural change, neither is it like an artefact invented for use in daily life, nor is it, generally speaking, a human takes priority by its own nature. The greatest talisman, then, against all such difficulties is this: to know the principle of divination, to know that it is activated neither by bodies nor by bodily conditions, neither by a natural object nor by natural powers, neither by human disposition nor its related habits. It is not even set in motion by a skill acquired from without, one concerned exclusively with some aspect of human existence. Rather, all of its supreme power belongs to the gods, and is bestowed by the gods. (tr. Clarke, Dillon, Hershbell)¹⁷

...τῆς προγνώσεως (...) οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῶν ἐν τῷ γίγνεσθαι, οὐδ' οἷον φυσική τις ἀπεργάζεται μεταβολή, οὐδέ τι τέχνασμα ἐξεύρηται τοῦτο ὡς εἰς τὴν τοῦ βίου κατασκευὴν χρησίμων μεμηχανημένον, οὐδ' ὄλως ἀνθρωπικόν ἐστι τὸ ἔργον, θεῖον δὲ καὶ ὑπερφυῆς ἄνωθεν τε ἀπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καταπεμπόμενον, ἀγέννητόν τε καὶ αἰδίου αὐτοφυῶς προηγείται. Μέγιστον δὴ οὖν ἀλεξιφάρμακον πρὸς ἅπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀπορήματα ἐκεῖνό ἐστι, γινῶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς μαντικῆς, ὡς οὔτε ἀπὸ σωμάτων ἐστὶν ὀρμωμένη οὔτε ἀπὸ τῶν περὶ τοῖς σώμασι παθημάτων, οὔτε ἀπὸ φύσεώς τινος καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν φύσιν δυνάμεων, οὔτε ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης παρασκευῆς ἢ τῶν περὶ αὐτὴν ἕξεων, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἀπὸ τέχνης τινὸς ἕξωθεν ἐπικτήτου περὶ τι μέρος τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ διαπραγματευομένης· τὸ δὲ πᾶν κῦρος αὐτῆς ἀνήκει εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν ἐνδίδοται... (100.2 – 100.14)

So, in fact, for Iamblichus, the real divination is exclusively a *divine* mantic, and all the other forms, human forms, widely practiced by people, are only in best case relative and imperfect, but most often false or *pseudo* divinations.

III. Divine mantic

This status of divination as a divine activity (*θεῖον ἔργον*) is determined by the manner of conceiving the universe by Iamblichus and the Neoplatonists in general: as a system in which all things are in close communication and subordinate to the universal laws. Its principle (*ἀρχή*) is the following: the knowledge of the cause and essence (*οὐσία*) of becoming (*τὸ γιγνόμενον*) leads us to the knowledge of the future.¹⁸ So the ability to make predictions about the future is only granted to beings

¹⁷ Clarke (2003) 119.

¹⁸ Clarke (2003) 121. Iamblichus, *DM. III, 1*.

that have knowledge on universal causes, essences of things and all relations between things. These beings are the gods, because only they hold the whole science of the existences. Therefore, their divinatory force is infinite. But the gods do not keep this power only for themselves, on the contrary: they offer it to all other beings that are capable to participate (*μετέχω*) in the divine, without however losing any part of it.

DM. III, 12

...the divination power of the gods is bounded by nothing divisible, neither by place, nor by a divisible human body, nor by a soul contained in any single form of divisible entities, but being separate by itself and indivisible, it is wholly present everywhere to those able to share in it. And it both illuminates from without and fills all things, and permeates all the elements: it embraces both earth, air fire, and water, and leaves nothing deprived of itself, neither living beings nor beings governed by nature, but to some it gives a greater portion of its foreknowledge, and others a lesser portion. And existing itself prior to the totality of things, it is sufficient, but its own separateness, to fill all things to the extent that each is able to share in it. (tr. Clarke, Dillon, Hershbell) ¹⁹

...ἡ μαντική τῶν θεῶν δύναμις, χωριστή δ' οὖσα καὶ ἀδιαίρετος ὅλη πανταχοῦ πάρεστι τοῖς μεταλαμβάνειν αὐτῆς δυναμένοις, ἔξωθεν τε ἐπιλάμπει καὶ πληροῖ πάντα, δι' ὅλων τε τῶν στοιχείων διαπεφοίτηκε, γῆν τε καὶ ἀέρα καὶ πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ κατείληφεν, οὐδέν τε ἄμοιρον ἑαυτῆς οὔτε τῶν ζώων οὔτε τῶν ἀπὸ φύσεως διοικουμένων ἀπολείπει, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν μᾶλλον τοῖς δὲ ἦττον ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς δίδωσί τινα μοῖραν προγνώσεως· αὐτὴ μέντοι πρὸ τῶν ὅλων προὔπαρχουσα αὐτῶ τῶ χωριστῶ ἑαυτῆς ἰκανὴ γέγονεν ἀποπληρῶσαι πάντα, καθ' ὅσον ἕκαστα δύναται αὐτῆς μετέχειν. (129.3 – 129.11)

Also, this divination power is given to all men approaching gods and respecting the rules of worship theurgy precise steps, which are also set by the gods. In addition, the theurgist (*θεουργός*) knows that during divination practices, the real initiative belongs to the gods, and the worship officiant just participates in them, playing a role rather passive as instrument (*ὄργανον*) for the gods.²⁰ But because of his intellectual and spiritual complex structure, man can participate in the divine divinatory force or divine prescience (*πρόγνωσις*) in a progressive manner and increasingly deeper. On all levels, he acquires and develops his

¹⁹ Clarke (2003) 151.

²⁰ Clarke (2003) 161-162. Iamblichus, *DM.III*, 17.

divinatory capacity as a result of his knowledge of the truth about the different layers of reality.

Moreover, Iamblichus tells us about a few privileged activities of predicting the future which highlight the active force of the gods and the man possibility to evolve in his knowledge and in his ability of divination. These are the dreams lying between wakefulness and sleep or in the waking state, the only ones which are sent by the gods; the mantic enthusiasm and the theophoria; the divination by oracles; the divination by light. All these activities are forms of the divine mantic, because they express the will of the gods, their divinatory force and the clarity with which they send to men their science on the essences (*οὐσίαι*) of things and on the fate of these in the future.

For example, by means of the divine dreams, the soul reaches first to know all the causes of things in the sensitive world, being able to make predictions about all the phenomena of the cosmos (*κόσμος*). But on another level of contemplation (*θεωρία*) and union with the gods, the soul can get the truth about the intelligible beings (*τὰ νοηταί*), which allows it to practice divination in the field of intelligible. Finally, on the last level, that approaches the soul in the greatest measure, by knowledge and strength, to the divine condition, the soul not only becomes capable of the complete divination in the time, but it also participates in the divine providence (*θεία πρόνοια*) due to which it can improve (*ἐπανόρθωσις*) a lot the organization of human life.

DM. III, 3

If, however, it refers accounts of things happening to their causes, that is, to the gods, it receives from them a power and knowledge embracing things that were and will be, and takes a view of all time, and surveys events happening in time, and it participates in their order, care, and appropriate improvement. Further, it heals sick bodies, and re-arranges many things that were discordant and disorderly among human beings, and also it often transmits the discoveries of human skills, legal regulations, and the establishment of customs. So, in Asclepius's sanctuaries, diseases are arrested by divine dreams, and, because of the structure of nocturnal apparitions, the medical art has arisen from sacred dreams. Alexander's entire army was saved, though facing total destruction in the night, when Dionysos appeared in a dream, and this god indicated the mode of deliverance from incurable sufferings. (tr. Clarke, Dillon, Hershbell)²¹

²¹ Clarke (2003) 127.

Ἐὰν δὲ τοὺς λόγους τῶν γιγνομένων ἀνάγῃ πρὸς τοὺς αἰτίους αὐτῶν θεούς, δύναμιν ἀπ' αὐτῶν προσλαμβάνει καὶ γνῶσιν ἀναλογιζομένην ὅσα τε ἦν καὶ ὅσα ἔσται, θεωρίαν τε παντὸς χρόνου ποιεῖται καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ συμβαινόντων ἐπισκοπεῖ τὰ ἔργα, τάξιν τε αὐτῶν καὶ ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ ἐπανόρθωσιν τὴν προσήκουσαν μεταλαγχάνει· καὶ τὰ μὲν κεκμηκότα σώματα θεραπεύει, τὰ δὲ πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως ἔχοντα παρ' ἀνθρώποις εὖ διατίθησι, τεχνῶν τε εὐρέσεις πολλάκις καὶ διανομὰς τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν νομίμων θέσεις παραδίδωσιν. Οὕτως ἐν Ἀσκληπιῷ μὲν τὰ νοσήματα τοῖς θεοῖς ὀνειροῖς παύεται· διὰ δὲ τὴν τάξιν τῶν νύκτων ἐπιφανειῶν ἢ ἰατρικὴ τέχνη συνέστη ἀπὸ τῶν ἱερῶν ὀνειράτων. Τὸ δ' Ἀλεξάνδρου στρατόπεδον πᾶν ἐσώθη, μέλλον ἄρδην νυκτὸν ἀπόλλυσθαι, Διονύσου κατ' ὄναρ ἐπιφανέντος καὶ τὴν λύσιν τῶν ἀνηκέστων παθημάτων σημήναντος. (107.11 – 108.10)

Another way to arrive at a correct knowledge of the future is realized by people inspired by the gods and thus seized by divine enthusiasm. These people are called "θεοφόροι", that means "transporters" of the gods, and their relationship with the divine is accomplished through the soul or through the soul and the body, being practiced in various ways: either by participation (μετουσία) in the strength of the god, either by communion (κοινωνία), or by union (ἔνωσις) with the god. In these very special states of their soul, men are no longer themselves but an expression of the qualities and will of the gods. They abandon their human simple life and their limited personality, to live on another level of reality: superhuman, divine. That is why they are capable of exceptional physical and intellectual performances, which cause everyone's astonishment and admiration, and most importantly, they can predict the future without any mistake. But, in fact, they are only tools for the gods, the only ones who truly possesses the science of the future, so that the slightest deviation of the human soul from the divine will, corrupts the truth of the prediction.

DM. III, 7

But one would not rightly suppose that divine possession belongs to the soul or one of its faculties, or to intellect or one of its faculties or activities, or to bodily weakness or its absence. Nor would one reasonably suppose that it would occur in this way, for being transported by a god is neither a human accomplishment, nor does it base its power in human parts (of the body) or activities. But, on the one hand, these are otherwise subordinate, and the god uses them as instruments; on the other hand, the entire activity of divination comes to its fulfilment through the god acting by himself, purely detached from

other things, without the soul or body moving in any way. Hence, the divinations being done rightly, as I say, really and truly happen. But when soul takes the initiative, or is disturbed during the divination, or the body interrupts and perverts the divine harmony, the divinations become turbulent and false, and the possession is no longer true nor genuinely divine. (tr. Clarke, Dillon, Hershbell)²²

Ψυχῆς μὲν οὖν καίτινος τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ δυνάμεων, ἢ νοῦ καὶ τινοσ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ δυνάμεων ἢ ἐνεργειῶν, ἢ σωματικῆς ἀσθενείας ἢ ἄνευ ταύτης οὐκ ἂν τις ὑπολάβοι δικαίως τὸν ἐνθουσιασμὸν εἶναι, οὐδ' ἂν οὕτω γίγνεσθαι εἰκότως ἂν ὑπόδοιτο. οὔτε γὰρ ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστι τὸ τῆς θεοφορίας ἔργον, οὔτε ἀνθρωπίνοις μορίοις ἢ ἐνεργήμασι τὸ πᾶν ἔχει κῦρος· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἄλλως ὑπόκειται, καὶ χρεῖται αὐτοῖς ὁ θεὸς ὡς ὄργανοις· τὸ δὲ πᾶν ἔργον τῆς μαντείας δι' αὐτοῦ πληροῖ, καὶ ἀμιγῶς ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀφειμένος οὔτε ψυχῆς κινουμένης οὐδ' ὅτιοῦν οὔτε σώματος ἐνεργεῖ καθ' αὐτόν. Ὅθεν δὴ καὶ ἀψευδῶς γίνονται τὰ μαντεῖα τὰ οὕτως ὡς λέγω κατορθούμενα. Ἐπειδὴν δ' ἢ ψυχὴ προκατάρχη ἢ μεταξὺ κινῆται, ἢ τὸ σῶμά τι παρεμπίπτει καὶ τὴν θείαν ἀρμονίαν ἐπιταράττει, θορυβώδη γίνονται καὶ ψευδῆ τὰ μαντεῖα, καὶ Ἄ ὁ ἐνθουσιασμὸς οὐκέτι ἀληθῆς ὑπάρχει οὐδὲ γνησίως θείος. (114.13 – 115.11)

The other forms of the divine mantic lead us on specific routes to similar performances. Thus, divination by oracles (τὰ μαντεῖα), widespread in the ancient world, primarily involves the existence of special places (springs, caves, sanctuaries, etc.) that can receive and intensify the presence (παρουσία) of the gods, that is spread, in a way or another, everywhere in the universe. In addition, it requires specialized people, with natural inclinations towards communion with the divine but also able to learn and practice the art of being possessed by it. In fact, these people, appointed "prophets" (προφήται) by Iamblichus, are subordinate priests to one or other of the gods, with whose presence they are always accustomed. The ambient framework carefully arranged helps the priest to obtain the privileged state of the harmony with the god, and the various rituals preparatory to the acts of divination purify (καθαρίζω) his soul, making him worthy to receive the god fully, and the god seizes priest completely in order to speak and manifest himself through him. In these circumstances, obviously we are dealing with a divine mantic, so the priest who has fallen into the trance makes entirely true predictions about the future.

²² Clarke (2003) 135.

DM. III, 11

The prophetess at Delphi, however, whether she gives oracles to human beings from a subtle and fiery spirit brought up from an aperture, or prophesies in the innermost sanctuary while seated on a bronze stool with three legs, or on a seat with four legs that is sacred to the god, she thus gives herself absolutely to the divine spirit, and is illuminated by the ray of divine fire. And when the fiery spirit coming up from the aperture, dense and abundant, envelops her entirely in a circle, she is filled by it with a divine brightness; whenever she is found of the seat of the god, she is in harmony with the divine, unwavering oracular power. As a result of both these preparations she becomes wholly the god's possession. Then, indeed, the god is present, shining on her. (tr. Clarke, Dillon, Hershbell)²³

Ἡ δ' ἐν Δελφοῖς προφῆτις, εἴτε ἀπὸ πνεύματος λεπτοῦ καὶ πυρώδους ἀναφερομένου ποθέν ἀπὸ στομίον θεμιστεύει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, εἴτε ἐν τῷ ἀδύτῳ καθημένη ἐπὶ δίφρου χαλκοῦ τρεῖς πόδας ἔχοντος χρηματίζει, εἴτε καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τετράποδος δίφρου ὃν ἔστιν ἱερός τοῦ θεοῦ, πανταχῆ οὔτῳ δίδωσιν ἑαυτὴν τῷ θεῷ πνεύματι, ἀπὸ τε τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ πυρὸς ἀκτίνος καταυγάζεται. Καὶ ὅταν μὲν ἀθρόον καὶ πολὺ τὸ ἀναφερόμενον ἀπὸ τοῦ στομίον πῦρ κύκλῳ πανταχόθεν αὐτὴν περιέχη, πληροῦται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ θείας ἀγῆς· ὅταν δ' εἰς ἔδραν ἐνιδρυθῆ τοῦ θεοῦ, τῆ σταθερᾷ τοῦ θεοῦ μαντικῆ δυνάμει συναρμόζεται· ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων δὲ τῶν τοιούτων παρασκευῶν ὅλη γίνεταί τοῦ θεοῦ. Καὶ τότε δὴ πάρεστιν αὐτῇ χωριστῶς ὁ θεὸς ἐπιλάμπων. (126.4 – 127.1)

Divine enlightenment (*θεῖας ἔλλαμψις*) best expresses the inspiration (*ἐπίπνοια*) of priests or theurgists in the act of divination. From this cause Iamblichus considers "*φωτὸς ἀγωγή*", namely the ritual of capture of the light of the gods in order to predict the future, a distinct form of the divine mantic. This implies that the theurgist, through magic formulas and symbolic gestures, is capable of attracting the divine light and makes it shine on various materials: water (*ὑδωρ*), air (*ἀήρ*), walls (*τοιχοί*), sky (*οὐρανός*), stars (*ἀστέρες*), but also in the deepest darkness (*σκοτός*). In turn, this light penetrates the soul of the theurgist, thus preparing the god arrival there.

The enlightened man abandons his own rationality since he is no longer conscious of himself or of anything else; he no longer thinks with his human thought but, under the direct guidance of the god, puts his imagination to work, and this becomes able to access to numerous divine images (*φαντασίαι θεῖαι*, very significant, revealing the truth about

²³ Clarke (2003) 147-149.

future events. But the one who offers us this genuine knowledge of the future is the god, not man, who is only his servant, the transmission channel, so that this form of mantic is truly divine, not human.

DM. III, 14

There might be many other ways for conducting the light, but all are reduced to one, i.e. the shining of the bright light in whatever way and through whatever instruments it may shine forth. Since, then, this light is from without and alone achieves all its effects serving the will and intelligence of the gods, the greatest light has a sacred brightness which, either shining from above in the aether, or from the air, or moon or sun, or any other heavenly sphere, appears apart from all these things to be such a mode of divination that is autonomous, primordial, and worthy of the gods. (tr. Clarke, Dillon, Hershbell)²⁴

Γένοιτο δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλοι πλείονες τρόποι τῆς τοῦ φωτὸς ἀγωγῆς· ἀλλ' ὅμως εἰς ἓν ἀνάγονται πάντες, εἰς τὴν τῆς ἀγῆς ἔλλαμψιν, ὅπου περ ἂν καὶ δι' οἴων ὀργάνων ἐπιλάμπωσιν. Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἕξωθεν τέ ἐστὶν αὕτη καὶ μόνη τῇ βουλήσει καὶ νοήσει τῶν θεῶν ὑπηρετοῦντα κέκτηται τὰ πάντα, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον φῶς ἔχει ἱερὸν καταυγάζον, τὸ μὲν ἄνωθεν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰθέρος τὸ δ' ἐξ ἀέρος ἢ σελήνης ἢ καὶ ἡλίου καταλάμπον ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς οὐρανίας σφαιράς, φαίνεται ἐκ πάντων τούτων αὐτεξούσιος καὶ πρωτουργὸς καὶ τῶν θεῶν ἐπάξιος ὁ τοιοῦτος ὢν τρόπος τῆς μαντείας. (134.8 – 134.14)

So we see that during the acts of the divine mantic we are united to the gods because it reveals to us the causes of sensible and intelligible things as well as their truth deeply, reveals to us the thoughts and provisions of the gods which set in motion the whole universe, allowing us to know the future events, and makes us wise, divine. But this type of divination: sacred, pure, divine occurs only in theurgy. We know this it is a religious practice that combines intellectual activity with precise rituals that use hidden symbols whose meaning is known only to the gods.

The ultimate goal of the theurgy is the union of the theurgist with divinity, and from this point of view, the authentic divination is the crowning of the theurgy. However, in the moment when we are identical with the gods, we obtain all good (τὸ ἀγαθόν) that can be conceived and all happiness (εὐδαιμονία), so that, ultimately, the real stake of the divine mantic practiced by people is not that of knowing the future but to rise to gods to get the divine perfection (θεϊὰς παντέλεια) and to enjoy the best

²⁴ Clarke (2003) 157.

life possible: entirely free from materiality and fatality, above all evil, fully good and happy. It goes without saying that a being capable of such a divine life has a universal and absolute knowledge, that enables it to predict the future also.

DM. X, 4

Only divine mantic prediction, therefore, conjoined with the gods, truly imparts to us a share in divine life, partaking as it does in the foreknowledge and the intellections of the gods, and renders us, in truth, divine. And this genuinely furnishes the good for us, because the most blessed intellection of the gods is filled with all goods. Hence, those who have this mantic prediction do not, as you conjecture, "have foreknowledge, and yet remain without happiness" – for all divine foreknowledge is patently good – nor they "foresee the future but do not know how to use this well". Rather, along with the foreknowledge, they receive Beauty itself, and the order which is both true and appropriate – and also present with this is utility. For the gods grant the power of defence against the dangers which menace us from the natural order. (tr. Clarke, Dillon, Hershbell)²⁵

Μόνη τοίνυν ἡ θεία μαντική συναπτομένη τοῖς θεοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡμῖν τῆς θείας ζωῆς μεταδίδωσι, τῆν τε προγνώσεως καὶ τῶν θείων νοήσεων μετέχουσα καὶ ἡμᾶς θείους ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀπεργάζεται· ἡ δὲ αὐτὴ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡμῖν γνησίως παρέχει, διότι πεπληρωται τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὅλων ἢ μακαριωτάτη τῶν θεῶν νόησις· οὐ τοίνυν προορῶσι μὲν, ὡς σὺ τοπάζεις, οἱ ταύτην ἔχοντες τὴν μαντικὴν, οὐ μὴν εἰσιν εὐδαίμονες· ἀγαθοειδῆς γὰρ ἐστὶ πᾶσα ἡ θεία πρόγνωσις· οὐδὲ προορῶσι μὲν τὰ μέλλοντα, χρῆσθαι δὲ αὐτοῖς καλῶς οὐκ ἐπίστανται· ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὴν τάξιν τὴν ἀληθῆ καὶ πρέπουσαν μετὰ τῆς προγνώσεως παραδέχονται· πάρεστι δ' αὐτῇ καὶ τὸ ὠφέλιμον. Οἱ γὰρ θεοὶ καὶ δύναμιν τοῦ φυλάξασθαι τὰ ἐπιόντα ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως δεινὰ παραδιδόασιν. (289.3 – 289.13)

But most of the common forms of divination practiced in his time were very far from this ideal of human perfection proposed by Iamblichus, although the best category of them could, sometimes, achieve some remarkable results. It is, as we saw above, about acts of divination that appeal to the gods, quite correctly (*ἀψευδῶς*) interpreting the signs sent by them throughout the universe. Instead, all divination practices which is based only on the psychic and intellectual capacities of humans are imperfect, relative, problematic, although they capture in a

²⁵ Clarke (2003) 347-349.

blinded manner, something of divine mantic. Finally, human mantic has also totally false and misleading forms, some of them claiming without any foundation that appeal to the gods, others proclaiming with much vanity the exclusively human ability to predict the future.

IV. Conclusion

Concerned with an ethical and ontological model of man aimed at his fulfilment in divine perfection, Iamblichus criticizes the principal human forms of divination, in order to describe, as opposed to them, the authentic form of divination, namely theurgical divination, the only one capable, of his view, of raising man to the divine and of uniting him with that one. In addition, the purpose of Iamblichus' approach, in an era (centuries III and IV after Christ) which has assisted at the very hard physical and theoretical fights between Christians and pagans, was also to justify the religious force of some traditional Greek practices of the worship of the gods, capable of integrating into the body of the theurgy and to express it in a perfect manner. This approach of Iamblichus is an example of the way in which the philosophers can reinterpret diverse cultural practices, which they confer unusual meanings to legitimize them of a higher theoretical perspective.

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REVOLUȚIA COPERNICANĂ ÎN INTERPRETAREA LUI HANS BLUMENBERG

Ionuț RĂDUICĂ¹

Abstract: *This article focuses on Blumenberg's interpretation of Copernican Revolution in modernity. The study starts from the possibility in traditional systems to lead to such revolution, and on the other side it tries to correlate Copernicus thought with posterity within the modernity's boundaries. Considering this, the study underlines and investigates also the concepts of change and motion, that will finally provide better tool for modernity to differentiate by former theories. The basic idea of this article resides in rejecting all causal interpretation of Copernican revolution - on the contrary, Blumenberg assumes that the new paradigm was possible through inherent determinations, according to Copernic's own ideas and to modernity as an epoch, as well.*

Keywords: *Hans Blumenberg, Copernicus, Giordano Bruno, Ludvig Feurbach, modernity, theory, motion, change.*

Succesul modernității ca epocă vine pe fondul redescoperirii teoriei științifice, cu tot ce implică aceasta, inclusiv, în mod cu totul special, posibilitatea de a oferi cosmologii, ca explicații performante ale lumii. Revoluția copernicană este o puternică schimbare istorică² - în acest fel, Evul Mediu dispare, iar în locul lui se naște modernitatea. Din punctul de vedere al lui Jean Seidengart³, interesul lui Blumenberg față de sistemul copernican vorbește de la sine⁴ chiar din felul în care filosoful german împarte lucrarea

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² Această discuție o implică și pe cea privind ideile noi sau cele care sunt schimbate. Trebuie să subliniem, în acest sens, că ideile axiomatiche, „paradigmatiche”, nu trebuie privite în sens platonice, ca idei eterne și fixe, ci ele sunt esențializări ale unor coordonate, versatile până la anumite puncte. Altfel spus, ele sunt convergențe ideatice aflate într-o mișcare care poate să fie internă epocii sau externă, adică ele pot să constituie chiar și o altă epocă. După ce acceptăm viziunea asupra ideilor, anume ca nuclee de confluență abstractă, putem să afirmăm cu tărie că o viziune esențialistă, să zicem, paradigmatică, a modernității, nu inhibă existența unor idei ascunse sau nemanifestate explicit în aceasta.

³ Seidengart, Jean, „Hans Blumenberg, lecteur et interprète de l'oeuvre de Copernic”, *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, No. 1, 2012, pp. 15-33.

⁴ Este vorba de cele șase părți ale ei: 1. contemplarea greacă, ambiguă, a cerului; 2. Posibilitatea apariției lui Copernic; 3. tiparul primelor efecte ale lui Copernic; 4.

Die Genesis der kopernikanischen Welt, subliniind atât importanța acordată metodei sale istorice, cât și cronologiei evenimentelor.

Metodologic, putem spune că joncțiunea celor două epoci, de care vorbim mai sus, are o dimensiune deosebită, fiind ușor să confundăm condițiile (*Vorgeschichten*) cu efectele (*Wirkungsgeschichten*)⁵. Dacă analizăm însă ideea centrală a lui Copernic, sugerează Blumenberg, putem să scăpăm de această capcană științifică. În acest sens, Copernic, trebuie spus, leagă teza sa de pitagoreici și de Aristarchus de Samos⁶, în scopul „decapitării reproșului superficial că ar avea mania inovației”⁷. Deși, pe de o parte, prinderea în tradiție nu anulează șansa inovației, pe de altă parte, principala dificultate copernicană constă din juxtapunerea posibilităților de fond ale tezei sale pe coordonate aristoteliciene sau platoniciene, așadar această racordare la trecut nu se realizează total. Acest insucces al ruperii de tradiția filosofică și fizică înseamnă și eliberarea de anumite constrângeri. Mai mult decât atât, Copernic se adresează, consideră Blumenberg, unui public diferit, care are așteptări, prejudecăți, valori diferite⁸.

De unde survine, totuși, succesul lui Copernic? Așa cum poate nu ne-am aștepta, revoluția copernicană nu izvorăște din factorii epocali⁹ prezenți în *De Revolutionibus*, cu toate că desfășurarea ulterioară a teoriei în aplicații, inclusiv în astronomie, arată, prin „inevitabilitatea” (*Unausweichlichkeit*) cu care este implementată, o astfel de presupuziție¹⁰. În plus, argumentează Blumenberg, chiar dacă o teorie este inevitabilă prin inovația pe care o conține, nu înseamnă că acea teorie capătă magnitudine. Prin urmare, trebuie să fie vorba de altceva.

conceptul de timp în lumina copernicană; 5. Perspectiva copernicană în interiorul noii imagini a lumii; 6. Critica copernicanismului autentic.

⁵ A se vedea Blumenberg, *Die Genesis der kopernikanischen Welt. Die Zweideutigkeit der Mimmels Eröffnung der Möglichkeit eines Kopernikus*, Band 1, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1989, p. 149.

⁶ A se vedea Sir Thomas Heath, *A History of Greek Mathematics. From Aristarchus to Diophantus*, Vol. II, The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1921, pp. 1-2 și urm.

⁷ Blumenberg, *Die Genesis der kopernikanischen Welt. Die Zweideutigkeit der Mimmels Eröffnung der Möglichkeit eines Kopernikus*, Band , ed. cit., pp. 153-154.

⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 154-155.

⁹ E vorba de motivații intrinseci epocii, precum nevoia de schimbare, anularea unor teze contradictorii etc.

¹⁰ Blumenberg, *Die Genesis der kopernikanischen Welt. Die Zweideutigkeit der Mimmels Eröffnung der Möglichkeit eines Kopernikus*, Band 1, ed. cit., pp. 157-158.

Aparent, sursa acestei dimensionări cu potențial expansiv și revoluționar a teoriei lui Copernic rezidă în ideea de invenție, care ar consta din eliberarea din chingile principiilor fixe, dogmatice, limite care închid posibilitățile. Astfel, eliberarea posibilităților înseamnă asigurarea unei dispoziții istorice¹¹, ca revoluție de paradigmă, a copernicanismului. Și totuși nu aceasta este direcția interpretativă a lui Blumenberg, căci ideile de durată, care includ și paradigma copernicană¹², nu au indicatori sau dovezi care să privească așa-zisele lor cauze¹³. Aceasta ar traduce o dimensiune logică, greu de aplicat în istorie. Lucrurile sunt însă la un grad de complexitate mai mare, atât prin multitudinea de elemente care interacționează între ele, cât și prin evidența șocantă că ceva considerat intolerabil devine dintr-o dată nu doar respirabil, ci și necesar. Aici se pare că „epocalul” are un rol major: „Această «preistorie» a potențialității, a deschiderii libertății teoretice, este, în inseparabilitatea sa de istoria efectelor evenimentului, cea mai strictă definiție a «interesului» istoriografic” (trad. noastră)¹⁴. Cu alte cuvinte, eliberarea teoriei devine o precondiție latentă, activată de funcția epocii de a se construi pe sine, prin intermediul interesului istoric identitar. Cu toate acestea, teoria existenței unui potențial revoluționar care să fie activat prin Copernic nu ar face decât să admită că ultimul este o epocă în sine, cu paradoxul că ar iradia în afara ei principiile revoluției, ceea ce este de neacceptat din punctul de vedere al unei înțelegeri pertinente a epocii sau a Revoluției copernicane.

Adevărata dimensiune a sistemelor constă din așezarea posibilului pe solul necesităților, așadar o substituție a celor două, în funcție de cosmologie. Cu cât sistemul este mai instabil, putem să bănuim, cu atât va

¹¹ Aceasta îl face pe Seidengart să accentueze legătura dintre *Vorgeschichten* și *Wirkungsgeschichten*, ca expresie de forță a funcției istoricității „Revoluției” (Seidengart, Jean, *op. cit.*, p. 19).

¹² În sens doar logic, căci calitativ și cantitativ, paradigma înseamnă mai mult decât idei de durată.

¹³ Blumenberg, *Die Genesis der kopernikanischen Welt. Die Zweideutigkeit der Mimmels Eröffnung der Möglichkeit eines Kopernikus*, Band 1, ed. cit., p. 158.

¹⁴ „Diese Vorgeschichte der Potentialisierung, der Eröffnung der theoretischen Freiheit, ist in ihrer Unabtrennbarkeit vor der Wirkungsgeschichte die strikteste Definition eines historischen Interesses, wenn denn überhaupt eines die Schrumpfung der Zeitdimension unter dem Druck der räumlichen Diffusion von Interessen überleben sollte” (Blumenberg, *Die Genesis der kopernikanischen Welt. Die Zweideutigkeit der Mimmels Eröffnung der Möglichkeit eines Kopernikus*, Band 1, ed. cit., p. 158).

fi mai mare sfera posibilităților. Pe de altă parte, sistemele au proprietatea conservării, asemenea unor organisme vii, dotate cu sistem imunitar. Ele sunt destinate chiar eliminării oricărei intruziuni străine în sistem. Cu toate acestea, copernicanismul ocupă sistemul, asemenea unui virus gazda. Cum s-a întâmplat aceasta? Blumenberg dă un răspuns simplu, păstrând aceeași comparație sistem-organism: prin procese „subcutanate”. Așadar, prin desfășurarea unor acțiuni în interiorul sistemului. Desigur, pentru a vedea acest lucru, trebuie să observăm ce se întâmplă înainte de Copernic, dar nu în privința „precursorilor”, care nu sunt decât o „componentă” a sistemului, ci în direcția variațiilor sistemului, adevărații indicatori ai stării sale.

Modalitatea care circumscrie atitudinea justificativă a lui Copernic nu este revolta față de tradiție și nici speculația asupra unor fisuri ale ei. Dimpotrivă, Copernic trebuie să demonstreze validitatea propriului sistem în paralel cu filosofia naturală acceptată. În același timp, filosofia naturală nu putea să nu intre în contradicție cu Copernic¹⁵. Una dintre transformările esențiale ale teoriei acestuia se bazează pe faptul că mișcările cosmice trebuie să fie privite din interior către afară, și nu invers, ca la Aristotel: „Copernic a concentrat adevăratele mișcări ale Cosmosului în regiunile sale lăuntrice” (trad. noastră)¹⁶. Această turnură generează definirea mișcării ca imanentă. Dar principalul contrast față de Evul Mediu al copernicanismului nu îl reprezintă heliocentrismul¹⁷, ci conceptul cauzalității, legat implicit de problema relațiilor distanțelor spațiale. Înainte, viziunea dominantă aparținea lui Aristotel și se baza pe faptul că mișcarea are un agent în orice situație. Or, Copernic asertează cauzalitatea ca stare¹⁸. Aplicat la scară cosmologică, copernicanismul presupune producții noi de mișcare, în orice moment, dar și imposibilitatea de a

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 165.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 166.

¹⁷ Cu aceeași viziune empatizează și Seidengart, atunci când spune că Blumenberg s-a străduit prea mult să dovedească faptul că antropocentrismul nu este, în mod necesar, legat de geocentrism, susținând, așadar, umanismul lui Copernic, ce plasează omul în centrul ideal, nu fizic sau spațial, al Universului (*vezi* Seidengart, Jean, *op. cit.*, p. 27); de asemenea, Monod acceptă și el această viziune, care eludează „umilința umană” rezultată din pierderea centralității Universului, odată cu Revoluția copernicană (Monod, Jean-Claude, *Hans Blumenberg*, Editions Belin, Paris, 2007, p. 97.)

¹⁸ Blumenberg, *Die Genesis der kopernikanischen Welt. Die Zweideutigkeit der Mimmels Eröffnung der Möglichkeit eines Kopernikus*, Band 1, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

aționa la distanță (*actio per distans*). Acest lucru contravine Scolasticismului, care presupunea existența unei cauze metafizice a mișcării, precum și ideea că mișcărilor fizice trebuie să fie localizate în apropierea centrului.

Pe de altă parte, Blumenberg recunoaște că efectele copernicanismului sunt ambigue¹⁹, dar acest lucru trebuie să-l vedem ca generator al unei diversități congruente, acoperite de conceptul de „postcopernicanism”. Pozitivitatea acestei „revoluții” de paradigmă depășește în importanță efectele particulare ale complexelor de inferioritate ontologică²⁰, întrucât acestea din urmă sunt mai puțin importante decât nivelul superior al realizărilor lor. Dacă cineva consideră că a „obținut”, ca modern, doar periferia existenței sale, în raport cu centralitatea mai firească a Universului, acest lucru este prea puțin important în raport cu sinteza efectelor postcopernicane, construită din ideea că rațiunea a învins aparențele, în ciuda unor inconveniente psihologice sau aplicații la cazuri particulare (de pildă, la particularitatea teologiei²¹). Dar, întrebarea pe care o pune Blumenberg, este: „Pierderea intuiției – raportul direct dintre subiect și obiect – este tot un câștig?”. Răspunsul prezumtiv este că toate sistemele originare în copernicanismul ideal, prin premisele sale cele mai preeminente, dintre care face parte și „triumful rațiunii” asupra simțurilor, imaginației, fantasmelor, viselor etc., nu presupun intuiția. De aceea, la autori precum Feuerbach, până și cerul decade în importanță²², ca urmare a faptului că intuiția, cel mai reprezentativ mijloc tradițional de raportare la el, pierde în valoare ca metodă²³, dar și din cauza transformării părților lui din imagini sau Idei, fixe prin definiție, în obiecte particulare supuse

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 99.

²⁰ Sintagma ne aparține.

²¹ În realitate, faptul că vorbim de o perspectivă particulară teologică este tot un efect postcopernican, căci Biserica era înainte de aceste efecte un gen, iar diversitatea, restrânsă din punct de vedere logic, dar generoasă prin domeniile aplicației ei, putea fi socotită ca alcătuită din specii; în afara acestui sistem putem vorbi de excepții.

²² Blumenberg, *Die Genesis der kopernikanischen Welt. Die Zweideutigkeit der Mimmels Eröffnung der Möglichkeit eines Kopernikus*, Band 1, ed. cit., p. 99.

²³ pe de altă parte, ca o compensație a limitării metodice, de care vorbim, conștiința este generos privită de către Feuerbach prin prisma faptului că este conectată cu conștiința infinitului, în mod indisolubil (Feurbach, Ludvig, *Esența creștinismului*, Editura Științifică, București, 1961, p. 32); la fel, rațiunea e, dacă nu desăvârșită, cel puțin „non-limitată” (Feuerbach, Ludvig, *op. cit.*, p. 37).

interpretării științifice, care presupune, înțelegerea graduală. Motivația plasării intuiției mai jos de alte mijloace, la Feuerbach, consideră Blumenberg, indică un rău necesar pentru un bine mai mare²⁴. Cu toate acestea, imediatetea, care presupune un raport direct al eului cu ea, nu dispăre din geografia orientărilor intenționale ale omului, ba chiar dimpotrivă, la Feuerbach, ea se bucură de întâietate, ca satisfacție a senzorialului, ceea ce sugerează că nemijlocirea este încă posibilă și dezirabilă în modernitate²⁵. Ca o prelungire a acestei idei, tocmai datorită conservării raporturilor dintre contrarii, ca urmare a fluctuației dialectice a ideilor care stau în baza științei și a culturii și, pe de altă parte, prin scoaterea dramatică a intuiției din lumea vieții, dar și prin faptul că nimic din ceea ce este scos nu este eliminat cu totul, intuiția rămâne un apanaj al geniului, o aplicație la care au acces doar inițiații din punct de vedere științific. Cu toate acestea, cum istoria nu se bazează pe nicio constantă – sofistic spus, singura constantă este mișcarea – unele momente vor încerca să elimine cu totul intuiția, chiar dacă indirect. O astfel de încercare aparține „cele mai înalte ofensive” idealiste, întemeiată pe critica simțurilor, care sunt privite prin neputința lor de nu se sfârși în ele însele și de a produce cunoașterea datului. Cu toate că i se recunoaște omului statutul de ființă cu simțuri – într-o definiție antropologică, nu epistemologică, subliniază Blumenberg – orizontul imediat al lumii și lumea ca întreg nu mai sunt accesibile²⁶. Intrând doar în sfera rațiunii, orizontul imediat și cel îndepărtat, unitar, ale lumii nu mai pot constitui o cosmologie, lucru care inhibă construcția istorică sau chiar o blochează, întrucât nu se bazează pe ajutorul intuiției, singura capabilă să unifice părțile, care apar acum ca supraabundente, și să ofere explicații acolo unde rațiunea nu poate fi aplicată. Prin urmare, soluția este ca supraabundența (*Überfluss*) să apară ca obiect estetic, ca element care permite raportul direct cu el²⁷. Prin faptul că ea are un rol doar în anumite situații particulare, rezultă că intuiția nu este o metodă de cunoaștere reală sau că nu i se recunoaște acest statut.

Provizoratul intuiției, de care vorbește Feuerbach, este însă pentru Blumenberg tocmai șansa dată intuiției. Bagatelizarea modernă este

²⁴ *A se vedea, Blumenberg, Die Genesis der kopernikanischen Welt. Die Zweideutigkeit der Mimmels Eröffnung der Möglichkeit eines Kopernikus, Band 1, ed. cit., p. 100.*

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 102.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 103.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 104-105.

compensată doar printr-o singură excepție: autointensificarea omului (*menschlichen Selbststeigerung*)²⁸. „Ecuția” prin care se ajunge la această soluție presupune faptul că, întrucât simțurile nu sunt mijloace suficiente de cunoaștere, rațiunea trebuie să fie cu mult mai eficientă epistemologic; cum rațiunea nu poate pătrunde în toate zonele comprehensibile, intuiția trebuie să fie mult mai utilă în acest scop; întrucât intuiția este apanjul prin excelență al omului, atribut care poate fi exploatat și dezvoltat, omul însuși se îmbogățește și se autointensifică prin el.

Cu toate acestea, acordarea unui rol parțial intuiției nu o impune pe aceasta ca mijloc de cunoaștere în modernitate și nici nu frânează tendința generală de a o elimina complet din teorie. În opinia noastră, viziunea unor autori precum Feuerbach vizează posibilitatea internă a epocii de a reînvia intuiția, lucru care se va întâmpla mai târziu cu ajutorul fenomenologiei.

Revenind la discuția principală, trebuie spus că amestecul condițiilor și efectelor, în ceea ce privește istoria științei, sunt însă destul de frecvente. Dacă ne gândim la copernicanism, sursa erorilor vine din raportarea posibilității ideii centrale la diverse cauze istorice²⁹. Mai degrabă, o viziune pertinentă constă din înțelegerea, nu a diferențelor, ci a compatibilităților dintre copernicanism și fizica și metafizica aristotelică, pe de o parte, și fizica platonice, pe de altă parte. În felul acesta, adevărata revoluție nu apare cu miză doar în astronomie, ci în toată dimensiunea sa de paradigmă nouă³⁰.

Un alt gen de condiții se revendică de la contradicțiile interne ale Evului Mediu și căderea acestuia în nominalism și umanism. Copernic poate fi considerat în toată regula un umanist, care se erijează în salvator al Cosmosului și apărător al credinței adaptate omului³¹. Cum umanismul nu poate fi separat de lupta împotriva Scolasticismului, nici scrierile lui Copernic³² nu pot evita acest subiect. Din punct de vedere al mizei acestei lupte, Blumenberg consideră că victoria copernicană ar fi însemnat

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 105.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 153.

³⁰ Blumenberg, *Die Genesis der kopernikanischen Welt. Die Zweideutigkeit der Mimmels Eröffnung der Möglichkeit eines Kopernikus*, Band 1, pp. 154-155 și urm.

³¹ *Ibidem*, p. 237.

³² Pentru înțelegerea acestui conflict și a felului în care a fost el însuși personal de Copernic, în urma studiilor sale la Cracovia, Bologna și Padova (a se vedea Blumenberg, *Die Genesis der kopernikanischen Welt. Die Zweideutigkeit der Mimmels Eröffnung der Möglichkeit eines Kopernikus*, Band 1, ed. cit., p. 243).

aurorealizarea omului și postularea preeminenței intereselor sale existențiale, spre diferență de conceptul de cunoaștere aristotelic care subvaluează atât preeminența omului, cât și interesele existențiale³³. Câștigul reprezentat de Copernic nu este doar în interiorul dezvoltării științelor naturii, ci în însăși constituirea conștiinței omului modern³⁴.

Această stare de lucruri paradigmatică eliberează posibilitățile intrasistemice și chiar energia conflictelor antagonismelor, a extremelor. Convergența acestor energii eliberate, după Blumenberg, se regăsește în Giordano Bruno³⁵. Ultimul are șansa să demonstreze practic ceea ce în copernicanism are statut de posibilitate și nu de inevitabilitate ca sistem. Faptul că deja sistemul funcționează astfel o demonstrează și faptul că, oricât ar părea de straniu, Copernic nu reprezintă o autoritate pentru Bruno³⁶. Acesta din urmă este primul care introduce metafora în postcopernicanism, în particular, aceea a luminii, care apare la el ca „lumină nouă”³⁷. Putem considera că acest atribut provine din faptul că Bruno era și metafizician și punctul de convergență a posibilităților copernicanismului. Așa se explică de ce „descrie cu ușurință consumul infinit al sorilor și lumilor”, chiar dacă găsește cu dificultate un răspuns rațional³⁸. Mai degrabă, soluția lui este alta: realitatea trebuie să fie construită în interiorul posibilităților, păstrând disocierea realitate-vizibilitate activă³⁹.

Tot sub cupola Revoluției stă și Galileo Galilei. Chiar dacă pentru acesta era important depășirea Scolasticii, el păstrează referirile lui Aristotel la adevăr, pe care îl vede ca expresie a puterii tradiției, însă contestă pilonii centrali ai acestei școli. Prin urmare, tezele cu privire la mișcare și repaus aristoteliciene, unde mișcarea constantă și repausul sunt nedisociate, vor fi de această dată privite și înțelese diferit, iar pentru fiecare mișcare va fi necesară o forță proporțională cu aceasta⁴⁰. La fel, dificultățile tradiționale

³³ Blumenberg, *Die Genesis der kopernikanischen Welt. Die Zweideutigkeit der Mimmels Eröffnung der Möglichkeit eines Kopernikus*, Band 1, ed. cit., p. 238.

³⁴ Blumenberg, *Die Genesis der kopernikanischen Welt. Typologie der frühen Wirkungen Der Stillstand des Himmels und der Fortgang der Zeit*, Band 2, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1989, p. 416.

³⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 417.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 423.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 424

³⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 432-433.

³⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 440-441.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 459.

de aplicare a fizicii la astronomie vor fi rezolvate prin înlocuirea filosofiei scolastice. De pildă, ficțiunile despre vacuum și intenție au trebuit, prin postcopernicanism, să fie eliminate din lumea vieții⁴¹.

Galilei realizează afirmarea omului, pentru a păstra sintagma blumenbergiană, prin întărirea experienței omului. Întrucât experiența are de-a face cu ansamblul Cosmosului sau, cel puțin, cu depășirea sistemului solar ca întindere, ceea ce este, imediat, prin definiție, capătă valențe cosmice, ca urmare a acestei echivalențe. Numai că, pentru a fi valabilă, experiența trebuie să evite manifestarea ca fenomen a obiectelor, prin apariția cognoscibilă direct și intuibilă. O astfel de disociere este subînțeleasă acolo unde un plan construit este considerat diferit de planul ideal geometric perfect.

Din punct de vedere al evoluției științei și rezultatelor acesteia, copernicanismul în ansamblu, inclusiv Galilei, ne face să vorbim de schimbări fundamentale și în privința disoluției sferei stelelor fixe gen și a iluziei că aceasta se află în mișcare⁴², una dintre cele mai vechi și mai pregnante constante, care a traversat Antichitatea și Evul Mediu. În ciuda totuși a celor două secole de realizări copernicane și a lărgirii spectrului observațiilor cerului, atât prin telescop⁴³, cât și prin noua paradigmă teoretică, nu e oferit nimic în plus în privința imaginii universului, consideră Blumenberg. Însă, odată cu Thomas Wright apare ideea că imaginea Căii Lactee e produsă de dispunerea dinăuntru acesteia⁴⁴, lucru care va implica atât asimilația viziunii iluministe a descentralizării universului în teoria perspectivei de studiere a cerului⁴⁵, cât și expansiunea timpului și a spațiului cu privire la Univers⁴⁶.

Ca sumă a tuturor schimbărilor, putem nota fenomenul lărgirii orizontului posibilităților în istoria științei, în ceea ce privește „contextul lucrurilor și circumstanțele demonstrabile istoric”⁴⁷. Acest context este

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 462-463.

⁴² Blumenberg, *Genesis der kopernikanischen Welt. Der kopernikanische Komparativ. Die kopernikanische Optik*, Band 3, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1989, p. 616.

⁴³ Pentru analizarea amănunțită a diferitelor schimbări produse prin intermediul telescopului, a se vedea Blumenberg, *Genesis der kopernikanischen Welt. Der kopernikanische Komparativ. Die kopernikanische Optik*, Band 3, ed. cit., pp. 633 și urm.

⁴⁴ Blumenberg, *Genesis der kopernikanischen Welt. Der kopernikanische Komparativ. Die kopernikanische Optik*, Band 3, ed. cit., p. 617.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 619.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 630.

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 724.

diferit de cel antic, unde realitatea era redusă la planul vizibil. În modernitate, nu doar că acest plan vizibil are un spectru mai larg, ci și distorsiunea naturală, rezultată din imperfecțiunea naturală a vizibilului ca dat, e corectată și „văzută” într-o mai adâncă semnificație.

În concluzie, triumful copernicanismului și al epocii moderne se bazează pe eliberarea de principiile fixe, de natură scolastică sau chiar și platonice, mai ales în privința mișcării și cauzalității. Revoluția copernicană nu este un „produs” causal decât în sens foarte larg, realizat prin eliberări, din interiorul sistemului, ale unor condiții sau precondiții generice care au favorizat schimbarea de paradigmă.

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LEIBNIZ'S QUASI-MONISM

Adrian NIȚĂ¹

Abstract: *I will interpret Leibniz's monadology as "quasi-monism", or "nearly monism", or, from another perspective, a Monism of a special kind. The "quasi monistic" thesis is as follows: the man is a Monad, that is, a simple substance endowed with perception, appetite, memory and reason; a closer look shows that man is soul and body; at a deeper level, we find form and matter; even deeper, we have a substantial form united to a primary matter; deeper more, one finds active force and primitive passive force and so on to infinity. This is the reason and context on which I intend to do a reverse chronological reading, from the writings of 1716 to the writings of 1695, in order to see the exciting game of two kinds of metaphysics: disclosed metaphysics and hidden metaphysics.*

Keywords: *early modern philosophy, Leibniz, corporeal substances, substantial forms, monads, quasi-monism, disclosed metaphysics, hidden metaphysics.*

Leibniz's disputes with the Cartesians have not led, as we would have expected, to a final metaphysical theory about the relationship between body and soul. Rather, we have a theory which is continuously subject to change, always improving, and tending asymptotically to a definitive solution. There will be therefore no surprise that nowadays scholars support, all with strong arguments, different views on Leibniz's metaphysical position, as idealist² or naturalist³, a monistic⁴ or pluralistic one⁵.

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² Robert M. Adams: *Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1994. The abbreviations we use in this paper: A: Leibniz, *Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe*, Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Darmstadt und Berlin, 1923 ff; GP: *Die Philosophischen Schriften von Leibniz*, hrsg. C.I. Gerhardt, 7 vol., Berlin, 1875-1890 (Hildesheim, Olms, 1960-1961); GM: *Leibnizens mathematische Schriften*, hrsg. C.J. Gerhardt, 7 vol., Berlin, A. Asher et co., 1849-1863 (reimpr. Hildesheim, Olms, 1962); L: GW Leibniz, *Philosophical Papers and Letters*, tr. Leroy E. Loemker, second edition, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1969. The present paper is a version of my intervention at the Xth International Leibniz Congress (Hannover, 2016).

³ François Duchesneau: *Leibniz: le vivant et l'organism*, Paris, Vrin, 2010; Pauline Phemister: *Leibniz*, London, Continuum, 2010; Daniel Garber: *Leibniz: Body*,

In my opinion Leibniz's approach of the relationship mind-body is in a very limited degree pluralistic, since it does not support the idea that the soul would be a kind of substance and the body would be another kind of substance (as Descartes does). But, on the other side, his metaphysical position could hardly be called monistic. The nature of the soul and the body is such that the two entities need to be considered in depth, both horizontally and vertically, respectively, both synchronic and diachronic. In a previous study⁶, I interpreted Leibniz's theory as "quasi-monism", or nearly monism, or, from another perspective, a Monism of a special kind. The "quasi monistic" thesis is as follows: man is a Monad, that is, a simple substance endowed with perception, appetite, memory and reason; a

Substance, Monad, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009; Pauline Phemister: *Leibniz and the Natural World: Activity, Passivity and Corporeal Substances in Leibniz's Philosophy*, Dordrecht, Springer, 2005; François Duchesneau: *Les modeles du vivant de Descartes a Leibniz*, Paris, Vrin, 1998.

⁴ Mogens Laerke: „Monism, Separability and Real Distinction in the Young Leibniz”, in: *The Leibniz Review* 19 (2009), pp. 1–28; Mark Kulstad: „The One and the Many, Kinds of Distinctness and Universal Harmony: The Possibility of Monism or Pantheism in the Young Leibniz”, in: D. Rutherford and J. A. Cover (eds.): *Leibniz. Nature and Freedom*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 20–43; Mark Kulstad: „Leibnizian Meditations on Monism, Force, and Substance, in Relation to Descartes, Spinoza and Malebranche”, in: *The Leibniz Review* 9 (1999), pp. 17–42; Catherine Wilson: „Atoms, Minds, and Vortices in *De Summa Rerum*”, in: S. Brown (ed.): *The Young Leibniz and His Philosophy*, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1999, pp. 223–244; S. Brown: „The Proto-Monadology of the *De Summa Rerum*”, in: Stuart Brown (ed.): *The Young Leibniz and His Philosophy*, pp. 263–287; Mark Kulstad: „Did Leibniz incline toward Monistic Pantheism in 1676?”, in: *Leibniz und Europa*, pp. 424–428; U. Goldenbaum: „Qui ex conceptu extensionis secundum tuas meditationes varietas rerum a priori possit ostendi? Noch einmal zu Leibniz, Spinoza und Tschirnhaus”, in: *Leibniz und Europa. VI. Internationaler Leibniz-Kongress*, Hannover, 1994, pp. 266–275.

⁵ Glenn A. Hartz: „Leibniz's Animals: Where Teleology Meets Mechanism”, in: Justin Smith, Ohad Nachtomy (eds.): *Machines of Nature and Corporeal Substances in Leibniz*, Dordrecht, Springer, 2011, pp. 29–38; Andreas Blank: „Substance Monism and Substance Pluralism in Leibniz's Metaphysical Papers 1675–1676”, in: *Studia leibnitiana*, Band 33, Heft 2 (2001), pp. 216–223; Andreas Blank: „The Analysis of Reflection and Leibniz's Early Response to Spinoza”, in: Mark Kulstad, Mogens Laerke, David Snyder (eds.): *The Philosophy of the Young Leibniz*, Stuttgart, Steiner, 2009. On the multiple notions of substantiality, see: Andreas Blank: „Leibniz and the Sixteenth-Century Controversy over Substance Monism”, in: *Revue roumaine de philosophie*, vol. 63, issue 1, June 2019, pp. 157–176.

⁶ Adrian Nita: „Mind-Body Problem: The Controversy Between Leibniz and Pierre Bayle”, in: *Revue Roumaine de Philosophie*, vol. 63, issue 1, June 2019, pp. 189–200.

closer look shows that man is soul and body; at a deeper level, we find form and matter; even deeper, we have a substantial form united to a primary matter; deeper more, one finds active force and primitive passive force and so on to infinity.

In the controversy with Pierre Bayle, Leibniz shows that there are three systems that explain the union of soul and body: the system of mutual influence; the system of eternal supervision; the system of pre-established harmony. His system of mutual agreement is presented as “the consent of two substances, similar to that existing between very accurate clocks”⁷. A pluralist interpreter finds here the very proof justifying such an approach, but Leibniz’s intention was not to support the existence of two proper substances.

Another element of ambiguity comes to cast shades on the image on Leibniz’s metaphysics, namely the phrase “corporeal substance”⁸ used in another sense than he presented in his correspondence with Arnauld or De Volder. In the writings dating from the mid-1690, Leibniz distinguishes between the world simple elements and that of compounds, as if there were two different universes, completely separated, devoid of any kind of communication, namely the world of souls and the world of bodies. This distinction is maintained, including in the *Monadology*, which enables the interpretation that this famous work could be read as consisting of two parts: to the paragraph 60, Leibniz presents the metaphysics of simplicities, and from paragraph 61 to the end he addresses the metaphysics of compounds [of course, in this second part, it should be noted the paragraphs about the relationship soul-body (78-81) and spirits (82-90)].

At a quick or non-prevented glance, it might seem that the system of pre-established harmony is a kind of metaphysical parallelism between soul and body.⁹ The problem is that this metaphysical parallelism is not a quasi-dualism, but rather a pseudo-dualism. There could not be dualism because Leibniz never claimed the existence of two substances. Even in reference to the body, the substantiality does not appear as something

⁷ *Eclaircissement des difficultés que Monsieur Bayle a trouvées dans le système nouveau de l’union de l’ame et du corps* (1698); GP IV, 520.

⁸ See *A New System of the Nature and the Communication of Substances, as well as the Union between the Soul and the Body* (1695) (GP IV, 481, 483) and the correspondence with Foucher (GP IV, 7858).

⁹ See Barry Lower: „Mind Body Problem”, in: Jaegwon Kim/Ernest Sosa (eds.): *A Companion to Metaphysics*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1995, pp. 327-332, here p. 329.

different from the substantiality of the soul; rather, soul and body are the two faces of the same substance.

This theory sustained during the monadologic period could be called “disclosed metaphysics”: Leibniz strongly supports the theory of monads in the frame of the theory of pre-establish harmony. At the same time, he does not provide details about the profound metaphysics, based on the quasi-monistic thesis – I will call it “hidden metaphysics”. This is the reason and the context on which I intend to do a reverse chronological reading, from the writings of 1716 to the writings of 1695, in order to see the exciting game of these two kinds of metaphysics.

1. Disclosed metaphysics

In *Monadology* and *Principles of Nature and of Grace based on Reason* (PNG), harmony between soul and body on the basis of a parallel is obvious: between the world of souls with its laws and the world of bodies with its own laws¹⁰, and between the perceptions of the monad and body movements.¹¹ The metaphysical image operates horizontally, covering more the surface of things, rather than what is more profound or its deep structures.

Moreover, the metaphysical parallelism contradicts completely Leibniz’s ideas of the preceding paragraphs, particularly those dedicated to the body. For example, in paragraph 64, the body appears as a divine machine, *i.e.* a machine that retains this character endlessly in all its parts.

Even more challenging, in PNG appears an image that one could associate with onions:

each outstanding simple substance or monad which forms the center of a compound substance (such as an animal, for example), and is the principle of its uniqueness, is surrounded (environée) by a mass composed of an infinity of other monads which constitute the body belonging to this central monad.¹²

The horizontal image of metaphysics prevails, when, as a matter of fact, we should see here not so much the parallelism between soul and body, but the quasi-monistic thesis of the box in a box type. When something covers something else, as with onion skinning, we have a simple relationship of containment, concealment and disclosure, while the spirit of Leibniz’s

¹⁰ *Monadology* (1714) 78.

¹¹ *Principles of Nature and of Grace based on Reason* (1714) 3.

¹² *Ibidem* (1714) 3; L 637.

metaphysics is rather something contained in something else, this something else in turn being composed of two elements and so indefinitely.

The categorical couple one-multiple receives an ingenious solution. To solve the problem of the soul-body relationship, Leibniz claims that the multiple needs something simple receiving from it unity, identity and reality or, generally, its being. Or, in simple matter, passive, repetitive, there could not exist principles of unity. It takes a true unity, a formal atom, or atom of substance, to give through its simplicity and its unity the unity of multiple. In the works from the mid-1690, this simple element is the substantial form, and in the last works, *Monadology* and PNG is the monad. We will not be surprised that in *A New System of the Nature and the Communication of Substances, as well as the Union between the Soul and the Body* (NS) substantial forms are conceived by analogy with soul, while in *Monadology* and PNG Leibniz no longer uses the term “substantial form”.¹³ Moreover, Leibniz goes from analogy to identity: the soul is considered something simple, like a simple substance or monad.¹⁴

We see how the complexity of Leibniz’s metaphysical theory on the relationship soul-body overlaps a complex categorial system that multiplies meanings and where metaphors abound. For example, on the soul (l’âme) it is observed that the soul is both form¹⁵ and principle or substance¹⁶. In other words, the soul is simultaneously one part of the substance of man and also the whole, the substance as such. If in NS 3 is the soul that provides an analogous understanding in support of substantial forms, in *Monadology* 19 the soul appears as something that possesses appetite and perception, that is a monad, and in *Monadology* 70, the soul appears as a dominant entelechy. Hence, to support a panpsychism, spiritualism or idealism is only a small step, which commentators have not hesitated to do.¹⁷

¹³ On the adoption of substantial forms, see Adrian Nita (ed.): *Leibniz’s Metaphysics and Adoption of Substantial Forms*, Dordrecht, Springer, 2015; Daniel Garber: *Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009; Michel Fichant: „Mécanisme et métaphysique: le rétablissement des formes substantielles (1679)”, in: Michel Fichant: *Science et métaphysique dans Descartes et Leibniz*, Paris, PUF, 1998, pp. 163-204.

¹⁴ *Monadology* (1714) 19.

¹⁵ NS (1695) 3; *Monadology* (1714) 63.

¹⁶ *Monadology* (1714) 63, 78-81.

¹⁷ See Pierfrancesco Basile, „It Must be True - But How Can it Be? Some Remarks on Panpsychism and Mental Composition”, in P. Basile, J. Kiverstein, P. Phemister

The counterpart of the pansychist image is given by Leibniz's reflections on the body: whatever the claims on the soul might be, it must not be forgotten that in the world there is no soul without a body; in other words, whenever Leibniz speaks of the soul it must not be forgotten that this image must include also a body. In fact, this is exactly the problem with regard to the dispute over monism *versus* pluralism, or idealism *versus* naturalism.

Leibniz uses two highly suggestive metaphors: the body as a river¹⁸ and the body as a divine machine.¹⁹ Body as a river emphasizes the idea of continuous change to which the organic body is subjected, given that his being is precisely his becoming - how beautifully would have said an important Romanian philosopher, Constantin Noica (colleague and friend with Cioran, Eliade and Ionesco).

Leibniz's metaphor reminds us of the following thought experiment. Suppose a boat departing from the port of Hamburg, through the North Sea, to Amsterdam. On the way, it changes one by one all the parts of which it is built. The problem is: the same boat reaches its destination or another? We think that according to Leibniz the same ship reaches the destination only if there is a principle of unity in the material parts which are subject to change. The answer could be clearer if we imagine a living being that travels on this boat and whose parts are all changing one by one until it reaches its destination. In this case, the principle of identity is precisely the presence of the absolutely simple part, entelechy or soul. This is unchangeable and provides the principle of identity and individuation, although it is not strictly localized in any material part subjected to change.²⁰

(eds.), *The Metaphysics of Consciousness*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 93-112; J. Jalabert, *La théorie leibnizienne de la substance*, Paris, PUF, 1947.

¹⁸ *Monadology* (1714) 71.

¹⁹ *Monadology* (1714) 64.

²⁰ On the individuation in Leibniz, see: Lucio Mare, Roger Ariew: „The Individual in Leibniz's Philosophy. 1663-1686”, in: Adrian Nita (ed.): *Leibniz's metaphysics and Adoption of Substantial Forms*, Dordrecht, Springer, 2015, pp. 11-25; Adrian Nita: „Substance, Unity, and Identity in Early Leibniz's Work”, in: Adrian Nita (ed.): *Leibniz's metaphysics and Adoption of Substantial Forms*, Dordrecht, Springer, 2015, pp. 27-41; Roger Ariew: „Descartes and Leibniz on the Principle of Individuation”, in: Vlad Alexandrescu (ed.): *Branching off. The Early Moderns in Quest for the Unity of Knowledge*, Bucharest, Zeta, 2009, pp. 95-115; Massimo Mugnai: „Leibniz on Individuation: From the Early Years to the *Discourse* and Beyond”, in: *Studia*

The second metaphor, the divine machine, helps us see more clearly the image proposed by Leibniz.²¹ Unlike artificial machines, built by people, the nature's machines are alive in all their parts, have the same structural organization in all parts, so that they are machines to the smallest parts.²² It could be observed that Leibniz does not provide details about the depth of things, in other words the living body is a machine in every part of it by the fact that it contains something absolutely simple. But how propagate uniqueness and simplicity at every level of deep structural organization of living things, or, generally, of every entity? Maybe we could find an answer in other writings from the monadologic period.

2. Pseudo-dualism

The *Theodicy* (1710) focuses much on pre-established harmony, so that the horizontal metaphysics, which I called disclosed, is tested both on the nature of the soul, as well as on the nature of the relationship between soul and body: we have here the simple soul-substance equivalence, the idea of creation and annihilation, the pre-existence of the soul in seeds, the impossible existence of a soul separated from the body etc.

However the thesis of pre-established harmony brings a slight change: the body executes movements which it is programmed to, so that they reflect the desires of the soul. Although, the soul does not act as a cause of the events of the body, and the body does not influence mental phenomena, the principle of causality is a basic law of both kingdoms:

Leibnitiana XXXIII/1, 2001, 36-54; J.A. Cover, J. O'Leary-Hawthorne: *Substance and individuation in Leibniz*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999; McCullough: *Leibniz on individuals and individuation. The persistence of Pre-modern Ideas in Modern Philosophy*, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1996, chap. 1-40.

²¹ On divine machines and organisms, see: Raphaëlle Andrault, *La vie selon la raison*, Paris, Champion, 2014; Justin Smith: *Divine Machines: Leibniz and the Sciences of Life*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2011; Justin Smith, Ohad Nachtomy (eds.): *Machines of Nature and Corporeal Substances in Leibniz*, Dordrecht, Springer, 2011; Justin Smith (ed.): *The Problem of Animal Generation in Early Modern Philosophy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006; A.M. Nunziante: *Organismo come Armonia. La genesi del concetto di organismo vivente in Leibniz*, Trento, Verifiche, 2002; Hide Ishiguro: „Unity without simplicity: Leibniz on organism”, in: *The Monist*, vol. 81, 4 (1998), pp. 534-552; François Duchesneau: *Modèles du vivant de Descartes à Leibniz*, Paris, Vrin, 1998; Enrico Pasini: *Corpo e funzioni cognitive in Leibniz*, Franco Milan, Angeli, 1996; Catherine Wilson: *The Invisible World*, Princeton, Princeton University Press 1995.

²² *Monadology* (1714) 64.

simple substance is the genuine cause of mental phenomena as the body must be endowed with something which enables it to produce its movements.²³

The close link between the *Theodicy* and other works from the same period is more than obvious. But the highlight of the theme of the soul casted shades on issues about the nature of the body: the nature of the body remains mysterious in the only paper prepared by Leibniz for printing, although he is constantly using his ideas supported over the years. As in *Monadology*, the *Theodicy* shows how the body was already organized at birth, so birth appears as unveiling, and death as veiling.²⁴ Moreover, the fact that a body is inseparable from a monad is not explained in as much detail as in the *Monadology*, where it is argued that a body is attached to a monad, so only because of this it could be argued that a body is a divine machine. As the monads are everywhere, spread around the world, in the same way one must understand that monads are spread all over in the body.

It can be seen how the possibility of body change depends apparently on the body, but it would be more correct to say that it comes *from* the soul, as shown a mysterious phrase “the soul only changes its body little by little and by degrees, so that it is never deprived of all its organs at once.”²⁵

Metaphors of the body like a river and of the body as a divine machine need to be seen in another historical and systematic context, otherwise there is a danger for a contemporary audience to be deprived of the true metaphysics of Leibniz, that is to miss the quasi-monistic image and to see a false dualistic metaphysics, based on the idea of the pre-established harmony.

These ideas from *Theodicy* are consonant with the *Considerations about the unique universal spirit* (1702). Leibniz rejects the theory of universal spirit precisely because he wants to support a theory of a particular soul. Unlike the followers of Averroes, Leibniz supports the idea of the immortality of the soul and shows that a living being develops continually, increases, reveals itself and death is nothing more than decrease, decline or veiling.²⁶

²³ *Theodicy* (1710) 400.

²⁴ *Theodicy* (1710) 90.

²⁵ *Monadology* (1714) 72; L 650.

²⁶ See *Considerations on the theory of an universal spirit* (1702),

It might be raised the objection that it is not clear what it would mean for soul development or decline. Not being organic, the soul does not pass through the regular biological processes of development and decline, but given that it possesses a representative nature, an analogy in this regard might be relevant. With the theory of small perceptions, the philosopher from Hanover can explain how the soul *represents* to itself everything that happens in the body, and even more, everything that happens in the universe.

In relation to the idea of birth and death, Leibniz develops his argument through the concepts of creation and annihilation; these moments are a kind of birth, respectively death for the soul appears with the world and disappears with the world. Until the moment it will be joined with an organic body, the soul is bare form, a primitive entelechy; its being is only potential. Likewise, after the death of a living being, the soul returns to potentiality.

The argument that in each portion of matter there are particular forms, souls and spirits, reinforces the idea underlying quasi-monadic, in-depth metaphysics, to the detriment of metaphysical parallelism. But the demonstrative argument adopted by Leibniz was previously presented – suggests Leibniz -, when he spoke of unities, and he is unwilling to resume it in the *Considerations*. In the case that he referred to his *Discourse on Metaphysics* 8-9, 33-36, the problem is that here the explanation of the soul-body relationship is based on the theory of complete notion. If the reference is the New System, one can see that in this writings from 1695 the explanation of the union soul-body is ground on the theory of preestablished harmony; so, it is the paralelist view that is was put in the front; no explanation is given on the body.

3. Leibniz-Bayle Controversy

In his Controversy with Pierre Bayle (from 1687 to 1702)²⁷, Leibniz underlines the unity each time he shows the connection there is between

²⁷ On Leibniz-Bayle Controversy, see Mogens Laerke, *Les lumières de Leibniz: controverses avec Huet, Bayle, Regis et More*, Paris, Garnier, 2015; Christian Leduc (ed.), *Leibniz et Bayle: confrontation et dialogue*, Stuttgart, Steiner, *Studia Leibnitiana Sonderhefte* 43, 2012; Philippe Fréchet, *Pierre Bayle et la liberté de conscience*, Toulouse, Anacharsis, 2012; Hubert Bost, *Les „Eclaircissements” de Pierre Bayle*, Paris, Champion, 2010; Todd Ryan, *Pierre Bayle’s Cartesian Metaphysics: rediscovering Early Modern Philosophy*, New York, Routledge, 2009; Jean-Paul Larthomas, *L’article*

individuality and being: the individual is one, and so the individual *is*, only if it is a substance. This Aristotelian idea is used in order to show that if and only if the individual posses something substantial it is a being and not a phenomenon. This substantial element is the mind (soul, substantial form, monad). This principle of unity can be found at any level of existence.²⁸

It is obvious that this aspect that underlines the unity is the corporeal substance; but, in his controversy with Bayle, Leibniz does not use this idea, unlike is the case with the controversy with Arnauld or de Volder. Even more, the notion of monad, that already existed in his vocabulary, does not work in *Eclaircissement des difficultés que Monsieur Bayle a trouvées dans le système nouveau de l'union de l'ame et du corps*; in the *Extrait* appears on the last page, when Leibniz resumes his ideas. In *Reply* the term "monad" is present many times - a sign that this last part of the paper is of great importance for Leibniz's thinking.

Given that the soul gives the being, unity and identity, the soul has a capacity (power, *force*, *kraft*) through which it can accomplish the law that God attributed to it. Leibniz maintains the structure of the corporeal automaton, by which, apparently, the body obeys the soul.²⁹ But the corporeal substance is responsible of these complicated mechanisms, given that in any part of the body, there are both material and immaterial automaton.³⁰

In the controversy with Bayle, the soul is not a simple part of the individual, nor a different substance in respect with the body. The soul is a principle of being and unity, and this way, a principle of reality - an idea that Leibniz does not underly very well given the dualist context of the controversy with Bayle. He does not centre himself also on the entelechies and substantial forms, given that they are Aristotelian ideas and represent a part that Cartesians wish to reject. The controversy has the specific trait that Leibniz is forced to put in the centre not the substantial forms and entelechies, but the soul.³¹ In this context, can be understand that in his

„Rorarius” de Bayle et la (re-)fondation du système leibnizien après 1697, Louvain-la-Neuve, Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 2005.

²⁸ Leibniz: *Extrait du Dictionnaire de M. Bayle article Rorarius p. 2599 sqq. de l'Édition de l'an 1702 avec mes remarques* (1716); GP IV, 528.

²⁹ *Ibidem*; GP IV, 537.

³⁰ *Eclaircissement* (1698); GP IV, 522; L 495.

³¹ On the relationsheep between soul (*anima*) and mind (*mens*) in early Leibniz's work, see: Adrian Nita: „Substance, Unity, and Identity in Early Leibniz's Work”,

second edition of the *Dictionary*, Bayle compares the soul of Caesar, understood as an immaterial automaton, with an Epicurean atom, and he raises many objections to this approach. In his reply, Leibniz says that it is a great difference between “matter and soul”: matter is something incomplete, it lacks the source of its actions; the soul is a true substance, namely a complete being.³² Leibniz does not conceive the being and unity in Descartes' manner.³³ The soul is a complete being not in the sense that it can exist completely separate of the body, but in the sense that the soul *gives* being and unity to the individual.

Bayle sustains that the possibility of the hypothesis of Leibniz can not be calculated given that we do not know the substantial ground of the soul and the way in which it can change itself from an idea to other.³⁴ In his reply, Leibniz sustains that the thought on these very important matters are very new, and even more, they can be misunderstood by the profanes.³⁵ Ideas as “the present contains the future” (*le present est gros de l'avenir*), or “each substance express from the present all its future states”³⁶ are very mysterious for somebody who does not know the nature of the soul in Leibniz' view: the soul is a simple substance, that is a true unity; the soul is the expression of multiplicity, that is of the corporeal world, in accordance with its point of view; the soul is the expression of the phenomena according to “the metaphysic-mathematical laws of nature”³⁷ and finally, the soul is a imitation of God.

4. Quasi-monistic metaphysics

The complex game between disclosed metaphysics and hidden metaphysics leads us finally to two writings containing Leibniz's dynamics.³⁸ *Specimen dynamicum* (1695) distinguishes between primary

in: Adrian Nita (ed.): *Leibniz's metaphysics and Adoption of Substantial Forms*, Dordrecht, Springer, 2015, pp. 27-41

³² *Extrait* (1716); GP IV, 543-544.

³³ See Descartes: *Meditationes de prima philosophiae*, VI.

³⁴ Bayle to Leibniz (October 3, 1702); GP III, 65.

³⁵ Leibniz to Bayle (1702); GP III, 66.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, GP III, 66.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, GP III, 72.

³⁸ On Leibniz's dynamics, see: Michel Fichant: „De la puissance à l'action”, in: *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 100e année, 1 (1995); Leibniz: *La réforme de la dynamique*, trans. and commentary by M. Fichant, Paris, Vrin, 1994; Pierre Costabel, *Leibniz et la dynamique en 1692. Textes et commentaires*, Paris, Vrin, 1981; Michel Fichant: „La

matter and secondary matter, between active form and passive form, between primary forces and derivative forces, the central category being that of corporeal substance. Active force, useful for metaphysics, is identified with entelechy, soul or substantial form; the passive force is the one that is responsible for the physical and observable aspects of the entities. As both are either primitive or derivative, the most interesting for the present discussion, the passive primitive force, is the one that scholastics called *primary matter*.

Active force, which may well be called power, as it is by some, is of two kinds. The first is primitive force, which is in all corporeal substance as such, since I believe that a body entirely at rest is contrary to the nature of things. The second is derivative force, which is exercised in various ways through a limitation of primitive force resulting from the conflict of bodies with each other. Primitive force, which is nothing but the first entelechy, corresponds to the soul or substantial form, but for this very reason it relates only to general causes which cannot suffice to explain phenomena (...) Passive force is likewise of two kinds - primitive and derivative. The primitive force of suffering or of resisting constitutes the very things which the Scholastics call *materia prima*, if rightly interpreted. It brings it about, namely, that one body is not penetrated by another but opposes an obstacle to it and is at the same time possessed of a kind of laziness, so to speak, or a repugnance to motion, and so does not allow itself to be set in motion without somewhat breaking the force of the body acting upon it. Hence the derivative force of suffering thereafter shows itself in various ways in secondary matter.³⁹

The body understood at the junction between matter and monads, an interpretation presented in *De ipsa natura* (1698), shows how Leibniz can go from the idea of bodily substance as primary matter united with a substantial form, to the idea of the body as a plurality of substances; in other words, Leibniz changes slightly only the quasi-monistic image of his box in a box: from primary matter united with a substantial form he moves to a dominant monad united with countless subordinate monads. The body and soul relationship is based not on the idea of influence or supervision,

« réforme » leibnizienne de la dynamique”, in: *Studia Leibnitiana Suppl*, tome 13, 1974, pp. 195-214; M. Gueroult: *Leibniz: dynamique et métaphysique*, deuxième édition, Paris, Aubier-Montaigne, 1967.

³⁹ *Specimen dynamicum* (1695), GM VI, 236; L 436-437.

but the specific laws of the body, respectively soul, originally pre-designed by God.⁴⁰

Matter plays a major role precisely because of the possibility of infinite divisibility. So Leibniz can explain the existence of a principle of activity at every level of the organization of the body. This primordial unity, substantial principle responsible for identity, unity and reality is called *soul* for living beings or *substantial form* for other entities.

Now since these activities and entelechies cannot be modes of primary matter or mass, which is something essentially passive (...), it can be concluded that there must be found in corporeal substance a *primary entelechy* or first recipient of activity, that is, a primitive motive force which, superadded to extension, or what is merely geometrical, and mass, or what is merely material, always acts indeed and yet is modified in various ways by the concurrence of bodies, through a conatus or impetus. It is this substantial principle itself which is called the *soul* in living beings and *substantial form* in other beings, and inasmuch as it truly constitutes one substance with matter, or a unit in itself, it makes up what I call a monad. For if these true and real unities were dispensed with, only beings through aggregation would remain; indeed, it would follow that there would be left no true beings within bodies.⁴¹

5. Conclusions

To conclude, we retain some ideas: 1. Leibniz remains cautious in asserting its own metaphysical system; he always feels the need to submit it to others, so that his metaphysical theory is always in progress. 2. The game between disclosed metaphysics and hidden metaphysics shows that Leibniz's used metaphysics, replete with metaphors, was not intended to hide the truth, but rather the disclosure of the true metaphysics at a given moment when the public, or the philosophical community, would have been better prepared to receive it. 3. Disclosed metaphysics is based on the theory of pre-established harmony between soul and body, *i.e.* on a metaphysical parallelism which is in fact pseudo-dualism, because the image of the communication between soul and body that cannot act as a cause one on another, is not based on the existence of two substances. The body as a plurality of substances can not be taken as such; it is rather a metaphor. 4. Hidden metaphysics is based on the idea of box in a box,

⁴⁰ *De ipsa natura* (1698) 10.

⁴¹ *Ibidem* 11; L 503-504.

providing a picture of the internal, deep structure of any entity. The presence of monads to the smallest parts of an entity is consonant, continuous, and homogeneous with the idea that existence is based on the substantial form united to primary matter; at a deeper level, the existence means active force united to primitive passive force and so on. 5. The context can give us a good explanation of the complex game between disclosed metaphysical theory and hidden theory: in the writing published in journals from France and Netherlands, the context of the discussion has *per force* to be Cartesian and dualist while in the writings published in Germany, Leibniz does not need additional precautionary measures to present properly his ideas. 6. The body is a divine machine, that is alive in all its parts, with the same structural organization in all parts. We saw that uniqueness and simplicity propagate at every level of deep structural organization of every entity just because of its materiality. In this way, the metaphysics is united with the dynamics, as demonstrates *Specimen dynamicum* (1695) și *De ipsa natura* (1698).

REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE IN HENRI BERGSON

Vicente Lozano DÍAZ¹

Abstract: *In opposition to positivist-psychologist reductionism, which reduces the human being to just one more element within the material world, subject to natural laws, Bergson defends a conception of reality as a plurality of impulses and tendencies. A reality in which the human being is understood as creative freedom, with duration and giving duration to all other things, as a spiritual reality from which may be extracted much more than it contains. Additionally, this creative freedom which is the human being, and which allows the individual to participate in all other things, does not arise by chance as mechanists contend, nor as a mere adaptation to the environment as Darwinists believe, but possesses the ultimate meaning that the individual constantly improves reality and the self, giving being to what was not.*

Keywords: *spatialising intelligence, duration, intuition, creativity, spirit.*

I. Presentation

In 1915, the French philosopher Henri Bergson was at the height of his intellectual and social prestige, known in France as “the Bergsonian cult” and in Great Britain as the “Bergson Boom” (Soulez & Worms, 1997: 110 & 129). As a result of this renown, his Danish colleague Harald Höffding wrote a book about his thought: *The Philosophy of Bergson: exposition and critique*, which he forwarded to Bergson prior to its publication. This moved Bergson to write a letter in response pointing out what he believed were certain errors in the book and providing what is no doubt the best summary of his own thinking. After indicating that philosophical intuition goes far beyond artistic intuition, he states:

In my opinion, any summary of my views will produce an overall distortion and, in virtue of this very fact, expose them to a mass of objections, if it is not first situated at and does not ceaselessly return to what I consider the very centre of the doctrine: the intuition of duration. The representation of a multiplicity of “reciprocal penetration”, quite different from numerical

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multiplicity – the representation of a heterogeneous, qualitative, creative duration – was my point of departure and the point to which I have constantly returned. (Bergson, 2011b: 443).

Bergson thus establishes the specific framework through which he believes his philosophy must be understood: reality as duration, as a multiplicity of reciprocal penetration and not a mere numerical multiplicity of elements, and intuition as a new method of thought enabling this duration to be understood; a new method which, as he goes on to state: “requires a very great mental effort”, as it breaks with the habitual manner of representing ourselves and of conceiving of reality.

II. The critique of positivism and psychologism

Through what is commonly referred to as *common sense* and what is considered as scientific knowledge, we have become accustomed to perceiving reality as a series of regular and stable material facts located within space, juxtaposed one with another, basically repeating in the same manner: a stone, a weather phenomenon or a person occur, intervene and interrelate in a succession of events or actions. Thus, as the fundamental aspiration of every human being is to continue living, we are obliged to take advantage of these materials, to dominate them in order to avoid a danger or obtain a specific benefit, and for this we possess intelligence which itself plays a role in the perception of reality in the form of *common sense*.

The purpose of intelligence is above all the preparation and illumination of our action on material things, and thus must have been modelled on the structure of this material, must have developed in a way that agrees with it and so can know it. Thanks to intelligence, human awareness can understand, can project outwards and externalise in relation to itself in the exact measure that it perceives and distinguishes external things. Our life consists of a constant tracing of possibilities or goals, attempting to achieve them.

But, claims Bergson, to know and dominate the material world, intelligence has had to pay the price of its necessary “spatialization”. Since the material world is spatial, consisting of things or facts that occupy a specific position, and since intelligence had to adapt to this material world in order to know it, everything it perceives or produces is in spatial terms. Intelligence is always seeking fixed points or positions between which to

establish relations that permit measurement, transforming the inextensive into extensive and all qualities into quantities, to the point where any thought on any theme implies the establishment between ideas the same clear and precise distinctions and the same discontinuity perceived in external material objects. In perceiving the movement of a specific object, one does not observe the movement itself but establishes a series of positions in which the object successively appears. In the case of a specific muscular effort, one fixes the place of the effort and assigns an intensity depending on the amount of effort being made. In the case of time, one deals with it as a measurable entity allowing access to objects, as a succession of instants which measure what came before and what comes after, generating physical time, that of physics and the clocks we all live by and organise our existence. But this is not a time that lasts, that flows but is a mere juxtaposition of instants, positions of the hands of the clock.

Thus, all acts of intelligence have the same character, aiming to determine the perfect contours of all elements of reality, to distinguish its limits and make them impenetrable one from another in order that they are juxtaposed in space and “spatialised” time, and thus calculable and usable. In fact, Bergson maintains, intelligence functions as a in a film. Firstly, the mind selects certain elements of reality and isolates and freezes them, as in a still image or photograph, then situating them in a continuous manner to create a chain and, finally, reintroducing the movement in a manner that they occur in an specific order and at a constant pace, allowing them to be predicted and controlled. This is the origin of scientific knowledge, that is based on intelligence and is effective for action, to obtain results and power of material things but which impedes us from accessing what things and reality itself truly are.

Bergson thus believes that the principal obstacle to understanding what is truly real arises from the mentality produced by positivism and psychologism, the dominant currents of Western thought since the mid 19th century.

In effect, positivism, which posits that the only valid knowledge is that derived from the experimental methods of the natural sciences, that is, that which formulates affirmations or conclusions which must be contrasted or verified through the senses, leads to psychologism, which equates the mind with the brain, and therefore considers all human mental content, from ideas or feelings to emotions or desires to be the result of physical or material stimulate that are both observable and measurable. But this

sophisticated materialism is limited to one dimension of reality, the physical or material dimension, in which the human being uses their practical intelligence to respond to the exigencies of the material world, acting to achieve the greatest security and the greatest pleasure possible. This ensures the survival of the individual but at the cost of impeding access to the essence or origins underlying the material world. Access to the essential, the truly real, requires transcending the natural or immediate perception, going beyond intelligence into the realm of intuition.

This is the objection Bergson puts forth in his first book, *An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness*, published in 1889, which calls attention to the fact that the positivist-psychologist conception that dominates modern thought “implies a prior confusion of duration with extensity, succession with simultaneity, quality with quantity” (Bergson, 2007: VII).

From this opening salvo, Bergson shows with various examples the inconsistency of the positivist-psychologist conception. One of the most well-known examples and most repeated in his subsequent lectures, is the famous Achilles paradox attributed to the ancient Greek philosopher Zeno of Elea (Bergson, 2007: 83-86). According to this paradox, if a tortoise begins a race and a short time later the fleetfooted Achilles sets off after him, we can intellectually affirm that no matter how fast Achilles may be, he will never catch up to the tortoise. While he is running the first stretch or interval, the tortoise meanwhile will have completed another stretch or interval and, no matter how quickly Achilles runs this new interval, the tortoise will have advanced a certain distance, creating another interval, and so on. Achilles will always be one stretch or interval behind the tortoise.

According to Bergson, this paradox confuses space with movement. By forgetting that we can divide a thing but not an act, we confuse a simple act of intuition or thought, which we form into a unity, positioning this unity within space, the moment in which we objectify, that is, we transform it into an extensive and divisible thing (Dopazo, 2018: 77). That is, we correctly represent the specific space travelled by the protagonists as an extension, as a line that mobile agents travel that can be divided indefinitely into parts or intervals. But, secondly, we commit the error of projecting the movement of both protagonists in said space. By solidifying the acts of movement we create space. Just as space is a juxtaposition of positions, we consider movement as a juxtaposition of instants. Just as the space which separates the two moving objects is indefinitely divisible, to

be recomposed as we wish, we represent the movement of both moving objects in the space as something which can also be divided indefinitely and recomposed as we wish.

We thus commit a double error. Firstly, we fail to consider the difference between space, which is divisible, and movement, which is an indivisible act. And secondly, we also fail to consider the specificity and qualitative difference of each of the movements of the protagonists. We forget that each of the steps of the tortoise and each of the steps of Achilles are indivisible acts; we take movement, of different magnitudes in terms of space, and we regard them as two equal movements, recomposing them as if they were the movements of two tortoises, each regulated by the other and condemned to take the same steps or perform the same acts simultaneously, never surpassing the other.

If Achilles manages to pass the tortoise, Bergson insists, it is because the steps of each are indivisible in terms of movements, and are different magnitudes in terms of space, and thus the total space run by Achilles is greater than that run by the tortoise. This implies that both are effectively in a specific and divisible space, while also implying that their movements do not occupy space. If their movements occupied space, if they were a quantitative extension, Zeno's paradox would have no solution. Thus, the example illustrates how only that which has no duration is homogeneous; extensive space exists in the juxtaposition of positions or simultaneities while, in terms of the time in which it takes place, the distance covered within an interval or series of intervals can only be homogeneous, extensive or quantitative. But time itself, essential time, has no reality beyond a mere succession of states of consciousness, as an interpenetration of different and changing qualities or intensities, an interpenetration which can only take the appearance of a magnitude or quantity through the intermediation of a symbolic representation necessarily introduced by the spatial. (Bergson, 2007: 65).

Bergson recognises, however, that the positivist-psychologist conception has been so accepted that it has become part of the modern mentality, exceeding the scope of scientific knowledge to become *common sense*, as a way of seeing reality and of understanding ourselves.

In effect, all of us accept without any difficulty that our conscious state, that is, our sensations, feelings or passions are able to be graded numerically or even compared one to another. We speak of feelings that are more intense than others or that a feeling increases or decreases or is

greater of lesser than another feeling. According to the positivist-psychologist conception, we assimilate any mental or spiritual content of specific magnitudes which will form part of or be the objective or physical cause, as if all our psychological states, even the most profound, have a material cause and thus convertible into extension, in quantity, and reducible to the specific states of the molecules or atoms of our brain caused by the specific states of the molecules or atoms of the exterior physical world, caused by perceptions of material objects. This however, Bergson maintains, is not possible. While we can affirm that a number of quantity is greater than another, since between two numbers or magnitudes there is a relation of container and content. The number "four" is contained within or forms part of the number "eight". But this is not the case with psychological states. A state of consciousness, a feeling or sensation does not form part of another, greater feeling or sensation, it is simply a different feeling or sensation and so establishing relations of degree between them is not possible.

While it is true that a great number of psychological states are accompanied by muscular contractions and physical sensations inter-associated by purely speculative ideas or practical representations, but this should not lead us to convert these processes in the only causes of psychological states, the only causes which are measurable and comparable and permit an explanation of these states:

Our consciousness of an increase of muscular effort is reducible to the twofold perception of a greater number of peripheral sensations, and of a qualitative change occurring in some of them. We are thus led to define the intensity of a superficial effort in the same way as that of a deep-seat psychic feeling. In both cases there is a qualitative progress and increasing complexity, indistinctly perceived. But consciousness, accustomed to think in terms of space and to translate its thought into words, will denote the feeling by a single word and will localize the effort at the exact point where it yields a useful result : it will then become aware of an effort which is always of the same nature and increases at the spot assigned to it, and a feeling which, retaining the same name, grows without changing its nature. (Bergson, 2007: 19-20).

But this "psychologist" and "spatialising" reduction of the psychological or emotional to the physical by our intelligence is refuted by the simple fact that two common physical efforts or external physical phenomena, similar in extension and magnitude, cause in us, depending on the circumstances,

two different sensations or feelings. That is, the nature or magnitude of an internal or external physical or material source does not absolutely determine our subsequent psychological condition. I am not more tired than yesterday, nor do I love you less than tomorrow, I am tired in another way and I love you in another way. And so, concludes Bergson, we cannot reduce the qualitative to the quantitative, establish different degrees where there are differences of nature. We cannot simply equate “the intensity of some physical efforts” with “the intensity of profound feelings of the soul”; there is always in the psychological something that is irreducible to the merely material, a dimension linked to our content and hopes beyond the physical: “The affective state must then correspond not merely to the physical disturbances, movements or phenomena which have taken place, but also, and especially, to those which are in preparation, those which are getting ready to be” (Bergson, 2007: 25). This brief statement is fundamental as it is here that Bergson points out that beyond the practical conception of reality as something merely physical, as a merely spatial juxtaposition of situations or moments that occur. There is more; a dimension which refers to what one prepares for, what one hopes to be. Thus, there are two dimensions, each linked to a particular conception of time.

The first dimension is reality as conceived by positivism-psychologism, and which is accepted in the modern world as *common sense*. Reality is understood as a juxtaposition of material and extensive states from which arise certain physical stimuli that produce the mental content of human beings, that is, their feelings, ideas, emotions and desires. Here, the human being is a physical-biological component inserted into material reality, using intelligence to respond to situations or material stimuli seeking survival and pleasure. For this task human intelligence conceives everything spatially, as subject to extension and the numerical or quantitative. Everything is reducible to a multiplicity of states, including time, with the identity of the subject becoming a succession of states of consciousness occurring in space, and always in the present, the current states of consciousness, the special or fundamental states from which to respond to the demands of everyday life:

For if time, as the reflective consciousness represents it, is a medium in which our conscious states form a discrete series so as to admit of being counted, and if on the other hand our conception of number ends in spreading out in space everything which can be directly counted, it is to be presumed that

time, understood in the sense of a medium in which we make distinctions and count, is nothing but space. (Bergson, 2007: 68).

In this first dimension of reality, the human being is thus reduced to just another organic element, with all states, desires or even actions determined by natural stimuli and responses associated with mere survival and pleasure. The human subject is therefore not free and responsible for their actions but becomes a phantom, one more element in a specific structure governed by natural laws and the laws of self-preservation, an aggregate of successive facts of consciousness inserted into a material world in which events simply occur and the only meaning of existence is to preserve that existence:

The associationist reduces the self to an aggregate of conscious states: sensations, feelings, and ideas. But if he sees in these various states no more than is expressed in their name, if he retains only their impersonal aspect, he may set them side by side for ever without getting anything but a phantom self, the shadow of the ego projecting itself into space. (Bergson, 2007: 124).

III. The new conception of reality

Confronting the materialist reductionism and mechanist determinism to which the positivist-psychologist conception of reality leads, Bergson sets out in his first work a second dimension of reality. This is a reality understood, not as a mere juxtaposition of states linked to time conceived as a mere succession of events but understood as an interpenetration of interconnected states and connected to the physical world not merely as a response oriented towards survival but towards a spontaneous unity; a self in which the past, the present and the future coincide and from which this multiplicity of reciprocal penetration is related to the material, seeking something more than survival, that is, real life, meaning, freedom and creative purpose. Bergson refers to the essence of this new conception of reality as “duration”:

Pure duration is the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating its present state from its former states. For this purpose it need not be entirely absorbed in the passing sensation or idea; for then, on the contrary, it would no longer endure. Nor need it forget its former states: it is enough that, in recalling these states, it does not set them alongside its actual state as one point alongside another, but forms both the past and the present states into an

organic whole, as happens when we recall the notes of a tune, melting, so to speak, into one another. (Bergson, 2007:74-75).

Apart from the material dimension of reality there is a spiritual dimension, the internal life of the human being, the self, in which there exists diverse elements, diverse experiences or mental content that constitute an identity and which have organised very differently from the way intelligence organised the material world. Just as when we remember a tune we melt the notes together into a whole rather than a mere succession of notes on the music score, so we can speak of a self, an identity, as a unity that goes beyond a simple succession of the states of consciousness. If outside the self, in space and “spatialised” time there is nothing but a reciprocal exteriority, different material facts which the intelligence organises and juxtaposes separately, within the self there is multiplicity with reciprocal exteriority, that is, a process of organisation and mutual penetration of the facts of consciousness that constitute true and heterogeneous duration of the self, in real time, a true creative and unpredictable process that is both without exterior moments and without numerical relation. This is a free action, if we understand freedom not as an absolute but as the result of a self, understood as an interpenetration of states which “mix together like drops of rain in a pond” (Bergson, 2007: 125). The fundamental self which, although by degrees and in relation to the material world, is able to organise and engage in dynamic, creative and unpredictable action which expresses its own totality.

In his following important work, *Matter and Memory*, published in 1896, Bergson offers a precise and fully developed conception of the nature of reality and how to perceive it. He begins by distinguishing three levels of reality, the level of the material, the level of vitality and the level of spirituality (Panero, 2006: 22). This is clearly expressed in passages such as the following in which Bergson describes these three levels of reality while associating the positivist-psychologist conception with one of its origins in Kant’s speculative reason. Bergson thus shows the incapacity of speculative reason to capture the real in its totality and all its richness, finally insisting in the need for a new method of knowledge, intuition, which dismisses relativism in order to fully perceive this true reality:

The impotence of speculative reason, as Kant has demonstrated it, is perhaps at bottom only the impotence of an intellect enslaved to certain necessities of bodily life and concerned with a matter that man has had to disorganise for the

satisfaction of his wants. Our knowledge of things would thus no longer be relative the fundamental structure of our mind, but only to its superficial and acquired habits, to the contingent form which it derives from our bodily functions and from our lower needs. The relativity of knowledge, then, may not then be definitive. By unmaking that which these needs have made, we may restore to intuition its original purity and so recover contact with the real. (Bergson, 2008: 205).

The first level, as we have seen, is the purely material dimension; the level of ordered material realities governed by the laws of nature. This is characterised by its immediacy and also for a certain absence, since this is the dimension in which human beings reside as physical beings, acting and reacting, almost immediately or practically unconsciously, to stimulus-response, action-reaction as when we hear a sound and turn to look.

However, human beings do not reside on the material level in the same way as other things or animals; after an initial, purely sensorial instant, we begin to “disorder” this dimension, seeing it and organising it according to our interest and desires. Thus, we reach the level or dimension of vitality, of utilitarian perception in which we use our intelligence to satisfy our successive needs and preoccupations, that is, seeking self-preservation and pleasure.

Finally, we reach the third level, the dimension of spirituality. Here we do not engage with reality according to exclusively pragmatic criteria but seek something more. According to Bergson, here we seek to re-establish intuition to its original purity. That is, we cease to see the world as mere juxtaposition of immediate and contingent elements and begin to concern ourselves with questions related with the totality of the real and our own meaning and purpose in belonging to this reality.

On the spiritual level, we discover ourselves as temporal beings. While on the material level we live purely in the present, interacting with physical processes. on the level of vitality, it appears that the present also has primacy. It is on the spiritual level however that we are aware of our temporal structure, that the past accompanies us in the present like a shadow or a reflection which influences our decisions while the future is also with us as a possibility we have in mind when deciding on our actions. We do not live the past as something which happened, nor the future as something which has yet to happen. We live the past and future as integral parts of our present, as something which forms a part of our current

identity, that which we are, that which we do and that which we engage with (Bergson, 2008: 167-170).

In terms of consciousness we are present for ourselves but our consciousness is profoundly informed by our memory, binding us to what has been; our consciousness is also profoundly informed by our will, orienting us towards what is to come. We exist intrinsically within a knot of variable rhythms, projecting truly into both the past and the future. (Riquier, 2009: 388). It is the integration of the past, present and future which allows us to interpret the situations we face and conceive of possible futures, and thus allowing us to exist as the durations which we are.

IV. The intuition of the duration

Living in the material world occupied with things to achieve our personal and vital objectives, it may seem impossibly difficult to achieve an existence on a spiritual plane, and yet, according to Bergson, this is precisely the process we are engaged in by dealing with the material, allowing us to see ourselves as duration and thus allowing all other things to have duration as well.

It is true that all around us there are material systems that operate according to the laws of nature. But it is human beings, by inserting consciousness into these systems, who provide the form of possibility beyond the purely material or mere temporal succession. It is we humans who give these things "duration", as a film is composed of fixed and juxtaposed images that follow a preconceived pattern, or when we want to prepare a glass of sugar water, we know that the sugar will dissolve. But although the images of a film may pass at any speed without changing their pattern the correct speed is determined by the duration of the interior life of the person watching; or just as we must wait a certain period of time for the sugar to dissolve in water. The specific speed of the film and the need to wait for sugar to dissolve show to what point the states of our material world are related or symmetrical to the temporal flow of our consciousness. Although material systems can be foreshortened where time is a mere abstraction, a relation or a number, in reality these material systems form part of a whole for which we must wait or allow to unfold according to a certain duration (Bergson, 2009a: 12). This implies that these states of the material world are affected by pure duration which we are, in that they are related or incorporated into us. If we could encompass all of

reality, Bergson concludes, we would see that it is an interwoven whole of organic and inorganic beings which ceaselessly take on new forms, as new, original and unpredictable as our own states of consciousness.

Just as the sound of a bell is ultimately a set of vibrations, that sound exists or lasts due to vibration, the flow of time in our sensibility takes place beneath our perceptions, our actions and our conscious life; we feel the interpenetration of emotions as an interpenetration of internal vibrations, as the effect of resonance or tonalities of a different pitch (Lapoujade, 2011: 7). We live as beings that are in a process of becoming, with duration, which participate in the duration and make other elements participate as well. This is the source of original intuition, and the self that is aware of pure duration, the pure flow of facts within an interpenetrated consciousness, discovering that the same duration which constitutes its essence also constitutes the essence of the material world. The self understands that beneath all things that intelligence deforms or orders through “spatialization” and calculability, there is duration which constitutes it, just as within ourselves we find the same forces to act on our external reality.

The material and life which fills the world are also within us and we feel in ourselves the forces at work in all things. Everything that is and everything action possesses the same intimate nature. And this nature is common to all things, present in all things; it is pure duration in which newness is forever reborn and where evolution is creative, a distinct multiplicity or even indivisible, purely intensive or qualitative which will remain as is, comprising an endlessly growing number of elements. This is the key to Bergson’s famous notion of intuition: from the experience of things juxtaposed in inert material space we move to experience of duration as the fundamental nature of the real, and we do so by means of psychological phenomena (Vieillard-Baron, 2013: 125-126).

Intuition as a method to access the fundamental nature of the real is nothing more than the demand to be faithful to these moments of experience in which we overcome the framework of the exterior and relative spectacle to reach an absolute reality that is also our own, in which we participate and which we are (Worms, 2012: 16). That is, intuition is nothing more than the adhesion of our consciousness to the pluralism of experience. Here consciousness is not merely a spectator before which the material world appears as an external spectacle, but rather recognises itself both as spectacle and spectator; that is, another of the regions of reality, a

particular form of the totality of the real of which it forms a part (Prado, 2002: 82-86).

Duration is not only internal. It constitutes the horizon of all things, even the material world. Duration is found beneath all physical reality and all processes. It is the tissue of our being and all things, and Bergson expressly avoids the term “substance” or “essence” because these terms are too abstract, rigid or static.

There are only things or states at the material-spatial level, which is perceived by intelligence in order to effectively pursue survival. On the spiritual level, in the realm of duration, there are processes, actions and transitions. Thus, Bergson, in his later works, such as *Creative evolution* and the extensive, two-part introduction to his collected essays entitled *Thought and movement*, is dedicated to showing in detail that all reality is impulse, creation, tendency. Insisting also in that this pure activity is not produced blindly, nor by pure chance nor as mere adaptation, as believed by the mechanists, Lamarckians or Darwinists but that it possesses an ultimate meaning: to improve, to create, “to give being to what was not” (Bergson, 2009b: 52). This, according to Bergson, is the mission of the human being, to relate, always openly and always creatively, with the real, opening new possibilities, perfecting reality, while perfecting the self. Creative freedom is the true objective of philosophy as it reflects the human spirit; it is irreducible to reductive reflection of the intelligence, in that it can be defined as “a reality able to extract from itself much more than it contains”. (Bergson, 2011a: 399).

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AETERNITAS VS αἰί: HEIDEGGER Y LA RUPTURA CON LA TEOLOGÍA

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Abstract: *Martin Heidegger's conference Der Begriff der Zeit (1924) is one of the key texts to understand the genesis of Sein und Zeit (1927), considered one of the most important works not only of the author but also of the philosophy of the 20th century. In this conference, the existential analysis is exposed, reflected through Dasein's concept, which will then constitute the basis of the fundamental ontology on which the whole 1927 text is based. This ontology has as one of its pillars the temporality of existence. Our work in the present study will consist of showing how also this conception of time supposes a rupture of the philosophical thought of Heidegger with theology.*

Keywords: *Heidegger, theology, phenomenology, time, previous science.*

1. Introducción: Heidegger en 1924

El siguiente estudio son reflexiones acerca del hiato establecido entre la filosofía y la teología en el pensamiento de Martin Heidegger en los años en que está labrando la que será su obra magna, *Sein und Zeit*². Esa ruptura con la teología es fundamental para entender toda la fenomenología existencial que desarrolla en aquellos años. Es por eso que nuestro cometido es establecer cuáles son las características de esa separación que realiza previamente a la conferencia que impartió en la sede de la Sociedad Teológica de Marburgo el 25 de Julio de 1924. En la misma, ya está dada de antemano esa ruptura como uno de los puntos fundamentales para entender el análisis existencial que allí se esboza. Haremos entonces una arqueología conceptual de las primeras ideas expuestas en esa ponencia, relacionadas con la temporalidad, para mostrar como la separación de ambas disciplinas no es baladí en el camino para establecer la ontología fundamental que se persigue en *Sein und Zeit*.

La conferencia en cuestión, titulada *Der Begriff der Zeit*, está recogida en el volumen 64 de las obras completas (*Gesamtausgabe*) del autor alemán, formando pareja con un tratado inédito de idéntico título, redactado sobre

¹ Heidegger Archive, University of Seville, Spain.

² Heidegger, M. *Sein und Zeit*. Tubinga, Niemeyer, 2005.

la base de aquella disertación poco tiempo después de presentarla ante los teólogos marburgueses³. Cabe señalar que el texto recogido no fue publicado en vida y la versión editada está elaborada a partir de los apuntes de dos manos anónimas que asistieron a la conferencia. Heidegger destruyó el escrito original, como muchas de sus obras en el camino a la publicación de *Sein und Zeit*, teniendo presente la redacción del tratado homónimo que tampoco vió la luz. Ésto sirve para fomentar el halo místico de que *Sein und Zeit*, la considerada su obra magna y publicada en 1927, es una obra sin historia⁴.

En aquel año, Heidegger ejercía de docente en la Philipps-Universität de la ciudad del valle del Lahn. Allí había acudido al obtener una plaza académica que le diera la posición y derechos de un profesor ordinario⁵, ya que el exiguo sueldo de *Privatdozent* que recibía en Friburgo no le permitía alimentar a una familia ya de cuatro miembros⁶. Estamos en la época en que Heidegger descubre que él es Heidegger⁷, y se lanza a atacar todo aquello que consideraba obsoleto dentro de la filosofía, incluso la fenomenología trascendental de su maestro Edmund Husserl, a pesar de seguir denominándose públicamente su discípulo⁸. También estaban los rumores de que se había alejado de la fe, los cuales eran bastante importantes en una ciudad donde se respiraba un ambiente protestante⁹. Esos rumores fueron alimentados con la conferencia sobre la que fundamos nuestro estudio, donde se rompe el vínculo entre la teología y la filosofía, al ser presentadas como dos disciplinas sin nada en común pero que la

³ Heidegger, M. *Der begriff der Zeit* (1924). Hg. F.-W. von Herrmann. Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 2004. En adelante BZ.

⁴ La idea de *Sein und Zeit* como una obra sin historia se ve reforzada por la biografía intelectual de Heidegger realizada por Otto Pöggeler (y tutorizada por el propio Heidegger), donde se ignoran todas las pequeñas obras no publicadas en vida y destacando sólo las lecciones impartidas en esos años de redacción. En su descargo, podemos advertir que el material de las conferencias son notas sueltas y apuntes de oyentes y que lo que se destruyó fue por ser considerado preludios incompletos de una obra mayor. v. Pöggeler, O. *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers*. Pfullingen, Neske, 1983.

⁵ Heidegger, M.; Jaspers, K. *Briefwechsel 1920-1963*. Hg. W. Wiemel; H. Saner. Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 1990. p. 34.

⁶ Safranski, R. *Un maestro en Alemania. Martin Heidegger y su tiempo*. Tr. R. Gabás. Barcelona, Tusquets, 2007. p. 160.

⁷ "...entdeckt Heidegger, daß er Heidegger ist". Ib. p. 161.

⁸ Ib.

⁹ Ib. p. 162.

tradición se empeña en ligar. Para Heidegger, lo que separa a dichas disciplinas es el concepto de tiempo que manejan una y otra, por lo que la ponencia que traemos a colación nos introduce en esa problemática.

De este modo, la aburrida ciudad de Marburgo fue el punto donde comenzaron a tomar forma las desavenencias con lo aprendido en Friburgo, permitiendo el desarrollo de una filosofía propia que tomará una forma excelsa con la redacción de *Sein und Zeit*, cuya redacción inició el año anterior¹⁰, aun siendo asistente de Husserl. En esta ciudad del Hesse, dos personas dejan su impronta en la trayectoria vital de Heidegger: Hanna Arendt y Rudolf Bultmann. De la primera poco diremos en este estudio, a pesar de la transcendencia de su relación con el rey secreto de la filosofía, como le llamó muchos años después¹¹. El segundo si tiene aquí más importancia al ser quien organiza la ponencia en que ponemos el foco. Bultmann, profesor titular de teología, entabla rápidamente amistad con Heidegger debido al interés en la teología de Karl Barth. A partir del encuentro, tomará muchos elementos del pensamiento heideggeriano para crear una teología de la desmitologización. Porque para el de Meßkirch, y de esto tomó buena nota Bultmann, la teología debía de hallar de nuevo la palabra que llamase a la fe y a conservarse en ella, considerando el teólogo su crítica a la metafísica como un conato de desmitologización. Por su parte, Heidegger acepta la teología de Bultman bajo el presupuesto de que la fe en ningún caso puede ser asunto de la filosofía¹².

2. Raíces teológicas y fenomenológicas

Creemos firmemente que una de las premisas de Heidegger al impartir esta conferencia es el tomar distancia respecto de la teología, estableciendo una separación entre ésta y su pensamiento. Así, no deja de resultar significativo que escogiera para hacer público este alejamiento un encuentro con teólogos. La problemática asociada al vínculo entre filosofía y teología tuvo desde el principio una importancia especial en su pensamiento. Su andadura académica comenzó con la marca del catolicismo, con trabajos de claro corte religioso, debido en gran parte a la ayuda económica para sus estudios que le proporcionó la Iglesia Católica¹³.

¹⁰ Ib. p. 153.

¹¹ Arendt, H. "Martin Heidegger ist achtzig jahre alt". *Merkur* XXIII, 10. 1969. p. 893.

¹² v. Safranski, R. Op. cit. pp. 167-170.

¹³ Ib. p. 83.

De ahí que todos los trabajos anteriores a su estudio de habilitación sobre Duns Scotus¹⁴, publicado en 1915, tengan como referencia última el catolicismo, hasta el punto de haberse encaminado al noviciado de la *Societas Iesu* de Loyola a fin de ser ordenado sacerdote¹⁵. Pero finalmente, unas molestias cardiopáticas le determinaron como no apto para el presbiterado: Tal vez el corazón se puso en guardia contra los planes de la cabeza¹⁶.

La influencia católica fundamental de sus primeros años comenzó a resquebrajarse cuando tomó contacto con el pensamiento de Husserl, figura filosófica que supuso un giro hacia la fenomenología del joven Heidegger¹⁷. En el momento en que expone *Der Begriff der Zeit*, ya ha tomado distancia, como decíamos, de la fenomenología trascendental de Husserl, encaminándose hacia un filosofar propio. Pero no puede negar su influencia cuando intenta acercarse "a las cosas mismas", aunque también es conciente de que no puede ser una mera especulación frente a los encubrimientos artificiales del mundo fruto de la dogmática establecida¹⁸. En 1924 ya no es el método fenomenológico husserliano la guía, sino el desarrollo de una fenomenología propia y original, de corte existencialista¹⁹, lo que prima en su pensamiento. Heidegger señala los límites husserlianos porque Husserl, al salvar los fenómenos, agudiza el sentido del encuentro con lo ente pero sin plantearse en qué sentido es ente el hombre.

La ruptura con el pensamiento de Husserl vino determinada por la influencias de las lecturas que hizo de Dilthey y Kierkegaard. El primero mostró a Heidegger como la teoría del yo transcendental, al considerarse más allá de la historia, es imposible, puesto que toda filosofía ha de enmarcarse históricamente²⁰. Kierkegaard, por su parte, le proporcionó la

¹⁴ Heidegger, M. *Die Kategorien und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus*. Recogido en *Fruhe Schriften (1912-1916)*. Hg. F.-W. von Herrmann. Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 1978.

¹⁵ v. Safranski, R. Op. cit. p. 38.

¹⁶ "Vielleicht hatte sich damals das Herz gewehrt gegen die Pläne des Kopfes". Ib. p. 39.

¹⁷ Ib. p. 65.

¹⁸ Heidegger, M. *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (Sommersemester 1925)*. Hg. P. Jaeger. Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 1994. p. 118.

¹⁹ v. Xolocotzi, A. *Fenomenología de la vida fáctica. Heidegger y su camino a Ser y Tiempo*. México D. F., Plaza y Valdés, 2004.

²⁰ v. Safranski, R. Op. cit. p. 114.

división entre pensar y existir así como la diferencia entre el hombre de pensar y el hombre de realidad, que puede elegir entre aquello que es pensable²¹. Heidegger pretendía ir más allá de la fenomenología trascendental, que sólo describía las formas en que las cosas se dan en la conciencia orientada teóricamente, porque sólo en circunstancias ocasionales adoptamos la actitud teórica: por lo general nos dedicamos a vivir²². La vida fáctica, esto es, la vida "vivida" y no la teorizada, no puede ser observada desde fuera porque siempre pertenecemos a ella, siempre estamos en su interior, "viviendo" sus singularidades. Lo característico de la vida fáctica es el "más-acá". Este "más-acá" confrontará con el "más-allá" de la teología.

De este modo, *Der Begriff der Zeit* supone la doble ruptura con Husserl por un lado y con la teología por otro, las dos raíces fundamentales de su pensamiento.

3. En torno al tiempo

La diferencia fundamental que podríamos establecer para delimitar la barrera habida entre la teología y la filosofía es la cuestión del tiempo. Nosotros nos centraremos en la idea de temporalidad que subyace en la conferencia que aquí traemos a colación y no a todo el sentido que tiene el tiempo dentro de los planteamientos de Heidegger. Por todos es sabida la peculiar relación que éste tiene con el concepto de tiempo, tanto el que maneja el vulgo como lo que implica la temporalidad en sí misma. Esta temporalidad está en la ponencia de 1924 fuertemente vinculada a otros dos motivos fundamentales que en ella se plantean, a saber, la finitud y la subjetividad, hasta el punto de poder ser conceptos intercambiables en una estructura metafísica, pero con la particularidad de que cada versión de ellas posee un matiz que las diferencia en el trato cotidiano²³. Pero aquí sólo nos centraremos en el tiempo, al ser un punto de discordia desde el que parte Heidegger para establecer la franja que separa la teología de la filosofía.

La primera concepción del tiempo que nos sale al paso es la del sentido coloquial que se le da al término, su sentido, por así decirlo, vulgar. Esta noción vulgar de tiempo no es válida para una interpretación justa del

²¹ Ib.

²² Ib. p. 124.

²³ v. Gilibert, F. *Temporalidad, subjetividad y finitud a partir de la conferencia de Martin Heidegger "El concepto de Tiempo" (1924)*. Sevilla. Universidad de Sevilla, 2012.

tiempo²⁴. Para dicha concepción vulgar, el tiempo es "en" donde ocurren los acontecimientos²⁵. Esto es, en ella prima un criterio espacial, como un lugar donde se instalan las cosas. Con esto, vemos que los preludios para pensar el tiempo nos advierten que de él no sabemos nada, que sólo sabemos lo que en él ocurre. Se nos muestra desconocido en tanto que nosotros mismo tenemos también una posición "en" el tiempo. En esa posición es el tiempo mismo quien viene a nuestro encuentro, no hay un reloj permanente que nos lo indique en cuanto tal, más allá de los movimientos fijados por los seres humanos para delimitarlo²⁶.

Nosotros, como seres temporales, lo que hacemos es percatarnos de los cambios y la duración de los mismos y a partir de ello, fijamos el tiempo. Podríamos decir en base a esa experiencia sin miedo al error que el tiempo es simplemente el cambio, que es una serie de mutaciones en diversas categorías que podemos emplear para "controlar" un segmento "determinado" de un entramado metafísico denominado tiempo. Pero cuando empleamos aquí los términos "determinación" y "control" lo hacemos de forma hipotética, porque la determinación del tiempo y, por ende, el control del mismo, es algo que se nos escapa²⁷. Pareciera como si el tiempo real no existiera y, de existir, sólo veríamos el movimiento. No parece, si se piensa a fondo está concepción vulgar, que exista una entidad material denominada "tiempo", sino que éste sólo fuera un instrumento para medir. Porque el tiempo no es el movimiento, sino que a través de él, del movimiento, intuimos el tiempo²⁸.

Pero en Heidegger el tiempo, como aventuramos a partir de la concepción intercambiable con la subjetividad y la finitud, implica una ruptura con lo espacial, lo cual, a la postre, es clave para la diferenciación

²⁴ Heidegger, M. *Sein und Zeit*. Op. cit. p. 304

²⁵ cfr. Einstein, A. *Sobre la teoría de la relatividad espacial y general*. Tr. M. Paredes, Madrid, Alianza, 1995.

²⁶ Los instrumentos de medida del tiempo, tales como el reloj o el calendario, determinan, más que al tiempo mismo, los movimientos que en él ocurren. De este modo, el reloj sólo es el desplazamiento circular de unas agujas que señalan el espacio que recorren a lo largo de doce horas. Lo mismo vale para el calendario, que únicamente es una sucesión de días que señalan el movimiento alrededor del sol. Los nuevos avances digitales con los que se mide el tiempo, lo que hacen es señalar una sucesión numérica dada "en" el tiempo, pero no señalan el tiempo por sí mismos, necesitan también del movimiento numérico.

²⁷ BZ. p. 109

²⁸ Aristóteles. *Physica*. IV. 11, 219a.

entre teología y filosofía. Expongámoslo claro: la espacialidad está ligado esencialmente a la vida mientras que la temporalidad se une a la existencia (*Dasein*)²⁹. Los eventos que acaecen en la vida poseen un valor ontológico, todo vale ontológicamente, pero hay en la existencia unas limitaciones que implican a la propia finitud: el nacimiento y la muerte. Situar-se entre esas limitaciones implica una toma de decisiones, una necesidad de elegir. Si el tiempo es una vivencia subjetiva que condiciona a la existencialidad debido a su finitud, solo puede subsistir debido a ese decisionismo, donde siempre se decide "ahora". No importa el tiempo que indique el reloj, da igual temprano que tarde: siempre es "ahora". Porque la existencia siempre se vivencia desde el "ahora", pero no entendido como un punto exclusivo situado en una línea temporal, sino que está condicionado por todos los puntos anteriores (el pasado) y por las consecuencias que tendrá en los puntos siguientes (el futuro), siempre es temporal³⁰.

Este cuestionamiento del tiempo que hacemos desde el significado que él tiene para Heidegger implica el atrevimiento de plantear que el tiempo sea un asunto de fe. No es negar que en toda esta concepción que abandera el de Meßkirch haya cierto regusto teológico, pero si hay que considerar que la concepción de lo temporal que lleva implícita la existencia lo es siempre desde el punto de vista de que remite siempre al ser-humano, por lo que un análisis del tiempo en clave de la teología es absurdo, puesto que a ésta no le interesa el hombre como hombre sin más, sino por la relación que éste tiene con la divinidad. La divinidad de por sí no necesita de la teología, sino que ésta es algo propio del ser humano, concretamente de la parte específica que lo vincula con lo divino, pero no con la totalidad del ente que es el hombre. De ahí que Heidegger quiera marcar distancias entre el pensamiento filosófico y la teología, porque ésta no debe ocuparse del tiempo, al ser esto algo propio del hombre en cuanto hombre³¹.

De ahí que la conferencia de 1924 comience acentuando que sus palabras no versarán sobre lo divino, que se mantiene durante la eternidad y lo infinito, sino sobre lo humano, lo finito, lo que puede morir, y que, por tanto, conlleva temporalidad. Porque toda existencia es siempre humana y, por ende, finita.

²⁹ BZ. p. 111.

³⁰ Ib. p. 124.

³¹ cfr. Ib. p. 107.

4. Dos concepciones de tiempo

En *Der Begriff der Zeit* podemos encontrar un especial hincapié en la distinción que hay entre la manera de entender lo "siempre" en las culturas latina y griega. Dicha distinción es clave para entender porqué la concepción del tiempo en la teología, según el parecer de Heidegger, no es útil para exponer la temporalidad desde la filosofía. Cuando hablamos de lo "siempre" en ambas civilizaciones parece que remitimos a una identidad, a una traducción en ellas de nuestro "siempre" contemporáneo-occidental. O mejor dicho, que nuestro "siempre" ha derivado de ellas dos, al ser Europa la heredera legítima de griegos y romanos. Pero lo cierto es que entre las dos hay una fisura que es clave para nuestros propósitos. Esa fisura es la que determina el punto central de nuestro trabajo.

En la tradición latina, identificada con la antigua Roma, pero también con el Catolicismo, y por ende con toda la tradición cristiana, el término que se emplea para exponer lo "siempre" es el de *aeternitas* (eternidad). La referencia a lo "siempre" como la eternidad ha tenido preponderancia en Occidente. *Aeternitas* es un vocablo que tiene el carácter de eterno, de sempiterno, esto es, de una perpetuidad sin principio, sucesión ni fin. Pero el carácter de la *aeternitas* también lleva consigo de manera intrínseca la inmortalidad. Un ser eterno, tal y como, por ejemplo, podría ser el Dios cristiano, es un ser que no sólo no fenece nunca, que no muere, sino que no tiene un principio y un fin, porque es el principio y el fin, alfa y omega³². Y sin embargo alberga la contradicción de estar encuadrado en una temporalidad cuyo carácter predominante es la linealidad, al ser éste el modo de concebir el tiempo que tiene la tradición cristiano-romana.

Porque la *aeternitas* lleva parejo el concepto de voluntad divina: el mundo es obra de los deseos de Dios, dándose con ello una suerte de significación antropto-teológica. Dios, que es eterno, da lugar a un mundo que tiene un principio, la Creación, y un fin, el Apocalipsis. La Creación es una decisión divina, se crea el mundo a través de la palabra: se nombran las cosas en el tiempo y lo creado va surgiendo día a día³³. El mundo pertenece en primer lugar a Dios, que es su creador, y luego al hombre, que es designado como el continuador de la voluntad de Dios³⁴. Lo decisivo no es la relación entre mundo y hombre, sino con aquello que trasciende a uno y

³² *Apocalipsis*, I, 8

³³ *Génesis*. I, 1-31

³⁴ *Ib.* II, 15

otro, con el Creador. De este modo se crea un concepto de tiempo que supone un trasfondo sagrado del pasado (la Creación) y el futuro (el Apocalipsis, el fin de los tiempos, que para unos será condena y para otros salvación). Ello contiene una suerte de nihilismo *supra-tempore*: el mundo viene de la nada y va a la nada. En esa nada es donde está el sentido del mundo, fuera de él. La explicación de todo está al final de los tiempos, donde se produce el encuentro con lo divino. El tiempo humano trasciende en el tiempo divino, que es la eternidad. La finitud humana es inconsecuente frente a la infinitud divina.

Pero mientras Occidente hizo suyo ese concepto cristiano-romano de tiempo, donde éste se presenta como una línea y es la eternidad su excepción al situarse en un plano diferente a la misma, para los griegos, desde la noción que manejaban de lo "siempre", el tiempo era concebido de manera cíclica, como dentro de un círculo, de modo que principio y fin se conectan en un mismo punto o, mejor dicho, todo punto de esa circularidad *tempórea* es a la vez principio y fin, puesto que no hay un lugar claro de inicio y final, sino que cualquiera puede serlo dentro de esa circunferencia³⁵. Esta circularidad griega que refleja lo "siempre" fue denominada *ἀεί*. A nuestro parecer, este *ἀεί* debe ser traducido, más que como "lo eterno", como "lo sido siempre". Señala Heidegger en 1924 que la eternidad es una cosa distinta del vacío ser siempre, del *ἀεί*³⁶. Porque el *ἀεί*, y éste es el argumento que pretende esgrimir el pensador de la *Schwartzwald* en la conferencia de Marburgo, es un concepto profano frente a la *aeternitas*, propia de la teología.

Los antiguos griegos no tenían una concepción lineal del tiempo, sino que su concepto estaba fundado a partir de entender la Naturaleza como un orden inmutable, su concepto era algo concomitante al Cosmos. El Cosmos tiene su propia norma y es el límite irrebalsable: nada hay que se externa a ello, no como sucede con el mundo dentro del entramado teológico, donde lo divino está por encima de él. Siguiendo aquella concepción limitada, los griegos no tienen un concepto de pasado y futuro, sino que tienen un "fondo" cósmico que se repite eternamente. No hay una finalidad, sino un cumplimiento de la Naturaleza.

³⁵ Châtelet, F. *La naissance de l'histoire. La formatio de la pensée historique en Greece*. París, Minuit, 1962. p. 25.

³⁶ "Ewigkeit etwas anderen sein al das leere Immersein, das *αεί*". BZ. p. 107.

La teología ha pretendido dominar el tiempo, dotarle de un sentido desde el concepto de *aeternitas*, pero esta concepción no es filosófica. De ahí que las consideraciones que sobre el tiempo hiciera Heidegger no tenían que ver con la eternidad, que está en el orden de lo divino-teológico, sino con la reflexión más propiamente humana. Porque

Wenn der Zugang zu Gott der Glaube ist und das Sich-einlassen mit der Ewigkeit nicht anderes als dieser Glaube, dann wird die Philosophie die Ewigkeit nie haben und diese sonach nie als mögliche Hinsicht für die Diskussion der Zeit in methodischen Gebrauch genommen werden können³⁷

Si nuestro acceso a Dios pasa por la fe y si el entrar en el tema de la eternidad no es otra cosa que esa fe, en tal caso, la filosofía jamás tendrá acceso a la eternidad y, por consiguiente, en el plano metodológico nunca podrá tomarla como una posible perspectiva para discutir la cuestión del tiempo.

La filosofía solo puede considerar el tiempo desde el *ἀεί*, puesto que éste alberga dentro de sus definiciones lo siempre constante, lo sucesivo, indicando que cada punto en el tiempo está en relación con los otros de tal modo que siempre se vuelve sobre sí mismo, no remitiendo a un principio y un fin: cada punto es principio y fin en sí mismo a la vez que algo que ha sido y que será siempre. La caracterización propia de la *aeternitas* divina la situaba por encima de la linealidad del tiempo finito humano porque cada momento era situado espacialmente al principio y al fin, así como en el resto de la línea temporal humana. Pero el *ἀεί* quita toda la trascendencia teológica al no considerar lo eterno más que como *ἀεί χρόνος*, esto es, "siempre tiempo". No deja de ser curioso que los antiguos griegos para hacer uso de lo eterno tengan también que introducir con ello a una divinidad, a *Χρόνος* (*Crono*), dios de las Edades y del Zodíaco³⁸: Para decir que el tiempo es eterno, también recurren a lo divino, pero aquí ese recurso es externo, mientras que en el Cristianismo ya va intrínseco, por lo que el

³⁷ Ib.

³⁸ Por un juego de palabras se ha considerado a veces al dios Chronos (*Κρόνος*), con el tiempo personificado, Crono (*Χρόνος*), representado por el paso de los planetas en el Zodíaco. Esta confusión es casi feliz para nuestros propósitos. De un lado, *Κρόνος* es el dios del tiempo humano, el tiempo de los hombres, con lo que se suprime cualquier acepción al tiempo divino. De otro, el mito cuenta que Chronos (*Κρόνος*) derrocó a su padre Urano (*Οὐρανός*). Tiempo después él mismo fue derrocado a su vez por su hijo Zeus (*Ζεύς*), lo que indica es una cierta circularidad en los hechos. v. Grimal, P. *Diccionario de Mitología griega y romana*. Barcelona, Paidós, 1981. Entrada "Crono". pp. 120-121.

tiempo en esta última sólo puede ser considerado desde sus matices teológicos si se considera la *aeternitas* como una teología del tiempo.

Y sin embargo, el *àéí* tampoco es el tiempo existencial. Más bien es un modo de acceder al tiempo, pero el tiempo, entendido en clave heideggeriana, necesita de una exposición en base a una pre-ciencia que clarifique ese tiempo "accesible" y, desde esa clarificación, que logre una verdadera reflexión filosófica acerca del tiempo. Es por eso que la reflexión de Heidegger en 1924, "tampoco es filosófica, pues no pretende ofrecer una definición sistemática del tiempo y universalmente válida del tiempo"³⁹. Y más adelante: "Las reflexiones que siguen sólo tienen en común con la filosofía el hecho de no ser teología"⁴⁰.

Con las últimas palabras de Heidegger citadas, tenemos claro que filosofía y teología son dos ámbitos distintos, pero habría que preguntarse qué interés hay en el uso de la separación entre la *aeternitas* y el *àéí* y por qué supone establecer la barrera que separa la teología de su pensamiento. La respuesta habría de ser contextualizada dentro del propio entramado filosófico heideggeriano, situando la temporalidad de la existencia, del *Dasein*, más cercana a esa concepción del tiempo como *àéí* que como *aeternitas*. Late aquí la vieja distinción entre lo humano y lo divino, pero creemos que el propósito del de Meßkirch es espaciar aún más el trecho que entre una y otra hay, a fin de evitar la confusión que puede originar una posible frontera colindante. La tradición ha dado cobijo a lo humano a partir de las categorías aplicadas a lo divino, salvo excepciones que consideraban a la divinidad como producto de lo humano⁴¹. Pero Heidegger quiere inclinar la balanza hacia la existencia (*Dasein*), que solo puede ser experienciada como propia desde el ámbito de lo humano, más concretamente de lo humano "en cada caso propio"⁴². Porque la existencia no es que esté en un plano distinto al de la divinidad, sino que ésta no tiene un plano "propio", sino que sólo está el plano existencial, desde donde, en todo caso y como último resquicio de lo divino, se convierte la

³⁹ "Die abhandlung ist aber auch nicht philosophisch, sofern sie nicht beanspruch, eine allgemein gültige systematische Bestimmung der Zeit herzugeben". BZ. p. 108.

⁴⁰ "Mit der Philosophie hat die folgende Überlegung nur so viel gemein, daB sie nicht Theologie ist". Ib. p. 108.

⁴¹ Hay una larga lista de autores que han considerado que el ser humano tenía necesidad de los dioses como salvaguarda de sus preceptos morales. No vamos a entrar en este debate ni citaremos ningún ejemplo.

⁴² "Est ist je eigenes und als eigenes jeweiliges". BZ. p. 113

relación con ello, con lo divino, en una de los ámbitos existenciales: la religión. Pero en esta categoría de relación con lo divino no radica el interés del análisis de Heidegger, ya que es el área de trabajo del teólogo y no del filósofo.

5. El tiempo como área de trabajo del filósofo

A partir de aquí la doble pregunta que podemos plantearnos es acerca del área que corresponde al trabajo del filósofo y si éste puede desplegar un saber acerca del tiempo de una forma distinta a como lo desarrolla el teólogo. Hemos expuesto que la teología, al presentarse como especializada en un tiempo que trasciende el tiempo vulgar, pretende hacer un dominio de la temporalidad y, con ello, dota de sentido a la *aeternitas*, precisamente ese tiempo trascendente. Pero también hemos querido hacer hincapié en que Heidegger se aparta de la idea de *aeternitas* por querer superar el ámbito de la teología en las cuestiones relativas al tiempo. Podemos entonces alegar el uso que hace del *ἀεί*, y no de la *aeternitas*, para inclinar la balanza hacia la existencia, que siempre es humana, en la confrontación "teológica" dual entre lo humano y lo divino. Resaltamos que dicha dualidad es de carácter teológico, porque las disquisiciones de lo humano y lo divino no tienen relación con ninguno de los otros asuntos del ser humano, los cuales toman la forma de disciplinas o ciencias cuando se indaga acerca de los mismos.

La teología es entonces esa ciencia o disciplina que se ocupa de la relación entre Dios y hombre, por lo que las competencias acerca de esta relación deben entonces estar tan alejadas de la filosofía como de cualquiera del resto de las ciencias. La filosofía no debe situarse en un plano de relación con Dios, ya que ese es el trabajo de la teología. La filosofía es, más bien, otra cosa. También consideramos a la filosofía una disciplina más, como parece hacer Heidegger al señalarla como una reflexión que ofrece una definición sistemática y universal del tiempo⁴³ y no como algo que se ocupa de los fundamentos, como hará años después⁴⁴. La cuestión del fundamento y de la estructura de la vida misma era, en 1924, algo de que

⁴³ Ib. p. 108.

⁴⁴ v. Heidegger, M. *Zollikoner Seminare. Protokolle - Zwiegespräche - Briefe*. Hg. M. Boss. Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 2006. o v. Heidegger, M. *Was ist das - Die Philosophie?* Pfullingen, Neske, 1992.

debiera de ocuparse la fenomenología⁴⁵ o la pre-ciencia (*Vorwissenschaft*) que ya anuncia⁴⁶.

Heidegger señala que la filosofía, como cualquier otra ciencia, "se mueve en el medio de los conceptos"⁴⁷. De ahí la importancia capital que tiene clarificar el concepto de tiempo para hacer una filosofía que se ocupe de la existencia, porque ésta tiene como principal aspecto, frente a lo divino e infinito, su finitud. Y esta finitud sólo puede plantearse si se comprende al tiempo. Ahora bien, la filosofía sólo puede comprender al "tiempo a partir del tiempo"⁴⁸. Y el tiempo que hemos heredado por nuestra tradición y desde el que podemos comprender el concepto de tiempo es el tiempo teológico, por lo que se ha de desgranar, una vez más, la noción de *aeternitas*. La *aeternitas* es el fruto de la fe, en la que el ser humano, desde su finitud, contempla la infinitud que va más allá de él. Para la teología cada uno de nosotros posee una existencia finita, que se traduce en una vida terrena, una vida que podríamos denominar a fin de diferenciarla con las pautas que en este trabajo hemos establecido como una "vida filosófica". Esta vida tiene como límites al comienzo el nacimiento y al final la muerte. Pero a la vez, en la contemplación de la *aeternitas*, cada existencia posee una vida más allá de la finitud por obra y gracia de lo divino, una vida infinita que sólo tiene validez desde la fe y que, siguiendo lo pautado, podemos denominar "vida teológica".

La vida finita, que es la que relacionamos con la existencia y la filosofía, implica "tiempo": somos seres temporales que tarde o temprano estamos arrojados a la muerte⁴⁹. Trascender esta vida y pasar al plano "eterno" ya es cuestión de la fe (y de la teología). La vida infinita de la teología, la que está situada en otra esfera, implica "no-tiempo", su ausencia, puesto que la infinitud implica a la *aeternitas*, que no tiene ni principio ni fin. La existencia comprende desde el principio-nacimiento hasta el fin-muerte, dos puntos en el tiempo, entendido éste en sentido líneal, que abarcan la totalidad de la "vida filosófica". Lo mismo pasa, desde esta teología, con el mundo, con el lugar donde se desarrolla la existencia: el mundo también tiene su principio y su fin como vimos: la Creación y el Apocalipsis. Pero la

⁴⁵ v. Heidegger, M. *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (Wintersemester 1919/1920). Hg. H.-H. Gander. Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 2010.

⁴⁶ BZ. p. 108.

⁴⁷ "Sich im Begriffe bewegen". Ib.

⁴⁸ "Die Zeit aus der Zeit" Ib.

⁴⁹ Ib. p. 115.

aeternitas, en otro plano, no posee esos dos puntos al ser un tiempo sin tiempo, esto es, allí no tiene lugar la sucesión de puntos temporales al estar conectado todo con todo, de modo que es difícil de considerar al tiempo.

Pero, sin embargo, la teología habla de "tiempo". El tiempo teológico tiene como cuestión fundamental la conexión de lo humano con lo divino. El objeto de la teología, como disciplina, es la búsqueda de esa conexión. El hombre es, de este modo, el motor del tiempo, puesto que la divinidad, eterna, no es temporal ni tiene nada que ver con el tiempo mismo. Es más, ni siquiera es el objeto propiamente dicho de la teología: la divinidad sólo le interesa en cuanto se conecta con lo humano. La teología se ocupa del hombre cuando hace algo para sentirse partícipe de la obra divina. No es lo divino sino lo humano aquello que busca trascender, porque la divinidad ya tiene de por sí el atributo de la trascendencia, lo humano busca esa trascendencia como una de tantas maneras de dar sentido a su existencia. El hombre, mediante el tiempo, conecta su finitud con la infinitud divina de la totalidad. El tiempo es lo que trasciende como tal, siendo algo propiamente humano y no divino. De ahí la cuestión teológica del trascender del tiempo al "no-tiempo", porque sin ese "no-tiempo" que implica la *aeternitas* no tiene sentido el tiempo finito de la existencia. Porque es esta existencia, la del ser humano, la que necesita de la teología para saber de la existencia de lo divino, "Dios mismo no necesita de una teología"⁵⁰ para saber de su existencia.

El otro gran problema que señala Heidegger respecto de lo heredado por la tradición teológica tiene que ver con el acontecer que implica el advenimiento de Cristo, un tiempo que "fue el de la plenitud de los tiempos"⁵¹ y que tiene como referencia las *Cartas* de Pablo de Tarso a los Gálatas⁵² y a los Efesios⁵³, así como el *Evangelio* de Marcos⁵⁴. Esta llegada del Mesías rompe con la línea temporal del mundo entre la Creación y el Apocalipsis, puesto que se supone como un tercer hito, que sin embargo es segundo en el orden temporal (el Apocalipsis sucederá en último lugar). Al ser un hito de la línea de tiempo, esto es, acontece "en" el tiempo, implica además la paradoja de que es el punto donde se intercambia el tiempo finito y humano con el tiempo eterno y divino o "no-tiempo".

⁵⁰ "Gott selbst brauch keine Theologie" Ib. p. 107.

⁵¹ "Da die Zeit erfüllet war". Ib.

⁵² *Gálatas*. 4, 4.

⁵³ *Efesios*. 1, 10.

⁵⁴ *Marcos*. 1, 15

Pero todo esto ya es una especulación que escapa de nuestro ámbito, porque "el filósofo no cree"⁵⁵. La filosofía es a-tea porque trata de conceptos, como el tiempo, que si bien tienen un uso en el orden de lo teológico es allí una mera "herramienta" lingüística para hacer una referencia a algo distinto de dicho concepto, a saber, la *aeternitas*. La concepción de la filosofía debe ser independiente de las motivaciones religiosas puesto que el cometido filosófico debe ser la "definición sistemática y universalmente válida"⁵⁶ de los conceptos, entre ellos el tiempo, y no de la relación que éstos tienen con la divinidad. De ahí que la ruptura de Heidegger con la teología, al inclinarse por la reflexión sobre la existencia, implique también un mirada a lo humano que abarque incluso a la teología misma, al estar situada en el mismo plano "humano", al no haber nada, ni siquiera la transcendencia y contemplación de lo divino que esté "fuera" del hombre. No es que no haya una posibilidad de un plano propio para lo divino, pero si que ese plano es externo a la existencia humana y no es posible de ser contemplado salvo desde ésta. Y si el filósofo no cree, ni tiene por qué hacerlo, no hay entonces un lugar para contemplar una temporalidad, que es algo que atañe única y exclusivamente al ser humano, por lo que cualquier disquisición sobre el tiempo también ha de estar alejada de lo divino.

Es preciso recurrir entonces para llevar a cabo un análisis del tiempo al *àéi*. Este análisis, que implica la clarificación de conceptos, tampoco ha de ser considerado a juicio de Heidegger dentro del ámbito de la filosofía, sino más bien en una ciencia previa (*Vorwissenschaft*)⁵⁷, cuya "posibilidad consiste en que cada investigador"⁵⁸, sea un especialista de la disciplina que sea, "clarifique lo que comprende y lo que no comprende"⁵⁹. Para Heidegger a partir de esta comprensión es cuando se puede comenzar a trabajar filosóficamente. Los conceptos fundamentales, entre ellos el tiempo, son previos a toda disquisición tanto de la filosofía como de cualquier otra disciplina, también de la teología. Por eso cuando se plantea la pregunta por aquello que es el tiempo lo que se plantea es por su entidad para ponerse a trabajar con él, ya que si no se conoce su sentido y significado difícilmente se podrá hacer una reflexión filosófica del mismo.

⁵⁵ "Der Philosoph glaub nitch". Ib.

⁵⁶ "Allgemein gültige systematische Bestimmung". Ib. p. 108.

⁵⁷ Ib. p. 108.

⁵⁸ "Irhe Möglichkeit besthet darin, daB jeder Forscher sich darüber Aufklart, war er versteht und war er nich versteht" Ib.

⁵⁹ "Ich darüber Aufklart, war er versteht und war er nich versteht" Ib.

6. Conclusiones que permiten avanzar

El objetivo de nuestro trabajo era clarificar la ruptura que Heidegger hace respecto de la teología y para ello habíamos tomado la concepción que de la temporalidad posee dicha disciplina y demostramos como dicha noción no tenía validez para un pensar filosófico al apuntar hacia un plano distinto al de la existencia finita, que es aquella desde donde se reflexiona siempre. La separación ha sido mostrada desde la clarificación de un tiempo sin tiempo al que remite en última instancia la teología. Una pareja de conclusiones aparece en el horizonte. Pero estas conclusiones no suponen un fin, sino que más bien nos permiten avanzar para realizar una lectura adecuada de la analítica existencial que se esboza en *Der Begriff der Zeit*.

La primera de estas conclusiones nos indica que la finitud humana, del modo en que ha sido expuesta en el presente trabajo, sólo puede ser investigada de manera filosófica, habiendo que descartar cualquier implicación de la teología en el estudio de la temporalidad desde el hombre y para el hombre.

La segunda conclusión es la necesidad del establecimiento de una ciencia previa que permita clarificar una serie de conceptos fundamentales en relación a la existencia, finita y por ende temporal a fin de evitar intromisiones de otras disciplinas que, al igual que la teología, expongan un sentido pervertido de dichos conceptos y los eleven a unos planos distintos a la existencia misma.

Esta pareja de conclusiones son, aunque no de manera explícita, las cartas con las que jugó Heidegger en la separación de teología y filosofía que le sirvió de presupuesto en la conferencia de 1924. Desde la misma trató de establecer una analítica existencial que permitiera llevar a cabo una re-elaboración de la pregunta por el Ser. Toda la ciencia previa que esta analítica significa parte de la existencia misma (*Dasein*), la cual está condicionada por la finitud. Es por ello que la pregunta por el tiempo es preguntarnos por un tiempo finito y acotado, no por lo infinito.

Establecida la separación entre teología y filosofía, queda el pensar el tiempo aquí y ahora desde la existencia que cada uno es cada vez. El establecer un análisis de esa existencia es entonces la pre-ciencia necesaria para toda reflexión e investigación, sea filosófica o de cualquier otra índole.

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DESPRE ABUZUL HERMENEUTIC: PROBLEMATICA SINELUI LA PAUL RICŢEUR ŞI GALEN STRAWSON

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Abstract: *In this article we show, invoking the principle of hermeneutic equity formulated by Georg Friedrich Meier in *Versuch einer allgemeinen Auslegungsunst*, that the perspective of the episodic self proposed by Galen Strawson is hermeneutically abusive, referring to the hermeneutic of the narrative self, as it appears in the works of Paul Ricœur. Also, in this paper we analyze the principle of hermeneutic equity, we present the narrative self within the Ricœurian philosophy, and we show that Strawson's arguments against the narrative of the self are false and abusive. We offer in each section a few observations that can show the reader new research directions.*

Keywords: *self, narrative identity, narrative self, episodic self, the principle of hermeneutic equity.*

Introducere

În lucrarea de față ne vom opri atenția asupra principiului hermeneutic formulat de Georg Friedrich Meier în *Versuch einer allgemeinen Auslegungsunst*², anume, asupra principiului echității hermeneutice. Vom face acest lucru pornind de la problematica sinelui în cadrul filosofiei lui Paul Ricœur și vom arăta că o perspectivă precum cea a lui Galen Strawson asupra sinelui este, de fapt, un abuz hermeneutic cu privire la această problematică.

Astfel, în prima secțiunea lucrării vom aduce în discuție, urmându-l pe Jean Greisch, câteva noțiuni ce țin de hermeneutica lui Meier. Vom discuta, pe scurt, despre principiul echității hermeneutice și despre cum survin abuzurile în interpretare. Vom arăta, de altfel, că acest principiu are și o dimensiune etică, ceea ce trimite la faptul că hermeneutica filosofică necesită nu numai o bună cunoaștere a contextului în care apare un text sau altul, cum ar fi, de pildă, o tradiție de gândire, dar și de o atentă analiză a premiselor nou formulate cu privire la o temă filosofică. Acest lucru va fi

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² Georg Friedrich Meier, *Versuch einer allgemeinen Auslegungsunst*, reeditat de Axel Bühler și Luigi Cataldi Madonna, Hambourg, F. Meiner, 1996.

clarificat abia în secțiunea a treia, unde vom arăta că toate argumentele lui Galen Strawson despre existența unui sine episodic sunt false.

În a doua secțiune vom expune o schiță a hermeneuticii sinelui narativ, așa cum apare aceasta în opera lui Paul Ricœur. Vom identifica aici câteva aspecte despre modul în care este constituit sinele narativ: identitatea narativă, punerea-în-intrigă, funcția narativă etc. Cu alte cuvinte, vom încerca să arătăm că această perspectivă ricœuriană urmează principiul echității hermeneutice, fără a interveni de-a lungul acestui travaliu filosofic abuzuri hermeneutice. Problemele apar atunci când o astfel de viziune narativă asupra sinelui, după cum am remarcat deja, este întru totul contrazisă și anulată de o perspectivă care, în linii mari, este reduționistă, anume perspectiva sinelui episodic a lui Galen Strawson.

Astfel, în a treia secțiune vom zăbovi să arătăm, urmându-l pe Kristofer Camilo Arca, că argumentele lui Strawson împotriva sinelui narativ, din perspectiva filosofiei lui Ricœur, sunt false și, deci, în aceste condiții, putem vorbi despre o încălcare a principiului hermeneutic formulat de Meier, precum și de anularea dimensiunii etice a acestui principiu. În sfârșit, în ultima secțiune vom lămuri în ce constă, așadar, abuzul hermeneutic cu privire la hermeneutica sinelui narativ și vom face câteva constatări despre principiul echității hermeneutice.

Unitatea lucrării de față va fi dată de miza filosofică a cercetării, aceea de a arăta modul în care survin abuzurile hermeneutice cu privire la o temă de reflecție atunci când hermeneutul nu cunoaște îndeajuns respectiva temă de reflecție. De pildă, Strawson critică și demontează perspectiva narativă asupra sinelui, amintind numai în treacăt lucrările lui Ricœur, unde multe aporii cu privire la sine sunt depășite.

1) Georg Friedrich Meier și principiul echității hermeneutice

Georg Friedrich Meier este un filosof aproape uitat de istoricii filosofiei. În monumentală *Istorie a filosofiei* de unsprezece volume a lui Frederick Copleston, filosoful german este amintit ca fiind unul dintre studenții lui A.G. Baumgarten și succesorul acestuia la catedră.³ În sfârșit, nu vom face aici o expunere pe larg a ideilor acestuia, ci ne vom opri asupra unui principiu hermeneutic formulat de Meier în prima lucrare de hermeneutică

³ Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy, vol. VI, Modern Philosophy: From the French Enlightenment to Kant*, Doubleday, New York, London, Toronto, Sydney, Auckland, 1994, p. 119.

din mediul filosofic german, *Versuch einer allgemeinen Auslegungsunst.* Desigur, este vorba de principiul echității hermeneutice. Înainte de a-l formula, facem câteva observații cu privire la lucrarea lui Meier.

După cum observă Jean Greisch, principiul echității hermeneutice apare și în opera lui Baumgarten, aproape cu același rol pe care îl are și în cadrul hermeneuticii lui Meier. Echitatea hermeneutică este mai mult decât o simplă regulă, este un principiu – *principiul principiilor hermeneutice*.⁴ Mai mult, în ceea ce privește comentarea unor texte filosofice, regulile hermeneutice decurg din principiul echității și, de aceea, pentru Meier, perfecțiunea textului și a autorului reprezintă „sufletul” tuturor regulilor hermeneutice.⁵

Desigur, pentru a înțelege un astfel de principiu, trebuie să ținem cont și de ce înseamnă hermeneutica pentru filosoful german. Bunăoară, Jean Grondin observă că încă de la începutul lucrării scrise de Meier găsim o primă definiție a hermeneuticii. Hermeneutica, în sens larg, este știința regulilor a căror respectare conduce hermeneutul la sensul textului, adică la buna înțelegere a semnelor textului. Și aici este o întregă discuție despre semne, discuție ce apare în lucrarea lui Meier. În sens restrâns, hermeneutica este știința regulilor ce trebuie respectate pentru a cunoaște sensul textului și pentru a transmite acest sens și altora. Pentru Meier, hermeneutica este aplicabilă atât semnelor naturale (ale lui Dumnezeu), cât și semnelor artificiale⁶; de aici generalitatea acesteia.

Principiul echității hermeneutice postulează faptul că aceasta este tendința unui interpret de a păstra sensul unui text până apar noi ipoteze care să-l contrazică. Așadar, până nu dovedim că sensul unui text este altul decât cel indicat de autorul acestuia, este echitabil să-l acceptăm pe cel din urmă. Desigur, în acest caz, după cum observă Rudolf A. Makkreel, avem mai curând un fel de credință că acela este sensul indicat de autorul textului, dar nu cunoaștem nicidecum că acela și este sensul textului.⁷ Astfel, o interpretare este autentică numai dacă poate dezvălui imediat sensul textului, așa cum este acesta indicat de către autor.

⁴ Jean Greisch, *Le principe d'équité comme «âme de l'herméneutique»* (Georg Friedrich Meier), în *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, 2001/1 (n° 29), pp. 19-42, p. 36.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 17.

⁶ Jean Grondin, *Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics*, trad. din limba germană de Joel Weinsheimer, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1994, p. 56.

⁷ Rudolf A. Makkreel, *The confluence of aesthetics and hermeneutics in Baumgarten, Meier, and Kant*, în *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 54 (1), 1996, pp. 65-75, p. 68.

Pe lângă mențiunile de mai sus, atunci când hermeneutul are de-a face cu un text și ține seama de principiul lui Meier, trebuie să abordeze obiectul interpretării sale cu bune intenții, întrucât, dacă este nedrept din punct de vedere moral, nu doar că se află în poziția de a comite o eroare hermeneutică, dar și acționează din ură față de creatorul semnelor, deci față de autorul textului.⁸

Mai mult, interpretul nu trebuie să introducă sensuri noi într-un text. Niciun interpret nu trebuie să „altereze” textul, deoarece astfel sunt introduse sensuri false. De altfel, hermeneutul se poate afla în poziția de a nu crede sau de a nu fi de acord cu sensul unui text, acest lucru nu înseamnă că în acel text nu există propoziții adevărate și, în plus, acest lucru arată limitele hermeneutice ale cititorului. La fel, dacă un interpret gândește mai mult decât autorul textului, din nou introduce sensuri noi în text. Aceste două cazuri sunt exemple de abuzuri hermeneutice, care încalcă principiul echității formulat de Meier. Prin urmare, interpretarea poate eșua prin a nu-și atinge ținta, adică sensul textului, dar și prin postularea unui sens parțial fals⁹, prin introducerea unor noi semnificații.

Așadar, există două moduri de a face „nedreptate” unui text: interpretarea supraevaluată și interpretarea rău intenționată, după cum am amintit deja. Tocmai din aceste motive Meier a formulat principiul echității hermeneutice și tocmai de aceea, după cum observă Jean Greisch, există în această teorie hermeneutică și o dimensiune etică.¹⁰

În următoarea secțiune vom prezenta pe scurt modul în care filosoful francez Paul Ricœur constituie hermeneutica sinelui narativ, pentru ca în cea de a treia secțiune să arătăm că argumentele lui Galen Strawson împotriva unei astfel de abordări a sinelui sunt false. În ultima secțiune, urmând ipotezele hermeneuticii lui Georg Friedrich Meier, vom arăta că încercarea lui Strawson este una eronată, schițând câteva argumente care vor ilustra abuzurile sau erorile hermeneutice ale unei astfel de perspective asupra sinelui.

2) Paul Ricœur și hermeneutica sinelui narativ

Contribuția decisivă a identității narative la constituirea sinelui își are locul în dialectica ipseității și identității-idem. Desigur, cercetarea lui Ricœur nu

⁸ Nicolae Râmbu, *The Barbarity of Interpretation*, în *Filozofia*, 2010, vol. 65, No 5, pp. 477-484, pp. 480-481.

⁹ Jean Greisch, *Op. cit.*, p. 34.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 41.

se oprește numai la acest stadiu. Funcția narativă pare a fi un laborator al judecății morale¹¹ și acest fapt îl determină pe filosoful francez să dezvolte discuția în direcția discursului etic, întrucât acțiunea descrisă trebuie să se potrivească cu acțiunea povestită. În ceea ce privește studiul de față, vom limita expunerea numai la constituirea sinelui la nivelul dialecticii *idem-ipse*, implicațiile etice deplasând discuția într-o altă direcție și, drept urmare, fiind lăsate pentru altă ocazie.

Constituirea sinelui narativ se desfășoară în două etape. Raționamentul lui Ricœur are drept punct de pornire modelul de conexiune dintre evenimente, care rezultă în urma operațiunii de punere-în-intrigă (*muthos*), preluată de la Aristotel. Acest artificiu permite includerea în permanența timpului a ceea ce este contradictoriu acesteia; anume diversitatea, variabilitatea, discontinuitatea și instabilitatea. În plus, teoria narativă merită o reevaluare, întrucât unii critici ai filosofiei ricœuriene au remarcat faptul că povestirile sunt reproduse, și nu trăite; pe când viața este trăită, și nu relatată.¹²

Astfel, funcția narativă, așa cum apare la Aristotel în *Poetica*¹³– imitație a acțiunii –, este preluată de Ricœur și corelată cu punerea-în-intrigă. Cele trei stadii ale povestirii sunt discutate de filosoful francez în *Time and Narrative I (Temps et Récit)*, fiind numite: *Mimesis*₁, *Mimesis*₂ și *Mimesis*₃.

*Mimesis*₁ este prefigurarea. Aceasta constă în faptul că există câteva competențe preliminare cu privire la acțiunea umană, un fel de presupuziții ale înțelegerii unei intrigi.¹⁴ De exemplu, suntem capabili să identificăm, după cum observă Karl Simms, agentul acțiunii și putem înțelege ce face acest agent; în plus, în prefigurarea unei intrigi noi formulăm deja întrebări precum „ce?”, „de ce?”, „cum?”, „cine?”.¹⁵ Este în joc, de fapt, ceea ce Aristotel numea „înlănțuirea faptelor” și există, deci, un principiu de ordine care guvernează această înlănțuire. Ricœur îl numește *concordanță*.¹⁶

¹¹ Paul Ricœur, *Sinele ca un altul*, trad. din limba franceză de A.-D. Marinescu și P. Marinescu, Spandugino, București, 2016, p. 185.

¹² Idem, *Life in quest of narrative*, în David Wood (ed.), *On Paul Ricœur: narrative and interpretation*, Routledge, London and New York, 1991, pp. 20-33, p. 20.

¹³ Aristotel, *Poetica*, 1455b 25, trad. C. Balmuş, Editura Științifică, București, 1957, pp. 57-58.

¹⁴ Paul Ricœur, *Time and Narrative I*, trad. în engleză de Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 54.

¹⁵ Karl Simms, *Paul Ricœur*, Routledge, New York, 2003, p. 84.

¹⁶ Paul Ricœur, *Sinele ca un altul*, trad. din limba franceză de A.-D. Marinescu și P. Marinescu, Spandugino, București, 2016, p. 187.

*Mimesis*₂ e nivelul configurativ. Principiul care guvernează este *discordanța*. Aceasta face ca intriga, în urma răsturnărilor de situație apărute în povestire, de la început și până la final, să fie totuși o transformare controlată.¹⁷ Așadar, *Mimesis*₂ este nivelul care solicită punerea-în-intrigă pentru a organiza diferitele evenimente într-un întreg inteligibil.¹⁸ Mai mult, la acest nivel putem supraveghea acțiunea personajului, precum și contribuția acestuia la întreaga poveste. Cititorii au o imagine de ansamblu asupra povestirii, întrucât pot observa înlănțuirea faptelor din punctul final. Astfel, povestirea, în întregime, are un avantaj față de personaje, tocmai pentru că poate fi citită în acest mod.¹⁹

*Mimesis*₃ e nivelul refigurativ și constă în intersecția dintre lumea textului și lumea cititorului.²⁰ Sau, după Simms, reprezintă aplicarea lumii textului la lumea cititorului.²¹ De asemenea, în *Sinele ca un altul*, Ricœur arată că principiul concordanței și principiul discordanței generează configurarea narativă; pentru ca apoi, acestui ultim nivel narativ, caracterizat de ceea ce am putea numi *concordanță discordantă* – din motivele expuse mai sus, să-i atribuim noțiunea de *sinteză a eterogenului*.²² Bunăoară, sinteza eterogenului constă în diversele medieri pe care le produce intriga, cum ar fi: între diversitatea evenimentelor și unitatea temporală a istoriei povestite, între componentele acțiunii și înlănțuirea istoriei etc.

Aceste reevaluări asupra teoriei narative, îl determină pe Ricœur să formuleze teza acestei prime etape a constituirii sinelui narativ: „identitatea personajului poate fi înțeleasă prin aplicarea asupra acestuia a operațiunii de punere-în-intrigă, care a fost mai întâi aplicată acțiunii povestite”²³; ceea ce înseamnă că personajul este pus-în-intrigă. Așadar, structura narativă pune la lucru două procese de punere-în-intrigă, unul al acțiunii și unul al personajului. Prin acest artificiu sunt depășite toate aporiile ascrierii care puteau interveni în discuția cu privire la constituirea sinelui narativ. Mai mult, înlănțuirea povestirii constă, de fapt, în răspunsurile date întrebărilor:

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 187.

¹⁸ *Idem*, *Time and Narrative I*, trad. în engleză de Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 65.

¹⁹ Karl Simms, *Op. cit.*, p. 85.

²⁰ Paul Ricœur, *Op. cit.*, p. 71.

²¹ Karl Simms, *Op. cit.*, p. 85.

²² Paul Ricœur, *Sinele ca un altul*, trad. din limba franceză de A.-D. Marinescu și P. Marinescu, Spandugino, București, 2016, p. 187.

²³ *Ibidem*, p. 187.

cine?, *ce?* și *cum?*, dintr-un punct de vedere sintagmatic. De aceea, povestirea înseamnă să spunem *cine* a făcut, *de ce* și *cuma* făcut o anumită acțiune.²⁴ În acest mod, prima etapă a constituirii sinelui este încheiată.

A doua etapă a constituirii sinelui presupune faptul că operațiunea de punere-în-intrigă face legătura dintre acțiune și personajele povestirii și, în plus, „produce o dialectică care este în mod clar o dialectică a faptului-de-a-fi-același și a ipseității”²⁵. Mai mult, între personajul povestirii și acțiune există o corelație ce implică o dialectică internă a personajului, care corespunde în totalitate concordanței și discordanței dezvoltate de punerea-în-intrigă. Concordanța rezultă din faptul că „personajul își extrage singularitatea din unitatea vieții sale înțeleasă ca o totalitate temporală, ea însăși singulară, ce îl diferențiază de altele”²⁶. Pe de altă parte, când vine vorba de discordanță, aceasta este dată de rupturile care amenință unitatea vieții, segmentând-o.

Acesta este punctul în care intervine *Mimesis*³ sau refigurarea. Dialectica concordanță-discordanță, adică concordanța discordantă, are drept urmare faptul că evenimentele contingente participă într-un mod retroactiv la formarea istoriei unei vieți; și această istorie este comparată cu identitatea personajului. De aceea, o persoană poate fi înțeleasă ca personaj dintr-o povestire – în acest caz, propria-i povestire –, și nu diferă de experiențele sale, împărtășind „condiția identității dinamice specifice istoriei povestite”²⁷. Concret, povestirea construiește identitatea personajului. Această identitate poate fi numită *identitate narativă*, întrucât o elaborează pe cea a istoriei povestite. Prin urmare, identitatea acestei istorii constituie identitatea personajului.

Mai departe, această dialectică concordanță-discordanță atribuită personajului trebuie înscrisă în dialectica faptului-de-a-fi-același și a ipseității. De asemenea, în studiile filosofului francez identificăm două forme de permanență în timp: caracterul și cuvântul dat. Caracterul este menit să acopere intersecția dintre idem și ipse, iar cuvântul dat este un criteriu de ireductibilitate, fiind asociat ipseității. De asemenea, cuvântul dat, pentru că nu poate fi înscris într-o dimensiune generală a identității, este corelat de Ricœur cu *menținerea de sine*.²⁸ În acest punct al cercetării

²⁴*Ibidem*, p. 187.

²⁵*Ibidem*, p. 186.

²⁶*Ibidem*, p. 194.

²⁷*Ibidem*, p. 194.

²⁸*Ibidem*, p. 165.

trebuie să înscriem dialectica personajului, după cum am observat, în dialectica dintre cei doi poli ai permanenței în timp.

Povestirea caută și produce *variațiile imaginative* la care este supusă identitatea narativă a personajului și, astfel, literatura este un laborator de experiențe de gândire. Mai mult, resursele identității narative – dialectica dintre faptul-de-a-fi-același și ipseitate –, sunt supuse povestirii prin aceste variații. Ca atare, raportul dintre cele două forme de permanență în timp este evidențiat prin raportul dintre aceste variații imaginative. Desigur, în experiența cotidiană, observă Ricœur, acestea se suprapun. Bunăoară, când avem încredere în cineva înseamnă că, în același timp, ne bazăm pe stabilitatea unui caracter și avem pretenția ca acel cineva să-și țină cuvântul dat, chiar dacă apar câteva evenimente neprevăzute.²⁹

Desigur, acestei teorii narative i s-au adus câteva obiecții. De exemplu, dacă avem de a face cu o ficțiune precum cea a lui Robert Musil³⁰, în care omul este fără însușiri, adică fără proprietăți, ce putem spune despre identitatea personajului? În sfârșit, această întrebare conduce la o alta: putem identifica un astfel de personaj într-o lume reală? Răspunsul este negativ. Oricum, Ricœur are în vedere o astfel de situație. După cum am observat mai sus, ipseitatea își pierde uneori suportul faptului-de-a-fi-același. De aceea, într-o povestire în care personajele sunt înzestrate cu nenumărate proprietăți, identitatea-ipse și identitatea-idem se suprapun; pe când într-o ficțiune derutantă precum cea a lui Musil, acțiunea se dezvăluie numai ca o reinterpretare a ipseității.³¹

În plus, un astfel de exemplu poate fi închipuit doar într-o ficțiune tehnologică. Ficțiunile literare, în opinia lui Ricœur, „rămân variații imaginative în jurul unui invariant, și anume condiția corporală trăită ca mediere existențială între sine și lume”³². Desigur, dacă personajele sunt oameni. Oricum, corpul propriu, despre care au tot discutat Husserl și Heidegger, este o componentă a sinelui, pentru că variațiile imaginative în jurul acestuia sunt, de fapt, variații asupra sinelui și asupra ipseității sale. Corpul devine, așadar, un element care constrânge teoria narativă a identității și elimină toate ipotezele ficționale, precum cea a omului fără proprietăți.

²⁹*Ibidem*, p. 195.

³⁰ Robert Musil, *Omul fără însușiri*, trad. Mircea Ivănescu, Humanitas, București, 2018.

³¹ Paul Ricœur, *Op. cit.*, p. 196.

³²*Ibidem*, p. 197.

3) Falsitatea argumentelor lui Galen Strawson din perspectiva filosofiei ricœuriene

Filosofia reflexivă ricœuriană, după criticile la adresa *cogito*-ului, își asumă deturul prin analiză. La capătul acestui travaliu, problema avută în vedere, constituirea sinelui narativ, apare ca dialectică a ipseității și a faptului-de-a-fi-același; însă această dialectică presupune mai multe momente. De pildă, momentul dialecticii antrenate de acțiune și personaj, care generează o identitate de tip narativ. Această identitate narativă rezolvă aporiile identității rezultate în urma deturului prin filosofia analitică. Astfel, una dintre mizele hermeneuticii sinelui narativ este aceea a depășirea acestor aporii.

Pe de altă parte, Ricœur a căutat în studiile proprii un concept care să ofere identității, fie că vorbim de identitatea-ipse sau de identitatea-idem, permanență în timp. Cercetarea dimensiunilor identității-idem s-a sfârșit cu un eșec, întrucât la acest nivel nu putem da seamă de ceva care să persiste în timp și să fie, totodată, un substrat al acestei identități; timpul fiind într-o astfel de situație mai curând un criteriu de neasemănare. Ca atare, este propusă o nouă miză de cercetare, anume găsirea unui relațional invariabil care să susțină dialectica idem-ipse. Astfel, două concepte, amintite deja, pot oferi identității personale permanență în timp: caracterul și cuvântul dat. Caracterul este punctul de intersecție a faptului-de-a-fi-același și a ipseității, iar cuvântul dat, corelat al menținerii de sine, aparține doar ipseității. Cercetarea, însă, nu se încheie aici, fiecare astfel de câștig hermeneutic aducând cu sine și o nouă problemă.

Între evenimentele distincte care se petrec de-a lungul vieții trebuie să existe o conexiune. Aceasta din urmă este asigurată de punerea-în-intrigă (*muthos*). Astfel, povestirea se desfășoară în trei etape *Mimesis*₁ (prefigurare), *Mimesis*₂ (configurare) și *Mimesis*₃ (refigurare), după cum am arătat deja. În urma acestora, identitatea personajului poate fi înțeleasă prin punerea-în-intrigă, care a fost mai întâi aplicată povestirii. Mai mult, această operațiune face legătura dintre acțiune și personajele povestirii, producând, totodată, o dialectică ce are drept poli ipseitatea și faptul-de-a-fi-același. De asemenea, concordanța discordantă ce caracterizează personajul este „organizată” la nivelul *Mimesis*₃ (refigurare). În acest mod evenimentele punctuale și rupturile care amenință unitatea vieții sunt restrânse în cadrul identității narative.

Ca atare, în filosofia reflexivă ricœuriană hermeneutica sinelui pune în mișcare, pe lângă deturul prin analiză, o „dialectică de dialectici”; sinele fiind „aproximat” din aproape în aproape. În urma unui astfel de efort filosofic, sinele este constituit ca un sine narativ, în cadrul căruia persoana, de la naștere și până la moarte, își găsește continuitatea temporală.

Desigur, sunt unii filosofi care contestă faptul că sinele uman ar fi narativ; sau doar narativ. Bunăoară, Galen Strawson, în *Against Narrativity*, critică teoria narativității sinelui. Concret, acesta critică teza conform căreia narativitatea ar constitui identitatea persoanei și teza normativă conform căreia viața, pentru a fi bună, ar trebui trăită dintr-o perspectivă narativă, considerându-le false.³³

Mai mult, acesta susține că există două moduri în care un individ se poate percepe în raport cu viața; astfel, unii percep viața ca întreg, având o viziune *diacronică* asupra acesteia, pe când alții pot avea o percepție distinctă, considerându-se *episodici*.³⁴ Cineva este *episodic* dacă nu se percepe ca un sine care a existat și în trecut și va exista și în viitor. *Diacronicul*, după Strawson, este contradictoriu episodicalui, întrucât „acesta are experiența prezentă a continuității sinelui său dinspre trecut către viitor”³⁵. Evident, episodicalul nu-și cunoaște și înțelege viața ca pe o narațiune; numai diacronicul acceptă faptul că viața și, implicit, sinele pot fi înțelese dintr-o perspectivă narativistă.

Împotriva acestei poziții anti-narativiste se ridică Kristofer Camilo Arca, susținând că, dintr-o perspectivă ricœuriană, toate argumentele lui Galen Strawson sunt false. După ce prezintă pe larg tezele susținute de Strawson în lucrarea citată, Arca, așezând aceste argumente sub formă silogistică, dovedește neajunsurile acestora. De exemplu, un prim argument pe care Arca îl demontează este tocmai cel al episodicității sinelui. Astfel, după Galen Strawson, ceea ce noi numim *sine* rezultă din experiența trăită, acestei experiențe trăite conștient îi corespunde o stare mentală distinctă – în sensul că pentru fiecare experiență avem o altă stare mentală; de exemplu, imaginația este diferită de percepție, care este diferită de memorie etc. –, în plus, deoarece sinele rezultă din experiența conștientă trăită, și ținând cont de faptul că aveam de-a face cu mai multe astfel de „trăiri”,

³³ Galen Strawson, *Against Narrativity*, în *Ratio (new series)* XVII, 4, December, 2004, pp. 428-452, pp. 1-2.

³⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 2-3.

³⁵ Constantin Oprea, *Sinele narativ și sinele episodic. Opoziție sau complementaritate în cadrul unui sine multiplu?*, în *Rev. filos.*, LXV, București, 2018, pp. 261-272, p. 6.

rezultă că există un sine pentru fiecare experiență; așadar sinele este episodic.³⁶

Nici nu e greu de combătut un astfel de argument. Pe scurt, dacă acest silogism ar fi valid, cum am mai putea vorbi despre faptul că unele persoane sunt diacronice? În plus, Arca observă că premisa a doua este problematică. Atât memoria, cât și imaginația intră în sfera de studiu a fenomenologiei percepției, în structura intenționalității conștiinței. Mai mult, o critică și mai dură este afirmată de Arca cu privire la natura intuitivă pe care Strawson se bazează când spune că acest argument este valid. Pe bună dreptate, această natură intuitivă nu este de ajuns pentru a demonstra episodicitatea sinelui.³⁷ După cum am amintit în secțiunea precedentă, în cadrul filosofiei lui Paul Ricœur, hermeneutica sinelui narativ presupune deturul prin analiză. Sinele poate fi „aproximat” în urma interpretărilor și medierilor date de semne și simboluri, la care se adaugă funcția narativă, cu cele trei dimensiuni discutate.

În fine, un alt argument strawsonian demontat de Arca este următorul. Episodicitatea este adevărată, dacă episodicitatea este adevărată, atunci nu există narativitate; ca atare, tezele narativ-psihologice³⁸, cele care promovează faptul că, după cum am arătat mai sus, oamenii sunt înzestrați cu presupuziții în ceea ce privește intriga; sunt false.³⁹ Acest argument este și mai ușor de respins. Întrucât primul argument împotriva perspectivei narative s-a dovedit a fi fals și prima premisă a celui de al doilea este tocmai concluzia celui dintâi, este evident că este fals.

Următorul contraargument strawsonian are în vedere implicațiile etice ale povestirii. Chiar dacă în studiul de față nu am avut în vedere acest lucru, întrucât acest contraargument vizează identitatea narativă, îl redăm în continuare. Astfel, pentru Strawson, teoria narativă a sinelui implică găsirea unor evenimente care formează povestea vieții cuiva. În căutarea acestor evenimente, teoria narativă are în vedere constituirea sinelui; acest lucru mai mult inhibă decât promovează nivelul etic (ca dimensiune a

³⁶ Kristofer Camilo Arca, *Opaque Selves: A Ricœurian Response to Galen Strawson's Anti-Narrative Arguments*, în *Études Ricœuriennes / Ricœur Studies*, Vol 9, No 1, 2018, pp. 70-89, p. 12.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 13.

³⁸ Perspectiva narativă asupra sinelui este dezbătută și în rândul psihologilor.

³⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 13-14.

povestirii) al acțiunii. Prin urmare, nu ar trebui să adoptăm o identitate narativă.⁴⁰

După cum observă Arca, acest contraargument poate funcționa în cadrul unor teorii narrative concurente celei ricœuriene, dar nu și împotriva celei din urmă. Din perspectiva hermeneuticii sinelui, acest contraargument este fals, deoarece, pentru Ricœur, sinele este în permanență însoțit de altul său. Apoi, după cum am amintit în treacăt, povestirea nu este neutră din punct de vedere etic. Orice istorie mundană pe care cineva o poate spune despre sine are o dimensiune morală, care „construiește” adevărul și, în plus, pune în evidență menținea de sine.⁴¹

Al patrulea contraargument identificat de Arca în textul lui Strawson este următorul. Constituirea sinelui pe baza detaliilor amintite mai sus, după Strawson, înseamnă netezirea estetică a povestirii. Astfel, dacă anumite evenimente sunt omise, înseamnă că narațiunea nu epuizează viața, în sensul de sumă a acestor evenimente. Dacă viața nu este epuizată prin narațiune, atunci nu poate fi redusă la o identitate de tip narativ. Așadar, viața nu este narativă.⁴² Acest argument este fals, pentru că, în urma celor prezentate, identitatea narativă presupune reîntoarcerea la unele evenimente, reinterpretarea și înțelegerea acestora.

Ultimul argument strawsonian împotriva narativității prezentat de Arca apare astfel: întrucât sinele este narativ, povestea vieții unei persoane poate fi revizuită. Revizuirea conduce la falsitate și, de aceea, a încerca să înțelegi viața prin intermediul povestirii înseamnă a te îndepărta de adevărul faptelor întâmplante; deci n-ar trebui să adoptăm o identitate narativă.⁴³ Falsitatea acestui argument rezultă din a doua premisă. Strawson presupune că revizuirea conduce numai la denaturarea identității, fiind o formă de înșelăciune, ceea ce ar însemna că revizuirea este coercitivă în natură⁴⁴, lucru de-a dreptul fals.

Am arătat, așadar, mergând pe urmele lui Kristofer Camilo Arca, că argumentele lui Galen Strawson împotriva sinelui narativ sunt false. Mai mult, după cum am arătat în a doua secțiune a studiului de față, hermeneutica sinelui narativ propusă de Paul Ricœur este completă și complexă. Deturul prin analiză, dezvoltarea funcției narrative, depășirea

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 14.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, p. 14.

⁴² *Ibidem*, p. 14.

⁴³ *Ibidem*, p. 15.

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 15.

aporiilor identității personale, identitatea narativă și dialectica idem-ipse sunt elemente care dovedesc faptul că sinele are mai degrabă o natură narativă; posibilitatea unui sine episodic fiind respinsă cu argumente suficiente.

Concluzii. Sinele episodic și abuzul în interpretare

După cum am arătat în prima secțiune, principiul echității hermeneutice generează o oarecare onestitate în interpretarea textelor; în cazul de față, a textelor filosofice. Urmărind, așadar, în precedentele două secțiuni, constituirea sinelui narativ în cadrul filosofiei lui Paul Ricœur și apoi demontarea câtorva argumente ale lui Galen Strawson împotriva unei astfel de viziuni asupra sinelui constatăm, și acest lucru l-a făcut deja și cititorul, că filosoful britanic comite câteva abuzuri hermeneutice.

Desigur, cititorul ar putea reclama faptul că Galen Strawson face parte dintr-o tradiție filosofică total opusă celei în care se înscrie Ricœur; lucru fals, întrucât, în lucrările filosofului francez, filosofia analitică ocupă un loc aparte și, în plus, de-a lungul operei acestuia depistăm încercarea de a arăta completitudinea celor două „tradiții”. Dacă adăugăm acestui lucru faptul că fenomenologia husserliană⁴⁵ și filosofia analitică își au originea (comună) în opera lui Gottlob Frege, distanța dintre cele două moduri de a filozofa și contraargumentul (posibil) amintit mai sus nu-și găsesc locul într-un studiu precum cel de față.

Astfel, la o atentă lectură a studiului indicat, un prim abuz pe care-l face Strawson este acela de a restrânge teoriile despre narativitatea sinelui numai la cele ale unor filosofi analitici (Daniel Dennett, Charles Taylor etc.) sau psihologi – desigur, poate acestea i-au fost la îndemână –, o teorie coerentă și „completă” precum cea a lui Ricœur fiind amintită în treacăt.

Apoi, este limpede că poziția lui Strawson față de teoriile sinelui narativ este abuzivă din start, întrucât, urmând hermeneutica lui Meier, acesta „introduce noi sensuri” în teoriile analizate. Pe de altă parte, Galen Strawson ni se pare a fi rău intenționat, și ne raportăm din nou la hermeneutica lui Meier, atunci când propune cele câteva argumente care demontează narativitatea sinelui. După cum am arătat, aceste argumente, pe lângă faptul că sunt abuzive, sunt și false.

⁴⁵ Paul Ricœur scrie în mai multe locuri că filosofia proprie se vrea a fi varianta hermeneutică a fenomenologiei husserliene.

Mai mult, fără a comite noi înșine un abuz hermeneutic, la cele de mai sus adăugăm și faptul că filosoful britanic, deși filosofează în cadrul unei anumite tradiții de gândire – cea analitică –, încalcă principiul echității hermeneutice când oferă argumente logice pentru episodicitatea sinelui, adică restrânge câmpul analizei hermeneutice la un singur domeniu: logica. Putem spune, revenind la prima secțiune, că Strawson „gândește” mai mult decât autorii pe care-i critică, deci comite un alt abuz hermeneutic.

De asemenea, episodicitatea sinelui conduce la consecințe etice sau / și morale drastice. Dacă am urma liniile gândirii strawsoniene, cineva care se consideră *episodic*, după cum am indicat în secțiunea precedentă, „crede” că nu a existat în trecut și nici nu va (mai) exista nici în viitor, ceea ce înseamnă că un astfel de individ este predispus să comită diverse infracțiuni, întrucât, orice ar spune Strawson, este lipsit de conduita morală. Astfel, dacă principiului echității hermeneutice avea și o dimensiune etică, se poate observa că în cazul textelor lui Strawson această dimensiune lipsește odată cu principiul și, mai mult, predispoze sinele către încălcarea oricărui principiu etic.

Oricum ar fi, este limpede că dacă urmărim cu atenție hermeneutica lui Georg Friedrich Meier și încercăm să aplicăm această hermeneutică în duelul exegetic dintre Galen Strawson și filosofii ce susțin și încurajează existența unui sine narativ, observăm că filosoful britanic încalcă principiul echității hermeneutice și comite abuzurile indicate mai sus.

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THE PROBLEM OF THE CRITERION AND THE DISPARITIES BETWEEN THE EPISTEMIC AND THE LINGUISTIC NORMS OF KNOWLEDGE

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Abstract: *What we know is decided in the framework of the linguistic norms for knowledge ascriptions. Such include not just epistemic conditions but also communicative ones. Knowledge in communicative context is conditioned on public agreement upon the question and the nature of the presented evidence, sincerity of testimony and responsibility in claiming. This distinction is used here to explain the puzzles surrounding the problem of the criterion. The disparity between the epistemic principles and the communicative conditions of knowledge ascriptions is presented here as a philosophically important question about the role of language in theory-construction.*

Keywords: *problem of the criterion, knowledge, metaepistemology, epistemic norms, linguistic rules.*

Chisholm's famous formulation of the problem of the criterion² poses two questions that lay the starting ground for all philosophical investigations of knowledge: "What do we know?" and "How are we to decide in any particular case *whether* we know" (Chisholm, 1977: 120) The answers of these question being mutually depended seem to invite scepticism for the prospects of analyzing knowledge. If establishing a criterion requires availability of some instances and identifying such instances is in need of a criterion, then the epistemically sound alternative would be suspension of judgement. Sceptic challenges arise from the preference of either of the questions because of the risks of circularity and arbitrariness in creating a theory of knowledge. Thus, the problem of the

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² For a discussion on the problem see Bonjour, 1985: 11-15.; Steup, 1993: 378-381 and Fumerton, 2008.

criterion invites a discussion about the proper assumptions epistemology should take on in its theory construction³.

Empiricists, according to Chisholm give preference to the criterion, while “commonsensism” begins with instances of knowledge (Chisholm, 1977: 120). Because the question about the starting point of epistemological study depends on the understanding of its subject matter, the difference between these two approaches lies in the way they understand what the term “knowledge” designates. Empiricists recognize under the notion of knowledge a normative concept, commonsensism – a factual one. This raises the question if there is a right and wrong understanding of the concept of knowledge with respect to both the possibility of mapping the extent of our knowledge and in explicating the epistemic principles that determine knowledge ascriptions. The problem of the criterion as it is set by Chisholm presupposes a conceptual uniformity of the notion - a thesis that, as I shall argue, neither epistemological studies nor common language use would easily confirm. It is more likely that various understandings about what “knowledge” means co-exist in practice. If this is the case, then the questions posed by Chisholm may have their answers independently of one another for each might be answered in accord with a different understanding of knowledge or a different function of the term.

This paper aims at presenting a disparity between the linguistic rules that govern knowledge ascriptions and the epistemic requirements for true beliefs as a possible tool for a new approach to the problem of the criterion. Linguistic and epistemic conditions of knowledge both participate in the concept application but their merit is context-dependent. Although the epistemic set of norms is a part of the linguistic set, it does not exhaust it and, some of its elements, it seems, are not necessary for all knowledge ascriptions. What we know, as I will argue, may be decided under a different set of criteria for different occasions and the criteria themselves may not be derived from some necessary “core” of definitional conditions. This Wittgensteinian⁴ idea is used here as a possible resolution to at least

³ This, methodological perspective to the problem of the criterion is developed partly by Bonjour (Bonjour, 1985: 10-15) and in detail by Fumerton (Fumerton, 2008).

⁴ I understand Wittgenstein’s analysis of common sense propositions in *On Certainty* (Wittgenstein, 1969) as driving a distinction between the pragmatic and the epistemic requirements for knowledge. Here, apart from reconsidering the

some of the puzzles surrounding the problem of the criterion. It explains why choices of a different starting point in Chisholm's dilemma result in very different epistemological theories.

To demonstrate the discontinuity between the linguistic and the epistemic layer in the concept of knowledge I will use the case of common sense propositions⁵ as cases satisfying the linguistic norms for knowledge but not all epistemic norms. The question about the disparity between the epistemic principles and regular cases of knowledge ascriptions is a philosophically important question about the nature of language and its role in theory-construction.

1. A criterion for what?

“Criterion” designates a normatively established method for judging whether some instance is of a particular kind and presumably how one should act in accord with the case at hand. The normative aspect resides in the idea, that criteria ensure that a judgement is right or successful with respect to some pre-established principle. It is therefore important to understand what rightness in the context of knowledge means –what the relevant norms or principles that determine the criteria are.

Although a criterion in a way depends on a definition, it is not always the case that a definition of a notion provides guidelines for its application. Definitions of knowledge in epistemology contain both linguistic (referential and pragmatic) and epistemic conditions. The normative and the factual aspects of the concept are intertwined in a way that makes the rules for concept application hard to explicate. Referential definitions (based on the referent), unlike pragmatic ones (based on language use) may be said to present the referent as a metaphysical entity leaving the question about its relation to human cognitive capacities open. A criterion on the other hand, by virtue of its function, requires cognitive accessibility for its application. A referential definition does not lay out epistemic criteria for concept application on particular occasions unless it is clear under what conditions the referent is present, and the norms associated with it - satisfied. For example, a referential definition of a term about an object may

problem of the criterion in light of this distinction, I will also try to justify theoretically the adequacy of the idea.

⁵ Of the type suggested by Moore, for instance “The Earth has existed for many years past.”(Moore, 1925: 111)

not contain notions that relate to perceptual experience and be only suggestive about the empirical conditions concerning the term application. It could be argued that this is the case with externalist definitions of truth, meaning, knowledge and other epistemologically important terms.

Pragmatic definitions of the notion of knowledge, on the other hand, may incorporate some but not all epistemic conditions, recognized by epistemology. Pragmatic by a large part is the definition of knowledge, suggested by Wittgenstein in *On Certainty*.⁶ Wittgenstein treats knowledge as normatively restrained by the possession of evidence. (432 OC) Evidence, however, by virtue of its function is what could be presented to others and be accepted by a co-member of the same set of language-games⁷. The knower is presented as a trustworthy person that may be relied upon⁸. (575 OC) For this, she must provide publicly accessible justification in the form of evidence. This account puts forward the public nature of knowledge. Wittgenstein's point about the pragmatic aspects of knowledge ascriptions is applicable to all epistemic designations. The subjective conditions of rational epistemic evaluation of beliefs and the proper symmetry between the evidence and the doxastic attitude toward a proposition concern only the epistemic agent, while the contexts of concept application include other speakers as well. The epistemic requirements for knowledge that are related to the epistemic agent are not the only ones that would be sufficient for knowledge ascriptions. Furthermore, the conditions under which a mental state is knowledge change with the shift of the cognitive perspective of the speaker. For example, in order for a state to be regarded as a supposition rather than knowledge, there are two distinct sets of norms applicable. The epistemic norm states that cases of inconclusive evidence require the doxastic attitude of supposing in contrast to believing. There are however, also linguistic norms that possess some additional dimensions. A proposition may be treated as a supposition in communicative context when a person fails to present socially acceptable ground for the truthfulness of the proposition, regardless of her doxastic

⁶ "230. We are asking ourselves: what do we do with a statement "I know..."? For it is not a question of mental processes or mental states. And that is how one must decide whether something is knowledge or not." (230 OC)

⁷ See Wittgenstein (175, 176, 504, 657 OC).

⁸ Austin provides a similar pragmatic analysis of the knowledge claim as acts of giving one's word that something is the case, see Austin, 1946: 171 in Wisdom, J., et al. 1946

attitude. Imagine that Jane is certain who the president of France is, but Peter disagrees that the evidence presented by Jane is conclusive. Then in this discourse, before the question is resolved for both parties, it is reasonable to regard Jane's belief as a supposition rather than knowledge even if Jane claims to possess rational certainty – that is certainty based on conclusive justification.

The public attributes of knowledge constitute norms for the use of the term whose satisfaction will strongly depend on social agreement – actual or foreseeable for the agent. It is hard to agree that such norms also reflect the epistemic requirements for rational certainty. At best, agreement may be treated as evidence in favor of some proposition for an individual thinker. At the same time, its role in communicative contexts is much more decisive. Knowledge ascriptions are further determined by communicative intentions, conventions, and practical functions that are also not necessary attributes of a rationally acquired true belief. In accord with the epistemic norms, some philosophers would be reluctant to disregard as cases of knowledge beliefs whose justification is based on evidence of private nature, such that the social agreement as a requirement is not even foreseeable⁹. Furthermore, the pragmatic aspects of knowledge attributions provide some rather obscure¹⁰ criteria for knowledge, stranger than one is usually ready to admit for epistemological analysis or at least whose consequences for the theory of knowledge are not yet fully understood¹¹.

2. Linguistic and epistemic conditions for knowledge- the difference

In both referential and pragmatic definitions of knowledge, the problems with the proper designation originate from mixing up the epistemic conditions that a mental state must satisfy in order to count as knowledge and the linguistic principles for knowledge ascriptions. The norms of designation differ when they are applied in accord with the function of recognizing the status of different mental states and when they are employed with their communicative function. The subjective function of the concept of knowledge is related to the differentiation among beliefs as

⁹ Ayer's analysis of the private and public uses of language among other things opens the possibility for private justification and private evidence of the sort disregarded by Wittgenstein's pragmatic approach (see Ayer, 1956: 63-64)

¹⁰ Political, sexist etc.

¹¹ For an excellent comment on the relevance of the pragmatics of knowledge to traditional philosophical questions see Haslanger, 1999

guides of individual behavior. True belief is the best guide of behavior so the purpose of the norms of epistemic evaluation is to select true beliefs¹². Thus, epistemic principles serve a very different purpose than the linguistic ones. They serve to determine the veracity of a proposition, not the epistemic status of a mental state. This can be demonstrated by answering the question about the purpose of cognitive inquiry. If an agent has to determine whether a belief is a case of knowledge, she inquires about the facts, not about her mental states. Epistemic evaluations are concerned with the agent's mental states only as far as their conditions may stand in the way of true belief. Therefore, a theory about the way in which the subject can appropriate truth is relevant to epistemic evaluation but is usually not the central goal of cognitive inquiry. Strictly speaking, there are epistemic norms for veracity, not straightforwardly for knowledge, and possession of rationally acquired truth is knowledge. Epistemology's interest is in the criteria for true belief that may be rationally established and if such criteria can ever be conclusive on the question of truthfulness. The purpose of the epistemic judgements – attainment of (only) true beliefs – prescribes the rightness or wrongness of methods and actions regarding learning and justification.

On the other hand, linguistic norms secure the understanding of the concept of knowing and its usage in communicative context. They include agreement upon the question and the nature of the presented evidence, sincerity of testimony and responsibility in claiming. Understanding what a proposition means in the usual cases of its application guarantees nothing more than the possession of tools for agreement about its truth-conditions and the ability to use it appropriately. And while it is generally clear when one should use the verbal expression "I know" it is also clear that a speech act of this kind may be based on a mistaken belief. It is not resolved under what circumstances a cognitive endeavor could reach a point where a belief is such that no mistake, regarding its veracity is possible but this does not prevent from taking on the social responsibility of claiming to know.

There are also conditions of knowledge that may serve as rules for both the epistemic and the communicative function. Rational certainty is both an epistemic requirement and a linguistic rule for knowledge ascriptions of

¹² The instrumentalist account of epistemic rationality presented here is questioned by T Kelly (Kelly, 2003) however, even if that criticism is accepted its arguments do not diminish the difference between the epistemic and the communicative aspects in the concept of knowledge.

the kind "I know." Referential definitions of knowledge as a proper type of true belief on the other hand, provide criteria for ascribing the knowledge-state to other persons. By saying "Peter knows." one presents the physical fact of knowledge therefore committing epistemically to the claim of knowing this fact with regard both to Peter's beliefs and to ones own. The pragmatic conditions refer to the appropriateness of such ascriptions but the practice shows that not all ascriptions fulfill all of the epistemic requirements for true belief.

3. The case with common sense propositions

The problem of the criterion would be easily resolved if the answers of both Chisholm's questions guided the analyses in the same direction. Ideally, if the criteria for knowledge are derived from the linguistic practices of concept application and these in turn are governed by meanings distilled from particular occasions, then the conflict between the linguistic principles of knowledge ascriptions and the epistemic conditions of their application should only be a seeming one. It should be possible to explicate the epistemic norms that guide knowledge ascriptions in all instances and they in turn would be acceptable on a priori grounds since they sustain language use. A case of knowledge would be easily subsumed under the general requirements derived from conceptual analysis and any epistemic norm would be easily validated by practice.

It would also be unnecessary under such analysis to pre-select a starting point for theory construction since the definitional conditions for knowledge would present a coherent set of principles exclusive for all accepted instances of knowledge. Under the mutual governance and fit between cases and criteria of knowledge, the sceptic could not stand her ground. Indeed, there are enough approaches arguing for explanatory or justificatory symmetry in usage between criteria and tokens in the quest for uncovering a fit and illuminating knowledge¹³. However, the force of the problem of the criterion does not lay only in its logical structure and methodological dilemma. What gives fuel to the issue are the actual situations where the attempts to match any provisional criterion with specific instances of knowledge have been just as unsuccessful as the

¹³ Reflective equilibrium named so by J. Rawls as a method of "mutual adjustment of principles and considered judgements" (Rawls, 1999: 18) is one such solution; see T. Poston (Poston, 2011) for a similar one in the lines of explanationism.

attempts for explicating the rational norms that determine the knowledge status of these instances. Such is the case with common sense propositions that seem to question the entire prospect of the analysis of knowledge. They do not fit within the epistemic conditions of knowledge since it is hard to see how they satisfy the anti-luck requirements - they are not rationally justified by appeal to conclusive evidence or other uncontroversial method. On the other hand, if they are granted the status of knowledge – no particular norm that they may be said to constitute can be narrow enough to exclude cases of mistaken beliefs in similar situations and wide enough to cover all accepted instances of knowing.

This situation can be explained by treating knowledge ascriptions in these cases and guided by the some linguistic rules in line with externalist conceptions of knowledge and by the pragmatic requirements for knowledge ascriptions. Common sense propositions are cases representative for the disparity between the epistemic and the linguistic principles of concept application. For any individual, they possess a high level of rational certainty and they enjoy widespread public agreement even though the beliefs that embody them for a single epistemic agent do not fully satisfy the epistemic principles of true belief. Their justification, regardless of how it is explicated in epistemological theories, remains incomplete but they serve successfully as common ground presumptions in many communicative situations and prove to be good guides in individual behavior. The fact that their validity as cases of knowledge is related to the success in their linguistic and practical functions also explains why they cannot be said to result from individual acts of careful inquiry, as they are seldom a subject of contemplation outside of philosophy.

4. Splitting the problem of the criterion

Concept application in the case of knowledge, it seems, is guided by considerations about the prevalence of some features paradigmatic for the cognitive situation not by some “hard core” of necessary conditions. The hard philosophical issue here is how these two sets of principles –epistemic and linguistic have come to diverge from one-another to the point where common designations of knowledge in communicative context do not fit with our most basic understanding about the normative aspects in the meaning of the notion. The answer that common sense propositions provide to Chisholm’s question of what we know does not fit well within

the criteria we have for knowledge. The criteria on the other hand, are so strong that they cannot explain even a single case of knowledge ascription. The disparity between the epistemic and linguistic requirements may explain how this problem came around. Although it does not resolve the epistemic issues, surrounding the impossibility to match our conception about what knowledge is with the term's practical applications it suggests that the circularity of the problem of the criterion was brought about by historical contingency. The development of communicative practices and epistemic requirement for knowledge have taken place in different contexts. Bringing them together may be viewed as part of the philosophical task.

It seems our conception of knowledge is not a straightforward generalization from paradigmatic cases of knowing. A suggestion that may explain this disparity is related to the fact that linguistic principles concern not only communication but also the acts of naming. Naming prescribes an ontological status to the referent and therefore presents a basic act of theory construction. The theory of the world embedded in the common everyday language could be responsible for this disparity and this is a reason for a strong sceptic concern. The veracity of such a theory cannot be conclusively established since the available conceptual tools for its epistemic evaluation will always carry the same ontological commitments. Knowledge is what should make any hypothesis about reality acceptable, but analyzing knowledge already requires the concept of reality, because the notion of truth becomes meaningful only in the light of an ontological projection. This result suggests the need for philosophical conceptual engineering beyond the contexts of everyday discourse.

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MATHEMATICAL STRUCTURALISM AND PURELY FORMAL THEORY

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Abstract: *In this paper we put a thesis that it is possible to perceive mathematics as a science of structures, where the difference between structure as the object of study and theory as something which describes this object is blurred. We discuss the view of set-theoretical structuralism with a special emphasis placed on a certain gradual development of set theory as a formal theory. We propose a certain view concerning the methodology of formal sciences, which is an attempt at describing precisely and capturing in a scheme the ways of development of deductive sciences in general, set theory including. We show that the standpoint of sui generis structuralism has some features characteristic of purely formal theory.*

Keywords: *philosophy of mathematics, mathematical structuralism, structure, structurality of mathematics, deductivity of mathematics, structuralism sui generis, set theory, methodology of mathematics.*

1. Introduction

More than two decades ago J.P. Burgess, while writing a review of the book *Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology* (Shapiro, 1997), stated that since then the view of mathematical structuralism could hardly be ignored (Burgess, 1999, 291). Nowadays an animated discussion takes place both on a number of detailed aspects of specific standpoints in its area and on the principal types of mathematical structuralism in general. Attempts at putting this non-uniform view in order are undertaken (Hellman, 2001), (Hellman, 2005), (Horsten, 2007).

The purpose of the present article is an attempt to understand what lies behind the statement that mathematics is a science of structures. From among the possible variants of mathematical structuralism we choose two, as those which without any doubts maintain that mathematics is just this kind of science. Let us analyze the views of *set-theoretical structuralism* and *sui generis structuralism*. We believe that at present they are most frequently discussed and best studied, which is why they deserve the most attention. Despite this arbitrary choice, we think that the thesis proposed in the

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present article, namely a certain way of understanding mathematics as a science of structures, has some values of generality and it extends onto other types of structuralisms. That is the reason why, with certain reservations, other structuralist standpoints, such as modal structuralism and categorical structuralism, can also be viewed as structuralist in the meaning of the name suggested here.

The first part of this paper discusses the view of *set-theoretical structuralism* with a special emphasis placed on a certain gradual development of this science as a deductive theory. We regard it as obvious that set theory is treated as the basic theory for all mathematical theories. The next part proposes a certain view concerning the methodology of formal sciences, which is an attempt at describing precisely and capturing in a scheme the ways of development of deductive sciences in general, set theory including. The third part shows that the standpoint of *sui generis structuralism* has some features characteristic of purely formal theory. Finally, we put a thesis that it is possible to perceive mathematics as a science of structures, where the difference between structure as the object of study and theory as something which describes this object is blurred. This thesis should be treated as one of the possible variants of structuralism, a certain attempt to understand what its advocates believe. The purpose of the present article is not to argue for the statement that mathematics is a science on structures understood in the way proposed here, which is why at the end we point to the possible criticism of the view discussed here.

2. Set theory as structure for mathematics

The view of *set-theoretical structuralism* is based on the statement that all mathematics can be reduced to set theory, which describes the most fundamental mathematical structure. Structure is treated here as a certain ordered set, consisting of other sets, relations and functions. The fact that the concepts of relation and function are inter-definable and dependent of the concept of set is considered obvious.

Mathematical structures are certain sets, ordered tuples of a domain together with distinguished relations, functions, and possibly individuals (members of the domain). Structures can be models of certain theories, satisfying their theorems. Such theories would include all the ones normally encountered in mathematics (Hellman, 2005, 538-539).

According to this view, the statement that mathematics is a science of structures is reduced to the theorem that mathematics is a science of certain sets. These sets, also called structures or models, are – according to the advocates of this view – what mathematics studies and describes.

The answer to the question about what lies behind the concept of a set, what sets exist and how to find out about it is the subject of interest for set theory as a science. Understanding the notion of a set and indicating the most fundamental theory which would be universal for all mathematics would be an explanation of the structural nature of mathematics.

We will try to describe those basic aspirations of set theory. We will briefly provide a few facts referring to the history of development of set theory and the bases of mathematics. We limit ourselves only to selected achievements, significant from our point of view. Deeper analyses concerning set theory can be found in numerous studies (e.g. Ferreiros, 2007).

As is well-known, set theory appeared in the 19th century as an attempt to base natural numbers on the obvious and intuitive foundation. Pioneering works by G. Cantor and R. Dedekind, and next a lecture on the foundations of mathematics (Frege, 1893) were supposed to indicate the undermineable basis for the concept of the number, and thus for all classical mathematics. At that time natural number were treated as cardinal numbers, and the concept of set was considered intuitively understandable and not requiring a definition.

A naive faith in the obviousness of the fundamental assumptions for mathematics quickly proved to be a problem. In its initial phase, set theory was full of contradictions. One of those which are better known today is B. Russell's antinomy, whose discovery he announced to Frege in a letter from 1901. It turned out that basing the concept of the natural numbers on the intuitive concept of set leads to a contradiction. The inconsistency is as it were automatically generated by means of the axiom of comprehension.

Removing the antinomy was associated with making the concept of set more precise. Attempts were made to do it in different ways. B. Russell put forwards the Theory of Types. E. Zermelo presented the axiomatic set theory today known as ZF-theory. Initially, Russell's proposition gained popularity while now mathematicians prefer set theory in the axiomatic variant. Zermelo's theory was based on a few axioms which stated what sets existed and which made the concept of set more precise in some way.

Those axioms were assumed to be true and they described the most fundamental mathematical structure.

At that time, results connected with a description of the basic assumptions for arithmetic of natural numbers were already known. R. Dedekind's concept of identifying the structure of natural numbers with the simply infinite system (Dedekind, 1888) found its continuation in G. Peano axioms. Together with axioms for set theory E. Zermelo proposed a certain hierarchy of sets where successive natural numbers were identified with sets: $0 = \emptyset$, $1 = \{\emptyset\}$, $2 = \{\{\emptyset\}\}$, $3 = \{\{\{\emptyset\}\}\}$, ... (Zermelo 1908). In this way natural numbers were reduced to sets and the axiomatic set theory became the fundamental mathematical structure.

In-depth studies on set theory proved to be very productive. Zermelo's axioms were corrected and modified almost immediately. Set theories based on other assumptions, which were not mutually reducible, began to appear. Expectations to find permanent, unequivocal and certain foundations for mathematics in set theory proved to be missed.

The fact got intensified by the proposition to reduce natural numbers to sets. It was put forward by J. von Neumann. He also treated numbers as sets, but in a different manner: $0 = \emptyset$, $1 = \{\emptyset\}$, $2 = \{\emptyset, \{\emptyset\}\}$, $3 = \{\emptyset, \{\emptyset, \{\emptyset, \{\emptyset\}\}\}\}$, ... (von Neumann, 1923). It turned out that there was no unequivocal way of reducing natural numbers to sets.

At the beginning of the 20th century it became obvious to researchers that they could not count on finding one basic theory which would be the foundation for all mathematics (see discussion: (Lakatos, 1967). At present, set theory is still the most basic theory for mathematics, with a reservation that there is no complete agreement as to which of the known set theories is the distinguished one, the only true one. In the light of meta-theoretical results, there is even no common agreement as to the acceptance of concrete axioms within one theory. While searching for the answer to philosophical questions, especially whether we have to do here with the most basic mathematical structure, first we must decide which of the known set theories we are going to study.

While summarizing the results achieved in the area of set theories, A. Mostowski found out that the aim of basing mathematics on unequivocal concepts and obvious assumptions had not been achieved in a satisfying manner. According to him, the contemporary set theory became similar to

other, abstract and arbitrarily created deductive theories, such as group theory or various kinds of algebras.

Such results show that axiomatic set-theory is hopelessly incomplete. (...) It is comparable rather to the incompleteness of group theory or of similar algebraic theories. These theories are incomplete because we formulated their axioms with the intention that they admit many non-isomorphic models. In case of set-theory we did not have this intention but the results are just the same (Mostowski, 1967a, 93-94).

The development of set theory can be understood as passing through a few successive stages. In the first stage this theory was constructed as based on obvious assumptions which were supposed to guarantee the permanent and true foundation for all classical mathematics. A breakdown occurred at the moment when antinomy was discovered. The next stage consisted of specifying the assumptions, changing the axioms, and rejecting those that generated contradiction as false. At this stage, set theory, as an axiomatic theory with obvious assumptions, constitutes a solid foundation for mathematics and natural numbers are identified with certain established sets. Unfortunately, this is not the end of the development of research in this area. The next stage includes numerous propositions of different competitive fundamental theories, discussions concerning the truth of axioms and studying the relations between the appearing theories. At this stage, however, there is no one basic theory. Depending on different factors, different theories are studied which are sometimes mutually contradictory.

In the next paragraph we will present a proposition to capture this gradual development of set theory in a certain methodological scheme. We treat set theory as one of many deductive sciences.

3. Development of deductive sciences

The methodology of formal sciences in the form of their development in stages was systematically developed by K. Ajdukiewicz, who was a D. Hilbert's student in Gottingen and J. Łukasiewicz's in Lviv. A straightforward lecture on it can be found in (Ajdukiewicz, 1974), (Tkaczyk 2016). Formal sciences are, in other words, deductive sciences which are distinguished from other sciences by deduction being the only acceptable way of justifying derivative theorems.

Deductive sciences go through three phases (stages) of development. The first one is called *preaxiomatic intuitive* and its major properties are the *openness* of the list of primary theorems and *obviousness* of the accepted theorems and the terms used in theory. At this stage any sentences that seem obvious to the researcher and that do not encounter opposition from other specialists in the area can be accepted as primary theorems. Most frequently, all those theorems are enumerated nowhere and their list is open. Derivative theorems are accepted if they derive in an obvious way from the earlier accepted sentences. A dictionary of the studied theory is created by terms which are comprehensible for the researcher without a definition, or those which can be reduced to the former by means of a definition. At the first stage of development of deductive sciences the list of *primary theorems* and *primitive terms* is never finally closed. At any moment a sentence which we consider obvious, or a certain term whose meaning does not give rise to doubts can be added.

Set theory remained at this stage until contradiction was discovered in it. Passing to the next stage took place by writing down in a clear way all axioms, primitive terms and inference rules, and by finally closing those sets. Zermelo-Fraenkel (**ZF**) axiomatic set theory can be treated as a formal theory which is already at the second stage of development.

Passing to the next stage of development of formal sciences, called the *axiomatic intuitive* stage, takes place by the final establishment of the set of *primary theorems* and a dictionary of *primitive terms*. Obviousness and possibly no opposition from other specialists still constitute an indicator to recognize primary theorems, with a reservation that their list should be established and closed. The situation is similar with primitive terms; here obviousness also determines their acceptance and their set should be established and closed. Deduction is the only acceptable way of justifying derivative theorems. The openness of stage one disappears and closed lists of primary theorems and terms appear. Obviousness of the adopted theorems, both at the first and second stages, is of key importance.

ZF set theory is just such theory. It is based on a closed list of axioms and primitive terms, which are treated as obvious and accepted by the community of researchers, in addition to best capturing the intuitions expressed in the initial, naive set theory. All derivative theorems in **ZF** are justified by means of deduction on the basis of the adopted axioms. Unfortunately, this situation did not persist for long and set theory passed to the next phase. Among the researchers there was no complete agreement

referring to the obviousness of some axioms (e.g. the axiom of choice) or the obviousness and way of using certain terms (e.g. the concept of a class and the concept of a set). A number of competitive theories appeared which were based on different kinds of axioms and different sets of primitive terms.

The final stage in the development of deductive sciences is called the *axiomatic abstract* stage. Primary theorems are accepted in an absolutely arbitrary manner, without any justification, their obviousness or a lack of it playing no role. The only one condition that is imposed on the set of axioms is its decidability. This set might even be infinite but it must be clear which expressions are axioms and which are not. Primitive terms at this stage do not have any intuitive meaning, or we possibly disregard it completely. They have the meaning determined by the way they are used in axioms. Like before, sets of axioms and primitive terms are established once and for all, and deduction is the only acceptable way of justifying derivative theorems.

While characterizing the last stage, Ajdukiewicz states that primitive terms are the names of certain entities which meet the conditions that axioms impose on them.

(...) the specific terms of a given discipline are made to be names of such entities which satisfy the conditions imposed on them by the axioms, regardless of what those terms used to denote in their received meanings and regardless of whether they had any meanings at all (Ajdukiewicz, 1974, 2020).

Deductive theory at this stage describes the reality which fulfils the conditions assumed in axioms. Axioms, as it were, create a certain structure whose places can be filled with any entities, with a reservation that the relations between those entities must satisfy the conditions established by the theorems of this theory. The names of those relations are initially primitive terms of a given theory, and secondarily other terms defined by means of the former. Ajdukiewicz writes elsewhere:

(...) a range of symbols is mentioned; those symbols appear in axioms and based on the axioms a range of "theorems" is "proved". These symbols have no attributed meaning. However, why are they called symbols rather than strokes or ornaments? After all, to mean something seems to be essential for any symbol. Primitive symbols of deductive sciences are undoubtedly not symbols in the sense that vernacular words are. (...) And yet, they differ from common strokes and ornaments as well. (...) Both symbols of deductive sciences and pieces in chess are symbols in the sense that they are interrelated in one way or

another. For symbols of deductive sciences these interrelations are axioms and other theorems. (...) Hence, symbols of deductive sciences are called symbols not because they supposedly “mean” or “denote” anything, but because they play a specific “role”, because they are related to one another in precisely determinate ways’} (Ajdukiewicz, 1921, 2-3, trans. by Tkaczyk, 2016, 31).

Let us consider a certain simple example of a theory which is at the final stage of its development. *The elementary theory of inequality* is based on first-order logic and that is the reason why the terms taken from logic have their established meanings here. Three specific primitive terms, which acquire meaning through being used in axioms, are added to the set of these terms. Those are: “<”, “=”, “ \mathbf{Q} ”. The alphabet of this theory also includes the symbols of variables “ \mathbf{x} ”, “ \mathbf{y} ”, “ \mathbf{z} ”, whose range of variability is set \mathbf{Q} . The set of axioms specific to the theory discussed here is composed of seven theorems which explain the way of using specific primitive terms. One of such axioms is the following theorem:

$$\forall_{x \in \mathbf{Q}}: \exists_{y \in \mathbf{Q}}: (x < y).$$

Which will be read as: *for each \mathbf{x} exists \mathbf{y} , that $\mathbf{x} < \mathbf{y}$.*

Therefore, there are a number of different possible interpretations for a given set of symbols and theorems. We can treat this theory as a theory describing the relations between rational numbers. Then, the symbols above will be interpreted in the following way:

< we read as: “*is less than*”;

= we read as: “*is equal to*”;

\mathbf{Q} we read as: “*a set of rational numbers*”.

With the meanings of the terms of this theory established in this way a given axiom can be read in the following way: *for any rational number there is a bigger rational number.*

There is no obstacle to understand primitive terms differently. This theory can be recognized as describing relations between points on a straight line and then the symbol < will be read as: “*lies on the left from*”. The given axiom will then be read as follows: “*for each point \mathbf{x} on a given straight line there is such point \mathbf{y} on this line that \mathbf{x} lies on the left from \mathbf{y}* ”. Or let us put it differently. Let us assume that this theory describes relations between temporal moments. Then, the symbol < will be read as: “*is earlier than*”. The axiom under consideration can be read as: “*for each temporal moment \mathbf{x} there is such a moment \mathbf{y} that \mathbf{x} is earlier than \mathbf{y}* ”.

The theory, which we called *the elementary theory of inequality*, describes a certain structure that can be arbitrarily interpreted with a reservation that all theorems of this theory must be regarded as properly describing a given reality. Naturally, there is no problem to build and study axiomatic theories which have no interpretation and are based on completely arbitrary axioms, even an inconsistent set of them.

We claim that set theory can, under certain conditions, be considered a science in the last, *axiomatic abstract* stage of its development. In this sense, the axioms of a given theory (e.g. **ZF**) will mark a certain structure which can be interpreted in different ways. The truth, obviousness and intuitiveness of those axioms are of no importance. With such an approach, we do not ask whether it is true that *for each family of non-empty and mutually disjoint sets there is a set which has exactly one common element with each set of this family*. We can say, on the other hand, that in **ZFC** theory (Zermelo-Fraenkel with Axiom of Choice) we accept such a theorem as an axiom and as a consequence, all theorems which can be proved on its basis. And the other way round in **ZF** theory (Zermelo-Fraenkel without Axiom of Choice): here, we do not accept this axiom nor the associated theorems. **ZF** theory describes a certain structure while **ZFC** describes a different one. Each of these theories can be studied by asking which theorems in it are provable, and even, what the relations are between these theories (structures). Each of these structures can be suitable to reconstruct the arithmetic of natural numbers and, as a consequence, all classical mathematics.

4. Contemporary structuralism

As said above, attempts to reduce the arithmetic of natural numbers to set theory, i.e. reduce numbers to sets, gave ambiguous results. The problem of reducing numbers to sets in a variety of ways is called Benacerraf's Challenge. Some researchers point at (Benacerraf, 1965) as a pioneering work for the currently considered structuralist standpoints.

Nowadays, other views of this kind – apart from set-theoretic structuralism – are also considered. We said in the introduction that attempts to sort out and study the main assumptions of structuralism in a concise manner have been made (Hellman, 2001), (Hellman, 2005), (Horsten, 2007). Researchers claim that the fundamental property common to all standpoints is that they clearly point to two features of mathematics.

Firstly, the objects studied by mathematics are structures. Secondly, mathematics justifies its theorems exclusively by means of deduction.

Mathematics is seen as the investigation, by more or less rigorous deductive means, of "abstract structure," systems of objects fulfilling certain structural relations among themselves and in relations to other systems, without regard to the particular nature of the objects themselves (Hellman, 2005, 536).

The objects studied by mathematics are structures. The tool to study is deduction. The metaphysical nature of the studied entities, i.e. structures, and the possible properties which are inherent in them, are the subject of discussion. This controversy is most clearly visible in so-called *sui generis structuralism*, which treats the metaphysical status of mathematical structures in a way similar to the status of general concepts (universals) (Rätz, 2015), (Schwartz, 2015), (Korbmacher & Schiemer, 2018), (Menzel, 2018).

(...) this approach conceives of structures as absolute objects, but not as abstract particulars – rather, as universals, patterns in Resnik's terminology, answering to "what all particular systems of a given type – whether made up of concreta or abstracta such as sets – have in common" (Hellman, 2005, 541).

Advocates of this view claim that a structure is a certain being separate from theory which is studied by mathematics. A mathematical theory can describe this structure in the proper way or not. Such a structure has certain properties which mathematics must capture and next – by means of deduction – describe. This kind of view could be compared to the aforementioned second stage of the development of deductive sciences, called *axiomatic intuitive*. At this stage primary theorems have certain justification on the basis of which we state that they capture the structure described in the proper way. The criterion to accept them, i.e. obviousness, must refer to the reality, understood in any way, other than the theory itself. Obviously, deduction is the only accepted way to justify derivative theorems.

We claim that the views of *sui generis structuralists*, including first of all (Shapiro, 1997), (Shapiro, 2010), (Resnik, 1997), can also be presented in another way. Mathematical structuralism can be compared to the last, axiomatic abstract stage of the development of deductive sciences. Then, the discussed two features of mathematics, namely its structurality and deductivity, will be understood as equivalent. There will be no difference

between structure and mathematical theory. Axioms will be accepted in a completely arbitrary way, without any justification.

Sui generis structuralism has a few variants. We will focus on *ante rem structuralism*, which seems to be best analyzed and most frequently discussed. We think that the arguments presented here also remain valid in case of other standpoints, especially *in re structuralism* (Resnik, 1997) and *modal structuralism* (Hellman 1989). Besides, it can be said that under certain conditions, interpretation of mathematical structuralism proposed here is simpler to defend just within those two standpoints, which are sometimes called *eliminative structuralism*.

The most important representative of *ante rem structuralism* is S. Shapiro. We will show in three points that it is possible to understand this view in such a way that it will be considered similar to the axiomatic abstract stage in Ajdukiewicz's concept.

1. We said that deductive science in the third *axiomatic abstract* stage treats specific constants occurring in axioms in a way similar to how it treats variables. These are not, however, empty ornaments but symbols which mean certain relations. They obtain meaning thanks to axioms and theorems in which they occur. "*Symbols of deductive sciences are called symbols not because they purportedly 'mean' or 'denote' anything, but because they play a specific 'role', they are related to one another in precisely determinate ways*" (Ajdukiewicz, 1921, 3, trans. by MC).

Ante rem structuralists claim that "*a structure has a collection of places and a finite collection of functions and relations on those places*" (Shapiro, 1997, 93). Places of the structure can be taken by any objects and they can even be empty since it is the relations between those places that constitute the structure. Even if the objects occupying the places in the structure possess some features other than relational, those features do not play any role for mathematics. Mathematics studies structures from the perspective of *places-are-objects* (Shapiro, 1997, 10). The structure is defined by the relations which Shapiro calls formal and whose meaning is simply determined by their use in the theorems of the theory.

In mathematical structures, on the other hand, the relations are all formal, or structural. The only requirements on the successor relation, for example, are that it be a one-to-one function, that the item in the zero place not be in its range, and that the induction principle hold. No spatiotemporal, mental, personal, or spiritual properties of any exemplification of the successor function are relevant to its being the successor function (Shapiro, 1997, 98).

The conditions placed on the relation of the successor and enumerated by Shapiro are nothing more but enumeration of the axioms of PA arithmetic. *"If each relation of a structure can be completely defined using only logical terminology and the other objects and relations of the system, then they are all formal in the requisite sense. A slogan might be that formal languages capture formal relations"* (Shapiro, 1997, 98). According to Shapiro, mathematical structures are created by formal relations. The meaning of those relations are established by their use in the axioms of the theory. We claim that this is Ajdukiewicz's view expressed in other words on the meaning of primary terms of deductive sciences which are at the third axiomatic abstract stage of their development.

2. We said that according to Ajdukiewicz, the axioms of a deductive science which is at the last stage of development are accepted quite arbitrarily. No condition is placed on them; their obviousness, common agreement for them or any other justification do not have to be present while accepting them.

Structuralists have a similar opinion. Shapiro thinks that it is sufficient to describe a structure to make it the proper object for mathematics to study. Such a description can be treated as enumeration of axioms of a certain deductive theory.

(...) way to understand a structure is through a direct description of it. (...) In either case, most competent speakers of the language will understand what is meant and can then go on to discuss the structure itself, independent of any particular exemplification of it} (Shapiro, 1997, 74).

The work (Shapiro, 1997) describes a certain structure which is to be basic for all mathematics and, in a way, competitive for set theory. The theory enumerated a number of axioms from which the other properties of this structure are to be derived by means of deductive inference. Shapiro claims that this very description determines what the structure is like and there is no need to refer to understanding of reality understood in any way beyond this description.

On the traditional Platonist view, there is an important autonomy between the axioms and the subject matter. (...) the axioms be true of the intended subject matter. (...) We structuralists reject this autonomy between the axioms and subject matter. (...) Because on the traditional Platonist view, the axioms are statements about a particular realm of objects, it is possible that the axioms can be mistaken. (...) On our view, the language characterizes or determines a

structure (or class of structures) if it characterizes anything at all (*Shapiro, 1997, 131*).

Axioms are here neither true nor false because it is them which determine the properties of a given structure. That is why the axioms describing a given mathematical structure do not need any justification and they can be accepted quite arbitrarily. We claim that where structuralists speak of structure, the concept of theory can be used. Instead of a description of a structure, we can speak of enumeration of axioms of the theory. Then, structuralists' views can be treated as very close to the described third stage of the development of deductive sciences.

3. The last stage in the development of deductive sciences, like the earlier ones, assumes that the only way to justify derivative theorems is deduction. Independently of the status of axioms and the way of justifying them, other theorems of the theory should be a logical consequence of the former.

This is how all mature mathematical theories are built. The **ZFC** set theory, for example, is such a theory. Shapiro also builds his theory of structures in an axiomatic style and he compares it to the **ZFC** theory. What is more, he believes that both theories can be used interchangeably (*Shapiro, 1997, 96*).

When R. Torretti writes about the structural vision of mathematics, he claims that its task is to draw logical consequences from the adopted theorems (axioms).

(...) it would seem that we need only pay attention to two general traits. (1) Mathematical studies proceed from precisely defined assumptions and figure out their implications, reaching conclusions applicable to whatever happens to meet the assumptions. The business of mathematics has thus to do with the construction and subsequent analysis of concepts, not with the search for real instances of those concepts. (2) A mathematical theory constructs and analyzes a concept that is applicable to any collection of objects, no matter what their intrinsic nature, which are related among themselves in ways that, suitably described, agree with the assumptions of the theory. Mathematical studies do not pay attention to the objects themselves but only to the system of relations embodied in them. In other words, mathematics is about structure, and about types of structure (*Torretti, 1997, 4*).

The first of the enumerated features of mathematics seems undisputable. That theorems of mathematics should have a proof, that is they should be the logical consequences of the adopted assumptions, is not questioned in principle. Obviously, a discussion is going on what mathematical proof is

and what ways of proving are accepted within mathematics but this matter does not seem to be the object of interest of the advocates of structuralism.

A vision of mathematics as a science making use of deduction to study certain objects he calls structures emerges from the above quotation of what Torretti said. Those objects are something different from mathematical theories. With such an approach, philosophical questions about the way structures exist and how to get to know them, and – as a consequence – the truth of the adopted assumptions are justified. We believe that such structuralist understanding of mathematics where theory and structure will become equivalent is possible. With this understanding, philosophical questions about the way structures exist and how to get to know them will change their meaning and will refer to mathematical theories, and not to structures as such. The possible truth or falsity of the adopted assumptions will only play a part if we happen to want to give any meaning to primary terms of the theory, the meaning which would be different from that established by axioms.

We can also say that varieties of structuralist standpoints, which is mainly manifested in different ontological views, seems to support our thesis. A structuralist vision of mathematics where differentiation into structure and theory describing the former is of no importance is possible. Whether structures have the status of Platonic ideas (*ante rem structuralism*), general concepts like in Aristotle (*in re structuralism*), or – finally – a different one, for example they are only possible in a certain way (*modal structuralism*), is not important if the mathematical theory is at the last stage of its development. At this stage, the theory describes a certain structure, axioms determine the meaning of primary terms and whether such a structure does exist and in what way it does is of secondary importance. The question about the metaphysical status of mathematical objects appears only when we acknowledge that the meaning of primary terms (structural relations) is established through some kind of their reference to a certain reality (structure) existing independently of the mathematical theory.

The aim which we set for the present text was an attempt to understand the structuralist vision of mathematics. We showed that it is possible to understand mathematics in such a way that the structure, as the object studied by mathematics, will be identified with the mathematical theory. The third stage in the development of deductive sciences is assumed not to

distinguish structure (as an object) from theory (as a description of this object). We believe that this proposition is a kind of an alternative to explain the statement that *mathematics is a science of structures*. We would like to make a reservation that ultimately we do not take a stand in whether mathematics is a purely deductive science (the theory in the last stage of development) in the understanding presented here. Besides the arguments provided here, we are also familiar with arguments against this statement.

5. Two faces of mathematics

Let us draw attention to the fact that outstanding researchers of mathematics had certain doubts as to the possibility of cultivating mathematics as a purely deductive science. In 1920 B. Russell thought it was not a mistake; what is more, in some respects this way of cultivating mathematics could be valuable but it seemed to be a certain kind of simplification which does not comprise all aspects of the studied reality.

It might be suggested that, instead of setting up "0" and "number" and "successor" as terms of which we know the meaning although we cannot define them, we might let them stand for any three terms that verify Peano's five axioms. They will then no longer be terms which have a meaning that is definite though undefined: they will be "variables", terms concerning which we make certain hypotheses, namely, those stated in the five axioms, but which are otherwise undetermined. If we adopt this plan, our theorems will not be proved concerning an ascertained set of terms called "the natural numbers" but concerning all sets of terms having certain properties. Such a procedure is not fallacious ; indeed for certain purposes it represents a valuable generalization. But from two points of view it fails to give an adequate basis for arithmetic. In the first place, it does not enable us to know whether there are any sets of terms verifying Peano's axioms; it does not even give the faintest suggestion of any way of discovering whether there are such sets. In the second place, as already observed, we want our numbers to be such as can be used for counting common objects, and this requires that our numbers should have a definite meaning, not merely that they should have certain formal properties. This definite meaning is defined by the logical theory of arithmetic (Russell, 1920, 27).

A. Tarski also notices a possibility of building a mathematical theory based on any assumptions but he claims that such theories for which no justification is presented and whose terms do not have definite meaning are simply uninteresting from the cognitive point of view.

Admittedly, sometimes we develop a deductive theory without ascribing a definite meaning to its primitive terms, thus dealing with the latter as with variables; under such circumstances we say that we treat the theory as a formal system. But this kind of situation (...) arises only if several models or interpretations for the axiom system of this theory are available to us, that is, if we are concerned with several ways of ascribing concrete meaning to the terms occurring in the theory, but we do not desire to give preference in advance to any one of these ways. On the other hand, a formal system for which one could not give a single model would, presumably, be of interest to nobody (Tarski, 1994, 119-120).

It should also be remembered that in 1931 K. Gödel proved that each rich, consistent and formalized axiomatic theory is incomplete. For example, **PA** arithmetic of natural numbers is such a theory. This result can be understood in this way that it will never be possible to capture – by means of purely deductive methods – the reality which the axioms of **PA** arithmetic try to describe. If we only use the classically understood deduction, there will always exist such true sentences of **PA** arithmetic which are not possible to prove. This is certainly a serious limitation for the whole deductive method and thus for the statement that mathematics is a structural science in the understanding presented here.

Besides extreme standpoints, which – on the one hand – treat mathematics as a purely formal science (this is how we interpret the views of Ajdukiewicz and mathematical structuralists), and – on the other – completely reject the possibility of cultivating mathematics as this kind of science, there are also moderate views. Some believe that mathematics has two faces: one purely formal and focused exclusively on deduction, and the other, which is more obvious and also concerned with justification of the adopted assumptions.

(...) there are two mutual irreducible attitudes towards the method of mathematics: one focus on the truth and the other on consequence. At the intuitive stage one asks such questions as «how many parallel lines there are to a given line?». At the abstract stage one asks such questions as «what follows from the Riemannian or Euclidean theory?» (Tkaczyk, 2016, 37).

We believe that mathematical structuralism in the understanding presented here perceives mathematics as asking about the logical consequences of the adopted assumptions. The area of interests of this kind of structuralism includes such questions as, for example: *What properties does the structure described by the axioms of Euclid's theory or Riemann's theory have?* On the

other hand, within this standpoint no questions are asked about which of these structures exist if axioms describe it properly and if they have the proper justification. The answer to the question if mathematical structuralism in this understanding is the proper standpoint and possible from the point of view of the philosophy of mathematics is left as an important but open issue. We do not take any stand in this paper about this problem.

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PARADIGM OF POSTMODERN PARANOIA IN PREETI SHENOY'S *LIFE IS WHAT YOU MAKE IT AND WAKE UP, LIFE IS CALLING*

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Abstract: *The aim of the study alleges on the postmodern perspectives of paranoia in Preeti Shenoy's Life is What You Make It and Wake Up, Life is Calling. The term Paranoia is irrational and persistent feeling. The features of paranoia are depression, exasperation and holocaust of mind, Schizophrenia, tantrums and hallucination. The postmodern tendency of paranoia is exemplified by researchers in various works. The postmodern writer, Preeti Shenoy is a multifarious writer. Her famous novels are Life is What You Make It (2011) and Wake Up, Life is Calling (2019) that is a sequel to Life is What You Make It. These novels portray the issue of postmodern paranoia through her writings. Ankita Sharma is the protagonist in both novels. She is affected by bipolar disorder, and she leads her half of the life in a mental asylum. These two novels focus on Ankita's holocaust of mind. The methodology of the study also adopts the theories of paranoia proposed by Sigmund Freud, Sheldon Cooper, Jacques Lacan, Thomas Ruggles Pynchon, Harry Stack Sullivan, Ivan Pavlov, Carl Jung, Jean-Francois Lyotard and James Cameron. The present study emphasizes Shenoy's texts that depict the paranoid thoughts of Ankita Sharma. The issue of paranoia in the texts is substantiated and explored by using the various theories related to postmodern paranoia. The results of the study are compared and discussed with other studies concerning paranoia. Finally, the findings of the study explore that postmodern paranoia exist in the works. Bipolar disorder is one of the mental problems in paranoia. The protagonist Ankita Sharma is affected by bipolar disorder. By this disorder, her life is shattered and admitted in a mental asylum.*

Keywords: *postmodern paranoia, exasperation, bipolar disorder, mental asylum, suspicion.*

1. Introduction

Postmodern paranoia is one of the perceptions in postmodern fiction, and it explores the reality in society by its nature and changes (Bywater, 1990).

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Postmodern writers depict the cause of paranoia through their writings in many ways, such as depression, societal pressure, brazenness, petulance, hallucination, authoritative parenthood, etc. The term “Paranoia” was derived from the Greek word ‘παράνοια’, which means ‘madness’.

Paranoia is a thought process and mental condition of an individual. The paranoid tendencies are characterized by disorder, delusion, vicious, hallucination and suspicion. John Farrell has mentioned the symptoms of paranoia; those are brazenness, distrust, hallucination and so on (Farrell 2006). The Roman encyclopaedist Aulus Cornelius Celsus abbreviates, “paranoia means insanity or crazy” (Celsus 1938). Crazy, audacious and adamant are the by-nature behaviors of the persons who are affected by paranoia. Mary B. Sinclair attributes that the individuals affected by paranoia may overreact and mentally ill, but they have much self-confidence (Sinclair 1912). The symptoms of paranoia are stumbled on. In the very beginning, Paranoia appeared in the plays of Greek tragedy and later both Plato and Hippocrates used it. The notable theorists of paranoia are Sigmund Freud, Sheldon Cooper, Jacques Lacan, Thomas Ruggles Pynchon, Harry stack Sullivan, Ivan Pavlov, Carl Jung, Jean-Francois Lyotard and James Cameron. The term paranoia is reflected in literature, especially in postmodern literature. It is highly visible in the works of Thomas Ruggles Pynchon who mentions that “Paranoids are not paranoid because they are paranoid, but because they keep putting themselves, fucking idiots, deliberately into paranoid situations” (Pynchon, 2012).

While coming to Indian English Literature, Preeti Shenoy is a postmodern writer and also a TEDx speaker. The works of Shenoy focus only on the sufferings of women and the empowerment of depressed women. Considering the above statement, the postmodernist can read the texts of Preeti Shenoy in postmodern paranoid perspective. The works of Preeti Shenoy is also associated with the statement of Sigmund Freud that eulogizes “Every dream will reveal itself as a psychological structure, full of significance” (Freud 2019). Likewise, Preeti Shenoy’s *Life is What You Make It* acquaints the dialogue of Ankita Sharma that “I was filled with a deep sense of rage, helplessness, frustration, anger and a sinking feeling of abandonment” (Shenoy 2011). Ankita Sharma is the protagonist of this novel. Her dream is to join Delhi University after the completion of her Under Graduation. However, her dream is distilled by her parents and the person named, Abhi, who has proposed his love to Ankita. After the misunderstanding with Ankita, Abhi drinks and drives a car, and it

ultimately leads to the sorrowful accident. At this point, Ankita is affected by the delusions of paranoia, and she is always in the state of exasperated that moves her to Bipolar Disorder³, which is a symptom of paranoia. Another novel of Preeti Shenoy is also highly associated with postmodern paranoia -- *Wake Up, Life is Calling*, which affirms the dialogue of Ankita Sharma that "There is such a lot troubling me. I struggle every day to control my thoughts. I am fighting a daily battle with my mind" (Shenoy 2019). Ankita shares her paranoiac problems to Dr.Namita, who is a psychiatrist and works in the National Mental Health Institute (NMHI).

Though there are many studies related to postmodern perspectives, only a few studies have been conducted in terms of postmodern paranoia, which is one of the perspectives of postmodernism. It is evident from the studied literature that there is no such study concerning the postmodern paranoia in Preeti Shenoy's texts. This motivates the authors to conduct research in this field.

The rest of the paper is categorized into four sections. The sections are literature review, methodology, discussion and conclusion. The second section deals with the review of the articles related to postmodern paranoia in literature and highlight the viewpoints of other studies. Literature review proves that no such study regarding postmodern paranoia in Shenoy's works. The third section is methodology that deals with the adoption of the theories of postmodern paranoia in Preeti Shenoy's texts. The fourth section is discussion, which compares the finding of the present study with other studies. The last section, conclusion, sums up the study and highlights postmodern paranoia in Shenoy's texts-- *Life is What You Make It* and *Wake Up, Life is Calling*.

2. Literature Review

Paranoia has some branches, and male paranoia is one of the branches of paranoia. Male paranoia is only related to the male who has paranoid problems. There are two studies related to male paranoia⁴. They are conducted by Rita Felski and Cynthia Weber. The study of Rita Felski

³ Bipolar disorder is a type of mental disorder. It classifies into three episodes. They are manic, hypo manic and depressive.

⁴ Paranoia is a sort of thought process and suffered by both male and female. So, the author mentions about male paranoia only.

focuses on the term 'kitsch'⁵ and differentiates both masculine and feminine (Felski 2009). It mentions about the paranoia that is also rooted in a gothic novel and related to suspicion that cultivates in fantasies of persecution (Felski 2009). Stephen King's notorious work is *The Shining*, and this novel is a sequel to *Doctor Sleep*; it comes under gothic genre and deals with the patriarchy of feminist as well as psychological (King 1977). The novel *The Shining* is based on the life of Jack Torrance. The protagonist Danny is an alcoholic and in the state of depressed. Thirdly, the author portrays the woman as a monster because he projected the women through culture. According to culture, attitude and behavior are totally changed by the human being. The author analyzes this article through Sheldon's view on paranoia and his famous novels are *Fast Cars* and *Misery's Return*. Sheldon's *Fast Cars* is the novel and taken as a film. Stephen King is written as like Sheldon, but he changed the title of the book as like *Misery*. The author projects the idea that Stephen's *Misery* comes under psychological because the protagonist Misery Chastain is suffered from bipolar disorder and schizophrenia (King 1987). So, the author exhibits male paranoia through a man named Misery Chastain.

In the second article, the author is considered only on feminism through paranoia. Here, the author did not mention about paranoia as much like the preceding article. Cynthia is mentioned male paranoia as "the fearful response of patriarchy to the loss of boundaries endemic to the condition" (Weber 1994). The author uses feminist theory and to categorize as like the title 'Good Gils, Little Girls and Bad Girls'. And then, these girls are referred to as three categories of feminism. The author has pointed out only male paranoia through the text of Robert Keohane. In his essay "Millennium", concerns about two bodies. They are feminist and the author's point of view but the author is only projected on the feminist body of literature (Keohane 1989). The above articles are illustrated about male paranoia. The study of Mike Davis abbreviates with gothic logic of paranoia. The author states that how gothic logic of paranoia in Brown's *Wieland* and Hawthorne's *The Marble Faun*. He is differentiated between paranoia and gothic logic of paranoia. In this article, the author mentions only American novels because he reveals that most of the Americans are

⁵ The term 'kitsch' refers to art and its craving. It is also an international movement of classical painters and established in 1998. This term elucidated in Odd Nerdrum's *On Kitsch*.

affected by paranoia and one can identify it through their politics (Davis 2005). Here, the author exhibits the idea between gothic logic of paranoia and American politics.

Thomas Pynchon is a notable writer, and paranoid ideas are portrayed in his fiction. His notable works are mentioned in many articles for paranoia. Those well-known novels are *Gravity's Rainbow* and *The Crying of Lot 49*. The study of Leo Bersani accolades paranoia in Pynchon's fiction, especially in *Gravity's Rainbow*. This novel is based on war story, and Slothrop is the protagonist of this fiction. His mind is distilled by the war, and he is always in the state of being. Pynchon eulogizes, "Like other sorts of paranoia, it is nothing less than the onset, the leading edge, or the discovery that *everything is connected*, everything in the creation" (Pynchon 1973). The author highlights the idea of Pynchon that people have to stop the ideas of suspect and concealed ideas will explore. Likewise, the protagonist feels also like that he is suspecting himself. Bersani projects the writings of Pynchon and how he is mentioned the words that clearly depict the idea of paranoia. In Pynchon's text, the writer's words have hidden the ideas of paranoia and do not convey the meaning directly. Those hidden words are giving paranoid ideas told by the author (Bersani 2014). Bersani evaluates Pynchon's novel with James Joyce's *Ulysses*. While comparing both novels, paranoid ideas are depicted clearly in Pynchon's novel than James's novel. Because Joyce is not explored much sufferings or suspicion in his work. The novel, *Gravity's Rainbow*, all the characters are endured with suffering themselves especially the protagonist, Slothrop. So, the author is used Pavlov's theory. He is a well-known paranoid theorist. Pavlov acclaims that "the ideal, the end we all struggle toward in science" (Pavlov 1927). In the novel, *Gravity's Rainbow*, is only focusing on the war and the machines for the war. So, it relates to Pavlov's theory. The article of Richard Olehla abbreviates paranoia and possible madness in *The Crying of Lot 49*, and the author is employed Lacan's 'concept of parental authority'⁶ in Pynchon's *The Crying of Lot 49*.

⁶ Parental authority deals with how the parents treat their children.

Firstly, parental authority is nothing but, deal with the child with love from the parents. They have to take care and shower their love towards their children. However, here, the author states the father role alone. Oedipa Maas is the protagonist of the novel, and she is treated Pierce Inverarity as his father but he does not like that. He is always thinking about God and religion. He does not concern about Oedipa as his daughter. Here, the parental authority is portrayed in

Finally, he projects that paranoid persons are individual and behave in a diverse way. Richard reveals that if anyone is having faith in God or religion, which is 'eo ipso'⁷ paranoia (Olehla 2008). Secondly, the author analyzes two types of paranoia in Pynchon's works. They are cultural paranoia and linguistic paranoia by Freud's theory (Freud 1961). Thirdly, the author points out 'Semiotic theory' that was coined by Saussure (Saussure 1974), and it is a treaty with an elucidation of the sign through subjective reading. Pynchon is used the terms such as NADA, DEATH and WASTE in his fiction. The actual meaning for DEATH is 'Don't Ever Antagonize the Horn' and for wastes 'We Await Silent Tristero's Empire'⁸ (Pynchon 2012). The author indicates the vocabulary and it takes place. The third article of Danielle Bukowski, "Paranoia and Schizophrenia in Postmodern Literature: Pynchon and Delillo" mentions only Pynchon's *The Crying of Lot49* and Delillo's *Libra*. This article is divided into two sub-headings. The first part deals with how paranoia shifts to schizophrenia in Pynchon's *The Crying of Lot 49*, and the second part is the treaty with postmodern terms and paranoid schizophrenia in *Libra* by Delillo (Bukowski 2014).

Sigmund Freud is one of the trendy Paranoia theorists. He is known for his psychoanalytic approach. He has focused mainly on delusion and personality. Most of the articles deal with the theory of Freud. The study of Leo Bersani projects Freud's theory. Bersani has mentioned Freud's paranoia along with Dr.Schreber case because Freud has mentioned paranoia as a hidden idea in homosexual aspiration. Freud abbreviates the types of paranoid delusions. They are delusion of discrimination,

a linear level. The previous novel also lost the parental authority nuance the character between Slothrop and the Scientist. He is also concern about his science machine (Pynchon 2012). The author is trying to convey paranoia through religious. He notes that some persons are following and worshipping god. So, they are a believer and to follow god's words. Those who are not following and they are considered to be an enemy. So that enemy is a symbol of paranoia. They are following the rules of themselves and they are deeming to individual.

⁷ The term 'eo ipso' came from Latin and it is used as idiom in English. The term 'eo ipso' means through or by take action or quality.

⁸ Thomas Pynchon is a famous writer and he explores the idea regarding 'Tristero' Empire' in *The Crying of Lot 49*. In the beginning of the novel, Pynchon mentions that Oedipa and Metzger attend a play where they mention the name "Tristero". At the end of the novel, the author modified and explores 'Tryster' as hallucination.

erotomania, envy and opulence (Freud 1911). The author projects the ideas that Freud's theory regarding delusion and his famous book *The Schreber*⁹. Freud is mentioned about delusions in different aspects. So, the author is differentiating the delusions from the theory with the book. And then, Freud is mentioned, "to decide whether there is more delusion in my theory that I should like to admit, or whether there is more truth in Schreber's delusion than other people are as yet prepared to believe" (Freud 1984). After that, the author considers the theory as a symptom of paranoid, and the book is having truthful ideas. Finally, Bersani exhibits that both ideas are portrayed in the work of Pynchon. Next, the author Mike Davis has used Freud's theory in his book "Reading the Text That Isn't There". Mike Davis has used Freud's theory, especially the concept of Megalomania and Schreberian problem. Megalomania¹⁰ is nothing but, it relates to depression. In this work, he is satirizing the Schreberian problem (Freud 2000). The author is mentioned Foucault's ideas also. As Foucault said that, "must not be understood like a dream building: It is the diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form; it's functioning, abstracted from any obstacle, resistance or friction, and must be represented as a pure architectural and optical system" (Foucault 1977). The author Nandhakumar employs Freud's "Psychoanalytical theory" in his article. He mentions about three sorts of thoughts. They are ego, id and superego. The author portrays the idea of superego with the character Shruti in Shenoy's *The One you cannot Have*. He poses the character Shruti by superego because of her husband Rishab (Shenoy 2013). The author illustrates Freud's idea that sacrifice is a huge matter but the humans are not sacrificed all the time. Certain times, they can change by their desire. But, some persons cannot control their unconscious mind. Finally, he affirms that the human mind is the powerful thing while comparing both ego and superego, it does not an issue but the human mind is only ruling everything (Nandhakumar 2018). The author mentions another concept of 'Electra complex'¹¹. It deals with behaviours especially female characters.

⁹ Daniel Paul Schreber was a German Judge who undergone by three mental illness. Sigmund Freud is mentioned about him through his writings and he named as the concept 'Schreber Case'.

¹⁰ Megalomania is a mental illness and those who are affected by megalomania they have delusional desires.

¹¹ The term 'Electra complex' is recommended by Carl Jung in his *Theory of Psychoanalysis*. It deals with a girls' psychosexual with her mother.

This concept exhibits the veiled thoughts of female characters. The study of Perry Nodelman abbreviates Freud's theory along with Robert Cormier's *The Chocolate War* (Nodelman 1999). The study of Bran Nicol elucidates Freud's case of paranoia. The author declares the case of interpretation. Freud articulates that through interpretation, to connect both past and present life incidents. Likewise, the author interprets Lisa's case in the novel *The White Hotel* (Nicol 1999).

The study of Gerald H. Zuk and Carmen V. Zuk abbreviates paranoid transformation through the paranoid theory of Freud. The author mentions that paranoid problem flourishes from their childhood but no one aware of them. It replicates in adulthood that creates a conflict for identity. The author illustrates paranoid with Freud's case study (Zuk 1995).

Sheldon Cooper is a well-known theorist. His theories are mentioned in various studies. The study of Rita Felski truncates with Sheldon's real incident. The author states that the writer Stephen King writes two kinds of novels: romance and gothic but Sheldon's works come under melodramatic pulp fiction. The author illustrates Sheldon's road accident that time he is recovered by an unknown woman, and he is admitted in the hospital by her. Finally, he is recovered from the unconscious with impenetrability. Likewise, Stephen's *One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest* stir up with a female character. He states that the child depends on mother. The character of mother is only invincible (King 2009).

Jacques Lacan is a famous theorist, and his theories are used by many authors. A few studies are based on Lacan theory. The study of Richard Olehla abbreviates Lacan's concept of parental authority. Actually, parental authority deals with both mother and father's role towards their children especially the way take caring their children (Lacan 1996). The author focuses on only Pynchon's *The Crying of Lot 49* and expresses the role of father. The author elucidates name-of-the-father. It represents 'paternal metaphor'¹² and this concept is called name-of-the-father (Olehla 2008). The study of Brain Nicol is based on Sheldon's ideas regarding paranoia. He mentions Lacan's idea that those who are misanthrope of delusion and they must send to the world of delusion (Lacan 1977). The author illustrates Lacan's ideas through D.M. Thomas's *The White Hotel*.

Ivan Pavlov is a well-known theorist of paranoia. He has experimented the dogs for salivary secretion. Leo Bersani's article abridges Pavlov's

¹² The phrase "Paternal metaphor" is proposed by Jacques Lacan in 1957.

theory, and the author mentions Laszlo Jamf is a student of Pavlov and he has experimented conditioning of baby. The upcoming article is related to the experiment of conditioning baby (Pavlov 1927). The author Leo Bersani employs the theory of conditioning baby with Slothrop's infant child in Pynchon's *Gravity's Rainbow* (Bersani 2014).

Harry Jack Sullivan is a famous paranoia theorist. The study of Gerald H. Zuk and Carmen V. Zuk attributes Sullivan's interpersonal theory. He mentions that paranoid person cannot believe that he is affected or not. However, he wants to prove in front of others that he is not having a paranoid problem. Self-judgment plays a vital role while proving and how he transforms and modifies himself.

The person may accept that he is having paranoid problems through other activity, especially the way he is treated by them. The person must have the capacity to judge himself (Sullivan 1955). The author takes interpersonal theory by Sullivan for analyzing the person (Zuk 1995). Another study deals with Sullivan's theory applied in the novel of Eugene Ionesco's *Amadee*, and it is a French play. The author states about nightmares. But both the paranoid theorist Cameron and Sullivan declares that anxiety is the cause of paranoid. So, the author takes the idea of them and illustrates the concept of nightmares with anxiety through the characters of Amadee and Magdalene.

The study of Saxby Pridmore and William Pridmore focuses on suicide in the works of Dostoyevsky's novels. They are collected the data from Dostoyevsky's novels in four kinds of perspectives. They are the persons of committed suicide, suicide effort, suicidal feelings, and some other points regarding suicide. The author points out the methods of suicide in Russia. They are committing suicide by drowning, shooting and hanging (Pridmore 2015).

The study of Peter Wolf and Elza Marcia Yacubian abbreviates epileptic experience in the works of both Dostoyevsky and Assis. The author points out that Dostoyevsky's famous character is Prince Myshkin in the novel of *The Idiot* and Assis's famous novel *Quincas Borba*¹³. The author highlights the topic by using different terms of epilepsy like Auras, Prodromes, Bras Cubas and Quincas Borba. Here, Bras Cubas is a kind method refers to the

¹³ The novel *Quincas Borba* (1891) is written by Machado de Assis and it is distinguished as *Philosopher or Dog?* in English.

protagonist's past incidents. Finally, the author is using different terms related to epileptic experience (Wolf 2019).

The exceeding studies are illustrated as Paranoia theories with postmodern fiction. However, only one study relates to paranoia with the background of the writer, Virginia Woolf by Sherman C. Feinstein. The study of Sherman C. Feinstein demonstrates adolescence and manic depressive illness. The author finds paranoia in the life of Virginia Woolf, and she is affected by manic depressive because of her mother and sister. Manic depressive is sort of bipolar disorder. Virginia Woolf is affected during by her childhood. The author explicit the point of Wolpert that person has some psychological illness by their parents or whoever that lead psychological corollary (Wolpert 1975). He points out her suicide also. Finally, the author states Virginia Woolf is affected by bipolar disorder, and her death also conveys the precise meaning that she always in the state of depression that's why she submarine into the river (Feinstein 1980).

The above studies represent the idea of postmodern paranoia, and these studies are conducted by various authors in different works. Some authors find paranoia in various texts but no one has identified postmodern paranoia in Preeti Shenoy's texts. So, the present study will bridge the gap between the literatures. Thus, the present study attempts to dig out the postmodern perspective of paranoia in Shenoy's texts.

3. Methodology

Karl Menninger is a well-known writer, and he mentions that 'a theory will lead to confirmation or rejection' (Menninger 1985). Likewise, paranoid ideas are substantiated by paranoid theories. The notable theorists of paranoia are Sigmund Freud, Paul Eugen Bleuler, Carl Jung, Jacques Lacan, Melanie Klein, Thomas Pynchon, Harry Stack Sullivan and James Cameron. This section deals with the paranoid theories and the texts of Preeti Shenoy, *Life is What You Make it* and *Wakeup Life is Calling*. The texts are substantiated by the theories of paranoia.

Sigmund Freud is a trendy paranoid theorist. He wrote many works regarding psychology. Dreams play a fundamental role in everyone's life. As like, Freud abbreviates that dreams only perfectly leads the person and what he is going to achieve. Those dreams guide and mould the character in a positive way to achieve the goal, and the person should be confident and enthusiastic with his or her dreams. While fixing dreams, he/she is

always in the state of thirst for knowledge. However, his activities seem to be unconscious. Some persons do not know what they are doing? However, they think that they are hard-working to achieve their goal. Freud reveals the idea that “The interpretation of dreams is the royal road to knowledge of the unconscious activities of the mind” (Freud 2019). Likewise, Preeti Shenoy shares the same idea in her novel *Life is What You Make it* through the character of Ankita Sharma. She is fixed her dream to study MBA in Delhi. Then, she works hard and excellent in her studies to attain her goal. After completion of her Under Graduation, she conveys her dream to her parents, but they ignore it. She is disappointed by her parents and whatever she explains; her parents are not lending their ears to their daughter’s words. Finally, her dream is collapsed by her parents because they are not ready to allow her lonely and stay there. She expresses that, “I feel down and depressed. I feel worthless. I don’t know what is happening to me and why I am feeling this way. There is really no reason. I have tried to make these thoughts go away. I have failed. I don’t want to do this MBA anymore” (Shenoy 2011: 134). However, she is not like Freud’s idea as unconscious. She involves in all the activities with the conscious mind because she is thorough with her dreams what she is going to achieve. With wholeheartedly, she involves in her studies as well as competition also. When her parents ignore her dreams that time onwards, she is in the state of depression (Shenoy 2011). Another incident is Abhi’s death. Because she always remains him and his thoughts make her as exasperated and she cannot involve in any activity. This statement is the opposition to Freud’s statement. Freud said that dreams only make much knowledge to attain the goal. However, here, Ankita’s dream is entirely shattered by Abhi’s death. So, Ankita is tormenting by the feeling and thoughts of Abhi. However, she enjoys with her friends as well as Vaibhav. Ankita states that “The thoughts kept going round in my head, tormenting me. I endured them silently” (Shenoy 2019: 86). It is also a kind of habit to understand the character of Ankita. Freud shortens that each dream has a psychological impact. He states, “Every dream will reveal itself as a psychological structure, full of significance” (Freud 2019). Similarly, Shenoy’s *Wake Up, Life is Calling*, Ankita reads the book of “Dream Dictionary”. She elucidates that this book clarifies notable dreams and its concealed meaning for dreams. And then, Ankita has some dreams, and she wants to know about the hidden meaning of her dreams. She finds a dragon in the book that symbolizes blistering. So, she is afraid of what is going to happen. Ankita utters, “But

there was nothing close to what I had dreamt of. There was no description of that creature I had seen (...) I decided to look up the meaning of a dream with dragons in it, (...) It said that a dragon in a dream could represent someone (possibly me) with a fiery personality” (Shenoy 2019: 179). Another incident, her dreams are shattered by her parents and Abhi then she is distilled by the thoughts of Abhi’s death. The negative thoughts are filled with the mind of Ankita Sharma. That is always suppressing her mind and she does not focus on anything. She acquaints, “The taunting voice inside my head started its usual cacophony. You are a failure. You can’t even write. Your essay is rubbish. You will fail. You will be laughed at” (Shenoy 2019: 126).

Paul Eugen Bleuler is a notable paranoid theorist. Moreover, he abbreviates that if the persons are affected by a disorder that will be the leading cause for all the reaction. Affectivity is an influence on the characteristics of greed, lethargic, vigor, attentiveness, control and lacking care. However, the paranoid persons do not know what they are doing. Every attitude is changed by disorder and the level of effect. Bleuler divulges, “Next to the quality of reactions, we must also consider the rapidity and force of the affects and hence of the impulses. Jealousy, envy, vanity are characteristics as well as affects. Affectivity is also responsible for laziness, energy, steadiness, diligence and carelessness” (Bleuler 1912: 39). Ankita is a very good girl and always keep her room very clean. After affected by bipolar disorder, she does not worry about anything. She totally forgets her activities before the attack of disorder. Now, she feels herself as frighten towards her appearance. Ankita excludes, “I was becoming increasingly disregardful of my appearance too. I had lost a lot of weight. My already thin frame now looked positively haggard. My eyes took a haunted appearance. Yet they glowed with a kind of energy” (Shenoy 2011: 114).

Sigmund Freud abbreviates that if any person is affected by any psychological disorder, especially paranoid person, they have poor memory and they cannot memorize all those things. The main thing is that they cannot recall the person’s name also. Here, Freud analyzing the paranoid person’s memories. Freud states, “If an average psychologist should be asked to explain how it happens that we often fail to recall a name which we are sure we know, he would probably content himself with the answer that proper names are more apt to be forgotten than any other content of memory” (Freud 1921). This theory reveals in Shenoy’s work in a

conflict way. Freud points out that the paranoid person could not recall the name. However, Shenoy's character Ankita Sharma, she explains everything to her Psychiatrist Dr. Madhusudan with a lucid explanation. She can remember all the past incidents with her beloved Abhi. After his death also, she rethinks the words of Abhi and how she enjoyed with her friends. All those memories are shared by Ankita to Dr. Madhusudan. During her mania, she recollects all the incidents with a clear note. She affirms, "I recalled the giddy exhilaration I felt and how everyone clapped. I was also painfully aware that it was during my 'highs' or the 'mania phase' that it had happened" (Shenoy 2019: 40). Ankita is well-versed in creative writing skill. So, she has the attitude that to write all those things as diary writing and she makes some notes. She recalls her love and what the ideas she learnt through. Those ideas are made by written form. She eulogizes her love towards Vaibhav that she is waiting for the phone call of Vaibhav. She consoles her that Vaibhav, wherever he goes but his love only for her. Ankita accolades, "Love does not mean waiting for the phone to ring or waiting for them to appear. Love is the quiet knowledge that they aren't going anywhere, and will always be there for you" (Shenoy 2019: 92). Then, she abbreviates the life to coconut because the out layer of coconut refers to how people see and some persons are enacting in front of others. They do not reveal their sufferings as like the white part of the coconut. However, here, Ankita recalls everything and shares all those things to Dr. Madhusudan. Ankita excludes, "I compared life to coconut. I talked about how it is green on the outside, and that is what people see (...) I spoke about how some people are so closed that they never reveal the white bits to anybody, and how it ultimately shrivels up and dies inside" (Shenoy 2019: 42). Finally, she consoles her that she loves all those sufferings. That also made of her life as heaven. Ankita ratifies, "I loved it all! It was my own personal slice of heaven" (Shenoy 2019: 4). Lastly, Freud mentions that paranoid persons may forget some content in their memory. However, Ankita does not forget anything; rather, she elucidates every incident to the psychiatrist Dr. Madhusudan.

Thinking induction is significant, and it has the ability to both upgrade and degrade the person. Sigmund Freud delivers his lecture and states that thinking is a sort of experiment. The person may think much, but he can complete the thinking process with a small level of energy. While comparing his thinking process level, he cannot put much effort as like his thinking process level. Before that, the person must think positively while

surrounded by the troop. Because of everyone in this troop, they observe and monitoring his action. And then, what we think and our body should hold that. No one expresses the thinking process entirely, and some changes might have happened. Freud declares that "Thinking is an experimental dealing with small quantities of energy, just as a general moves miniature figures over a map before setting his troops in action" (Freud 1973). The same idea contributes to the character of Ankita Sharma. Abhi is the boyfriend of Ankita. When she hears the dead news of Abhi and her memories seem to be bizarre. She is in the state of melancholy and insane. She is thinking about her days with Abhi and how she spent her time with him. And then, Abhi's words are running on in the mind of Abhi, and she does not share anything. If she expresses her grief in front of her troop, they will know and treat her in a different way. Ankita thinks the words of Abhi that "Keep in touch, Ankita. That is all I ask of you. Pride has gone to your head, Miss Bombay. I am willing to wait a lifetime for you if you say yes" (Shenoy 2019: 80). Then, Ankita has oscillation whether to share about Abhi to Vaibhav or not. She mentions all the memories, but she left the idea of Abhi through the letter. She alleges, "I could not write to Vaibhav about Abhi as I had never mentioned Abhi to him. I toyed with the ideas of telling him everything starting from the beginning" (Shenoy 2011: 105). She is always capable of thinking about her love with Abhi and Vaibhav, college life and so on.

Carl Jung is the renowned paranoid theorist. He mentions about paranoia through his theories. He states that the paranoid persons are able to bare the impediments. However, their dreams are a tool that may pretend or create some trouble. Jung implies, "Nevertheless it is possible to pass the barrier. Nevertheless, a special and unexpected danger looms up just at this moment—something "animal" (non-human or subhuman), which moves backwards and downwards, threatening to drag with it the whole personality of the dreamer" (Jung 1972). Jung states that through dreams, only the problems may arrive in paranoid persons and they cannot bear all those problems. However, the character of Ankita faces lots of trepidations. Her life is filled with ifs and buts. She fights with her thoughts because she is able to control her thoughts. She feels that her intact life is filled with no happiness, only grief. Even though she bares all those pains and angst, Ankita utters that "My life was about fighting my thoughts. Every day" (Shenoy 2019: 95). She is facing all the problems directly by her surroundings. She senses like a wounded animal, and she wants to hide in

her gloomy room. She imagines the words: mental patient and psycho bitch. She is the only girl who bares all the sufferings inside her heart. Whatever the problems may arrive, she is ready to bare. However, those problems are tormenting her and always raise the voice inside her mind. She is filled with positive vibes; that is why she sends her sufferings as a balloon. Ankita suffers that “I felt like an injured animal and wanted to hide in the safety and darkness of my room” (Shenoy 2011: 146). Another incident is made her feel as melancholic. Ankita imagines herself as a mental patient and a psycho bitch¹⁴. These words are scolding and tormenting her mind. She defines that “I imagined the words ‘mental patient’, ‘psycho bitch’ and everything else my inner voice sometimes screamed at me in big, bold letter. I shrank them, put them in the balloons and sent them away” (Shenoy 2019: 239-40). Here, Ankita’s ideas are not connected to Jung’s ideas and opposite to the idea of Jung.

Jung explains about his patient that “The conscious attitude of my patient is so one-sidedly intellectual and rational that nature herself rises against him and annihilates his whole world of conscious values. But he cannot de-intellectualize himself and make himself dependent on another function” (Jung 1972). Jung mentions that one part of his patient is intellectual like Ankita. She is good at creative writing. After recovering from bipolar disorder, she wants to forge a new identity. The way of affection leads to a new identity. Ankita wants to create a new identity like intellectually. She feels that “It meant that nobody knew me here, nobody knew my past, nobody knew of the crazy things I had done when I had bipolar disorder. I was free to forge a new identity” (Shenoy 2019: 3).

Jacques Lacan is celebrated, paranoid theorist. His great concept is ‘Paternal Concept’. Under this concept, he narrates some ideas about the parents. He affirms that parents’ role as a second movement in the sense they have to work for their children and take caring of their children also. Here, Lacan points out that the mother’s role is challenging and it is subjective. The father’s role is objective because he does not take care of his children as like mother. Lacan instructs that “The symbolic function presents itself as a double movement within the subject: man makes an object of his action, but only in order to restore to this action in due time its

¹⁴ Preeti Shenoy is a well-known writer, and she has written the novel *Wake Up, Life is Calling* in 2019. In that fiction, she abbreviates the character of Ankita Sharma as ‘psycho bitch’ which means a female considered herself as wrath and mentally unbalanced

place as a grounding” (Lacan 1977). Likewise, the parents’ role in Shenoy’s text is entirely different. The attitude mother is entirely different because she is a traditional woman. She does not allow boys inside her home, and she does not let her daughter call and talk to boys. Ankita’s mom divulges the rule to her daughter and she says that “I quietly had accepted her rule of “No boys are allowed to call you on the phone” (Shenoy 2011: 128). Her parents leave their daughter in a mental hospital because of Ankita’s behavior. Finally, out of exasperation, she writes that shaming mother and no one like her in the world. The common thing is that parents have to take care of their child in the entire situation, but Ankita’s parents do not like that. That is why she writes like that and entirely she hates her parents for this activity. She writes that “Then I took out my paintbrush and wrote at the bottom of my picture “SHAMING-MOTHER NATURE”. I signed my name underneath and now was quite pleased with the end result” (Shenoy 2011: 102). Ankita shares everything about her parents’ irresponsible activity. Even though she does not care or worry about anything. Another incident, Ankita mentions that if parents only do all those things for their child without the ideas of her daughter’s suggestion that leads to frustration. Some parents are not allowing their children to make a decision that time they are disappointed and in the meantime, they can avoid their parents and hatred towards their parents. Ankita advises that “Live life according to how your parents want you to, and you might end up frustrated” (Shenoy 2019: 104) because she also lives according to her parents wish that leads agony and alienation. Ankita commits suicide out of frustration. After her suicide, the parent’s duty is to give advice and to motivate their daughter. During this incident, she is always in front of the eyesight of her parents. Ankita is a single child for them so they shower much love towards her. Parents should give freedom to their child and to arrange some trips to change the mindset or for relaxation. But they do not like that so Ankita feels lonely in her home and feels like a prisoner. She feels that “I felt like a prisoner” (Shenoy 2011: 136). Ankita realizes her mistake after that she pleads her parents because they want to force her into the mental asylum. She has trepidation towards the mental hospital. Ankita conveys her ideas that “I promised them I would never ever do it again. My dad wanted me to agree to accompany him to the psychiatrist” (Shenoy 2011: 136). Then, Ankita’s parents do not inform where they are going to. After returning to home, her father explains that they went to meet Dr. Neeraj Ramiah is suggested by Dr. Madhusudan. Without her

permission, her parents discuss Ankita's case to Dr. Neeraj. Here, etiquettes of her parent are collapsed. Finally, she is depressed by her parents' activities. She expresses her thoughts towards her parents that "I was filled with a deep sense of rage, helplessness, frustration, anger and a sinking feeling of abandonment. How could they leave me like this?" (Shenoy 2011: 159). In the beginning, Ankita's parents do not allow any boys to talk through phone and do not allow the boys inside their home. But now, they are changed. They allow Vaibhav and welcome him with a smile. Ankita narrates the behavior of her parents that "Vaibhav had started turning up each morning to play badminton with my father. Ma would greet him and serve him coffee (...) she liked chatting with him while he finished his coffee" (Shenoy 2019: 45). Finally, the ideas regarding parent are connected and interfere with Lacan's theory.

Lacan notices that science experimental is not labeled by quantity. At the same time, the measurement of the relation is not original by everyone. People can change day to day life, and they are mortal, and their relationship may remain immortal. And then, science experiment is correct in sometimes, but the human being relationship is not correct one, and it undergoes some changes through time. Lacan affirms that "For experimental science is not so much defined by the quantity to which it is in fact applied, as by the measurement it introduces into the real. This can be seen in relation to the measurement of time without which experimental science would be impossible" (Lacan 1977: 55). Likewise, the love between Ankita and Vaibhav is measured by Lacan's ideas. Lacan affirms that people can change according to time. However, Ankita depicts love in a different way than they are talking through phone and spend their time taking. In love, the persons may not change according to time. If they do not talk or spend their times, their love may die. It is not like other common people. But, they are changing their attitude towards people and they may create a clash between them. Ankita alleges that "The measure of what constitutes love is different for everyone. For some, calling once a week and talking for a while is enough expression of love. For others, calling once a day is adequate. If love should thrive, communication is a must. If you do not communicate, love dies" (Shenoy 2019: 197). Lacan does not believe in human beings relationship; that's why he is written like that. The other idea is, life is not controlled by any laboratory locale and here people have to study the cause and effect of life (Lacan 2006). Ankita affirms that "Life is not a science experiment in controlled laboratory settings where you can

study cause and effect. Life is so much more” (Shenoy 2019: 117). Another incident, out of irritation, Ankita neglects her life to live. She quotes that there is no grade to evaluate comrades, love, smile, euphoric and trust and those are not given the grade for life. This idea is dissimilar with the idea of Lacan. Ankita conveys that in life, many levels are there. But those levels are not permanent and they are not giving any grades especially there is no grade for life also. Ankita frustrates that “And yet, friendship, laughter, love, kindness, hope, joy, generosity-these are the most important things in life. And there is not a single grade to measure that. There are no grades given for LIFE” (Shenoy 2019: 127).

Melanie Kleine is a noteworthy paranoid theorist. He verifies that the change is between the strength of mind and desolation, and these are the features of miserable disorder that is found in children. Kleine points out that “For instance, the change between excessive-high spirits and extreme wretchedness, which is a characteristic of melancholic disorders, is regularly found in children” (Kleine 1960). He points out the symptoms of melancholic disorder. Likewise, Shenoy exhibits the symptoms of bipolar disorder. The characteristics of bipolar disorder are exasperation, fury, moaning and helplessness. Kleine points out some features in children. However, here, these features are exhibit in a teenage girl. That is the only idea is different from here. Ankita expresses that “Frustration, rage, tears and helplessness welled up inside me. I closed my fingers again and my nails dug deep” (Shenoy 2011: 133). Another symptom may be alienation and always remaining the past and to realize all the sufferings. Every idea is remaining in the form of pain. She feels that pain is the only companion and always accompany her just like shade. She notifies that “I agony of it made me want to weep and wail out my sorrow but even grief eluded me. I was numb and senseless. I ached to feel something. I ached to feel pain. I ached to cry. I ached to think. I ached and ached. The ache was a constant companion like a shadow” (Shenoy 2011: 143). Through these features or symptoms, she is confirmed by the psychiatrist that she is affected by bipolar disorder. However, Kleine mentions ‘melancholic disorder’ and here bipolar disorder. Dr. Madhusudan mentions that Ankita is affected by bipolar disorder through her activities. The doctor states that “Ankita, you have a severe case of bipolar disorder” (Shenoy 2011: 162).

Suicide plays a vital role in the world. Many persons are committing suicide by depression. Thomas Joiner is the notable writer. He mentions “From time to time, completed suicides cluster in space and time” (Joiner

2005). He states that a group of people are committing suicide day by day. Joiner has experimented the patients that depression is the main cause of suicide. He determines that "This research shows that depressive symptoms (a key one of which is suicidality) are associated with feelings of social ineffectiveness and that these may manifest particularly in close relationships" (Joiner 2005). Likewise, Ankita commits suicide out of depression. At first, she does not know in what way to commit suicide. She learns from the book how to commit suicide. The book "A Suicide Manual" is presented by Ruth. Through that book, she learns some things regarding suicide. She states that a normal person can read the book for pleasure, but she memorizes all the tactics for her life. Out of depression only, she does not know what she is doing. Ankita states that "Normal people did not read a book about suicide, memorizing all the methods to take their lives. You can never be normal, the voice inside my head screamed" (Shenoy 2019: 159). After learning, she takes a blade and makes a small cut near the side of the wrist. After cutting only, she realizes the pain, and she could not bear that pain. She explains that "I took it and made a small cut on the side of my wrist. I winced slightly as the blade cut the skin, and a line of blood appeared. I felt better than, Now at least, the pain was real. I could bear this. It was not like the phantom pain which was terrifying unbearable" (Shenoy 2011: 120). Whatever happens, she does not stop her plan for suicide and she thinks that what the possible plans to commit suicide. She learns a few methods. The first method, she imagines bathtub and it is not available in her bathroom. The second method is to pour kerosene and the third method is to hang from the fan. Ankita mentions about her tactics to commit suicide that "I thought of slashing my wrists and then submerging them in a bucket of water which would ensure that I bled to death. In the movies, they usually do it in bathtubs. But our bathroom had no bathtub (...) the other method I considered was pouring kerosene all over myself and getting burnt like the letters (...) Then I thought of hanging from the ceiling fan which was the most common method used in movies" (Shenoy 2011: 151). The tormenting of Abhi's death is the only reason to commit suicide. She is totally distressed and feels alone in her home. She feels like a prisoner and without her parent's permission, she cannot do anything as like her wish. Ankita feels that "I felt like a prisoner" (Shenoy 2011: 136). She finds difficulty in her living and she cannot control her thoughts. She brawls with her mind. Ankita expresses about her life that "There is such a lot troubling me. I struggle

every day to control my thoughts. I am fighting a daily battle with my mind” (Shenoy 2019: 128). Finally, she takes long forty winks that may change her mind and thinks that sleep is the only habit she forgets and bears the problem. She utters that “Sleep was elusive” (Shenoy 2019: 148). Finally, she understands that life has taught many lessons but it does not provide the syllabus. Every human being has to understand the value of life and to set their life positively. Ankita learns that “Life is also a great teacher. Life gives you the exams but doesn’t tell you the syllabus. It is up to us to set our own lessons” (Shenoy 2019: 117).

The famous writer Pynchon accolades that those who are affected by paranoid, that is not exact paranoia. They are affected by the surrounding people because they are underestimated by paranoid assumption. Those people force persons into paranoid situations. He abridges that “Paranoids are not paranoid because they’re paranoid, but because they keep putting themselves, fucking idiots, deliberately into paranoid situations” (Pynchon 2012). Likewise, Ankita is affected by Abhi’s death. That is why; she is always in the state of exasperated. However, her parents depict that her behavior and attitude is changed. Here, Ankita is forced into paranoid situations by her parents. She hates her parents because they send her daughter into a mental hospital and she gets agony towards her parents. Ankita expresses her pain that “I was now admitted in a mental hospital and I was alone. I HATE YOU. BOTH OF YOU. COME BACK HERE-DON’T LEAVE ME LIKE THIS- YOU’RE MY PARENTS DAMMIT (...) WHY THE FUCK DID YOU GIVE BIRTH TO ME? COME BACK DAMMIT-COME BACK” (Shenoy, 2011: 159-60).

Freud acclaims about memory because it is the central part of each and everyone’s life. He mentions that to avoid the pain and sufferings through memory. It can change the disturbance thoughts. He declares that “To avoid the awakening of pain through memory is one of the objects among the motives of these disturbances” (Freud 1914). As like the character of Ankita is disturbed by Abhi’s death and her parent’s attitude. Finally, Ankita is affected by bipolar disorder, and her life is in a mental asylum. After recovery, she is a tick on with her memory without any disturbances, and she completes her studies. She receives six degrees. And then, she marries to some other man, and he is a very sensitive man. They have a child, and there are in Bangalore. Here, Ankita’s memory activates positively that is why she is settled in her life with euphoric. Finally, as Freud says, memory is the main object to remove or remain the disturbances. Here,

Ankita eliminates all the upheavals in her memory and her life leads with cheerful (Shenoy 2019).

Melaine Kleine is a famous paranoid theorist. His ideas are different, and he explains paranoid problems with children. If any child shows any disturbances in front of their parents or whoever that should be analyzed by a psychiatrist, those who are affected by any disturbances their life ends in prison or asylum and their mind is shattered into pieces. After saving from the disturbances, they can build up their life in a positive way. Kleine praises that "If every child who shows disturbances that are at all severe were to be analyzed in good time, a great number of those people who later end up in prisons or lunatic asylums, or who go completely to pieces, would be saved from such a fate and be able to develop a normal life" (Kleine 1960). Here, Ankita is not a child, and she is a teenage girl, but Kleine's idea is related to Ankita. Kleine's theory points out children's life and here Shenoy points out a teenage girl, Ankita. She has spent her life with bipolar disorder and admitted to a mental asylum. After revealed from bipolar disorder, she feels complimentary, luminosity, superb and awake for those disturbances. She reveals that "I felt free. I felt light. I felt wonderful. I felt alive. Life was calling, and I was awake" (Shenoy 2019).

The above explanations reveal that the texts of Preeti Shenoy give substantiation to the theories of postmodern paranoia. Many incidents are portrayed regarding paranoia by her in the texts, and all the incidents have the link with postmodern paranoia. Finally, the author's exploration of paranoia in the texts of Shenoy is highly visible. Then, a discussion is a key content to contrast and compare paranoia tendency in Shenoy's works with other studies.

4. Discussion

There are a few studies regarding paranoia in literature. Those studies are compared and illustrated with Shenoy's select texts in terms of postmodern paranoia.

The study of Nicholas Lemann affirms that the concept of paranoid attributes in every fiction in America because commonly American people are affected by paranoia. The main reason is American politics. That is only made to think and live. The style of paranoia is in their writings. Those American writers focus on paranoid because of American people. It is directly referred to American people (Lemann 2006). The study of Richard

Hofstadter justifies about the same as the previous article about American people. However, these studies are focusing on only American people (Hofstadter 1996). As like, paranoid style prohibits in the works of Shenoy. Her texts are focusing only on the character of Ankita Sharma and how she leads her life with bipolar disorder and how she is frustrated (Shenoy 2011).

The study of Leo Bersani abbreviates about Pynchon's *Gravity's Rainbow* through paranoia. In this novel, Slothrop is the protagonist of this novel and science fiction also. He is always in the state of suspicion regarding V-2 rockets. He wants to save his native people and he knows the tactics of the rockets. He is in the state of oscillation that he is going to save his native people or not. The author portrays the suspicion of Slothrop that comes under paranoia (Bersani 2014). Likewise, Ankita is the same as the character of Pynchon's Slothrop but the idea is only different. Here, Ankita is always in the state of exasperation because of Abhi's death and her parent attitude. Abhi's death is only the turning point of her life that shatters the life of Ankita (Shenoy 2011).

The study of Perry Nodelman affirms about Cormier's *The Chocolate War* through paranoia. The author points out both the father and his son Tom Brown. The father wants to fulfill the wish of his son to own a shop inside the school campus to sale chocolate. The father writes a letter to the Headmaster, but he does not accept. So, Tom Brown is always thinking about the candy shop and wherever he goes and thinks about the shop and gets agony towards the Headmaster. Finally, he reaches the state of hallucination and frustration. The author points out paranoia through the character of Tom Brown (Nodelman 1922). Likewise, Ankita Sharma is also in a state of frustration. Tom Brown is affected by paranoia through the candy shop because the Headmaster does not give permission. But in the case of Ankita is different. She is always thinking about the death of Abhi as like Tom's candy shops (Shenoy 2011).

The study of Hariharasudan abbreviates that paranoia is portrayed through the character of Ammu in Arundhati Roy's *The God of Small Things*. Her husband is an alcoholic person. Through his activity, Ammu feels paranoiac. She takes the large book from the shelf and beats her husband. The author mentions the etiquettes of Ammu. Finally, the author projects that paranoid ideas are explored through the character of Ammu (Hariharasudan 2017). Likewise, Ankita is affected by the death of Abhi and her parents.

The study of Sherman C. Feinstein abbreviates that the writer Virginia Woolf is affected by bipolar disorder. The author studies the biography of Woolf and finds some paranoid ideas in the life of her. The author points out that Woolf is affected by manic-depressive during her childhood because of her mother and sister. They are the reason that Woolf is depressed. Manic depressive is a part of bipolar disorder. The author exhibits that Woolf's writings also depict the idea of paranoid. For example, Woolf's *The Years* (1937) mentions her sister Laura, and she is described as insane. Actually, at the age of 13, Woolf is affected by manic-depressive, but through her writings, she changed the character's name instead of Woolf. After the death of her mother, she is committed to suicide. Before that, she is affected by a bipolar disorder that leads to committing suicide (Feinstein 1980). Likewise, the character of Ankita is also affected by bipolar disorder by Abhi's death. After his death, she hates everything and does not concentrate on anything. She is always in the state of depressed, and there is no such happiness in her life. She still recollects the days with Abhi and his words. These are lead to commit suicide. She explores her pains and agony through her writings in the format of poetry (Shenoy 2019).

The study of Oleg Bazaluk and Olega Nezhyva abbreviate Martin Heidegger regarding his views on life. The authors states Heidegger's views are Husserl, Dilthey and Jaspers and it is otherwise known as phenomenology, philosophy of life and existentialism. The authors categorize three stages on life (Nezhyva 2016). Likewise, the character of Ankita Sharma's life is categorized by these ideas because she is affected by bipolar disorder. From this disorder, she learns that life has teaches many lessons and the person set to achieve the goal like college degree, good job, even marriage also. She learns from her life that to forget the past and do not want to remember at any time. This is the philosophy of life through the character of Ankita Sharma. Here, Heidegger's second view, philosophy of life connects with the character of Ankita Sharma (Shenoy 2019).

The study of Michael Wendland represents Wittgenstein's ideas regarding language game. The author notifies that language game as synonym for words especially in language. Sometimes, a person conveys any idea that may be misunderstood by anybody. So, every person must know about the language especially the synonym (Wendland 2016). Likewise, Ankita's mother is a traditional woman and she does not allow the boys inside her home. After a year, she allows especially Vaibhav and

she makes conversation with him. At the beginning, Ankita misunderstood the words of her mother. Here, Michael ideas link with Shenoy's idea that portraying of language (Shenoy 2019).

The study of Tetiana Matuskevych commands that transformation leads revolution or eclecticism in society. The author mentions eclecticism that deriving ideas, style and thoughts. The author points out the transformation in society that leads both revolution and eclecticism (Matuskevych 2016). Likewise, the character of Ankita Sharma leads her life in different angle because she is affected by bipolar disorder. According to disorder, her life splits into before, during and after the bipolar disorder. Finally, her life leads revolution that she completes her education as her wish. She proves her creative skills through she gets a well settled job and leads her life with euphoria (Shenoy 2019).

The study of Gabriel Furmuzachi requires identity in two ways. They are personal identity and imaginative identity. The first criterion personal identity refers to a particular person and it may physical or psychological. The author eulogizes that personal identity person has the mind to tackle all the problems while comparing psychological identity person. The psychological person's identity affects by his/her brain that leads some problems (Furmuzachi 2017). Likewise, Ankita Sharma affects by bipolar disorder. During this, she treats herself as mental and psycho and she does not know that what she is doing. After recovery, she wants to create new identity in the society. Here, Gabriel ideas connect with the character of Ankita Sharma through to create new identity (Shenoy 2019).

Paranoia is portrayed in many novels by various writers. They are Virginia Woolf, Sylvia Plath, Judith Guest, Jane Greenberg, and Jasmine Warga. For example, Virginia Woolf's popular novel is *Mrs. Dalloway*. In this novel, Septimus is the shell-shocked war hero. He is affected by the bipolar disorder as same as Ankita Sharma. Actually, it is the real story of Woolf, and she writes her life incidents through some other characters. Here, the author is affected by bipolar disorder, and that is why her writings seems to be (Woolf 1925). Another writer, Sylvia Plath's *The Bell Jar* represents the life of Esther. She is depressed by bell jar, and Ankita is depressed by Abhi's death. Esther spends her life in a mental asylum as like Ankita (Plath 1971). Another novel, Guest's *Ordinary People* is the popular novel and Conrad is the main character in this novel. He commits suicide but it is failed. After his suicide attempt, he is forced to admit in the hospital. Then he realizes his mistake and gets into life as positively. This

character's life also seems to be the character of Ankita's life. Some quite different is there between the theory and the text (Guest 1982).

Lastly, the issues of paranoia are compared and discussed with other studies. That projects that paranoia is portrayed in Shenoy's texts highly through the character of Ankita Sharma. The idea of paranoia contributes too many fictions, but those novels are not in Indian contexts. The present discussion is not only compared with the studies of other researchers, but also it is compared with other novels in the perspective of postmodern paranoia in Shenoy's select texts. Each study and novels mention that paranoid ideas are the same and way of narration only differs from each text and study. Finally, the study affirms that paranoia is there in the texts of Preeti Shenoy through the character of Ankita Sharma, who is affected by bipolar disorder.

5. Conclusion

This study spotlights the postmodern paranoia. It is rare in literature, especially in Indian writing. Paranoia diversifies from both psychology and literature. In literature, paranoid ideas entail in the form of writing. The present study analyses the postmodern fictions of Shenoy, such as *Life is What You Make It* and *Wake Up, Life is Calling*, and those are illustrated through the theories of paranoia. Finally, paranoid ideas render in the select novels of Preeti Shenoy through her writings. The upshot of the study is that the protagonist, Ankita Sharma, is affected by bipolar disorder, and she leads her life in a mental asylum. So, the paranoid ideas are explored in the works of Shenoy -- *Life is What You Make It* and *Wake Up, Life is Calling*. The limitations of the study are: most of the studies transmit to paranoia are in psychology, not in literature. So, that is a very tricky thing to find paranoia in literature. Many theorists are there concerning postmodernism but the only number of theorists is there under postmodern paranoia. This is intricate to find postmodern paranoia theorists. The present study recommends for auxiliary studies that the future research can be accomplished in the areas of exasperation life of Ankita, psychology barriers, quest for identity, alienation, migration, cultural disparity, love, role of friendship, reminiscence of Ankita's college life and so on.

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PHILOSOPHICAL MEDITATION, A TOOL FOR PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT AND LEADERSHIP

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Abstract: *The paper presents the interdisciplinary links that draw attention to meditative practices as part of philosophy put into practice, starting from the individual level and going to the groups and organizations. Looking at the areas in which he can interact, we refer in particular to the ways of applying philosophical meditation, as an important tool of the philosophical practitioner, who can interact with the leader of the organization, in the new process of philosophical counseling for management or leadership of the organization. This work brings to attention the concept of philosophical leadership, through which the leader can learn the meditative state to achieve a philosophical meditative application, made by a specialist, who uses specific elements of meditative exercises used since ancient times by philosophers, a process that can be brought in the current context of philosophical counseling, as a form of a useful philosophical practice for managers, with benefits for both parties, both for the practitioners and for the leaders.*

Keywords: *philosophical counseling, leadership, philosophical meditation, organization, personal development.*

Introduction

This approach is just a sequence of research into a new field dedicated to the potential offered by philosophical practice that can use various tools, one being the meditative exercises, manifested since antiquity under the name of spiritual exercises. In this way, we have studied the potential offered by meditative practice, which can become useful also applied to the business environment, through specific practices included in philosophical consulting services for organizations, for their leaders and staff. The paper analyzes some specific elements to philosophical practice, taken from philosophy, which become the working tools in new occupations, increasingly required in the world, the philosophical counseling and consulting, along with ethical counseling. These are the specializations that

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can find application in various fields of activity, and they are addressed to persons or groups, organizations, companies and institutions. Based on these considerations, we ask ourselves whether these philosophical practices can be applied in organizations specific to the business environment and the answer refers to some categories of people, such as: managers and their management teams, employees of the company or members of the community in which the organization operates; and leads us to define the other concepts who was detailed in other papers (Hategan, 2019b) such as: philosophical consulting, the philosophical leadership and ethics applied; all concepts are intended for the manager and management team of the company or institution.

Short review of our research about philosophical practice and leadership

In order to continue the research on the implementation of philosophical counseling in Romania, I focused on other fields of activity in which philosophical practice can develop and apply innovative programs of philosophical consulting and applied ethics, the chosen theme being the organizational environment, viewed as a generic representation for the companies and their business environment. In this context, I participated to some conferences held within the program called "Global Economy under Crisis" and the papers were published in university journals in the Economic Sciences Series. The study of applied forms of ethics and forms of philosophical counseling, which can be put into practice in companies and institutions alike, derives from the contemporary evolution of the business and community environment, where I found a real interest for other consultants, having new specializations with origins in ethics and philosophy alike. These approaches tries to signal to interested practitioners or philosophers, that there is a need to develop philosophical practices applied in business or institutions, with the help of philosophical consultancy, which can be brought to the organizations along with an ethic applied in this field.

A first paper resulting from the debates held at the mentioned event had the topic of leadership in organizations (Hategan, 2018b), which detailed the concept of leadership or management of organization, in correlation with the specialization that is outlined in philosophical practices, that of philosophical consulting, as a new philosophy for leaders. In the documentation I noticed a promoter of the concept called *the reflexive*

leadership, this being the Italian Andrea Vitullo, who developed the theme in his book with the same title, showing that philosophical practice can benefit managers, through reflexive tools (Vitullo, 2007). The research also refers to the book by Eugenie Vegleris for the same categories within an organization which starts from a generic letter to a manager, developing the topic and presenting the characteristics of the process which a manager can benefit by a new concept, the philosophical counseling (Vegleris, 2006).

The study identifies other concepts for leaders, such as philosophical sensitivity (Contesini & Zamarchi, 2009) or organizational thinking (Cervari & Pollastri, 2010), showing the link between the new type of leader and their concerns for the concept of social responsibility (CSR) of the organization they lead, it becoming a concept more current in organizations that want to build a reputation for the social environment in which they operate, only not in the business environment which is connected by the nature of its business. Thus, there is a growing need for the teams of leaders to develop programs and strategies that distinctly express socially responsible activities, with long-term benefits to the organization, not only by its reputation, but also by framing the unit in the social environment where it is located and it activates. We can observe such concerns among specialists and researchers in economics or management area, to identify strategies for actions specific to the field of corporate social responsibility (CSR), meaning that we have studied these approaches to highlight the interdisciplinary links that can develop between applied philosophy and a socially responsible organization.

In order to highlight the possibility of including philosophy in research topics for other fields, I participated in two multidisciplinary research projects, with a mixed team of researchers from the University of Timisoara, and conducted studies in the field of management related to CSR, which also allowed interdisciplinary approaches with the field of philosophy (Hategan e.a. 2018c, 2019d). It is useful this type of research projects carried out in common groups, with researchers or specialists from various fields, who can study a topic from different perspectives, in which each brings its own expertise to its specialization, which will highlight the interdisciplinary role of philosophy and the possibility to interaction with other fields. Within the same research concerns for other fields of activity, in which philosophical practice can develop and apply innovative programs of philosophical consulting and applied ethics, we chose as theme the organizational environment (Hategan, 2019b), this being a

general representation for the companies and business environment, followed by a review for this prospective field which presents the modalities of philosophical practice for the economic and business environment, and finally this work was recently finalized by editing a new volume entitled: *Philosophical Counseling in Organizations* (Hategan, 2020).

The cited book includes a special section for the translation into Romanian of some reference works published in the journal *Philosophical Practice*, and we refer to the paper of the British philosopher Geoffrey Klempner who assumes the role of "business philosopher" presenting the philosophy he sees in a business arena, where philosophy can enter through this practice expressed in the form of a specialized advisor, who can also address people of the business area, with the help of a new profession, the philosophical consulting for the business environment (Klempner, 2009). The next included paper was written by practitioner Eli Eilon who identifies a link between philosophical counseling and entrepreneurship, in the sense that the entrepreneur needs a counselor or can become a philosophical practitioner himself, and who can turn to a philosophical counseling practitioner to clarify intention and taking decision for developing a business as an entrepreneur (Eilon, 2009). The last of the works published in the mentioned collection belongs to a coaching specialist, David Brendel, who presents in parallel the coaching related to philosophical counseling, showing some similarities but also the essential differences of these two services applied to managers or leaders (Brendel, 2014). The mentioned author has a perspective of collaboration between this two services, which can be achieved in the form of partnerships between professions, considered to be "auxiliary professions" specific to the century we live in, he has the idea of a dual certification, which can be delivered in the form of a personal development and consulting package.

We can observe that the stated activities also highlight the interdisciplinary links made between philosophical practice and the business environment, needing to approach a philosophical consultancy for leaders, which leads us to outline a new concept called the philosophical leadership, or by others, the reflexive leadership. We support the way to revitalize leadership, using some tools taken from philosophy and presented by specialists trained in philosophical consulting for managers and their teams. We believe that philosophy put into practice within companies, as organizations specific to the business environment, can help substantially to regulate the economic systems in which they operate, by

applied ethics and philosophical consulting, as the new branches of philosophical practice for organizations. We believe that an important role can be played by the specialist in philosophical practice, who can be a good facilitator and philosophical consultant alike, for people working in business, in companies and organizations. All areas we have referred to, can develop new forms of interdisciplinary collaboration, where philosophical practice can play a greater role, and shows the importance of this research, indicating the need to make public the results obtained for the development of other specializations or applications, along with the requirement to include these concepts, tools and working methods in the training programs of practitioners in philosophy, as well as the development of other programs that can generate new specializations, with specific applications to all researched fields.

Some premises about the meditation concept, an instrument of philosophical practice

My experience as a trainer led me to some personal observations, followed by the study of aspects regarding the activation of mental processes and the work tools that can be used for the problem or dilemma, which a person is confronting during his life. My thesis was the first Romanian Ph.D. research about philosophical counseling (Hategan, 2018b), and was including a study of the need to implement philosophical counseling, which also indicates the ways for recognition and regulation for a new profession. The work contains brief references to previous studies, including a brief presentation of the meditative state related to a concept called the active philosophical meditation, which later became a distinct research topic, created through the link between the meditative state and the philosophical tools analyzed, which generate specific mental processes and they can act successfully on certain life situations, with certain effects. Previous research describes a method of inducing a meditative state, as a necessary state in the process of meditation and philosophical reflection, and I resume now some elements about the meditative state and its role in philosophical meditation and reproduce them schematically below, showing the positioning of the meditative state on an imaginary axis, which makes the transition from the active and conscious state of mind towards sleep, as a state of mind; but the meaning can be reversed, with or without experiencing the new meditative state.



Fig. no. 1. The meditative state as a form included in the mental states.

The conclusion becomes obvious, to support the development of these meditative methods and techniques, by including them in the professional training programs of the philosophical counselor. The topic was continued by a study about the potential that the meditative state can offer in the process of the philosophical practice, presented in the book entitled "Philosophical Meditation - an instrument in philosophical counseling" (Hategan, 2019a) where other similar concerns are included, identified by other contemporary practitioners of philosophy. The volume includes some references to Ran Lahav who introduced the new concepts in the analyzed field: one being contemplative philosophy, a concept based on relaxation and breathing exercises, which appeals to the meditative state induced by a group facilitator, a state in which the approach is like a theme of reflection, the exercise being also called "the philosophical contemplation" (Lahav, 2005) or another concept, called "the philosophical companionship" (Lahav, 2016). Lahav's efforts are continued on the theme of philosophical contemplation (Lahav, 2018a), being seen as a process that can take place in the state of meditation, which can be induced with the help of mental exercises, he says. At the event in Mexico, organized under the auspices of ICPP, the practitioner Ran Lahav presented the three principles underlying his new concept of the deep philosophy, showing that it is truly philosophical, deeply personal and transformative at the same time, requiring a state of mind, called "the contemplative state of mind" (Lahav, 2018b).

Italian practitioner Lodovico Berra wrote about the metaphysical meditation concept, classifying his meditation exercises on different levels of difficulty, which can be progressively accessed (Berra, 2010). The levels that Berra talks about, start with meditation on the body, continue with an inner centering after which at the next level the author says, the texts or phrases from philosophy can be introduced, chosen according to the topic of meditation. Another level noticed by him is the meditation on some

objectives or ideas, which can be elaborated before the exercise or results even from the meditative process, because in the meditative process the judgment is suspended, to reach the essence of the concept. The practitioner's exercises continue with the introduction of a meditation on time or cosmic consciousness, and for the more experienced, the Italian practitioner has a meditative exercise on death or other special concepts, such as nothing or the nothingness (Berra, 2010, 55). The whole theme of metaphysical meditation was later developed in the form of a textbook, where Berra also presents meditative techniques, such as: the reflection or introspection, contemplation, receptive technique, transcendence, resuming to Zen or yoga applications with new orientations towards meditation (Berra, 2017).

Returning to antiquity, about which we already know that many philosophers have resorted to meditation, where it was a process of thinking and reflection manifested in various forms of philosophical practice. The analysis studies the premises of using meditative practices in philosophical applications, starting from some connections of philosophical practices with other fields in which meditation manifested, referring especially to the spiritual realm, which included meditation in its own rituals, under various forms of application, especially in the form of spiritual exercises, which also generated some manifestations of paternity on the concept of meditative practice. But with the emergence of other fields of science dedicated to the human mind, the concept of meditation was taken over to be studied, referring here to psychology, which included in its procedures the new elements of meditative state, or in psychoanalysis, as a result of studying the consciousness states of person. Thus, we can observe some interferences of the meditative concept with various fields, starting with the ancient philosophy and its practices, in the spiritual and theological field alike, continuing with the field of studying the human mind, where meditation is sometimes attributed to be specific to it, or with the various meditative practices, where we can include yoga or Zen, specific to some oriental religions, and recently, with the personal development programs that can also use the mental states specific to meditation.

Elements of meditative practice are also found in the philosophical schools of antiquity, which practiced such exercises, and later became those the spiritual exercises referred by St. Augustine and Thomas D' Aquino, and recently by the French philosopher Pierre Hadot, who defines

meditation as a "practice of self-conversation", showing that the place of philosophy was largely occupied by theology, through the spiritual exercises of the periods following antiquity, thus giving up the philosophical meditations specific to ancient schools (Hadot, 2002).

The Buddhist spiritual leader Dalai Lama also talks about meditation in his interviews or in various published works, where he speaks about the mental training, without giving it religious connotations, in the sense of Buddhist religion, and he is showing a clear distinction between the two types of meditations: the first being the analytical meditation, specific to the thought process, and the second being the concentrated meditation (Dalai Lama, 2010). In an attempt to explain psychotherapy in a Buddhist perspective, the psychologist Mark Epstein draws attention to Buddhist meditation, showing how it can complement therapy, he referring to the so-called Buddhist parable of the cork, the cork being similar to meditation, which will allow "crossing the waters" (Epstein, 1995).

My recent book presented the forms in which meditation is used as a useful tool for new philosophical practices (Hategan, 2019a), manifested in the form of a specialized service offered by a specialist in philosophical practice, called a philosophical counselor, with some reference to the specific forms of work, which can be included in the training portfolio of a specialist in the new practice, the philosophical counseling. In the same direction, these research concerns was applied by Professor Rick Repetti, and at the annual conference of American practitioners held in New York in 2018 (see at www.appa.edu), and he presented the role of meditation as a tool that can be used in philosophical counseling and he also talked about his research on groups of students who performed some meditative practices and which resulted in a change of attitude towards philosophy. His conclusion was: the students who tried a meditative exercise, later became interested and involved in studying and understanding philosophy, and the reduced interest was from the students who did not practice meditative exercises. To understand all these new ways of working, I reviewed some practices that have been successfully applied by practitioners in philosophy, thus identifying the areas where philosophical meditation can be applied by the new specialists and practitioners of philosophy. In the same research was proposed for example applied exercises that can be tested individually or with the help of a facilitator, recommended as a first mental experiment that can be done by those interested in the practices of philosophy, to learn and experience the

benefits of the meditative state. The meditative exercises bring to the practitioners' attention these working tools, in order to include the practice of meditation in the new applied current, represented by practice and the philosophical counseling.

About the meditative exercise, as a form of philosophical practice

The expression "to make philosophy" generally manifested by putting into practice the knowledge gained by philosophy, for the benefit of a person, involves the initiation of a thought process, which involves the use of tools taken from philosophy, one of which is philosophical reflection, it can also take place with the help of a meditative state.

This being the moment when a person has a personal state of reflection or meditation, to analyze a situation they are facing at a given moment and they try through the meditation process to obtain a result or a clarification on their life situation. We can observe that although meditation has its origins in the philosophy of antiquity, over time, its role was later taken over by theology, which promoted spiritual exercises; then other areas referred to meditative practices, especially the sciences dedicated to the mind, such as psychology and psychoanalysis, and recently the meditative practices was included in some personal development programs. In my work we identified the importance of a certain way of functioning of the human brain, represented by the alpha level, which can generate a conscious meditative state, in which the brain operates at a frequency specific to sleep but in which it remains conscious, and this level can be a special trigger for the meditative process, where the subjective instruments of the mind can be activated.

The conscious positioning of the subject between the active state of mind and the natural state of sleep, imprints an active character of the meditative process, in the sense that it will be able to use working tools of the mind, such as: visualization and imagination. In the same context, other Romanian practitioners were concerned with studying the correlation between brain and mind, concluding that the states described by traditional theories are directly correlated with the psychophysiological processes of the human brain, meaning that brain states can be seen as the mental states. Psychologist Ionut Mladin has studied the mental experiments from the point of view of the researcher in philosophy, highlighting the two working tools already mentioned, namely the perception through visualization and

imagination, as ways of operating the human mind, using known or constructed images, and he concludes that the image will have a productive character, by passing from the passive state to the active and creative state, given by the imagination. The author also affirms that the localization of mental images takes place in the occipital lobe of the human brain, a fact already confirmed by neurology and psychology alike (Mladin, 2018). In this context, we observe once again the importance of the two working tools, namely visualization and imagination, and I recommend these to be included in philosophical practice, along with the rest of the tools already successfully used by the practitioners. In the following table the studied mental instruments are presented, positioned in the context of meditative states and referring to an imaginary axis of time, where the orientation is from the past to the future:

	THE PAST	PRESENT	FUTURE
MENTAL PROCESS	REFLECTION	ANALYSIS	CREATIVITY
EFFECTS	CAUSE	ISSUE	SOLUTION
MEDITATIVE STAGE	MEDITATION (passive state)	CONTEMPLATION	MEDITATION (active state)
MENTAL TOOLS	VISUALISATION	PERCEPTION	IMAGINATION

Table no. 1. The mental processes and tools reported in time

In this table it can be observed how the two instruments specific to the active meditative state act, where the visualization takes place on in the some situations or events from the past, and the imagination is activated to mentally represent the possible future situations. The active state of mind is specific to the present time, and it is responsible for the analysis of the problem or situation, followed by a process of contemplation, activated by the perceptions specific to the present moment. The meditative practices proposed for philosophical counseling can be applied in the personal counselling and for group or organizational applications, provided that the practitioner being trained also had some experience in applying these practices, as a facilitator or philosophical counselor. Regardless of the forms of work adopted by a practitioner of philosophy, it can be observed that to achieve a meditative process, and the practitioner uses a specific processes, such as: philosophical contemplation, creative visualization and guided

imagination, elements that are useful for a philosophical reflection, in a process applied to the theme or meditative project.

The meditation and philosophical contemplation are a part to the practices of ancient philosophers, and the human history made this concept to be taken over later by theology or some Eastern religions, and contemporary, this concept is present in various therapies or is included in some motivational or personal development programs. In each of these fields, where meditation has found an expression, it has happened that this concept has been acquired or presented to be specific to that field, often to the detriment of philosophy, due to philosophers' concerns for the academic side of philosophy or by their inaction in combating those who take an exclusivity for the meditative process, or even by those who avoid any philosophical practice, but they could naturally include meditative practice as coming from the philosophy of the antiquity, but it has been forgotten for a long time.

In the same time with the return of philosophy in the applied field, philosophers who have now become practitioners or specialists in philosophical counseling have rediscovered the benefits that the meditative state can offer, the applications of meditation have thus been introduced into philosophical practices. All these actions show the role of the practitioner in philosophy, concerned with bringing home all the important tools used by philosophers of antiquity, and therefore implicitly that of philosophical meditation, now with the help of the specialist in philosophical counseling they will bring the philosophy to the regular people, as a practical way to understand their life and its meaning, through they learning the practical skill of philosophizing.

Conclusions

It is opportune for the research activity to be continued on this applied field, the philosophical counseling, by implementing a new specialization programs for philosophy practitioners, but also by publishing and promoting all research papers in this new field. This paper has highlighted only a few interdisciplinary links of philosophical practice that have led us to study meditative practices as part of the philosophy put into practice, the study started at the individual level, and be continued to a way of application to the groups or organizations, where all are willing to experience the benefits of active meditation, like a thematic application,

specific to philosophical practice. Looking at the various areas where it can interact, it can be learned how to apply philosophical meditation, as an important tool of the philosophical practitioner, generating a new practice for leader of the organization, used in the process of philosophical counseling, and applied to managers or any leaders of company. This paper supports the concept of philosophical leadership, which can now be completed with new tools and applied exercises brought by the counseling specialist or philosophical practitioner who supports the leader to learn the meditative state and together to use philosophical meditative applications. The specialist can now put into practice the specific elements of meditative exercises used since ancient times by philosophers, and which are brought today by including them in the process of philosophical counseling, becoming the specific forms of philosophical practices for managers and leaders, or for personal development, with more benefits for all participants to these meditative process.

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CUM TREBUIE SĂ PRIVIM POPULARIZAREA ȘTIINȚEI? CU UN STUDIU AL CAZURILOR MIRCEA MALIȚA ȘI SOLOMON MARCUS

Ana BAZAC¹

Abstract: *After the first part – rather a summary – about the meanings of science popularisation, the participants on both sides of this process, and the differences and similarities between the researchers in science and technology and the popularizers of science, more precisely, between the scientific theories and their popularized form – the paper emphasises some concrete aspects of science popularisation at two big Romanian researchers, the late Academicians Mircea Malița and Solomon Marcus. These aspects concern the new ideas advanced in the popularisation of science and technology. These new ideas might have appeared, or not, in the specialized works, and they are not (not necessarily) lucrative or unexpected emergence after an assiduous thought process. The novelty here is the original interpretation as a qualitative leap after the accumulation of facts and information about them. In this sense, the novelty has often a philosophical flavour, i.e. philosophical concepts and hypotheses – or even theories – appear as consequences of the scientific theories and suggestion of integrative, holistic approaches of knowledge and the world.*

Keywords: *popularization of science and technology, Mircea Malița, Solomon Marcus, philosophical meanings, holism.*

1. În loc de introducere

Astăzi nu se pune problema întâietății nici a filosofiei și nici a științei. Deoarece *fiecare face ceea ce îi este specific*. Iar dacă filosofia nu reușește să evidențieze semnificațiile lucrurilor în lumina experienței *actuale* a oamenilor, nu este din cauza că „nu mai e ce-a fost”, ci dimpotrivă, că nu este în stare să fie astăzi la fel de percutantă cum a fost în vechime, adică nu mai e în stare să fie cum e astăzi lumea/în consonanță cu lumea *de astăzi*. Iar această impotență este determinată de tendința *dominantă* din filosofie de a-și separa prezumțiile (analiza lor în spiritul „filosofiei profesionale”) de problemele lumii de astăzi, de a separa analizele din domeniile ei de

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perspectiva integrativă, „gödeliană” și de a crede că realitatea este judecarea abstractă/ceea ce dă această judecare. (Această ultimă frază (‘de a crede că realitatea...’) înseamnă aici că aceia care cred că propria imagine abstractă despre lucruri este singura adevărată, adică realitatea este aida imaginii lor abstracte, nu iau în seamă nici măcar faptul că lumea are semnificații pentru om în măsura în care ideile-cunoștințe apar și sunt prelucrate de minte², și că deci imaginile diferite trebuie confruntate pentru a înțelege realitatea. Perspectiva metafizică rea care mai există – mai ales la cei care se adapă din popularizarea unei filosofii ce refuză confruntarea, uneori sub semnul incomensurabilității teoriilor – constă tocmai în a crede că nevoia filosofică de principii prime ar fi totuna cu fetișizarea unei filosofii care nu își confruntă și nu își pune sub semnul întrebării prezumțiile).

O scădere a gândirii – și filosofice – este și excluderea din criteriile de analiză a perspectivei sociale/de clasă. Perspectiva *istorică* din filosofie nu este același lucru cu perspectiva *socială/de clasă*. Ideea iluministă că omul rațional va reuși să facă lumea mai umană a fost dezvoltarea întregii teorii a *rațiunii/raționalității* omului, a *educabilității* sale și a *capacității sale creatoare*. Ideea însăși a corespuns nașterii modernității, adică a capitalismului. Ideologia legitimatoare a acestuia, ideologia progresului, s-a bazat tocmai pe ideea iluministă de mai sus. Desigur că ideologia e *contradictorie*, după cum întreaga teorie de mai sus a fost creată într-un cadru social *contradictoriu*. Dar a vedea – și încă precis – caracterul contradictoriu al ideologiei moderne e una, iar a echivala ideea iluministă cu acest caracter și a o și nega („pe această bază”) e alta: adică ridiculizarea și refuzul ideii iluministe nu decurge în principal din scăderile ideologiei moderne, ci tocmai din consecvența acestei idei în care logica se unește cu etica³.

Astăzi acest caracter socialmente determinat este o banalitate. Astfel încât numai aceia care vor să escamoteze *responsabilitatea unor categorii precise*, vorbesc de „...conform căreia el, omul, prin ‘rațiunea’ sa poate face orice, în final și acesta este cel mai rău lucru, să schimbe cum are chef Natura”. Doar cei care nu vor să vadă caracterul de *clasă* al *deciziilor sociale* vorbesc despre „omul...” (în general)⁴. „Filosofia” care tratează raportul

² Constructivismul (Kant).

³ Ana Bazac, “The Enlightenment Epistemology and its Warning against the Instrumentalisation of Science”, *Noema* 2020, pp. 29-75.

⁴ Putem vorbi de „omul” în general/vina „omului” în general atunci când avem în față decizii economice și politice de a storce natura în numele profitului privat?

om-natură în modul acesta este clar impotentă. Căci *filosofia – care este o formă de cunoaștere – are, evident, mesaje*. Care este mesajul poziției de mai sus? Incriminarea omului în general; și ce mai rămâne? Oare filosofia nu este, înainte de toate, responsabilă față de om?

Problema – acțiunea rea a omului în natură – este una specifică arzător modernității în *criză de sistem*, apărând însă deja în modernitatea târzie. Această problemă trebuie rezolvată teoretic cu mijloacele actuale: informațiile date de științe și interpretarea lor punând sub semnul întrebării toate prezumțiile.

Cele de mai sus și acest răspuns reprezintă o notă epistemologică. Conceptele filosofice și universalul evidențiat de filosofie nu apar prin învârtirea unor termeni goliți de povara conținutului concret: ci dimpotrivă. Hegel spunea că adevărul e întregul (și anume întregul concret).

Caracterizarea tuturor științelor normative la grămadă, a tuturor creațiilor din filosofie și din științele sociale este pendantul perspectivei abstracte de sus în care se vorbește de vina „omului” în raport cu natura. Nu putem vorbi la grămadă, otova, ci trebuie să inferăm concluzii interesante tocmai din discernerea și condiționarea fină a ideilor. Trebuie să vedem și să arătăm clar ce/ce fel de lucrări filosofice – și de ce – au dat o imagine sau alta⁵. Nu toată filosofia a pierdut startul față de știință. Iar adecvarea filosofiei la cerințele lumii de astăzi, inclusiv prin considerarea creațiilor științei și tehnologiei, este aceeași și în filosofia profesională și în aceea popularizată. Căci, da, există și popularizare a filosofiei și, deși nu aceasta este subiectul articolului, trebuie spus că, dacă și filosofia profesională și aceea popularizată (în bloguri, video-uri, pe site-uri specifice) cer aceleași criterii de analiză, uneori tocmai filosofia profesională este mai timidă, să spunem: nu luăm în seamă, desigur, promovarea/reclama.

PARTEA ÎNTÂI

2. În jurul definiției *popularizării științei*

Sau când avem în față decizii economice și politice care storc individul uman în masă și îi *determină* disperarea, rata urâtă a îmbolnăvirilor, moartea *înainte de vreme*, chiar sinuciderea, în numele aceluiași profit privat?

⁵ "Alexandru Boboc, *Philosophy and Science in the Era of Late Modernity: Philosophical Reconstructions under the Influence of the Modern Scientific Spirit*", *Noema*, XV, 2016, pp. 341-358.

Istorie: Termenul este modern: a corespuns gândirii *iluministe* din sec. al XVIII-lea occidental (pe de o parte, acum știința se face din ce în ce mai aplicat, se descoperă lumea, se publică lucrări și se creează muzee; pe de altă parte, obiectivul explicit este răspândirea cunoștințelor – vezi *Enciclopediile*).

Dar popularizarea științei devine obiectiv general și prioritar în sec. al XIX-lea (publicul occidental amator de știință crește prin generalizarea alfabetizării și unei baze de cunoștințe raționale, necesară noii forțe de muncă industriale cu diferite grade de calificare): literatura științifică este parte a planului general de educație și este considerată mai benefică pentru morală decât beletristica (Și știința modernă s-a dezvoltat în cadru instituționalizat⁶).

Numele: vine de la popor (chiar în franceză, *vulgarisation*; în română, termenul de vulgarizare înseamnă depreciere/valoare slabă, de aceea se folosește *popularizare*⁷. În engleză, *popularisation* este și educația informală și neformală⁸).

Definire: popularizarea științei

A comunica știința în mod accesibil publicului larg (și nu comunității de specialiști) (dar există mai multe tipuri de public în publicul larg) (mijloace de popularizare: școală; cărți, jurnalism, muzee⁹).

A face cunoscută știința și în afara specialiștilor [în comunicarea de specialitate, fiecare știință (descoperiri, probleme) este cunoscută de proprii specialiști].

Popularizarea științei nu e o simplă dovadă de umanism, ci “un mijloc de stimulare a creșterii economice”¹⁰.

Dar este știința popularizată „vulgară”?

Sau: *oare accesibilitatea reduce calitatea științifică?*

⁶ Lewis A. Coser, *Oameni ai ideilor. Perspectiva unui sociolog* (1965), Traducere, studiu introductiv și note de Camelia Crăciun, Iași, Editura Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, 2012, pp. 75-84.

⁷ Ana Bazac, “For the popularisation of science: A critique of the present mainstream anti-scientism”, *Noema*, XV, 2016, pp. 365-382.

⁸ Cheng Kai Ming, Leung Kai Fong (Eds.), *Popularization of Science and Technology: What Informal and Nonformal Education can do?*, Paris, UNESCO, 1989 (An International Conference organized by Faculty of Education, University of Hong Kong in co-operation with UNESCO, September 4-9, 1989).

⁹ Massimiano Bucchi, Brian Trench (Eds.), *Handbook of Public Communication of Science and Technology*, Abingdon, Routledge, 2008.

¹⁰ Cheng Kai Ming, Leung Kai Fong (Eds.), p. 9.

În principiu, nu.

Calitate științifică = caracteristici ale textului științific: *claritate și precizie* (a termenilor, în descrierea premiselor, a problemelor, a soluțiilor), *demonstrare a premiselor și soluțiilor, deci logică și perspectivă critică asupra tuturor pașilor din oferta științifică.*

Popularizarea științei = *transmiterea logicii ideilor – inclusiv în desfășurarea lor istorică – legate de o problemă pusă în știință și rezolvată sau nu.*

Această transmitere exclude sau reduce/sintetizează mijloacele și limbajul tehnic fără de care nu există raport de cercetare științifică, dar nu anulează logica și perspectiva critică. (Conceptul de **jargon**¹¹: *în știință*, jargonul nu vrea să izoleze comunitatea științifică, ci e doar mijloc de comunicare specializată). Deci această transmitere implică o privire *meta* (filosofică) asupra științei.

Prezumții mai mult sau mai puțin tacite **împotriva** popularizării științei

Și motivele directe de popularizare (eficacitatea economică) și deprecierea popularizării științei au prezumții, care trebuie cunoscute, mai ales astăzi.

Prezumțiile celor care *obiectează*: 1) educația formală/În școală a forței de muncă e suficientă; 2) știința popularizată nu este bază pentru dezvoltarea științei (“nimeni nu citează cărțile de popularizare ci articolele de specialitate”); 3) popularizarea științei e pierdere de vreme, deoarece receptorii țintă nu sunt capabili nici să reacționeze și internalizeze cunoștințele științifice din literatura de popularizare, și nici să le dezvolte, adică să participe la creația științifică.

Pentru a verifica prezumțiile, să ne amintim de două aspecte. Unul este cel al imaginii despre popor. Există imagini *statice* – de la cele negative la

¹¹ Albert Dauzat, *Les argots. Caractères. Évolution. Influence.* Paris, Delgrave, 1929, p. 21: limbajul argotic reprezintă mijloace de „coeziune pentru grupuri închise, o reacție împotriva agenților externi și, dacă este necesar, un corpus de protecție”. Diferența dintre limbajul argotic și jargonul pare să fie că acesta din urmă nu își propune de la început să fie / să pară criptat pentru persoanele din afara grupului. De fapt, scopul principal al limbajului argotic este și acela de a oferi un sentiment de identitate. Dar într-un mod critic: evitarea tabuurilor societății are loc și prin numirea anumitor lucruri despre care „nu se vorbește”.

Vezi și Pierre Bourdieu & Luc Boltanski, *La Production de l'idéologie dominante* (1976), Paris, Raison d'Agir, 2008, pp. 15-19, 57-75, 139-144 ; Walter Nash, *Jargon: Its Uses and Abuses.* Oxford, Blackwell, 1993. Sau Terrill Pollman, *Building a Tower of Babel or Building a discipline? Talking About Legal Writing,* Marquette Law Review, Vo. 85, issue 4, 2002, pp. 887-928.

cele pozitive¹² – și imagini *dinamice* (sau, dacă nu uităm sensul dat de Hegel) dialectice. În aceste ultime imagini, și funcția de intelectuali și separarea intelectuali – non-intelectuali și separarea intelectualilor din umanoare de intelectualii din științe exacte și tehnică, și separarea intelectualilor din știință și tehnică de filosofie, sunt fenomene istorice/istoric determinate. Din acest punct de vedere, prezumțiile celor care refuză popularizarea științei se bazează pe imagini statice negative despre popor și pe absolutizarea distincțiilor de mai sus.

Al doilea aspect privește *educația*. Aceasta este mai mult decât transmiterea de informații științifice separate unele de altele. Ea este *legarea informațiilor științifice din domenii diferite: perspectiva holistă*. De asemenea, educația este *legarea informațiilor din știință și tehnică de valori: adică legarea obiectivelor din știință și tehnică de telos-ul dat de oameni, și anume de telos-ul dat în favoarea fiecărui individ și, deci, a majorității (telos umanist)*. În sfârșit, educația privește poporul ca *publicul larg* pe care îl are în vedere: mai specific, *publicul larg* poate fi educat doar prin transmiterea informațiilor *funcționale* (mai degrabă numai prin instrucția formală), și mult mai puțin cauzale; aceasta este educația de masă ca modalitate de impunere a dominației. Hegemonia „elitelor” se bazează și pe accesul social diferențiat la cunoștințe trans- oficiale și formale. Sau publicul larg poate fi educat prin transmiterea informațiilor cauzale, integrate/sistemice, holiste și legate de analiza logică, de criterii și de valori umaniste.

În orice caz, importanța educației formale și neformale este aceeași, ele sunt interdependente. (Iar popularizarea științei este în permanentă reconstrucție¹³).

3. Popularizatorii

Pot începe prin a fi „intelectuali organici” (Gramsci¹⁴), dar ajung conștient să fie legați de popor, adică a) îi dezvoltă aptitudinile de cunoaștere și, deci,

¹² De ex. (Gramsci:) „toți oamenii sunt intelectuali” înseamnă mai mult decât (Descartes:) „fiecare om – rațional/are bun simț”.

¹³ Luisa Massarani and Ildeu de Castro Moreira, “Popularisation of science: historical perspectives and permanent dilemmas”, *Quark*, 32, Apr-June 2004, pp. 75-79.

¹⁴ Diferența intelectuali *tradiționali* (se consideră și par autonomi față de categoria dominantă) – intelectuali *organici* (nu se consideră și nu par autonomi față de categoria dominantă) de la Gramsci; *unii* intelectuali organici ajung să se comporte ca intelectualii organici ai categoriilor opuse elitelor dominante.

cele creatoare, **b)** contribuie la constituirea unei contra-hegemonii, **c)** popularizarea științei și tehnicii concepută de ei nu coboară spre nivelul publicului larg ci *urcă*, stimulându-l (Galileo, Euler, Faraday, Einstein).

Ce fel de idei se popularizează?/este popularizarea științei și tehnicii doar o dare de seamă a ideilor existente deja în știință și tehnică? *Popularizarea științei nu este neutră, ci mereu interpretare*¹⁵.

- Popularizatorii vor public, cât mai larg (să fie cunoscuți).
- *Prestigiul* – achiziționat și prin excelență în cercetare și prin popularizare (Faraday).
- Popularizatorii vor să dea lucrări de calitate (să fie recunoscuți ca elite intelectuale).
- Popularizatorii vor nu doar să redea istoria și logica unor teorii din știință și tehnică, ci și să ofere propriile teorii.
- Popularizatorii sunt cei mai deschiși la filosofia domeniilor discutate, la perspectiva *meta*.

Raportul dintre **a)** popularizatori și **b)** publicul larg

a) Tipuri istorice de *diletanți, amatori; specialiști, experți*: azi între specializare (educația pentru această specializare) și privire *trans*; Oferta de soluții noi în cărți de popularizare și distanța (și discutabilă) între știința specializată și știința popularizată¹⁶.

b) *Publicul larg* ca: „receptor pasiv” „doritor de informații practice” (ce fel și cine e de vină?) (Istoric, popularizarea a vrut să ajute și provoace industria modernă).

Ce înseamnă „departe de teorie”? (cine e de vină și se justifică reducerea popularizării științei și tehnicii doar la *hic et nunc*-ul informațiilor practice?)

Pe măsură ce crește nivelul educației formale/în școală, publicul larg nu mai este receptor pasiv: chiar dacă pasivitatea sa în cunoașterea științei e considerată de către decidenții societății bazate pe dominație-supunere drept benefică/o condiție benefică pentru pasivitatea socială.

Se concurează cercetătorul popularizator cu cercetătorul strict specializat? Cine e mai cunoscut și cine e mai apreciat? (De cine? Aprecierea de către

¹⁵ Peter Bowler, *The Popularisation of Science*, 2015, <http://ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/crossroads/knowledge-spaces/peter-bowler-the-popularisation-of-science>.

¹⁶ David Quammen, “The Brilliant Plodder”, *New York Review of Books*, April 23, 2020 Issue.

structurile de putere – socotită de către cercetători ca determinantă¹⁷). Dar un mod de recunoaștere instituționalizată este caracterul public prin popularizare, deci autorii sunt interesați.

Dar obiectivele celor două tipuri de cercetători nu se concurează ci sunt complementare.

4. Context istoric

În secolul al XX-lea apar *politici* private și publice de *popularizare* a științei și tehnicii. Inițiativele răsfirate din secolele anterioare devin politici editoriale private (*serii de cărți* educative, implicit de popularizare a științei și tehnicii (H.G.Wells, Julian Huxley); *magazine* de știință și tehnică, după Primul Război Mondial; *rubrici* de știință și tehnică în ziare după al Doilea Război Mondial).

Politicile publice sunt mai puțin sau deloc lucrative, accesul în multe muzee și grădini botanice fiind gratuit sau extrem de ieftin. Politicile publice includ și programe de radio și TV destinate popularizării științei și tehnicii. Acum se structurează *imaginea publică* a savantului (Marie Curie) și savantul ca *popularizator și militant* (Einstein).

Odată cu IT, și *popularizarea științei și tehnicii devine/poate să devină* mai puternică. IT face informația din știință și tehnică ‘aproape absolut’ accesibilă publicului larg.

Dar nivelul cunoștințelor în știință și tehnică este asemănător nivelului cunoștințelor în umanioare¹⁸: superficial până la ignoranță. Ba mai mult, vechea separare umanioare-știință (blamată de C. P. Snow, *The Two Cultures*, 1959) e banală și azi (și în publicul larg). Dar popularizarea face posibil transferul lor reciproc în zestrea culturală a publicului larg¹⁹.

5. Publicul larg și informarea

Informarea a avut loc și prin educația formală/școală și prin aceea neformală. Specificul ultimei (în popularizarea științei): este *ad libitum* și

¹⁷ Lewis A. Coser, *Oameni ai ideilor. Perspectiva unui sociolog* (1965), Traducere, studiu introductiv și note de Camelia Crăciun, Iași, Editura Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, 2012, pp. 377-398.

¹⁸ Leah Fessler, Yale astrophysicist Priyamvada Natarajan on mansplaining: “It’s just too boring”, February 6, 2018, <https://qz.com/work/1176791/yale-astrophysicist-priyamvada-natarajan-wants-you-to-quit-the-mansplaining-its-just-too-boring/>.

¹⁹ Cheng Kai Ming, Leung Kai Fong (Eds.), p. 48.

reflectă caracterul *contextual* al interesului pentru o problemă sau alta / urgența (ca astăzi pandemia).

Dar *informarea/accesul la informație nu este decât un pas în cunoaștere*. (Nu strică să rememorăm definiția cunoașterii: capacitate de *înmagazinare* și *selecție* a informației, *interpretarea integrată* a informației, reprezentarea *coerentă* despre ansamblu, *spiritul critic*).

Iar dacă informarea are loc ca urmare a urgenței – cu atât mai mult (excludem aici din discuție controlul politic al informației, care distorsionează mai mult informarea și cunoașterea).

Așadar, cunoașterea are loc în primul rând prin educația formală/școală; aici „popularizarea” științei are loc prin construirea unor imagini *unitare, coerente, integrate* ale multitudinii fenomenelor studiate de diferite științe/discipline. Doar aceste imagini sunt *tipare* și *cadre* pentru *înțelegerea informațiilor noi* (inclusiv despre fenomene noi).

Or, *calitatea* educației formale a scăzut: situație vizibilă și la formatorii de opinie – ne amintim politicianul care s-a îngrijorat că „apa conține hidrogen” – și la populație²⁰, iar acest fapt *nu poate fi compensat de popularizarea informală*. De ex. dacă nivelul general de cunoaștere ar fi fost mai mare înainte de izbucnirea pandemiei și în timpul ei, comportamentul și politic și general ar fi fost diferit.

6. Tipuri de popularizare a științei și tehnicii

A. Informație despre *istoria* descoperirii fenomenului X

- *Descrierea teoriilor/teoriei* despre fenomenul X
- *În cadre sociale sau în afara* relației dintre cunoaștere și contextul social, în mod “neutru” (o simplă descriere și nu o povestire/ relevarea semnificațiilor²¹).
- Fenomene /teorii *vechi*
- Fenomene/teorii *noi*

B. Informație despre *structura, problema, problematica* din știință și tehnică

²⁰ Marc Landré, Une entreprise sur deux touchée par l'illettrisme et tout le monde (ou presque) s'en fout, Publié le 08/09/2017, <http://www.lefigaro.fr/conjoncture/2017/09/08/20002-20170908ARTFIG00256-une-entreprise-sur-deux-touchee-par-l-illettrisme-et-tout-le-monde-ou-presque-s-en-fout.php>.

²¹ Diferența dintre descriere și povestirea ce presupune relevarea semnificațiilor, la Georg Lukács, “Narrate or Describe”? (1936), in *Georg Lukács, Writer and Critic and other essays*, trans A. Kahn, London, Merlin Press, 1970, pp. 110-148.

- Legarea unei probleme din știință/tehnică de altele din aceeași sau diferite științe/tehnică
- Evidențierea unor *concepte noi* și a unei noi *logici* a fenomenului (o nouă *interpretare* a lor)
- Interpretări *holiste*
- Aplicarea în probleme *practice* (ex. igienă)
- Perspectivă *filosofică*

Ambiția lucrărilor de popularizare a științei și tehnicii este și de a propune idei și interpretări noi, și tocmai acest fapt dă valoarea lor. Cu alte cuvinte, lucrările de popularizare bune nu prezintă doar informații, ci sunt și *interpretări: coerente și interesante.* În acest sens, diferența dintre lucrări științifice și cele de popularizare este, la importante lucrări contemporane de popularizare, mai puțin clară.

Oricum, distanța dintre lucrările de specialitate și cele de popularizare este *istorică.* La începutul gândirii științifice – și chiar la începutul gândirii științifice moderne – ea nu a existat deloc. Apoi s-a dezvoltat limbajul de specialitate, odată cu formarea și consolidarea disciplinelor și cercetărilor.

Această dezvoltare nu a avut loc în același ritm: unele științe au putut să fie mai accesibile în sec. al XIX-lea (biologia, geografia, geologia) (ex. Darwin, Th. Huxley, E. Haeckel). În sec. al XX-lea a avut loc și apărarea „științei pure” (în fața aplicațiilor ei discutabile sau dăunătoare). După cum, în același sec. al XX-lea – au început sintezle (pornind de la un concept sintetic), implicând și propunerea unor concepte noi²².

Să dăm doar câteva exemple: May Somerville, *On the Connexion of the Physical Sciences*, 1834; din sec. al XIX-lea analiza lui James A. Secord, *Visions of Science: Books and readers at the dawn of the Victorian age*, Oxford University Press, 2014; din sec. Al XX-lea: Ray Lankester, “The Effacement of Nature by Man”, in *More Science from the Easy Chair* (1913), Lond., Methuen & Co., 1920, mai ales 259-264, 267-268, 270-272; J. B. S. Haldane, *Știința înaintea* (1944), București, Editura de Stat, 1949; Félix Le Dantec, *Science et conscience: Philosophie du XXe siècle* (1908), Paris, Flammarion, 1918; Einstein, *What I believe*, 1932²³; Lee Smolin, *The Trouble with Physics*:

²² De ex. Schrödinger, *Ce este viața* (1944) a propus conceptul de entropie negativă/ordine.

²³ Acest text și altele de accesibilitate populară au fost traduse în limba română ca Albert Einstein, *Cum văd eu lumea și Teoria relativității pe înțelesul tuturor*, Traducere de M. Flonta, I. Pârvu, D. Stoianovici, București, Humanitas, 2000.

The Rise of String Theory, the Fall of a Science, and What Comes Next, Boston, N.Y, Houghton Mifflin, 2006; dar și celelalte cărți ale lui, mai ales din 2003 și 2019; Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin, *The Dialectical Biologist*. Boston and London: Harvard University Press, 1987; cărțile lui Stephen Jay Gould, ale lui Stephen Hawking.

7. Popularizarea presupune cunoașterea subiectului de către popularizatori

Cunoașterea slabă la nivelul specializării popularizatorului duce la calitatea slabă a popularizării subiectului. (Exemplu: pandemia; mesajele contradictorii au fost determinate și de momentele de cunoaștere a infecției, a tratamentului, a profilaxiei. Dar popularizarea ca atare a fost foarte slabă (s-a mizat, poate, pe informarea individuală, spre deosebire de informarea de înalt nivel²⁴).

8. Ceea ce se popularizează, inclusiv în educația formală, este ideologic ales

/ Imaginea despre *istoria* unui fenomen – mai degrabă ideologic ales.

Ex. *popularizarea* artei plastice vechi (*școli*, în care temele sunt mai ales religioase, dar nu și excepțiile – barocul și chiar manierismul în general sunt excepții față de tradiția renesantistă religioasă – *individuale* (Giuseppe Archimboldo (opere 1563-1591); Giovanni Batista Braccelli, *Bizzarie di varie Figure*, 1624; Jacques Callot, 1633). De aici, trebuie să fim atenți la două probleme: *raportul continuitate-discontinuitate* și *excepția individuală*.

În exemplul pandemiei,

- *Imixtiunea ideologicului* (interese economice, politice) a fost/este mai mare decât în cazul alegerii temelor vizuale popularizate [*decretarea politică oficială a medicamentelor*, pro (Franța)/contra (Franța, Belgia, Italia), *semi-oficială* și pro și contra (SUA) (cazul cloroquina); *ridiculizarea medicamentelor naturale și ieftine* (cazul artemisia, contra sinteticului artemisinin); a

²⁴ Dr. Badia Benjelloun, Du toc dans les médocs. 3 mai 2020, <http://www.librairie-tropiques.fr/2020/05/du-toc-dans-les-medocs.html>; Dr. Badia Benjelloun, Immunité et vaccins, 11 mai 2020, <http://www.librairie-tropiques.fr/2020/05/immunité-et-vaccins.html>; Dr. Badia Benjelloun, Vacciner est-ce prévenir?, 8 déc. 2020, http://www.lapenseelibre.org/2020/12/n-209-vacciner-est-ce-prevenir.html?utm_source=ob_email&utm_medium=ob_notification&utm_campaign=ob_pushmail.

tratamentelor ajutătoare (cazul homeopatiei; *reducerea la o singură soluție* (cazul vaccinului)]. Or, homeo, medicina asiatică, plantele medicinale nu sunt ‘medicină alternativă’, dar și el și medicina alopată trebuie folosite potrivit intereselor pacientului, și nu potrivit perspectivelor ideologice.

- Rezultatul a fost creșterea neîncrederii în mesajele oficiale, inclusiv ale organelor științifice medicale.

- Dar imixtiunea ideologicului duce la întârzierea, uneori fatală, a îngrijirii medicale; la rata mai mare a suferințelor; la întârzierea fatală – și din cauza strategiei de organizare a îngrijirii spitalicească.

Nota de față nu se referă la forma comunicării dominante a pandemiei, ci la conținutul ei (și, desigur, la fenomenul global).

- Din punctul de vedere al *formei*: mesajele au generat ideile de *maximizare a confuziei* și de *minimizare a protecției și a sentimentului de a fi protejat social/de societate*. De asemenea, ele au dus la neîncrederea față de ele (mai ales la cele oficiale), la comportament repliat/individualist și, deoarece oamenii trebuie să aibă o motivație a comportamentului/ideilor lor, aliniere la mesajele cele mai individualiste și iraționale.

- Din punctul de vedere al *conținutului*: transpunerea de către mesaje a ideologiei dominante – având consecințele de mai sus – a fost menită să *ascundă*:

- *Nepregătirea sistemelor sanitare naționale, deși probabilitatea pandemiei a fost anunțată/avertizată de mulți ani (de aceea, primul obiectiv al strategiei politice a fost subordonarea lor la pandemie, neglijând complexitatea sarcinilor sistemelor sanitare);*

- *Nepregătirea managementului general (dovedită prin opoziția dintre strategia de continuare cu orice risc (adică fără implementarea consecventă a măsurilor de precauție, deoarece aceste măsuri costă sistemul privat) a economiei – în forma contradictorie actuală – și, pe de altă parte, strategia de precauție (carantinare, prevenire prin programe de creștere a imunității generale a populației);*

- *Folosirea pandemiei ca oportunitate pentru a introduce/pregăti măsuri economice restrictive;*

- *Folosirea pandemiei pentru a ascunde de public măsuri politice și juridice scandaloase;*

- *Ipocrizia politicii dominante: și izolarea și oprirea economiei au presupus continuarea muncii personalului din serviciile de îngrijire, alimentare, comerciale mari etc.*

- *Popularizarea științei în pandemie;*

De la ce nivel de cultură generală științifică am plecat:

- *familiaritate* cu concepte ?²⁵

- *familiaritate* cu măsuri de precauție/de igienă ? și semnificația lor²⁶?

Din acest punct de vedere este necesară analiza pe grupe de vârstă, înainte și în timpul pandemiei.

Care a fost nivelul cultural al mesajelor oficiale:

- Nu avertizare împotriva mysophobia, dar nici un fel de insistență pentru întărirea sistemului imunitar²⁷ (dimpotrivă, s-a pus falsă problemă dacă vitamina C/D ferește de virus sau vindecă; și evident că vitaminele nici nu feresc de contaminare și nici nu vindecă; dar întăresc sistemul imunitar);

- Nesiguranța cifrelor (în plus și în minus²⁸);

Reducerea la o singură soluție (vaccinul);

Sugestia că legile se respectă de frica amenzi.

²⁵ Microb/ virus și bacterie: virușii nu au metabolism și nu se reproduc; dar au proprietatea de a intra în celule-gazdă, iar acestea multiplică materialul genetic (sau ADN sau ARN) al virușilor; de asemenea, au proprietatea de a prelua componente ale celulei-gazdă pentru a crea noi învelișuri de proteine ale materialului genetic multiplicat; făcând posibil ca aceste copii de viruși să infecteze și alte celule; sunt organisme *semi-vii* (non-celulare, spre deosebire de bacterii), doar prin materialul genetic pe care îl conțin); prin distrugerea celulei-gazdă și prin infectarea a noi celule-gazdă, sunt parazite (inclusiv în bacterii) și provoacă boli sistemice, nu ale unui organ.

²⁶ Un exemplu este purtarea măștii. Este ea mereu în cunoștință de cauză (ce fel de măști pentru ce fel de microbi etc.) sau este dată doar de frica de amendă?

²⁷ În pofida unor studii ca Philip C. Calder, Anitra C. Carr, Adrian F. Gombart and Manfred Eggersdorfer, "Optimal Nutritional Status for a Well-Functioning Immune System Is an Important Factor to Protect against Viral Infections", *Nutrients*, 23 April 2020.

²⁸ Laura Tiernan, "Scientists set up independent committee to challenge UK government's COVID-19 response: 'there is no transparency'", 5 May 2020, <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2020/05/05/sage-m05.html>; Bryan Dyne, "Reports question undercounting of COVID-19 deaths in US and globally, 27 May 2020, <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2020/05/27/deat-m27.html>; Beware of studies claiming covid-19 death rates are smaller than expected, April 28, 2020, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/28/beware-studies-claiming-covid-19-death-rates-are-smaller-than-expected/>.

Nediscutarea *oficială* a tezei periculozității relative a virusului a dus la creșterea neîncrederii populației în teza oficială a pericolului maxim. Mai clar, nediscutarea *oficială* a *argumentelor* din teza periculozității minime a dus la zdruncinarea sau chiar lipsirea populației de perspectiva rațională asupra problemei.

Reflecțiile asupra pandemiei/a unui eveniment deja experimentat arată că:

- Pandemia poate fi și o oportunitate pentru a corecta deficiențele structurale semnalate în prezervarea sănătății populației.

Cauza corectării nu e epidemia/virusul, el doar revelează logica deficitară a sistemului.

- Problemele sistemului sanitar și ale prezervării sănătății populației nu pot fi rezolvate independent de schimbări societale deoarece toate aspectele societății sunt întreșesute.

- Problemele sistemului sanitar și ale prezervării sănătății populației nu se rezolvă printr-un singur factor (de ex. vaccinul anti-covid) deoarece există mereu mai multe cauze și, deci, mai mulți factori.

- În procesul de comunicare, explicarea negării (gravității) epidemiei, ca și a accentuării acestei gravități – implică explicarea intereselor economice și politice din spatele acestor două atitudini.

Cu alte cuvinte și fără să ne înecăm în relativism valoric, și popularizarea științei/a cunoașterii e pusă sub semnul întrebărilor:

- Cum se determină cunoașterea validă/ validitatea cunoștințelor?
- Ce se întâmplă dacă ceea ce e popularizat este eronat? Sau fals?
- Pandemia a pus și problema *condițiilor* de popularizare a *științei*
- Necesitatea *open science: open access* plus prevenirea monopolurilor asupra infrastructurii științifice²⁹.
- Și problema popularizării *cauzelor sociale* ale fenomenelor sociale.

(De ce cred oamenii teoriile „conspiraționiste”? Deoarece sunt plauzibile/au o anumită proporție de plauzibil; De ce reduc oamenii totul – așa cum sunt învățați și de teoriile „conspiraționiste” – la câțiva indivizi care...? Deoarece această reducere la persoane/evenimente individuale este mesajul principal al ideologiei dominante care a vrut să eludeze cu totul

²⁹ Claudio Aspesi and Amy Brand, “In pursuit of open science, open access is not enough”, AAAS, *Science*, 8 MAY 2020, VOL 368, ISSUE 6491, pp. 574-578.

logica socială). Să ne amintim definiția științei de către Aristotel: ea este cunoașterea cauzelor.

PARTEA A DOUA

9. Criteriile alegerii modelelor de popularizare Mircea Malița și Solomon Marcus

Cele de mai jos ilustrează una dintre calitățile cele mai importante ale popularizării științei și tehnicii: formularea de idei *noi* (legate de problemele popularizate, fie ele teorii vechi fie noi) și care se regăsesc, sau nu, în lucrările de specialitate: ale popularizatorilor și ale cercetătorilor din ramurile unde pot apărea. Caracterul de noutate nu trebuie să fie luat în sensul vulgar, de găselniță lucrativă – așa cum este redus acest caracter astăzi de către organizatorii științei și societății – sau chiar de apariție neașteptată după vreun asiduu proces de gândire. Noutatea este aici interpretarea inedită ca salt calitativ după acumularea faptelor și informațiilor despre ele.

Într-adevăr, cei doi autori, **Mircea Malița** și **Solomon Marcus**, discutați aici exclusiv ca popularizatori, sunt extrem de importanți în cultura română și făurirea unei civilizații românești înaintate, tocmai pentru că sunt promotori ai unor concepte, teorii și interpretări noi și interesante, benefice pentru cunoaștere.

Pentru a promova în lucrări de popularizare idei noi și a arăta drumuri la ele, autorii trebuie să aibă la bază o temeinică specializare și, în același timp, o largă deschidere spre spațiul cognitiv dincolo de aceasta. Acest spațiu cognitiv mai larg decât cel al specializării este factorul care stimulează interesul autorilor pentru a face popularizarea științei și tehnicii și, în același timp, permite oferte interesante și, într-o măsură însemnată, interpretări filosofice.

Concret: ambii autori au făcut o popularizare nu doar a unor concepte – inclusiv filosofice – și legături interesante și chiar inedite între diferite aspecte, ci au semnalat semnificațiile filosofice ale abordărilor, conceptelor și relațiilor.

Forma de prezentare a fost aceea a eseului. Permiteți-mi să citez dintr-un comentariu făcut cu prilejul discutării unei lucrări beletristice a unui mare

cercetător³⁰: „Dar ce sunt aceste lucrări? Sunt *eseuri* (chiar *Parabola...* este un astfel de roman-eseu). *Eseul* este, cum ne ajută etimologia cuvântului, o *încercare* asupra unui subiect, deci prevenind deja cititorul că este vorba cumva de o pseudo-lucrare așteptată: fie ea volum științific sau roman. Este rău că avem în fața noastră, ca lucrări de senectute ale lui Marcu Botzan, eseuri? Nicidecum. Constantin Noica observa că ‚nu faci eseuri de jos în sus, de la ignoranță spre cultură, ci de sus în jos, de la cultură spre joacă și grație, precum și spre cititorul mai puțin avizat’. Dacă se întâmplă invers, adică dacă se înlocuiește *ab initio* scrisul de specialitate cu eseul sau dacă se inundă câmpul de atenție al receptorului cu tot felul de notații trecătoare despre orice, atunci este vorba despre „talent fără răspundere” și despre „insuficientă cunoaștere”, adică despre „lăutărism”³¹.

Sau despre „foiletoane”, așa cum le-a descris Hermann Hesse³² sau mai târziu Carl Schorske³³.

Mai clar: deoarece ideile, oricât de interesante și inedite, din lucrările de popularizare sunt, pe de o parte, prezentate fără aparatul științific necesar unei lucrări de specialitate – bibliografia științifică a problemei/o bibliografie riguroasă și discutarea critică detaliată a argumentelor cu instrumentele științifice adecvate problemei – iar pe de altă parte, nu acuratețea științifică a demonstrației este urmărită (deși, desigur, nu există lucrare de popularizare bună fără o etalare logică a ideilor/argumentelor) ci legăturile inedite, atenția asupra unor aspecte noi, lucrările de

³⁰ Ana Bazac, „Marcu Botzan: parabola lui Marcus Aurelius și tratarea pământului”, *Studii și comunicări/DIS*, vol. VI, 1/2013, pp. 239-252.

³¹ Constantin Noica, „Modelul Cantemir în cultura noastră sau memoriu către Cel de Sus asupra situației spiritului în cele trei țări românești”, în *Despre lăutărism*, București, Humanitas, 2007, pp. 33, 35.

³² Hermann Hesse, *Jocul cu mărgelile de sticlă* (1943), Introducere, prefață și note de Ion Roman, București, Editura pentru Literatură Universală, 1969, pp. 14, 15 etc.: „'epoca foiletonistică'...o epocă într-o măsură deosebită 'burgheză' și favorabilă individualismului exacerbat... aceste foiletoane... informau sau mai curând 'flecăreau' despre mii de subiecte științifice...”.

³³ Carl E. Schorske, *Viena fin-de-siècle: politică și cultură* (1981), Traducere de Claudia Ioana Doroholschi și Ioana Ploesteanu, Iași, Polirom, 1998, pp. 8, 9: (p. 9) „Obiectul discursului își pierde supremația, importantă devenind reacția subiectivă a ziaristului sau a criticului în fața experienței descrise, tonul cu care sunt expuse emoțiile sale. Chiar modul de formulare a unei judecăți consta acum în evocarea unei stări de spirit...Lumea era concepută ca o succesiune accidentală de stimuli ai simțurilor, iar nu ca un spațiu al acțiunii. Foiletonistul reflecta astfel portretul cultural al propriului public căruia i se adresa...”

popularizare sunt considerate a fi exterioare bibliografiei științifice. Nimeni nu citează ideea din lucrarea de popularizare, ci numai pe aceea din lucrarea de specialitate.

Ca urmare, unele idei inedite din lucrările de popularizare nu există pentru cercetători: decât atunci când ele sunt/vor fi tratate într-o lucrare științifică. (Iar asta este o întârziere).

În același timp, eficiența informativă și formativă a lucrărilor de popularizare pentru publicul căruia le sunt destinate este determinată de trei aspecte: a) popularizarea acestor lucrări ca atare și accesibilitatea lor; b) nivelul lor științific; c) luarea în seamă de către specialiști în spațiul public³⁴, adică „atestarea” lor o dată mai mult.

Astăzi popularizarea beneficiază de IT, dar asta nu înseamnă că și cele trei aspecte de mai sus sunt corespunzătoare.

10. Mircea Malița

Mircea Malița a avut multe lucrări de popularizare, toate cu un nivel științific ridicat și în același timp cu mesaje filosofice extrem de fertile; adică generoase nu numai sub aspectul informației/ al ideilor noi, ci și sub aspect formativ: umanist. Preocuparea lui Mircea Malița pentru popularizare a fost atât de serioasă încât și-a asumat ca domeniu eseu.

Așa cum a fost anunțat în rezumatul prezentării în cadrul GCI, se arată doar elemente, întâi, din trilogia *Aurul cenușiu*³⁵. Volumele sunt atât de bogate în semnificații încât ele ar trebui să fie transpuse electronic și la îndemâna tuturor.

Volumul 1 (Dacia, 1971) se deschide cu evidențierea trăsăturilor Gândirii moderne (practică, globală, probabilistă, modelatoare, operatorie, pluridisciplinară, prospectivă, laică, optimistă, educabilă, economică). Chiar numai enumerarea ne arată interesul pentru metoda de a combina descrierile obiectiviste și referințele istorice la autorii care au ajuns la

³⁴ Desigur, și în afara spațiului public (de ex. dacă există recenzii de specialitate, în reviste de specialitate/de către specialiști).

³⁵ Pentru informații și despre alte cărți, Ana Bazac: „Mircea Malița, *Homo fraudens*”, București, Editura Rao, 2012”, *Noema*, XIII, 2014, pp. 387-396; „Mircea Malița, *Apa, focul și jocul. Metafora, o nouă filosofie a realului*, București, Editura Institutului de Științe Politice și Relații Internaționale, 2014”, *Noema*, XIV, 2015, pp. 423-431.

trăsăturile de mai sus și le-au creat ca teorii despre modul modern de gândire. Mesajul – întregii trilogii – este importanța fondatoare a științei/cunoașterii științifice pentru constituirea societății moderne. Gândirea modernă în știință/științele moderne în procesul creării și dezvoltării lor au conturat și întărit obișnuița de a *lega teoria de practică*, de a măsura *probabilitățile* în fenomenele studiate, deci în ultimă instanță *eficiența ideilor în practică*, de a cunoaște prin *modele* și critica lor, și ca urmare de a transpune modelele în practică/de a *opera*, de a *nu reduce/nu unilateraliza* ci de a privi fenomenele *din perspective științifice multiple*, de a privi lucrurile *în timp*³⁶ – care este „ireparabil” (p. 138) și totuși poate fi stăpânit *pentru om* dacă dezvoltarea este controlată, deci nu lăsată la voia întâmplării ci proactivă³⁷ –. Imaginea de mai sus este imaginea asupra științei: dar, spre deosebire de tradiția intelectuală de a privi disciplinele (știința) separat, izolat de societate, adică de a privi societatea separat de logica dezvoltării științei, Mircea Malița le-a legat. Gândirea științifică modernă este una laică și descrie omul ca educabil, practic/atent la economie și transformările ei, și astfel optimist. Optimismul este o problemă grea și față de care filosofii au fost mai mult decât rezervați. Mircea Malița a dedus optimismul din avântul științei și din încrederea în raționalismul științific: acesta se concretizează în corectare a practicii (prin studierea științifică a conducerii, prin reducerea „birocratismului” (p. 145)) și în constituirea civilizației³⁸ *umane* bazate pe „inteligenta mâinilor” (p. 162).

În **volumul II** (Dacia, 1972), în afară de unele dezvoltări ale unor teme din volumul I – făcute și cu instrumente din matematică – se avansează subiecte și abordări noi: toate, să nu uităm, legate de cunoaștere/mai corect, de cunoașterea științifică –. Primul subiect este legătura sau mai degrabă compararea creierului cu mașina, concret, calculatorul.

³⁶ Deci trans-matematic (deoarece matematica are o relație limitată cu timpul, timpul nu este un factor/o condiție nici a identității nici a schimbării în definirile matematice).

³⁷ Termenul „proactiv” este actual. Mircea Malița a vorbit de cercetarea viitorului și imaginarea viitorului în funcție de tendințele care există deja, mai puternic sau mai slab, în momentul când are loc cercetarea.

³⁸ Așa cum va fi descrisă ea în *Zece mii de culturi, o singură civilizație spre geomodernitatea secolului XXI*, București, Nemira, 1998: integrare civilizațională a lumii.

Comparația începe de la un model livresc de încetineală a gândirii și care – popularizarea bună nu ocolește niciodată sarcina de a transmite cititorilor legături între idei și, în același timp, autori – este didactic opus modelului lui Ralea, amânarea³⁹. Modelul didactic nu este, însă, real, mintea omului este formidabil de fructuoasă și rapidă. Ca urmare, în comparația creier mașină, câștigă creierul. (Tocmai invers față de toate mașinile care au imitat organele de simț, de prindere și de locomoție: aceste mașini sunt superioare organelor respective).

Dar, din simbioza în care sunt sortiți să trăiască și creierul și calculatorul, câștigă amândoi: creierul devine mai cunoscut, iar „calculatorul devine din ce în ce mai complicat, mai subtil, mai nuanțat” (p. 9).

Mașina proiectată de om este mereu economicoasă, sarcinile sunt defalcate și simplificate în așa fel încât să fie realizate cu un minim de materie și efort. Dar creierul, dimpotrivă, este „supra-redundant”, deoarece lucrează cu informația: altfel spus creează informație din și prin toate momentele de intrare, procesare și ieșire, deci de conexiune cu lumea, de experiență⁴⁰ a lumii. Și iată: „Un semnal ocupă minimum de loc într-o mașină de calcul și angajează un singur drum pe care-l parcurge în timpul cel mai scurt. În creier, semnalele răsună într-un număr uriaș de circuite...Obiectele, cuvintele, ideile nu au o corespondență univocă în creierul nostru, ci își găsesc mii și milioane de răspunsuri...Imprecizia aceasta este o garanție a regăsirii informației, o măsură de securitate împotriva accidentelor...Se învață în teoria informației că redundanța, repetiția, paralelismul sunt sursă de apărare împotriva pierderilor și erorilor⁴¹... mașina de calcul este strict deterministă. Creierul, nu. Numai rezultatul final, frumos așternut pe hârtie, oglindit în calcule și raționamente strânse, pare că respectă drumul de la cauză la efect și de la postulat la concluzie” (pp. 12, 13).

Din această comparație, rezultă necesitatea de a înțelege mai bine funcționarea creierului. Iar aspectul asupra căruia s-a oprit Mircea Malița a fost compoziția creierului, certificată de biologi, potrivit etapelor sale de evoluție. Mai clar, neocortexul, apărut cel mai târziu și responsabil de interpretarea intelectuală a lucrurilor, nu controlează cum trebuie instinctele și senzațiile emoționale. Exemplul concret dat de autor – care nu

³⁹ „Întârziem pentru a determina configurații și sensuri” (p. 8).

⁴⁰ Ne amintim că acum câțiva ani, tema sugerată de Mircea Malița pentru sesiunea de primăvară a DLMFS a fost Experiența.

⁴¹ AB: de fapt, acestea au și funcția de verificare reciprocă a informației și soluției.

a rămas la imagini abstracte despre tensiuni existențiale – este cel al războiului oamenilor împotriva oamenilor: cu totul deosebit de luptele celorlalte specii, doar pentru hrană. Or, oamenii au fabricat arme care le-au permis să ucidă din ce în ce mai departe de cei care mânuiau armele. Această îndepărtare de dușmani, deci lipsa contactului cu umanitatea celuilalt om, este ceea ce, a arătat Lorenz⁴², a anulat inhibiția instinctuală prezentă la celelalte animale care nu atacă semeni din aceeași specie.

Ce se poate face, a întreat Mircea Malița? Să consumăm medicamente inhibitorii? Ei bine, în afară de problemele de etică pe care le ridică prescrierea, acceptarea și refuzul, el a indicat, „cu anumită moderație și prudență” să folosim mai bine mijloacele „din familia limbajului și a modelelor raționale, care să cenzureze acțiunile greșite ale șopârlei și câinelui și să asigure prioritatea rațiunii”.

Mijloacele din familia limbajului și a modelelor raționale sunt cele care trebuie și să echilibreze *raporturile noi ale omului actual cu lumea*. În ce sens sunt noi? În primul rând, cei care creează produsele – care sunt din ce în ce mai complexe – ajung să le vadă prin intermediul „ecranelor”, adică al mijloacelor tehnice și organizatorice.

Întregul proces de creație este *specializat*, oamenii văd fragmentele, iar imaginea de ansamblu este dată, prin mijloacele tehnice, în urma educației științifice a creatorilor. Aceasta presupune a gândi prin modele/a vedea lucrurile prin intermediul imaginii modelelor: imaginația și gândirea abstractă – care îi poate face pe unii să ia drept real numai modelele – sunt *sine qua non* pentru omul actual; dar cer și conștiința concretului. Doar imaginea de ansamblu nu e suficientă: vezi și psihologia hobby-ului pentru meșterea a ceva concret (p. 22).

A nu vedea concretul înseamnă și a nu vedea natura: iar a o vedea înseamnă, tot cu ajutorul mijloacelor intelectuale (științe noi, perspective holiste) ocrotirea naturii⁴³.

Dar a nu vedea concretul nu înseamnă neapărat ceva rău: Mircea Malița a schițat imaginea optimistă a habitatului modern, orașul, în care emoțiile și relațiile directe din sat sunt înlocuite cu „emoția cerebrală”. Opus unei vechi idealizări a comunității organice (satul) față de relațiile impersonale și

⁴² Konrad Lorenz, *On Aggression* (1963), Translated by Marjorie Latzke, with a foreword by Sir Julian Huxley. London: Methuen, 1966, p. 208.

⁴³ Mircea Malița a atras atenția asupra ecologiei – care implică mereu și un aspect de organizare integrată (ekistică) și estetică – în pas cu preocupările mondiale (a amintit de Conferința de la Stockholm din 1972).

indirecte ale societății moderne mecanice⁴⁴, Mircea Malița a considerat, dimpotrivă, că satul a fost o sursă de emoții mai degrabă viscerale, iar modul în care oamenii pot depăși dezumanizarea modernă este, cu ajutorul culturii tehnice, deschis: „dar, în orice caz, pierderea unor etaje inferioare ale emoțiilor noastre nu este dezumanizare. Nu se pierde din esența umană prin intelectualizare” (p. 27).

Nici a depăși „bălăcirea” în *imediat*, în *acum*, nu este un lucru rău (p. 28). Chiar momentul prezent este mereu trecător, iar oamenii au interpus mereu – și o vor face la paroxism – între ei și acum modele mentale ale viitorului: prospectiunea, gândirea anticipatoare⁴⁵.

Ecranele sunt, deci, modele mentale ce mediază – ca și produsele modelării, organizarea și tehnica – raporturile omului cu lumea. Ele nu reduc, nu simplifică viitorul omului. Planificarea nu exclude spontaneitatea, nici limbajul precis, atât de necesar vieții moderne și creației științifice și tehnice, „cultivarea poeziei, a artei, a amicitiei și a iubirii”. Dar oamenii trebuie să stăpânească – adică să fie echipați cu instrumente de stăpânire a – ecranelor (p. 31).

Și iată cum poate programarea mașinii de calcul să ajute la ușurarea activității creierului. Sau poate doar experiența muncii intelectuale disciplinate a dus la programarea mașinii de calcul și, în același timp, la reflecția asupra activității creierului. Oricum, un concept comun și cercetării acestui aspect al creierului și programării – chiar dacă pare paradoxal – este cel de management. Adică algoritmizarea din programare este precedată de alocarea resurselor la obiective (pp. 37-8). În ceea ce privește creierul, managementul unui fragment de activitate presupune mereu precizarea obiectivelor:

- excluderea – pentru un anumit interval de timp – a subiectelor neavenite;
- atenția asupra documentării/punerii la curent/împrospătării;
- focalizarea asupra problemei principale/a interesului dominant (iar acestei focalizări îi corespunde o concentrare nervoasă mai mare, un efort mai mare, un timp mai îndelungat);

⁴⁴ Dar nu Tönnies a întreprins această idealizare.

⁴⁵ „Planurile cincinale îi deprind pe oameni cu gândirea anticipatoare...dacă nu sunt anticipate în planuri, inițiativele riscă să nu poată fi actualizate niciodată” (p. 28).

- alăturarea și a altor subiecte – fără de care focalizarea asupra subiectului principal este greu de făcut – dar, fiind subiecte cu grade diferite de relație cu subiectul dominant, li se alocă timp mai puțin (în diferite grade).

Modelul de management corespunde și cu schema unei vieți, dacă în viitor „nu este exclus ca un om să treacă prin aproximativ cinci slujbe, roluri sau funcțiuni”⁴⁶ (p. 41). Dincolo de acest model, se pune însă problema abordării conținutului cunoașterii, adică al cunoștințelor. Pe de o parte, acestea au crescut și cresc exponențial. Pe de altă parte, înmagazinarea lor de către tineri/de către populație în general devine practic imposibilă. Nu avem atunci de-a face aici cu un traseu prezumat de incompetență? Nu. Deoarece nu toate cunoștințele trebuie înmagazinate de oameni: masa lor este stocate electronic, este la îndemână. Dar asta înseamnă că trebuie să înțelegem ce cunoștințe asimilăm și ce cunoștințe socotim a fi doar informații aflate pe rafturi electronice ușor de căutat.

Cunoștințele pe care le asimilăm sunt „instrumentarul minimal cu care prelucrăm faptele de care avem nevoie” (p. 46), adică perspectiva *holistă a decelării și interpretării semnificațiilor*; iar la aceasta se ajunge prin procesele *obiective* din cunoașterea științifică: de unificare a disciplinelor în funcție de *obiective* – ceea ce astăzi se numește multidisciplinaritate și interdisciplinaritate – și de transgresare a *metodelor* dintr-o disciplină clasică până la preluarea lor de către studiile unificate și până la constituirea lor, în tendința de transdisciplinaritate; de dezvoltare a reprezentărilor abstracte *holiste și trans-sistemice* și de concretizarea lor în studiul diferitelor domenii

⁴⁶ Mircea Malița certifică această idee ca fiind prognoza profesiunilor viitoare. În *Ideologia germană* (Marx și Engels, 1846) se opune diviziunea muncii care – din motive tehnice și sociale – l-a determinat pe om să aibă aceeași profesiune toată viața (ne amintim și de Platon, *oikeiopragia*) la depășirea „legării individului de glia” unei singure ocupații pentru întreaga viață, nu în sensul transformării muncii eficiente prin competență și specializare în diletantism și superficialitate, ci în acela al alegerii și practicării domeniilor de activitate exclusiv potrivit dorinței individului. Dar munca urma să aibă un nivel înalt de intelectualitate: deoarece atât timp cât omul urma să o facă, munca urma să fie într-adevăr eficientă și plăcută, bazată pe medierea tehnică discutată apoi în celebrul capitol despre mașini din *Grundrisse* (1857). Nivelul înalt de intelectualitate a fost sugerat și de exemplul din carte: a fi critic de artă etc. presupune o mare pregătire („fiecare se poate perfecționa în orice ramură ar dori, societatea reglementează producția generală și tocmai prin aceasta îmi dă posibilitatea să...”, *Ideologia germană*, în Marx, Engels, *Opere*, vol. 3, București, Editura Politică, 1958, p. 33).

și subiecte⁴⁷; de prioritizare a explicației *funcționaliste* asupra morfologiei, adică de prioritizare a *relației* asupra elementelor componente/participante⁴⁸; de transpunere a acestui nivel de înțelegere a lucrurilor într-

⁴⁷ „Am văzut chiar un proiect – ne spune Mircea Malița în 1972 – conform căruia toți studenții, indiferent de specialitatea lor, de la științele umane, ale naturii și până la tehnică să studieze *teoria sistemelor*” (pp. 46-7) (subl. mea, AB).

⁴⁸ Trebuie, totuși, să nu uităm că relevarea și analiza elementelor – ca prioritate a cunoașterii – a reflectat procesul logic al cunoașterii: în care omul începe prin a distinge elementele din totul vag și caută să le precizeze specificul. Acest proces a fost caracteristic și științelor moderne în prima lor fază. Dar cunoașterea nu este reduționistă. Oamenii – și apoi științele moderne – au sesizat și rolul constitutiv al conexiunilor. Și științele moderne în înfiriparea lor și filosofia au subliniat importanța constitutivă a legăturilor. De exemplu, nici Newton nu a negat că spațiul există prin relațiile dintre corpuri, doar că acest spațiu era doar cel „relativ” al treburilor profane și măsurabile (cel absolut fiind containerul corpurilor), spre deosebire de Leibniz care a considerat că nici un spațiu nu e absolut ci este rezultatul raporturilor dintre corpuri; sau medicii enciclopediști Albrecht von Haller (1708–1777), Théophile de Bordeu (1722–1776) și Jean-Jacques Ménéuret de Chambaud (1733–1815) au avansat 2 teorii bazate în moduri diferite pe conceptul de relație: teoria *mecanismului*, în care între stimuli și organe erau relații cauzale materiale, și teoria *organismului*, în care acesta era și rezultatul proceselor din părțile sale componente dar și în care organismul ca sistem unitar explica funcțiile și viața diferitelor părți. (John Locke a anticipat și el teoria organismului, dacă nu uităm că, totuși, primul promotor al acestei teorii a fost Aristotel).

Nu am putea merge mai departe fără să amintim concepția lui Ernst Cassirer despre primordialitatea funcției asupra obiectului, deci al unității funcționale a acestuia (*Substance and Function & Einstein's Theory of Relativity Considered from the Epistemological Standpoint* (1910, 1921), Dover Publications Inc, 1953) și concepția lui Alfred North Whitehead despre prioritatea procesului, a relației asupra conceptului, esenței și identității (*Science and the Modern World* (1925) New York, The Free Press, 1967; *Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology* (1929), New York, The Free Press, 1978).

Ce arată acestea? Că în modernitate – și inclusiv în aceea mai recentă – a existat o inerție a popularizării/educării cunoștințelor față de tendințe fructuoase din știință și filosofie, o prioritizare a morfologiei și descrierii structurilor față de funcționalism și perspectiva integrată, holistă. Sau mai degrabă, o perspectivă de separare a acestora. De aici și dezarmarea oamenilor – și chiar a unor educatori – față de sarcina dată de realitate de a lua în seamă și analiza structurilor și integrarea lor holistă.

Poate ar trebui să relevăm și aspectul atitudinilor față de aceste două tipuri de abordare. „Se crede că cercetătorii sunt ultimii care ar avea nevoie de formule și opinii de-a gata. În nici un caz: ‘gândirea lor critică’ este de obicei limitată la serii înguste de fenomene, cicluri înguste de idei. Cauza constă în faptul că specializarea, inițial un simplu mijloc, a devenit treptat scopul, ‘datoria’ omului de știință. Din partea sa, publicul nu permite ca specialistul să iasă din cutia care i-a

o *schemă logică* ce este considerată mult mai importantă decât elementele asupra cărora se joacă; de sistematizare și sinteză – prin tot felul de „procedee mnemotehnice sugestive” ca schemele și organigramele – ce depășește „hectare de literatură descriptivă” (ibidem).

Dar nivelul la care s-a ajuns/se ajunge este mereu rezultatul evoluției cunoașterii: nu neapărat al acumulării cantitative de cunoștințe, cât al creării a noi perspective și concepte (p. 48). Astfel încât se poate vorbi nu de o copleșire fără soluție a oamenilor cu noi și noi informații/cunoștințe, ci de un nivel calitativ fructuos și eficient de discriminare și sistematizare a lor. De „legea cunoștințelor utile descrescânde” care permite creativitatea nu după un număr mare de ani de acumulare, ci foarte devreme (pp. 51-52).

Ca urmare, citându-l pe Sir Dainton⁴⁹ care i-a spus că „în toate științele suntem în mod progresiv ușurați de povara instanțelor singulare, de tirania particularului” (p. 53), Mircea Malița a insistat asupra sarcinilor pedagogiei contemporane – de a simplifica și sistematiza cunoștințele utile, dar nu aleatoriu, ci fiecare element nou trebuie să corespundă la cel puțin două elemente vechi de comprimat – în lumina principiului după care capacitatea generativă, fertilă (de cunoștințe) este mai mare pe măsura comprimării, selectării și sistematizării cunoștințelor (pp. 55-6).

Este extrem de importantă această legare a proceselor cognitive (și de management al cunoașterii) de practica pedagogică. Într-adevăr, dacă astăzi știm că adevărul nu rezultă neapărat din acumularea a cât mai multor informații (cazuri⁵⁰), că experiența este aceea care adevărește și dezmințe, în egală măsură trebuie să fim sensibili la reverberația practică a nivelurilor de cunoaștere, la apropierea teoriei de practică. Deși nu este obiectivul notațiilor de față, totuși trebuie să menționăm excepționala lucrare *Cronica anului 2000* (Editura Politică, 1969): în care se schițează tocmai tablourile societății viitoare din punctul de vedere al *tendențelor* din realitate și din *cunoașterea* lor. Astfel, toate aspectele vieții sociale (producția, locul și folosirea noilor tehnologii, controlul spațiului

fost alocată drept locuire. Și deseori nici specialistul nu vrea să o părăsească, ci chiar se mândrește cu îngustimea orizontului său”, Arnold Van Gennep, *La question d'Homère: les poèmes homériques, l'archéologie et la poésie populaire*, Paris, Mercure de France, 1909, p. 6.

⁴⁹ Frederick S. Dainton, *Science - salvation or damnation*, (Fawley Lecture), Southhampton, University of Southhampton, 1971.

⁵⁰ Émile Durkheim, *Les Règles De La Méthode Sociologique* (1894). 16e édition. Paris, Les Presses Universitaires de France, 1967, p. 77.

informațional, managementul general și al domeniilor, natura, resursele, tipurile de habitat, transporturile, relațiile de la „scara mică a istoriei” – decalajele, dezvoltarea, dezarmarea, diplomația, cooperarea –, treptele artificializării, sfera ideăției, munca și timpul liber, disciplina instituționalizată și morala) apar într-o schimbare care nu are nimic impus sau absurd, ci reflectă ineditul abordărilor noi permise de nivelul de sistematizare și reflecție *meta*. Sigur că totul apare în lumina optimismului științific și tehnologic (pp. 202-3): dar totul este deschis, iar unele concluzii ce apar grăbite nu sunt supărătoare.

Da, depărtarea de natură nu este o „prejudecată”, cum crede Mircea Malița, dar imediat natura este văzută prin prisma naturii omului: care nu este „stratul neguros al inconștientului, cu chemări biologice și cu ecouri ancestrale, ci în zona limpede a rațiunii” ce micșorează puterea exercitată de factorii naturali și de evenimentele naturale capricioase (p. 204). „Umanismul viitor”⁵¹ înseamnă „crearea de condiții de demnitate pentru

⁵¹ Conținutul conceptelor se schimbă, desigur. Dar ideea lui Heidegger (*Scrisoare despre umanism*, 1946) că asemenea concepte ca umanismul apar doar odată cu declinul gândirii (filosofice) originare – de a gândi *Ființa*, aceasta fiind umanitatea omului, adică esența sa – când umanitatea omului a fost gândită ca educație (la Roma), religios (ca separare de divin), renașcentist (ca opus barbariei gotice), iluminist sau comunist este nefundată. Deoarece el consideră că toate aceste forme istorice de concepere a termenului ar fi metafizice, bazate pe interpretarea *fiindului*, și nu pe chestionarea ‘adevărului Ființei în relație cu esența sa, gândirea’ (deci aceste forme istorice pleacă mereu de la *fiind*), el separă *Ființa* de *fiind* și consideră că trebuie să plecăm – dacă vrem să nu mai fim metafizici – de la *Ființă* (traduc: existența ca atare a omului, surprinsă de concept și dicolo de existența concretă). Sigur că, adaug eu, cercetarea realității concrete în formele permise de cunoaștere – specializarea din știință, focalizarea asupra individualului din artă – poate să ne facă să uităm, nu simplu spus misterul (vezi Blaga), ci existența ca atare, conceperea ei holistă și responsabilitatea noastră față de aceasta. Dar insistența numai pe uitarea *Ființei*, în același timp simplificând în mod ridicol *fiindul*, nu este altceva.

Umanismul nu este pentru Heidegger gândirea care pleacă de la existență, ci gândirea care pleacă de la *Ființă* gândind-o și, deci, folosind cuvinte. „Umanismul” nu ar ridica suficient de sus umanitatea din om. Dar de ce un cuvânt istoric, ca toate cuvintele, deci și ca acela de *Ființă*, nu poate să facă asta? Dacă totul pleacă de la conceptul de *Ființă*/ de la contemplarea de către om a existenței ca atare dar dincolo de existență, umanitatea din om este doar gândirea/exprimarea *Ființei*, și nu, insistă Heidegger, pentru ca omul să strălucească în civilizație și cultură. Dar *reducerea la conceptul – Ființă – din care se explică totul este tot metafizică*. Contemplarea de către om a *Ființei* este tot metafizică.

fiecare individ...cultura se transformă în bun public”, creat de toți (p. 205). „Binele public va sta mai sus de interesul individual, printr-o liberă și rațională alegere” (p. 215). Înseamnă predarea la ora de matematică a ‘dilemei prizonierului’ pentru ca să se înțeleagă paradoxul logic care a creat războaiele (p. 216). Înseamnă că transmiterea oricărui concept va fi însoțită de fișa statistică a răspândirii conceptului și de fișa sociologică, inerent istorică și socială, a conținutului său (p. 217). Înseamnă anularea caracterului prohibitiv al legii, rămânând doar cel normativ, realizat cu ajutorul aparatelor de calcul (p. 218), înseamnă toleranță unită cu precizie și claritate (p. 219). E vorba aici de utopie? Nicidecum: ci de un model posibil prin tendințe reale.

Volumul 3 (Dacia, 1973). Să reținem de aici o interesantă analiză a capacităților omului din punctul de vedere al limitelor lor. Dacă oamenii acceptă ușor limitele simțurilor, compensându-le cu instrumente, ei acceptă mai greu limitele judecăților lor. „bunul simț nu simte că trebuie să se prelungească prin aparatură” (p. 57). De aceea, o expoziție care să arate ceea ce există dincolo de judecata comună sugerează direcția corectivelor pentru a extinde mijloacele naturale de a judeca (p. 58). Expoziția descrie modelele și instrumentul lor matematic folosite pentru a vedea lumea

Heidegger a criticat aspru existențialismul (Sartre) deoarece nu a acceptat teza acestuia, că existența precede esența. Nu este, oare, o asemenea critică, o dovadă clară de metafizică? Oricum, textul *Scrisorii* doar pleacă de la critica umanismului, și apare ca un caiet de cuvinte (din teoria lui Heidegger) descifrate lingvistic și socotite a arunca o lumină asupra *Ființei* și a esenței umane și ca *Ființă* a prezenței (*Dasein*) și ca sugestie a *Ființei*.

De ce l-am amintit aici pe Heidegger? Deoarece el a întrebat dacă mai merită să folosim cuvântul umanism, care a acoperit acțiuni istorice. Dar și *Scrisoarea* este neîncheiată – formal, ea este, desigur – și *Sein un Zeit* este, cum e precizat și în *Scrisoare*, doar o pregătire a înțelegerii *Ființei*.

Noi putem să nu mai folosim termenul de umanism – care pleacă de la existența concretă a omului (ce presupune, desigur, gândire) – așa cum putem să nu folosim orice alt cuvânt. Dar oare, potrivit lui Heidegger, nu stă limba în luminișul *Ființei*? De ce cuvintele despre *fiindul* – inerent istoric și social, dar *Heidegger a ignorat absolut socialul* – ar fi neavenite, cele necesare fiind doar cele despre interpretarea metafizică, și doar palid existențialistă, a *Ființei*? Lăsând la o parte persiflarea, *Ființa* este ceea ce există, spune Heidegger, dincolo de *fiind*, adică dincolo de manifestările concrete. Trebuie, spune el, să deducem *fiindul* din *Ființă*, adică din destinul ei ce constă în ek-sistența sa extatică/în gândirea ei. Impresia că o asemenea rezolvare este metafizică și slabă este puternică.

Istoria umanismelor a fost asumată de Mircea Malița. De aceea a și spus el „umanismul viitor”.

micro („sub pragul inferior”); teoriile rezultate din observarea cu ajutorul instrumentelor pentru a vedea lumea mega („peste pragul superior”); teoriile capabile să surprindă mișcarea plecând de la clișeele fixe ale gândirii la paradoxurile eleate la formulele matematice ale lui Newton și Leibniz și la legile dialectice (Hegel, Marx) și analiza matematică: „minte singură, neajutată de conceptele rafinate de cultura generațiilor, este tot atât de slabă ca un om cu mâinile goale, fără unelte” (p. 69); logica clasică – ce a stat la baza definițiilor corecte din Logica de la Port Royal –, logica simbolică ce face ușoară succesiunea/alăturarea unor stări într-o situație complicată, adică ce a reconstruit prin calcul metodele logicii și a stat la baza mașinilor de calcul („matematizarea logicii a permis automatizarea unor operații mentale cu ajutorul mașinilor” (p. 74); modelele formale și simbolice, dialectica ce caută să depășească imobilismul (p. 75).

În sfârșit, omul este definit cu ajutorul conceptelor celor mai moderne:

- este organism *antientropic*, realizându-și ordinea/echilibrul/supraviețuirea – altfel spus, complexitatea, structurarea – prin reconstruirea lumii, adică prin deversarea dezordinii și simplificării în aceasta; dar procesul nu este numai triumf. Mircea Malița nu dorește să polemizeze cu perspectiva triumfalistă: de aceea, el spune că există școli de gândire care atrag atenția asupra impactului negentropic asupra naturii prin poluare, deșeuri și violență (p. 107); dar soluția sa, prin referința la savanți optimiști, este că acest impact negentropic nu este fatal;
- este o ființă *antialeatoare*; ca toate sistemele – de la cele din materia anorganică la cele vii – care sunt și antientropice și astfel opuse și legii hazardului; dar aceste caracteristici sunt în funcție de sisteme, deci de evoluția lor; după cum, caracterul antientropic nu se suprapune peste cel de aleator. Oricum, omul rezistă cel mai bine la fluctuațiile variabilelor din mediu și le și stăpânește, deoarece combină ordinea internă și complexitatea astfel încât nu este adaptat doar la un tip de variabile; și tocmai acest fapt permite și este realizat printr-o capacitate internă, mentală și fizică, aleatoare ce răspunde și transformă hazardul exterior în factori benefici; asta se realizează prin consum de energii mic, informaționale, transmițând semnale care sunt „explorări informaționale” (p. 114). Gândirea asupra condițiilor sale este o formă de luptă antialeatoare, cu atât mai mult cu ajutorul calculului probabilistic;
- subiect *autocinetic* (ce posedă o mișcare proprie). Asta înseamnă autonomia omului în mediu. Și inițierea ciberneticii a fost determinată de obiectivul de a transpune în tehnică autonomia din domeniul viu și, mai

ales din om. Ce înseamnă că omul este subiect autocinetic? În nici un caz – Mircea Malița a subliniat de multe ori – că individul ar fi autonom față de societate; ci că omul, așadar ca specie, „este subiectul⁵² și autorul principal al acestui proces de căutare veșnică a echilibrului în raport cu mediul înconjurător” (p. 118). Ideea este importantă în pedagogie – iar interesul permanent al lui Mircea Malița pentru complexitatea procesului transiterii, inițierii, învățării, desprinderii și originalității adică asimilării și transformării cunoștințelor arată o dată mai mult capacitatea sa de a transgresa mereu granițe de profesii și de a gândi umanismul în practică – și este, poate, ceea mai importantă. Deoarece educația trebuie să plece tocmai de la datul elevului ca subiect autocinetic, și educatorii trebuie doar să ajute la dezvoltarea acestui dat (pp. 120-1).

Caracterizările de mai sus sunt legate de autor de importanța ciberneticii și a perspective cibernetice asupra lumii. Ele sunt flash-uri proaspete față de vechile idei, desigur importante, despre autonomie și libertate. Poate că tot în sensul acesta de luminare din direcții noi a fost și dezvoltarea lui Sartre despre om ca ființă ce *alege* (mereu) și despre povara/responsabilitatea alegerii. Atitudinea negativă a lui Heidegger față de existențialismul lui Sartre se explică tocmai prin neplăcerea de a se confrunta cu ceea ce *neagă* prezumția că esența omului ar fi înțelegerea contemplativă a *Ființei* concepute ca dincolo de, deasupra și cumva exterioară existenței concrete (*fiind*); *grija* pe care Heidegger o definește, în ultimă instanță, ca preocupare pentru a nu depăși acea esență – singura care îl face pe om uman, a insistat Heidegger – arată o separare de, o rezervă totală față de faptul că alegerea presupune chestionarea a mai mult decât a *Ființei*, a mai mult decât a existenței abstracte: or, alegerea presupune chestionarea raporturilor dintre om și mediul său; doar aceste raporturi arată *ce și de ce* alege omul și *de ce* este dureroasă alegerea, la *ce fel de* umanitate pot duce alegerile sale⁵³.

11. Solomon Marcus

Articolele de popularizare ale lui **Solomon Marcus** au fost adunate în impresionantul volum *Paradigme universale*, ediție integrală, Pitești, Paralela

⁵² Adică *inițiatorul* mișcării/actului/activității.

⁵³ Perspectiva lui Sartre este dinamică și dialectică, sensibilă la contradicțiile ce marchează coexistența identității ordonatoare și a schimbării. Perspectiva lui Heidegger, deși el a raportat *Ființa* la timp, este statică, chiar coexistența identității și schimbării este subordonată identității/căutării *Ființei*.

45, 2011. Este vorba de volumele cu același titlu din 2005, 2006, 2007, 2010 (2 vol., în care al doilea, deci *Paradigme universale*, V, reia un alt volum din 2005, *Întâlnirea extremelor*, apoi cartea *Arta și știința*, 1986, plus câteva capitole noi).

Paradigmele sunt, cum se știe, concepte fondatoare pentru diferite direcții de cercetare. Paradigmele luminează aceste direcții și, așa cum sunt toate conceptele, sunt *teorii* – de data aceasta legitimând un ansamblu larg de preocupări pentru înțelegerea lucrurilor ce se așteaptă să justifice, la rândul lor, adică să adeverească paradigma aleasă în acel moment istoric de către cercetătorii din domeniul în care are loc direcția de cercetare respectivă.

Se pleacă de la paradigme? Nu, ci ele se analizează din punctul de vedere al importanței lor fondatoare în diferite, multe domenii, adică „pentru a ne apropia de o înțelegere a unității lumii și cunoașterii, pentru a descoperi numitorul comun al unor fapte și fenomene care altfel pot să pară copleșite de specificitatea lor și, de aceea, imposibil de cuprins”⁵⁴ (p. 5). Paradigmele se relevă.

Așadar, deși niște concepte sunt cele care determină observații despre lucruri, nu avem de-a face nici aici cu metafizica – reducerea lumii la concept și deducerea ei din concept, adică urmărirea și discutarea primelor principii⁵⁵ ca nivelul cel mai înalt de cunoaștere – ci cu o cercetare generoasă a legăturilor și unghiurilor sub care putem să vedem lumea.

⁵⁴ Și continuă: „Lumea este complicată la prima vedere, dar ea are ordinea ei ascunsă, care ne provoacă s-o descoperim, acesta fiind *jocul cel mare*, căruia îi sunt dedicate deopotrivă arta și știința” (p. 5).

⁵⁵ Formal, ultimele două cuvinte sunt un pleonasm, dar am dorit să explic rapid că, dacă pentru filosofia de început această căutare a primelor cauze/forțe/mecanisme/procese/principii era firească – și dacă urmărirea cauzelor/forțelor etc. pentru a explica lumea este normală și pentru filosofie și pentru știință, deducerea lumii din aceste prime principii și reducerea lumii la cuvintele ce le semnalează este un joc, astăzi cel puțin destul de nesincer. Adică filosofia nu poate să rămână la acest joc. Lumea nu poate fi confundată cu teoriile despre ea. Deși, desigur, o cunoaștem numai prin intermediul prelucrării sale *in mente*, trebuie să chestionăm teoriile: iar asta înseamnă mai mult decât a rămâne la circularitatea vagă ce ar aparține doar filosofiei (întrebare/căutare-găsire-căutare) descrisă de Noica (*Trei introduceri la devenirea întru ființă*, București, Univers, 1984, pp. 60-1). Cu atât mai mult cu cât, cel puțin în viziunea contemporană, există și în știință circularitatea întrebare-soluție-reîntoarcere la întrebare (sau punct de plecare-soluție- reîntoarcere la punctul de plecare). La Heidegger avem mereu doar momentul să întrebăm premisele. Dar nu avem și momentul întrebării consecințelor: deoarece acestea se află în *fiind*.

De aceea, lista – extrem de consistentă a – paradigmatelor cuprinde nu doar conceptele cheie atât de cunoscute (înțelegere, informație, comunicare, calculatorul, invenția, descoperirea, știința, simbolul, limbajul, imprecizia, ordinea și haosul, entropia, paradoxul, modelul și metafora, aproximația, identitatea și alteritatea, discretul și continuul, sistemul, timpul, cauzalitatea, simetria și asimetria, complexitatea, semnul, realitatea și ficțiunea, literatura, arta, logica, vizibilul și inteligibilul, microscopicul, cosmicul și cuanticul, obiectivul și subiectivul, generalul și singularul, natura și cultura, naturalul și artificialul, creația) cât și altele, desigur cunoscute dar relevate ca diferențe specifice în modurile de a concepe lumea: liniaritatea și circularitatea, perechile conjugate, structurile autopoietice, explicabilul și inefabilul, autoreferința, transparența și opacitatea, tranzitivul și reflexivul, paradigmaticul și sintagmaticul, conceptualul și contextualul, denotația și conotația, ambiguitatea, stereotipia, omonimia și sinonimia, globalizarea, liricul și narativul, transdisciplinaritatea, parodia, traducerea, personajul). La acestea – care sunt doar o selecție *ad hoc* din mult mai multe – se adaugă matematica și conceptele ei – fractalul, axioma, teorema, euclidianul, neeuclidianul, logaritmicul, exponențialul, infinitul, greșeala, combinatoricul – sau indicatorii, binaritatea și ternaritatea; ca și unele concepte ce nu sunt ideologizate⁵⁶, adică nu sunt exceptate de la tratamentul istoric și logic evident la concepte mai „neutre” (indiferent de concluziile concrete ale autorului): știința și religia, stânga și dreapta. Acestea sunt analizate din punctul de vedere al teoriilor despre ele și, deci, și din punctul de vedere al semnificațiilor indirecte despre obiectul lor.

Din cele de mai sus rezultă că paradigmele sunt multidirecționale, adică ele apar în analiza multor probleme, după cum mulți termeni construiți în discipline diferite și pentru probleme diferite au un clar „potențial paradigmatic universal” (p. 6). Solomon Marcus și-a declarat entuziast fascinația față de un „spectacol de idei care ne dezvăluie aspecte pe care cunoașterea disciplinară le ascunde” (ibidem), adică față de zborul liber al gândirii între artă și știință, sau mai restrictiv, între literatură și matematică (p. 5).

⁵⁶ Aproape toate conceptele reflectă, mai direct sau mai mediat, poziții ideologice. Caracterizarea de mai sus se referă la exprimarea clară a opțiunilor ideologice de către un autor sau altul.

Fiecare problemă, pusă sub semnul unei paradigme – dar, cum a apărut mai sus, paradigmele se repetă deoarece acoperă unghiuri noi de vedere – este descoperită prin unirea unor idei venite din domenii diferite sau ca urmare a unor preocupări chiar cu totul diferite. Ele sunt relevate și dintr-o bibliografie foarte la zi și din istoria fenomenului sau a teoriilor despre fenomen. Inteligența – capacitatea de a face legături – apare, încă o dată, ca atenționând asupra elementelor, a conținuturilor între care se fac legături.

Cartea de 1103 pagini, scrise pe două coloane, prevăzută și cu un index de nume, este atât de interesantă și densă încât fiecare cercetător, inginer și, inerent, fiecare om care poate citi în limba română ar trebui să o aibă la îndemână.

În ce mă privește, eu propun din nou, cu cea mai mare seriozitate, ca și acest volum să existe și on line.

Din numărul imens de probleme, am ales două.

Prima este aceea a evoluției modurilor de abordare din medicină potrivit cu schimbarea paradigelor.

Paradigmele sunt coerente cu experiența și se schimbă odată cu ele. Dar în practică – și aici, concret, în practica medicală – deoarece experiența include nu doar fenomene, tratate prin/integrate în raționamente inductive (medicii învață din cazurile anterioare/transmise), ci și paradigma prin care oamenii „văd”, există o inerție a modului cum apare experiența, adică realitatea. Modelele dominante în medicină – Solomon Marcus a luat modelul modern molecular – dar și paradigma liniarității în evoluție și a fragmentarității sistemului întreg în părți (deci a sistemului ca sumă a părților analizate) potrivit aceluiași modele dominante nu sunt suficiente. Autorul vorbește despre influența conștiinței asupra sănătății corpului/întregului, despre necesitatea depășirii viziunii mecaniciste asupra sănătății și corpului-mașină.

Ce înseamnă această depășire? Că sănătatea nu depinde numai de funcționarea organelor – ce trebuie înțelese până la nivel molecular – ci de ansamblul interacțiunilor omului cu mediul. Mediul însuși nu e un spațiu neutru în care individul schimbă neutru materie, energie și informație, ci este rezultatul interacțiunilor complexe, imediate și larg mediate, ale tuturor ființelor vii (și nu numai). De aceea, identitatea/unitatea materială a corpului uman este realizată prin schimbările și conexiunile din întregul mediu.

Astfel, pe de o parte, apare – paradigma nouă – că boala nu este doar o dereglare mecanică/indusă de factori externi ce acționează, în fond,

„mecanic”⁵⁷, ci este rezultatul conexiunilor îndelungate și compuse ale organismului uman în mediu: „devine, astfel, mai importantă strategia omului sănătos decât aceea a omului bolnav, deoarece în special când se află în stare de sănătate omul își sabotează, uneori conștient, capacitatea de a face față la perturbări” (p. 746). Iar pe de altă parte (paradigma nouă-veche), există factori psihici – la rândul lor *reflectând relațiile omului cu mediul* și nu simpla „gândire pozitivă” în care individul e sfătuit să intre în pofida a tot de care „trebuie să facă abstracție” – care determină sănătatea: referindu-se la un raport din statul Massachussets, Solomon Marcus informează că „supraviețuirea unui bolnav de ateroscleroză cardiacă este determinată în primul rând de satisfacția profesională și de starea de mulțumire în viață” (p. 743)⁵⁸.

⁵⁷ Nu discutăm aici nivelul chimic/biochimic de acțiune a unor elemente externe ce intră/perturbă funcționarea biochimică internă, ci faptul că raportul organism – factorul extern este mecanic, adică fiecare dintre cele două elemente este exterior celuilalt. (Și, ca să zâmbim, chiar coronavirusul actual se prinde, prin protuberanțele sale, de celulă).

⁵⁸ Schimbările în paradigmele din medicină au fost sesizate; vezi doar: James Witchalls, „What is health?”. In *Philosophy and Medicine*. Volume I, Edited by K. J. Boudouris, Athens: International Center for Greek Philosophy and Culture, 1998, pp. 267-273; Richard A. Miech, et al., „Low Socioeconomic Status and Mental Disorders: A Longitudinal Study of Selection and Causation during Young Adulthood”, *AJS*. Volume 104, Number 4, January 1999, pp. 1096–1131; Johannes Bircher, „Towards a dynamic definition of health and disease”, *Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy*. 8, 2005, DOI 10.1007/s11019-005-0538-y, pp. 335-341; Christopher G. Hudson, „Socioeconomic Status and Mental Illness: Tests of the Social Causation and Selection Hypotheses”, *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*. Vol. 75, No. 1, 2005, pp. 3-18; Yun-Mi Song, et al. „Socioeconomic Status and Cardiovascular Disease Among Men: The Korean National Health Service Prospective Cohort Study”, *Am. J. Public Health*, 96 (1), 2006 January, pp. 152–159, doi: [10.2105/AJPH.2005.061853](https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2005.061853); Machteld Huber et al. „How should we define health?”, *BMJ*, 2011, 343:d4163; Danny Dorling, *Unequal health: The Scandal of Our Times*. Foreword by S. V. Subramanian. Bristol: University of Bristol, The Policy Press, 2013; Manos Matsaganis & Chrysa Leventi, „The Distributional Impact of Austerity and the Recession in Southern Europe”, *South European Society and Politics*. Volume 19. Issue 3, 2014, pp. 393-412, DOI:10.1080/13608746.2014.947700; David Cooper, W.D. McCausland & Ioannis Theodossiou, „Is unemployment and low income harmful to health? Evidence from Britain”, *Review of Social Economy*. Volume 73, Issue 1, 2015, pp. 34-60, DOI: 10.1080/00346764.2014.986969; James E. Bennett, et al., „The future of life expectancy and life expectancy inequalities in England and Wales: Bayesian spatiotemporal forecasting”, *The Lancet*, 2015, DOI: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(15\)60296-3](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(15)60296-3); Arline T. Geronimus et al., „Race-Ethnicity, Poverty, Urban Stressors, and Telomere Length in a Detroit Community-

A doua problemă aleasă este legătura ce i-a apărut lui Solomon Marcus între arta modernă și știința modernă: trecerea centrului de greutate de la elementele structurilor la câmpuri, ansambluri de relații precizate numai printr-un număr care explică specificul lor drept cantități și care are valori în fiecare punct din aceste ansambluri.

„De la poezia clasică, tributară unei retorici exterioare, reprezentate de figuri locale, metaforice sau metonimice, la poezia de sugestie, promovată de Mallarmé, și la evoluția ei ulterioară, drumul este asemănător celui urmat de fizică, prin deplasarea atenției de la particulă la câmp, de la individual la global...Particulele nu pot fi studiate și înțelese izolat, dar devin inteligibile sub formă de cuante ale câmpurilor” (p. 847). În alți termeni, ceea ce este comun științei moderne și artei moderne este, între altele – precizează Solomon Marcus – , că „entitățile de bază devin mai degrabă sintactice decât referențiale. Această evoluție poate fi urmărită în întreaga dezvoltare a ideilor și metodelor structuraliste și, apoi, sistemice. Drept consecință, o altă trăsătură comună importantă: deplasarea atenției de la stare la proces. Teoria cuantică a câmpurilor este o expresie perfectă a noilor stări de lucruri din știință. Există particule care nu pot fi văzute cu nici un instrument, dar matematica mecanicii cuantice dă un sens ansamblului fenomenului” (ibidem).

Un exemplu că ceva similar are loc și în arta modernă este poezia lui Bacovia: „în universul bacovian, participăm la generarea unor câmpuri poetice, prin acțiunea de propagare pe care o dezvoltă anumite elemente.

Natura acestor elemente este indiferentă. Ea trebuie, cel puțin dintr-un punct de vedere, să se asocieze cu vagul, cu imprecisul, cu nedeterminatul. Și aici analogia dintre știință și artă funcționează. Orice tentativă de a determina o mărime caracteristică a unui sistem, la scară atomică, are drept consecință perturbarea, de o manieră care nu poate fi determinată sau prevăzută, a altor parametri care ar putea caracteriza sistemul respectiv (rezultatele lui Heisemberg și Bohr), cu alte cuvinte, introducerea unor

based Sample”, *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, 2015, pp. 1-26, DOI: 10.1177/002214651558210.

În ce mă privește, am discutat aceste probleme în: “Epistemology of Empirical Research: The Case of the Consequences of the Romanian neo-liberal ‘Healthcare’ Law”, *Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe*, Volume 26, 2018, , pp. 225-245; “What is natural and what is un-natural in cancer? ”, *Biocosmology – neo-Aristotelism*, Volume 8, Numbers 3&4, Summer/Autumn 2018, pp. 391-420, DOI: 10.24411/2225-1820-2018-00020.

elemente de imprecizie, de nedeterminare în comportamentul sistemului...(Toate acestea) apar în poezia lui Bacovia: o anumită entitate difuză, imprecisă este înzestrată cu o capacitate de expansiune, de propagare, generând un adevărat câmp de forțe cu tendințe acaparatoare” (pp. 847-48). În acest fel, la Bacovia se observă „expansiunea unităților difuze”, „propagarea ca simptom al unei obsesii”, „recurența plânsului și a râsului-plâns”.

Câmpul este, aș adăuga, mai convingător decât elementele: și nu doar în poezie. De aceea, totul este să ne aplecăm *meta* – inclusiv istoric – asupra adevărilor relevate de creații convingătoare.

12. În loc de concluzii

Atunci când se discută despre popularizare și, aici, despre popularizarea întreprinsă de Mircea Malița și Solomon Marcus, o problemă teoretică este comparația cu *falsa popularizare*, promovare a unei logici false din punctul de vedere al formei și reduționiste din punctul de vedere al conținutului. Un exemplu al acestei false popularizări este o mare parte a vastei literaturi/comunicări politologice de 30 de ani cel puțin.

De asemenea, ar fi interesant ca să se aducă exemple de popularizare/creație din diferite domenii: numai specialiștii din aceste domenii pot să le furnizeze.

În sfârșit, notațiile de față, cât de seci posibil, îndeamnă la noi/alte observații despre lucrările celor doi matematicieni care ilustrează aici nivelul înalt al popularizării în România.

O altă problemă teoretică este, și nu legată de lucrările autorilor discutați aici, că se pot populariza și idei discutabile, adică dovedite apoi a fi greșite. Exact așa cum cercetarea poate avansa idei care se dovedesc mai târziu neadevărate. Ideile transmise – în lucrări de specialitate sau în cele de popularizare – pot reflecta, pur și simplu, nivelul cunoașterii dintr-un anumit moment, nivelul informării (la care au avut acces, sau nu, autorii), poziția față de paradigma asumată sau chiar motivații extra-științifice. Există în transmiterea ideilor și aspectul conștientizării poziției sau ignorării paradigmei și aspectul sincerității și aspectul disimulării. De aceea, o dovadă a validității științifice a unei lucrări este și trecerea critică în revistă a pozițiilor, asumate sau nu și de autori, chiar autocritica autorilor.

De aceea, analiza unor lucrări – ca aceea de față, inerent superficială – nu poate fi niciodată un panegiric. Și atunci ceea ce ferește analizele de aliniere obedientă este cercetarea istorică și critică a tezelor din lucrări.

Din cele de mai sus vedem o *împletire a științei și tehnicii cu filosofia*. Este dovada celei mai înalte competențe: deoarece numai dacă cercetătorul specializat și inginerul reflectează asupra domeniilor lor – și, cu necesitate, asupra conexiunilor acestora cu alte domenii și cu *telos*-ul lor – depășesc ei pricepera *tehnică*⁵⁹, specializarea îngustă, deprinderile rutiniere ale unui *know how* țintit.

Teoretic – și lăsând la o parte istoria cunoașterii în care filosofia a fost anterioară științelor specializate – împletirea are loc, și trebuie să fie, și înainte de formarea de specialitate și după aceasta. Cercetătorul și inginerul nu „fac filosofie” la bătrânețe, după ce și-au încheiat desfășurarea practică a cunoașterii lor tehnice. Gândirea *meta* este fructuoasă – adică dă aripi cunoașterii și practicii tehnice a cercetătorului și inginerului – dacă le însoțește mereu. De asemenea, formarea cercetătorului și inginerului este eficientă dacă ea implică nu doar educația și practica tehnică: deoarece numai filosofia dă imaginea unui orizont care presupune și disciplina obiectivelor și lărgimea spațiului în care această disciplină este bună.

Discuția despre popularizarea cunoștințelor științifice – iar aici putem considera și cunoștințele filosofice și artistice – ne pune în fața întrebării despre rostul popularizării, dincolo de nevoia de public mai larg a autorilor. Ce se popularizează, din moment ce gradul de competență al publicului este mai redus decât cel al autorilor? La ce servește literatura de popularizare? Aristotel a semnalat răspunsul, formulat aici în termeni moderni. Oamenii s-au pregătit pentru a înțelege – a pricepe – *ce* este un lucru/sistem și *de ce* este el așa cum este și, desigur, *cum* este, deci *cum pot ei să fabrice* sistemul dorit. Dar înțelegerea cauzelor materiale, formale și eficiente vizează cunoașterea *internă* a sistemului/ *în sistem*, iar aici reflecția *meta*, selectivă și interpretativă, poate da o imagine veridică – fără a da demonstrațiile legate de aceste cunoștințe în sistem – despre sistemul ca atare. Totuși, în urma popularizării, nimeni nu devine competent *în sistem/domeniu*: pentru a avea această competență, el trebuie să se

⁵⁹ În sensul de competență în domeniul strict.

pregătească să înțeleagă demonstrațiile și elementele care nu au apărut/nu suficient în reflecția *meta* popularizată.

În limbaj modern cunoașterea *internă/în sistem* se numește *tehnică*. Oamenii au competențe tehnice în funcție de pregătirea lor *în sistem*. Dar cunoașterea este interesată mereu de și răspunde și la legătura dintre sistem și alte sisteme/lume: iar cea mai generală și mai importantă legătură este aceea cu omul. Această legare a lucrurilor l-a determinat pe Aristotel să pună și a patra întrebare/explicație a lucrurilor, *scopul/telos-ul/rostul* lor. Iar înțelegerea rostului este posibilă și de către non experți în domeniile respective. Dacă ei cunosc principiile generale ale funcționării și existenței sistemului prin popularizare – să nu uităm, popularizarea este educație și începe cu aceea formală – este cu atât mai bine. Dar ei pot cunoaște legătura sistemului cu lumea, deci pot avea o înțelegere competentă *din afara sistemului*. De exemplu, noi nu cunoaștem tehnic procesul de „altoire” în celula umană a secvențelor de ADN de la șoarece, dar putem să întrebăm care este rostul acestei fabricări, la ce folosește oamenilor. Tehnic, oamenii cunosc și fabrică orice; dar nu orice pot fabrica trebuie să se și facă. Întrebarea de mai sus nu sugerează deloc refuzul tehnicii de altoire, ci doar necesitatea ca oamenii să pună și întrebarea privind *telos-ul*. (De ex. dacă se introduce ADN din genele unei celule dentare a aligatorului – care își reînnoiește dinții – în celule stem ale șoarecelui, folosite pentru a-i reînnoi dinții, putem vedea rostul „altoirii” de mai sus în celule stem umane, nu?).

Pentru a privi competent *din afara sistemului* este necesară, în afară de o imagine *coerentă* despre mecanismul intern al sistemului, dată de o educație/popularizare bună, și o *educație/popularizare a întrebării telice*, adică o *educație/popularizare a interdependențelor multiple ale sistemelor și a finalităților acestor interdependențe*. Este interesant și semnificativ că Aristotel a dat exemple pentru întrebarea sau explicația scopului final/*telos-ului* nu din lumea anorganică, nici măcar din lumea vie, ci din lumea omului, adică din raporturile dintre intențiile de cunoaștere și fabricare și, pe de altă parte, rezultatele cunoașterii și fabricării⁶⁰. (Continuându-l pe Aristotel care

⁶⁰ „În al patrulea rând, cauza mai înseamnă și scop, adică ținta în vederea căreia se face un lucru, cum, de pildă, sănătatea e cauza plimbării... ca să își păstreze sănătatea”, *Metafizica*, Traducere de Șt. Bezdechi, Studiu introductiv și note de Dan Bădărău, București, Editura Academiei RPR, 1965, V, 2, 1013a, p. 161.

Prin faptul că Aristotel a arătat că explicația ultimă a lucrurilor nu e componența, nici funcționalitatea lor, ci „ceea ce se întâmplă în vederea a ceva are tendința de a fi scopul și cel mai mare bine pentru celelalte lucruri” (ibidem, 1013b,

a dat exemple didactice *în sistem*, nu e vorba de raportul dintre intenții și rezultate: deoarece unii pot considera acest raport rupt de consecințele cunoașterii și fabricării *dincolo de sistem*; exemplele, de la cele din psihologie, în care un nebun ucide potrivit intenției sale, explicate în cadrul său mental, până la decizia politică de a bombarda o populație pentru ca aceasta să se răscoale împotriva conducătorilor săi, arată că *niciodată nu este suficientă explicația în sistem*. Greșeala sistematică din întregul proces de educație de 30 de ani este tocmai aceea de a rupe cunoașterea despre sisteme/fragmente de perspectiva integrativă asupra lor. În acest fel, educația este copleșită de informații fragmentare care nu pot fi legate într-un mod coerent și ale căror semnificații nici nu sunt valorizate: mesajul tuturor instituțiilor formative de conștiință este disprețul față de cunoașterea temeinică ce se unește cu relativismul valoric. Dar această situație a cunoașterii este rezultatul deciziei politice).

Istoria contemporană a cunoașterii arată că oamenii au devenit conștienți de multe și competenți în a *judeca* – nu de a reduce la succesiuni/silogisme imediate și înguste, ci de a evalua ansamblul cauzelor și consecințelor acțiunilor și faptelor, adică de a *gândi* larg și profund. Iar dacă puterea de gândire a unora a fost și este împuștinată, vina este a acelor care i-au oprit să dezvolte această diferență specifică umană. Și tot istoria contemporană arată creșterea inimaginabilă înainte a competențelor tehnice ale majorității: nu doar experții aleși au aceste competențe. Și tocmai această creștere generală și a competenței tehnice și a celeia telice⁶¹ permite o abordare nouă a organizării sociale.

Dar popularizarea atrage atenția asupra inferenței false – determinate, desigur, de cauze istorice și sociale – a incompetenței telice din incompetența tehnică.

p. 163), el a sugerat nu doar că scopul/rostul este o explicație strict umană, ci și că în lumea anorganică „binele” este, pur și simplu, potrivirea dintre așezarea și combinarea forțelor și elementelor (deci „binele” este, pur și simplu, o traducere antropomorfizată a existenței ca atare), în timp ce în lumea vie a plantelor și animalelor, peste această existență se constituie și *conatus*-ul, adică – așa cum spuneau Spinoza și Leibniz – dorința de a persista, persistența fiind binele. La oameni, peste aceste două tipuri de „bine” se constituie intenția conștientizată și valorizată nu doar de a persista, nici măcar de a persista bine/în fericire, ci de a construi, a fabrica lumea, material și spiritual.

⁶¹ Competența în a gândi *telos*-ul lucrurilor.

WOMEN'S EMIGRATION IN CONTEMPORARY UKRAINE: SOCIAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS

Tetiana TSYMBAL¹

Abstract: *In the article the gender aspect of modern Ukrainian emigration is considered. It proved that the feminization of migration is a major social and cultural problem that has both an objective reason as well as mythologized. The practice of demythologization of immigration should mainly consist of thorough study of this phenomenon. It is alleged that the scenario of the modern Ukrainian female emigration – is rather an escape than an attempt to self-realization. We can reduce the emigration flows through deprivation of Ukrainian women from social and cultural marginality.*

Keywords: *emigration, feminization of emigration, mythologization of emigration, existential rootedness of man, socio-cultural marginalization.*

Introduction

One of the most actual problems of the modern world, which needs to be comprehended in the broad humanitarian discourse, are the problems connected with freedom of movement of the person: migration, emigration, immigration, etc. General migration activity has in several countries certain results: some countries must host a great quantity of immigrants, who are trying to ameliorate their life, augment the level of revenue through the recipient country, and some countries – at the contrary – are losing working resources, intellectual potential and are getting into a “demography” hole. According to estimates, there are now 258 million people living in a country different from their country of birth – an increase of 49% since 2000 – according to new figures released by UN DESA today, on International Migrants Day. The International Migration Report 2017 (Highlights), a biennial publication of the department, states that 3.4% of the world’s inhabitants today are international migrants. This reflects a modest increase from a value of 2.8% in 2000. By contrast, the number of migrants as a fraction of the population residing in high-income countries rose from 9.6%

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in 2000 to 14% in 2017². Considerable augmentation of the quantity of migrants led to activation of their influence on the vital functions of countries in all spheres: cultural, political, social, economic and others. These changes are estimated by experts ambiguously and sometimes even at contrary: from the estimation of immigration as a factor, which contributes to economy growth, till its acceptance as a reason of the unemployment growth among the local population and the overload on the social sphere. In the last years the problem of migration possesses the special severity because of terrorist threat, interethnic and intercultural conflicts etc.

In fact, the problem of emigration could not take such an important part in modern world if it was a phenomenon which took part “on the outskirts of the society”. But nowadays “migration became a diagnosis, which describes mass psychology”³. The augmentation of quantification of emigration in general, and, the gender imbalance of emigration flows, in particularity, actualizes the topic of our research.

Social and philosophical aspects of the problem of emigration and the internal migration of women in contemporary Ukraine

For Ukraine, one of the richest countries in the world for natural resources, the problems of the loss of the main capital and the leading value are acute – indigenous population, Ukrainians. In the process of comprehension of this problem, it is very difficult to separate the theoretical relevance from the political topicality. Today Ukrainians are in fact separated for two parts: the half live on the Motherland, the other half (according to different estimations, from 16 to 25 million) is scattered around the world⁴. In addition, the problem of emigration of Ukrainians is aggravated by the internal migration of the population generated by the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the occupation of the Crimea and certain districts of Donetsk and Lugansk regions.

² The International Migration Report 2017 (Highlights). – 18 December 2017. – Accessed: <https://www.un.org/development/desa/publications/international-migration-report-2017.html>

³ P. Sloterdaik, *Kritika cinicheskogo razuma* [Criticism of the cynical mind], Ekaterinburg, Izdatelstvo Uralskogo universiteta, 2001, s. 151.

⁴ V. Troshchynskyi, *Ukrainci v sviti* [Ukrainians in the world], Kyiv, Vydavnychiy dim “Alternatyvy”, 1999, 352 s.

The scientific novelty of the proposed approach lies in the fact that the phenomenon of emigration and internal migration is considered by us in the context of the author's concept of existential rootedness of man⁵. The last one we are considering in the both, broad (ontological) sense, and in the narrower: as a local rootedness of a person on the domestic ground. Modern internal migration of Ukrainians confirms our thesis about the main factor of migration in general as human losses of existential roots, or abandonment, which occurs due to some subjective (existential) and objective (socio-political, economic) reasons. That's exactly the condition of the loss of vital roots that leads a person to decide to leave the usual environment, from the territory of Motherland, generating thoughts and dreams of a better life in a foreign country, the desire to roam in a new environment, on a new ground.

Determining the forms of the loss of vital roots of a modern person, Simone Weil, French philosopher of the first half of the twentieth century, the most painful of them considered a war, when "deprivation of roots becomes almost a deadly disease for the enslaved peoples"⁶. However, the conquerors themselves, deprecating others, "cut their own roots". In addition, the loss of roots can lead to the economic domination of some people over others. At the same time, the main "poison" for the loss of vital roots is money and hired labor as a social phenomenon entirely dependent on money. The worker, although not losing its geographical, national roots, but existentially, morally devoid of roots, because the essence of his being is not his own life goal, not spiritual, personality forces, but the ability to be "working material", "human factor" in the category of the abandoned "economic outsiders". To the loss of vital roots of humans' beings, the modern education and culture are also involved, oriented, specifically, to pragmatism, extremely fragmented by specialization, completely devoid of "openness" to the world, to the "Other"⁷. In turn, sociopolitical loss of vital roots is the most terrible form of depreciation of human existence, which "consists in a peculiar conquest carried out by the state authorities over the peoples, the responsibility for which they bear ..."⁸. Such form of the loss of

⁵ T. Tsymbal, *Buttievisne vkorinennia liudyny* [Being rootedness of man], Kyiv, NPU imeni M. Drahomanova, 2005, 219 s.

⁶ S. Veil, *Ukorinennia. Lyst do kliryka* [Rootedness. Letter to the cleric], Kyiv, Dukh i litera, 1998, s. 36.

⁷ *Ibid.*, s. 38.

⁸ *Ibid.*, s. 103.

vital roots is “the most dangerous disease of human communities”, because it immerses a person “in a state of inertia of the soul, ... or ... in activities that are always aimed at depriving the roots of those who have not lost them yet or with whom it has only partially happened”⁹.

Today, all four forms of depopulation are, in my opinion, objective factors of internal migration and emigration of Ukrainians. Both the war and the nature of labor (and for Ukrainians, rather, the impossibility of finding a job at all or on a specialty), and cultural and educational problems, and the attitude of the state to the people, the speculation of power by the war create the preconditions for internal and external migration in modern Ukraine. Accordingly, we’ll consider the latter with an emphasis on the gender aspect.

Note that in the domestic scientific literature, people who were forced to move to other regions of their native country are called forced migrants and internally displaced persons, and in official documents – internally displaced persons, which most closely corresponds to the term “internally displaced persons”¹⁰.

The first experience of mass internal displacement in Ukraine was related to the Chernobyl accident in 1986, when more than 116 thousand people were relocated from radioactive contaminated areas to other regions of the country. In the following years, another 230,000 people were resettled¹¹.

Today, since the annexation of the Crimea and the beginning of the war in the East of Ukraine, from the temporarily occupied territory and areas of hostilities in other regions of Ukraine, there are about 1 million 800 thousand people, including Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts 1 million 35 thousand 400 people¹². This number is not accurate and may be significantly larger, since not all migrants register in the places of settlement. Nevertheless, the official number of migrants in Ukraine is larger than the number of people in many countries of the world, including European ones (for example, approximately the population of Montenegro and Estonia together – respectively 647 thousand and 1 265 thousand).

⁹ Ibid., s. 39-40.

¹⁰ <https://www.msp.gov.ua/timeline/Vnutrishno-peremishcheni-osobi.html>

¹¹ [http://energetika.in.ua/ua/books/book-5/part-3/section-3/3-3/3-4](http://energetika.in.ua/ua/books/book-5/part-3/section-3/3-3/3-3-4)

¹² *Bolshoe pereselenie: skolko v Ukraine peremeshchennykh lits i kak slozhilas ikh sudba*, in <https://www.epravda.com.ua/rus/publications/2016/07/7/598316/> (Accessed on 07.07.2016).

Today, Ukraine's number of internally displaced persons ranks first in Europe and is among the world leaders.

Thus, in 2015, according to the Monitoring Center's report on internally displaced persons and the Norwegian Refugee Council, Ukraine is ranked fourth in the world by the number of registered internally displaced persons alongside Syria, Yemen, Iraq and Nigeria¹³. In connection with the return of about 200 thousand Ukrainian settlers' home, in 2018 Ukraine is in the ninth place by the number of internally displaced persons in the world.

According to the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine, the largest number of internally displaced persons is registered in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk and Kyiv regions. The smallest number - displaced in Ternopil, Chernivtsi, Rivne, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk and Volyn regions¹⁴. This demonstrates the uneven regional distribution of domestic migrants across Ukraine, leading to undue social and administrative burden on communities, local labour markets, and the social infrastructure of the regions of the settlement.

As for external migration, as of 2017, the largest number consists of labour migrants with the main countries of destination for Ukrainian labour migration in such as Poland (about 39%);, Russia (26%), Italy (11%) and the Czech Republic (9%)¹⁵. The vectors of Ukrainian emigration have changed substantially over almost 150 years of history: if the first flow - the end of the XIX - the beginning of the XX century was directed to Canada, the USA and Latin American countries, the second (post-revolutionary) and the third (post-war) - to France, Germany, Great Britain and the US, then the fourth - to Israel, the US, Canada and the most developed European countries, and was mainly irreversible.

Today, most Ukrainian migrants go to European countries, each of which specializes in certain areas of activity: to Portugal, there are representatives of the working professions, to Italy - mostly female housewives, to Spain, people with good skills in agricultural work and

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ <http://dyvys.info/2017/05/30/statystyka-za-rik-kilkist-pereselentsiv-v-ukrayini-istotno-zmenshylasya/>

¹⁵ Zovnishnia trudova mihratsiia naseleння Ukrainy. Statystychnyi biuliten za 2015–2017 roku / Rynok pratsi / Publikatsii / Statystychna informatsiia / Derzhavna sluzhba statystyky Ukrainy / <http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/>

builders, and therefore the image of the Ukrainians and their perception in the recipient country will differ.

Unfortunately, traditional perceptions of Ukrainian migrant workers in Europe are wrong with the stereotypes of totally disenfranchised, disadvantaged people who went abroad to find any job for any payment. Most modern Ukrainian emigrants are indeed satisfying the West's demand for cheap labour, working in agriculture, construction, manufacturing and in the household sectors. These are several kinds of work that Europeans refuse. That is why modern Ukrainian labour emigration is in most cases associated with the concept of "3 D", namely: "dirty, dangerous and degrading", ie "dirty, dangerous, degrading"¹⁶.

According to our information, today's perception of Ukrainians in Europe depends on the category they belong to. Thus, the first group to which the intelligence belongs is regarded by the locals positively, as these Ukrainians demonstrate the best traits of national character: friendliness, high adaptability, respect for the host culture, diligence, intelligence and ability to quickly acquire new knowledge and skills. Representatives of the working professions and the peasantry, who are more difficult to tolerate staying abroad, find it more difficult to adapt to new conditions, but also demonstrate a high capacity for work, tolerance and mainly external expressions of national culture. There are also Ukrainians who are negatively perceived by Europeans. These are loose women, a variety of swindlers who are destroying positive ideas about Ukrainian migrant workers.

In our opinion, the main ways of presenting national identity by Ukrainian migrant workers are their attitude to the performance of their duties, culture of behavior and communication, a respect for their own and other cultures, national traditions, participation in the life of the Ukrainian diaspora, cultural and political activities, conducted by its most active representatives.

However, the attitude towards Ukrainians, the formation of their image in Europe depends on the events in Ukraine. The 2004 Orange Revolution has for some time changed the world's attitude towards Ukrainians. However, such sympathies did not last long because of disagreement in the

¹⁶ O. Krauze, *Zovnishnia trudova mihratsiia naseleattia Ukrainy* [External labor migration of the population of Ukraine]. Halytskyi ekonomichnyi visnyk. 2010. № 2 (27). S. 26-34.

Ukrainian political elite, so the image of Ukraine has changed again in the eyes of supporters of our Motherland. After the events of the Maidan, over the past two years, the situation has changed again. For example, at the beginning of 2014, Polish people, according to the survey, emphasized the liberty, religiosity and sociability of Ukrainians. Today, the Ukrainian authorities' indecisiveness, double standards, inability to lead the started thing to a logical conclusion are underlined. That is, a positive image after the revolutionary events does not last long.

In fact, there are not many people across Europe who are in direct contact with Ukrainians. So the image of a Ukrainian is both the result of state contacts and the result of its reflection in the press, in the Internet space, creating an appropriate image on radio and television.

Returning to the problem of internal migration, we emphasize that among the domestic migrants in contemporary Ukraine, it is logical to distinguish between two groups based on the dominant cause of displacement: the inhabitants of the East of Ukraine, the reason of which migration is a direct threat to life through military actions, and the inhabitants of Crimea who left, taking into account the difficult moral atmosphere, lack of prospects, manifestations of aggression, denunciations, demonstration of negative attitude, threats in the field of business, etc.

Most internally displaced persons in Ukraine are women. Gender imbalance of migration flows, on the one hand, fits the global immigration trends, as in recent decades in the world there has been a sharp feminization of migratory flows: women are the initiators and the main performers of emigrant intentions. In relation to refugees and internally displaced persons according to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the proportion of men and women among them in the world is roughly equal. In contrast, as the facts of the past five years show, there is a significant advantage for women in Ukraine. According to the Unified Information Database on Internally Displaced Persons, the proportion of women is approximately 65%. According to the International Organization of Migration, as a rule, women 30-55 years old with a higher or incomplete higher education are displaced, including many single mothers¹⁷. Such a correlation in the gender structure of internal migrants is formed at the expense of immigrants from the East of Ukraine,

¹⁷ *Prohrama Norvezkoi rady u spravakh biznesiv v Ukraini*, in <https://www.nrc.no/resources/fact-sheets/ukraine-fact-sheet-2/> (Accessed on 09.2017).

while among the immigrants from the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, there is a balance between the number of men and women.

Despite the high level of education, it is problematic for women to find employment at a new place of residence: if the registered unemployed in all categories of women accounted for 65%, then among the unemployed from the number of internally displaced people – 72%, which indicates the unfavorable situation that has developed with the use of labor resources resettled in local labor markets. In addition, it should be noted that among the able-bodied part of internally displaced people in Ukraine there is a significant proportion of young people. Up to 35 years – over 40%, which indicates the high potential of labor resources, because young people are more mobile and creative, have appropriate modern education and are capable of new activities¹⁸. As a matter of fact, among the emigrants, the proportion of young people is significant today.

It's should be emphasized that emigration is complex in its nature, diverse in its forms and reasons, and sometimes unpredictable by social consequences, the process of leaving the population from the donor-country to the recipient-country. Being with the society in a dialectical connection, emigration not only acts as an indicator of society, influences socio-political phenomena, but also affects them. Despite the undeniable relevance, the problem of emigration in many respects remains virtually unexplored in domestic science. In the post-Soviet humanities, this problem was studied mainly by psychologists and sociologists who emphasize the problems of adaptation, the prospects of marriage with foreigners, and the problems of self-realization in the conditions of emigration¹⁹. The research range of European and American scholars is wider and includes, besides the socio-economic situation of migrants, living conditions, forms of communication, organizations, etc.²⁰

¹⁸ *Bolshoe pereselenie: skolko v Ukraine peremeshchennykh lits i kak slozhilas ikh sudba*, in <https://www.epravda.com.ua/rus/publications/2016/07/7/598316/> (Accessed on 07.07.2016).

¹⁹ O. Makhovskaya, *Soblazn emigratsii ili zhenshchinam, otletayushchim v Parizh* [The temptation of emigration, or Women flying off to Paris], Moskva, PER SE, 2003, 144 s.; N. Frenkman-Khrustaleva, *Emigratsiya i emigranty: istoriya i psikhologiya* [Emigration and emigrants: history and psychology], Sankt-Peterburg, Gosudarstvennaya akademiya kultury, 1995, 153 s.

²⁰ Manuel Castles, *The Age of Migration: International Population movements in the Modern World*, London, Macmillan, 1993, 306 p.; Demetrios Papademetriou, *Managing Rapid and Deep Change in the Newest Age of Migration*, in *The Political*

However, until today, the semantic filling of the concept of “emigration” and derivatives from it remained uncertain and finally perceive in society in different ways: from betrayal, social outsidering, labor to search adventures, adventurism. Therefore, the problem of emigration requires a detailed, in-depth study and definition of a categorical status that is impossible beyond the limits of philosophical reflection.

Based on the research that was conducted, we propose an author's conceptual definition of the concept of “emigration”, in which ontological, existential and socio-philosophical categorical meanings mutually reinforce and complement each other, namely: a) emigration is the objectification of man's extinction, attempts to overcome the tragic rupture between the actual local presence and potential global existence, between the absolute value of the individual and the loss of meaning of life; this is the understanding and realization of the immanent-ontological ability to rootedness on a new cultural-historical ground (provided that it is impossible or problematic in the homeland); b) emigration is one of the forms of manifestation of human freedom, a way of implementing an individual hypothesis of being for itself and a personal project of life; is a process of temporally and locally oriented self-realization of a person as a tendency to the desired and proper through possible; c) emigration is the movement of a person from one sociocultural being to another in order to improve the conditions of personal existence and deploy the field for self-realization²¹.

In turn, immigration as an immigrant's entry to another country – settling “on the other side”, this is a differentness in the locus of the other, it is a subculture built on mimicry that helps in the process of adaptation. Immigration (especially intellectual) for recipient countries – in many cases, is a form of appropriation of human capital. An immigrant may acquire a new identity or remain a matrix of his native culture, a carrier that can develop a native culture on someone else's ground²².

Quarterly, 08/2003, V. 74, № s1, pp. 39–58.; Antoine Pecoud, *Migration, human rights and the United Nations*, in Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice, 2007, Vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 241–266; *World Migrant Stock: The 2015 Revision Population Database*, in <http://esa.un.org/migration/index.asp?panel=1> (Accessed on 11.08.2015).

²¹ T. Tsymbal, *Fenomen emihratsii: dosvid filosofskoi refleksii* [The phenomenon of emigration: the experience of philosophical reflection], Kyiv – Kryvyi Rih, Vydavnychiy dim, 2012, s. 390-392.

²² *Ibid.*, s. 393.

The urgency of studying the actual gender aspect of emigration, as noted above, is due to the sharp feminization of migration processes over the past decades. So, a comparative analysis of the gender characteristics of the first flow of Ukrainian emigration and its current state draw attention to the sharp decline in family emigration and the growth of individual female emigration: These are women who are the initiators and the main performers of emigrant intentions. Such a situation, in our opinion, is a consequence of the increase in the social activity of women in Ukraine. However, if the participation of women in various non-governmental organizations at home is compensatory socialization, emigration appears, according to O. Makhovskaya, as a way of hyper-socialization and hyperfeminization of young women²³. A modern Ukrainian woman no longer wants to be solely faithful wife and mother. She needs professional achievements, a certain level of material wealth, an appropriate social position. This tendency illustrates the desire of the Ukrainian women to go beyond the prescriptions and requirements of their culture and get closer to more acceptable contemporary European norms.

Today, the average age of a woman who leaves the country is 40-50 years old. This means that she was brought up and educated in the Soviet Union, and then this young woman fell into the test of "Reconstruction": lack of money, unemployment, trade on markets, and so on. Having passed through such life problems, a woman wants to "live normally".

Note that the basic living needs of women and men are practically the same, but there is a difference in the traditions of bringing girls and boys up in Ukrainian families, and since – the difference in world perception, the definition of existential strategies, etc. Women are more emotional and prone to subjectivation of events, while men consider objects and events in their interrelationships, distinguishing between facts and their perception of the latter. However, women are easier to adapt to new living conditions, find their place in a new environment. Higher adaptive opportunities for women are associated with a focus on everyday household problems. Casualty in any place of residence is much more similar than the excellent one. Immersing in everyday life, a woman experiences less stress in her emigration than a man, is more easily rooted on a new ground and is used in a new socio-cultural context. On the other hand, women are more prone to pseudo-rootedness: they consider their life's mission accomplished, their

²³ O. Makhovskaya, *op. cit.*, s. 56-57.

life is full, when they are useful to others (children, husband, parents). In my opinion, choosing emigration as a life strategy that helps a family in difficult times, a woman can easily bear the burden of a foreigner.

Traditionally, the responsibility for the children and their well-being in the Ukrainian family are predominantly placed on the shoulders of mothers by elderly family members. Moreover, responsibility in the family, in our opinion, is determined by these criteria – the care of the weaker, but not the responsibility of the spouses to each other. In despair, when there is no way to provide children with the most necessary things, women decide on emigrate. In this case, we have a paradox: on the one hand, high adaptability and responsibility of women lead to an increase in the number of Ukrainian emigrants, on the other – leaving children, depriving them of maternal affection, and everyday worries are manifestation of irresponsibility. Female emigration is in fact an escape from the family, which has devastating consequences for all participants in the events, but the worst ones – for children who are doomed to social orphan hood. According to studies conducted in Western Ukraine, every third family has parental labor migrants, labor emigrants, in two thirds of them – mother is an “inter-handmaid”.

When traveling abroad with a noble purpose (for example, to provide children with an opportunity to study at a higher educational institution or to buy a separate home), women rarely return to their homeland. However, first, “for the sake of children” is “the last argument, the highest motivation for self-abandonment from the cultural field, in which they were born and raised, but were not happy heroines”²⁴. “The Future of Children”, in our opinion, is a justification, a kind of camouflage, which, in essence, becomes a sentence for children-potential orphans²⁵. Children grow up, receive education, and then the mother finds a new justification for her absence – “for the sake of grandchildren”. Secondly, a person quickly gets used to a more comfortable life, to social order, respect, etc., which she sees in the West. Thirdly, the woman does not want to go back to the old wage standards. And lastly, spatial displacement necessarily leads to psychological shifts, to changes in world perception in an optimistic

²⁴ O. Makhovskaya, *op. cit.*, s. 7.

²⁵ *Dity emihrantiv pro sebe. Spovidi. Dumky. Sudzhennia... Bil* [Children of emigrants about themselves. Confessions. Thoughts. Judgment... Pain], Lviv, Artos, 2009, 180s.

direction, that is, returning home to a woman is a return to old, already inappropriate rules and standards of life.

The most important thing, in our opinion, is the assessment of women in society. As we have noted, most domestic wage earners are women aged between forty and fifty. In the psychology of Ukrainians (especially in rural areas), this is practically an “elderly woman”, and for Western men, such a woman is a subject of admiration. The significance of the fact that in the emigration of a couple, women are no longer returning to their native land, is not the motive of this decision, demanding assistance to children. Actions, not feeling the real material condition, as well as receiving money for irrational spending, sometimes – for anti-social needs. Men, left at home with children, feel used and unnecessary either today or in the future. And from here – the corresponding social and psychological problems, the most widespread of which – drunkenness.

Families in which one of the parents works in a foreign country are in a state of “temporary death”. This “temporality” grows in irreversibility in 60% of cases²⁶. That is how many families divorce when a husband or wife strives to stay in a foreign country forever, and even after returning to their homeland. There is an interesting fact, that we have established in the course of oral-historical studies conducted with Ukrainian emigrants: even if women had no claims to their husbands before leaving to work, then such claims appeared. Women are accused in their wanderings in a foreign country not of power and of new Ukrainian oligarchs, but of their own men. To a certain extent, they are right, but rather in this way emigrants try to justify not returning home.

Worst of all, women's emigration is destroyed not only by already established families but also by the future, because children who grow up without an example of marital consent and love between parents, in terms of hyper-care of the material side of life, lose humanistic value orientations. The duty of parents is to give children an example of family life and, being close, support in difficult, decisive moments, give time advice and moral support. Maternal laborer's epopees often end up for children tragically. The young life that has been plunged into the gravity is easily lost among the serious problems of the present.

²⁶ O. Berezovskyi, *Internaimychka. Dochka chy paserbytsia Yevropy?* [Inter-handmaid. Daughter or stepdaughter from Europe?], Ternopil, Pidruchnyky i posibnyky, 2005, s. 79.

Being able to make money in a foreign country, Ukrainian women increase their own self-esteem (sometimes too much) and perceive their past life in their homeland, either as a painful torment or as a “lost time”. As O. Berezovsky mentions, “in most workers, absolutely slavish humility is there (in a foreign country – T. Ts.) compensatory changes to the millionaire supremacy of the “primitive” way of life (even the existence!) of those who prefer to compete with misfortune here in Ukraine”²⁷.

Female emigration: between myth and reality

Of course, the motives of female emigration are also such objective social factors as uncertainty of the political situation, lowering the level of security in the country, rising prices for goods, services, education. And yet, despite the primacy of objective reasons, every woman decides to leave on her own and, to some extent, tries to justify her absence in the family. In this case, the motivation behind labor is not enough, therefore, women resort (consciously or unknowingly) to the mythologization of the causes of emigration.

It should be reminded that in modern philosophical discourse, the myth is understood not as a certain text, but as a way of perceiving and interpreting reality, based on traditional representations of the world, morality, and the relation between real and immortal. With the help of myths, each society reflects certain feelings, explains inexplicable natural, social, political, and historical events. Myths are based on real events, but exaggerate, adorn, and somewhat simplify them. Today myth becomes a kind of competitor of social sciences, which cannot or do not want to explain some processes of a political and social nature. However, the very myth itself is a certain general un-reflected basis that we need for knowledge. And the lack of un-reflection testifies to some inhibition of cognitive activity. After all, the myth is not only that which is not reflected, that we did not think enough about, but also what we do not want to think about, what we do not want to deeply analyze.

The desire for mythologization is an important property of human consciousness, which manifests itself at three levels: society as an integrity, a certain group of people or a community and an individual. Myths develop both horizontally (for example, extending from one member of the community to another), and vertically, moving from one level to another.

²⁷ Ibid., s. 45.

In essence, myth-making is an ontologically conditioned permanent phenomenon that is constantly developing and can be directed both to the future and to the past.

By origin, myths can be divided into natural, born with time in the minds of the people, but artificially created for a certain purpose. The last ones, which in turn are divided into own and borrowed, are so cleverly used to influence the consciousness of the average person, which subsequently makes it virtually impossible for him to explain the real meaning of events.

Also, myths are divided into positive (or myths-idealizations) and negative (or “black”, myths-destructions). Myths-idealizations involve the idealization of the subject or the idealization of reality. So, examples of idealization of the subject are numerous images of political and cultural figures of Ukrainian emigration, who have been created both by the emigrants themselves and by the environment, or the image of the mother-worker, created by her. The reality is idealized by the emigrants, first, for the purpose of self-complacency, self-defense, aestheticization of being in a foreign country. Conversely, negative myths are used to dampen positive references to their homeland.

Thus, myths perform certain functions, the leading ones of which, in our opinion, are axiological, compensatory, explanatory or hermeneutical, the function of self-identification, the function of communication of generations, “suggestion”, the function of the experience of self-knowledge and the creation of its own archetype. Emigrant myths occupy a special place among others and are aimed at explaining emigration as a means of preserving the cultural values of the homeland as an instrument of self-affirmation by denying the past and the present environment. In turn, female emigration creates its own myths. Perhaps the situation itself provokes enhanced myth-making, acts as a catalyst for it. And with each new emigre there is a peculiar process of “pulling” into a myth.

The myths of emigration, we consider it would appropriate to classify them on the external, that is, the myths about emigration, and internal – myths that are created in the emigrant circle by the settlers themselves. Our research interest is directed at the so-called internal myths – myths created by the emigrants themselves. When leaving the homeland, separating from the native soil, a person loses his mythology, and he cannot accept the myths of a new society at once. Yes, and in general, this perception is problematic. The emigrant essentially finds himself in an out-of-town

space, becoming an “inter-mythical” margin. Therefore, there is a need to create their own myths.

Women-emigrants create myths for compensation, self-justification. The main of these myths is the myth of the labor money that helps the family, strengthens it. But, as noted above, emigration destroys marriages and does not contribute to the normal upbringing of children. Not being close to mom or dad, not knowing how hard it is to make money in a foreign country, children are accustomed to treat parents in a consumer way. The negative impact of emigration on marital and family relations is increasing recently.

In order to make rootedness of the Ukrainian man on the domestic soil, reducing the number of temporary workers and emigrants, except actions of socio-economic nature, in our opinion, it is necessary to develop a cultural and educational program that will include and demilitarize the phenomenon of emigration. The process of demythologization should be directed, first, to external myths, but not to ignore the myths of the internal, which are created by the emigrants themselves. Of course, it's very difficult to separate the consciousness of people from the invasion of myths, and, in our opinion, it is impossible. After all, this depends not only on the efforts of demythologizers, but also on the attitude of people to myths in general. However, it is possible and necessary to reduce the level of mythology.

Considering, that myths are created when people either do not understand something, do not know, or do not want to know, emigration demythologization technology should consist mainly of a thorough study of this phenomenon. When the myth is rephrased, the need for mythologization will disappear by itself or at least minimized.

As it was already emphasized, despite the primacy of objective reasons, every woman decides to leave independently. And the main factor or reason for women's emigration is the desire for self-realization. The true real motive for emigration is the desire to be in demand, the desire for an adequate assessment of labor, abilities and personal characteristics. Contemporary Ukrainian society is in some way depersonalizing a person. On this basis, female emigration is the search for oneself and the realization of the right to freedom and independence. On the other hand, when creating a family, a person must understand that “there can be no more institution of society more dependent (in the sense of imposing certain

rules of life on a person), more rigid than a family”²⁸. Therefore, the scenario of female emigration for those who have a family is rather an escape than overcoming and trying to self-fulfill, escape from the family, duties, domestic slavery, a desire to hide from problems, to entrust the mentioned above things to others. The woman is justified, for example, by the need to pay for the education of children, the need to purchase housing, trying to give her escape nobility and sacrifice. However, we believe that the most important help is to be close to the family, along with the children in their daily care, and not to shift their maternity responsibilities to sponsorship, in a purely material plane.

Emigration can take the form of self-realization when a woman seeks professional growth and leaves the country with her family (if she has a family). We believe that these two scenarios of women emigration – escape and attempt to self-fulfillment – also generate two types of emigrant women: a woman-victim (unhappy, sacrificing herself for the sake of children) and a woman-winner. And although sacrifice is cultivated in the Orthodox tradition, it does not, however, constitute a productive life strategy, because, first and foremost, it serves as a negative example for children. The professional realization of women abroad, of course, is not easy, but it is quite possible.

Thus, the possibility of free movement around the world allows a person to exercise his right to freedom of choice of residence and the right to freedom of movement. In this case, emigration acts as a path to freedom, the search for and the exercise of freedom. The latest modern philosophy defines as “the universality of the subjective series of culture, which captures the possibility of activity and behavior in the absence of an external goal-setting”²⁹, that’s means, in the phenomenon of freedom, that there is an immanent presence of the opposition of the pressure of sociality.

Of course, it's not logical to talk about absolute freedom of a person, since each of us is a part of society, part of the world. And this means a certain determinism and connections with the outside world, which, in turn, acquire the character of necessity. Thus, human freedom is limited by an external necessity – the need to adapt to the world, as well as the internal necessity that opposes the external. Restrictions of freedom are

²⁸ V. Druzhinin, *Psikhologiya semi* [Family psychology], Ekaterinburg, Delovaya kniga, 2000, s. 4.

²⁹ *Vsemirnaya entsiklopediya. Filosofiya* [World Encyclopedia. Philosophy], Moskva, AST, Minsk, Harvest, Sovremennyi literator, 2001, s. 904.

perceived by man as an encroachment on his "Myself", on her inner world. External freedom is limited to the requirements of normal cohabitation, communication, but from the restriction of internal freedom, which allows a person to act, based on his own beliefs and moral values, is perceived by a person negatively.

Emigration from modern liberal-democratic countries represents the realization of the right to freedom. However, the free, unhindered realization of this right generates several moral conflicts and requires the person to solve certain ethical problems. First, the question arises: the realization of the right to freedom of departure from the country is "freedom from" or "freedom for"? If a person has the goal of self-realization and the possibility of self-realization outside the homeland, then "freedom for" is realized, which is a moral option of freedom. However, we often encounter a negative understanding of freedom - freedom as liberation from something. Such a negative variant, in our opinion, is the leading one for modern Ukrainian female emigration. In this case, we are dealing with a certain insincerity in declaring the motives of emigration. Second, the realization of the right to freedom also gives rise to the problem of individual responsibility.

In addition, to understand freedom it should be added that this is an existential-metaphysical phenomenon, which involves, firstly, the definition of human ability to a distinct free creative objectification (rootedness) in actions and behavior of individuals; secondly, the epistemological independence of man from the "external" forces of nature, of the world, "the Other" and thus providing a justification of the purpose and meaning of achieving existential independence; and, thirdly, the existential choice of internal imperatives of life, the meaning of life. The need, however, for understanding the person of his own life not as a series of random disconnected events, but as a single process with a definite direction, continuity and meaning, is another of the most important value-ontological foundations and needs of the rootedness of the individual in being, which avoids cardinal emigration decisions or minimize the number of emigrants.

Conclusions

Without condemning and not justifying emigration, we emphasize that the self-esteem of a nationally conscious person is not expressed in the

declaration of his feelings to his homeland, not in the cry of pseudo-patriotism, but in the everyday work in favor of the homeland, in the ability of “here and now”, together with compatriots build the desired future of the country. Despite the objective reasons for voluntary emigration, the main thing is the personal judgment of the person. And if emigration is an existential act, then the solution of this problem should begin with an individual.

Summing up, we emphasize that stopping the feminization of Ukrainian emigration is, of course, difficult, but possible. To do this, the Ukrainian woman must get rid of the socio-cultural marginalization imposed on her by the patriarchy, decades of totalitarianism and the socio-economic uncertainty of the last thirty years. The main role in this should be played by the system of education and socio-cultural policy in general. The actions of the state aimed at the rootedness of the Ukrainian man must be urgent and consistent, otherwise a massive decrease in the population (due to its most productive part) can lead to catastrophic consequences, and the inaction of people in power will be characterized as criminal.

Recenzie

ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, *The unconscious: a conceptual analysis*. New York and London, Routledge, 2004, 122 p. ISBN 0-203-57464-8

The unconscious: a conceptual analysis is an essay wrote by the Scottish professor Alasdair MacIntyre released by the Routledge & Kegan Paul publishing house in 1958. His work is republished in 2004 with a new thirty-eight pages long preface signed by the author himself. MacIntyre's effort is an analytical one, and not being concerned with the success of psychoanalysis, he proceeds to an inquiry in Freud's writings, also keeping an eye open for his predecessors understanding of "the unconscious". Considering that Freud did not pay enough attention to the clinical material which the concept is intended to illuminate, Alasdair MacIntyre sets forth to an analytical investigation of case histories, theoretical essays, as well as the more systematic works. In the first part of the book, *Prolegomena*, he writes: "We are concerned not with the correctness of the observations of Freud and his psychoanalytic successors but with the nature of their theoretical interpretation. What is offered here is a logical analysis of a theoretical concept, and any conclusions that may be reached will be conclusions of the kind that can appropriately be drawn from such an analysis" (pp. 44-45).

The second part of the book, which bears the title *Freud's account of the unconscious*, is the longest part of MacIntyre's work and starts with a reminder about the creative writers which used the concept of "unconscious" before Freud. Although MacIntyre considers that Freud was influenced in the developing of the concept by literature and poetry, in this chapter he stresses the development of Freud's theories as a departure from a neurological standpoint. Before arguing for his point, MacIntyre is giving a non-theoretical descriptive account of the psychoanalytic treatment. He is aware that his account is a highly artificial abstraction from what Freud said and actually this provides high value and objectivity to his straightforward and easy to read description. Alasdair MacIntyre continues by making an analogy between the explanations provided by the neurophysiologist of the time and the key elements of Freud's work. He invokes Freud's 1895 attempt to write a systematic account of psychology for neurologists in order to stress how much Freud's view is, especially in the first part of his life, "blended with the preconceptions of that

nineteenth-century materialism which took the schematism of Newtonian mechanics" (p. 55). Even Lorentz's hydraulic model is mentioned here. MacIntyre sees the concepts of "unconscious", "repression" and "traumatic event" interrelated and writes: "This mutual interdependence of concepts in the closely woven fabric of a general theory is nothing new in the history of science. The interrelation of «mass», «velocity», and «force» in Newtonian mechanics springs to mind immediately. But clearly, a comprehensive theory whose concepts are thus interwoven stands all more in need of justification as a whole. And the whole concept of «the unconscious» stands or falls with this general theory" (p. 54). The chapter has six conclusions, all elaborated on the last pages of it: (i) The Unconscious is formally distinguished from the Conscious and the Preconscious, (ii) The Unconscious is the area of the primary process, (iii) The understanding of the unconscious relies on the contrast between the ego and the repressed, (iv) The Unconscious is the background link between infancy and adult life, (v) The Unconscious is an omnipresent background to conscious and overt mental life and to behaviour, (vi) The Unconscious is "a place", "a realm". The conclusions are all placed upon MacIntyre's contention that Freud wrote up in psychological terms what had been originally intended as a neurological theory.

Mental words and mental concepts is the third part of the book. It is a short chapter of only eight pages where Alasdair MacIntyre makes a linguistic analysis of the different meanings of "the unconscious" both before and in Freud's work. The pre-Freudian meanings of the concept fall in two main categories: (i) "Unconscious" as an adjective applied to things distinct from people, equivalent to "inanimate" and (ii) "Unconsciously" used as an adverb which can be understood in three different ways: without conscious effort, unknowingly or as a synonym to "inadvertently" – to excuse otherwise blameworthy behavior. The radical innovation is that Freud uses "unconscious" as a noun. This analysis is made by MacIntyre in order to assess Freud's two influences. The works of the novelists are one of the sources for Freud's picture of the unconscious mind when he uses the concept "as an adjective to describe what we may have hitherto observed but have not hitherto recognized or classified" (p. 78). When Freud uses the concept as a noun not to describe, but to explain, the Cartesian philosophical tradition, mediated by Brentano is the second source identified by MacIntyre.

From now on, the discourse that follows introduces the reader in the field of philosophy of science and is presenting MacIntyre's most forceful critique from the entire essay regarding Freud's fundamental concepts and theory. The fourth chapter, as the title, *Describing and explaining*, suggests, develops the problem previously introduced, where Alasdair MacIntyre concerns himself with the coherence of Freud's theory and the capacity of its concepts to form an explanatory system without whom certain aspects of human behaviour could not be scientifically taken into account. The author is arguing that Freud did not distinguish between motives and causes and he also does not attach sufficient distinction between "remembering" and "making a memory claim". "Repression" is considered by MacIntyre a concept that rather requires more concepts to be understood than it itself clarifies. Thus, the author considers that "unconscious" and "repression" are indispensable terms in Sigmund Freud's theory, but their place as explanatory terms is highly dubious. Nonetheless, there is a good part in it: "One result of this is that his conceptual errors and unclarities are usually far more interesting and suggestive than the careful precision with which so many writers on psychology equip themselves only to find that the data of human behaviour and experience are far richer than the conceptual framework into which they want to see the data forced." (p. 103)

The last chapter, *Theory and therapy*, is written in the same manner as the previous one, with the discussion concerning the practicability part of Freud's theory. Without invoking empirical studies, Alasdair MacIntyre plunges into debating the difficulties over the verification of the theory. He is well aware of the complexity of Freud's work and his constant returning over older writings in order to adjust them, as well as the implications it has in morality when he is formulating three main objections: (i) Patient's resistance makes us unable to verify the analyst's interpretation. If the patient refuses the interpretation, it is due either to resistance or to the fact that the interpretation is incorrect. (ii) There is an ambivalence regarding love and hate which makes the verification of the hypothesis difficult. Thus the hypothesis is formulated widely enough to permit both forms of behaviour to work within it. (iii) The maxim "Every symptom is over-determined" impedes anyone from narrowing down his search for explanations. Although the author distances himself from Karl Popper's viewpoint, he writes: "What all these considerations combine to suggest is

that clinical experience could never provide adequate verification or falsification of the whole Freudian theory" (p.109)

The essay wrote by the Scottish professor, Alasdair MacIntyre, was, as well as it is now, a masterpiece of analytical philosophy and a helpful reading for scholars preoccupied with the unconscious. The balanced manner in which he writes, showing an in-depth knowledge of Freud as well as a strong knowledge of philosophy of science makes the volume *The unconscious: a conceptual analysis* a relevant reading even today for many: from philosophers of science and conceptual historians to anyone interested in psychoanalysis and psychology. Alasdair MacIntyre volume certainly qualifies for a place in the mandatory secondary bibliography of Freud – remark that can be approved just by reading the conclusion: "The presentation of Freud's work as a total system leaves his writings on unconscious motivation as a matrix in which very different elements can be discerned and separated out. There is the impulse to improve upon neurophysiological explanation which leaves its mark in a presentation of the unconscious that is expressed too much in causal terms. There is the ideal of conscious rationality which lends to Freud's writings both moral ferment and prescriptive flavour. There is the recognition of what was hitherto unnoticed or if noticed turned away from. There is the construction of hypotheses about the infantile causation of adult behaviour. To attempt to separate out these elements is to learn how much Freud has to teach." (p. 119)

The unconscious: a conceptual analysis by Alasdair MacIntyre, although is not a recent publication, remains a work of actuality nowadays. In an era when interdisciplinary approaches within humanities are flooded with New Age ideas and, often, pseudo-scientific theories that fail to give account both to philosophical systems and scientific theories, a work like Alasdair MacIntyre's is indispensable. If we truly want to "learn how much Freud has to teach" a conceptual analysis of the unconscious like the one Alasdair MacIntyre does in his book should be retrieved from the bookshelf and be read by anyone who has an interest in the subject matter.

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