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PLATO'S TRADITIONS IN MODERN EDUCATIONAL THEORIES

Oleg BAZALUK¹

Abstract: *The paper is an extension of previous works on the effect Plato's traditions in the development of educational theories in the history of culture. The author distinguished two key stages in the development of the theories of education according to Plato's line. In the paper, the author considers the development of the theories of education according to Plato's line in the Modern Age.*

Keywords: *Plato's line, Greek culture, Modern Age, Heidegger's philosophy, theories of education, humanism, human life*

§ 1. The paper is an extension of previous works on the effect Plato's traditions in the development of educational theories in the history of culture.² We have established that the main features of the theories of education according to Plato's line are:³

1. The relationship between the theories of education and the theories (concepts) of the Universe. In the theories of education according to Plato's line, the basis of the philosophy of knowledge determine the features that form new generations.⁴

2. The theories of education according to Plato's line are based on genuine, scientific and philosophical knowledge of man's place at the scales of the Earth and the Universe. They are in a constant search of the answer to the question: "What is man and what is the meaning of his being at the scale of the Universe?"⁵

3. The theories of education according to Plato's line formulate an understanding of man's image; what kind of man he should be in the

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² See (Bazaluk, 2017; Bazaluk, 2018).

³ See (Bazaluk, 2017).

⁴ From the written sources that have survived to our generations, that was in Plato's works, for the first time the connection between the peculiarity of the world knowledge and the understanding of education was traced. Plato's pedagogical views cannot be understood beyond his epistemology.

⁵ The dominance of Aristotle's scientific image of philosophy that provides a disinterested pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, John Sellars described in his work (Sellars, 2017).

meaning of *καλόν*, that is, a desired (or ideal) image. They generate a cultural ideal as a formative principle and the highest principle of morality (the categorical imperative in the terminology of Immanuel Kant), for the achievement of which man and society are directed.¹

We distinguished two key stages in the development of the theories of education according to Plato's line. Consider the development of the theories of education according to Plato's line in the Modern Age.

§ 2. The second stage in the development of the theories of education according to Plato's line is due to the replacement of the geocentric world system by the heliocentric system. The notion that the Earth occupies a central and stationary position in the Universe was replaced with a completely different vision of the structure of the Universe. Initially, Nicolaus Copernicus, Galileo Galilei, Johannes Kepler, and others proved that the Sun was the central celestial body around which the Earth and other planets were orbited. In the 20th century, through the efforts of several generations of scholars, the cosmos opened up to us as a large-scale structure of the Universe, in which the existence of numerous planets with biological life and extraterrestrial intelligence is possible.² The basis of the modern understanding of the Universe is formed by the Big Bang theory, which explains the two most significant facts of cosmology: the expansion of the Universe and the existence of cosmic background radiation. The modern Lambda-CDM Cosmological Model (Lambda-Cold Dark Matter) was based on the Big Bang Theory.

However, despite the truly revolutionary achievements in understanding the structure of the Universe, modern cosmology does not take into account the role and influence the properties as well as the evolution of the Universe and cosmic biospheres and noospheres. Mathematics, physics, astronomy and cosmology, which determine the meanings of modern ideas about the main stages of the development of the

¹ In the book "What is Ancient Philosophy?" Pierre Hadot showed that all the philosophers, which founded their schools: Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Plotinus, etc., formed a certain way of life, with the meaning of *καλόν* – the desired ideal. In the Platonic tradition, philosophy is a way of life, and education is a deliberately molding human character in accordance with an ideal of a certain way of life.

² The history of the development of modern ideas in cosmology is set out, for example, by Steven Weinberg (Weinberg, 2013).

Universe, do not consider the evolution of biological organisms and man in their models. It is for this reason, from our point of view, the modern idea of the structure of the Universe is explained deeper and better not by the Standard Model that has been developed in cosmology, but the model of Vladimir Vernadsky that we have called "Evolving Matter."¹ Vernadsky never dealt with the construction of cosmological models. However, his generalisation of the geological and biological chronicles of Earth, which he did in the first half of the 20th century, was equal to a simulation at the scale of a separate cosmic object.

Vernadsky's ideas and his followers about the Earth's biosphere were based on Charles Lyell's ideas, which themselves were no less fundamental and important for the understanding evolution of the Universe. These ideas lay in the fact they were the first that showed the natural relationship between geological and biological evolution. Vladimir Vernadsky first scientifically proved that not only the Universe evolved (according to his terminology – Inert Matter). Having originated from a space vacuum (quantum fluctuations), under the influence of certain physical and chemical processes, Inert Matter, through a transitional state, acquires a qualitatively new structure and functions – Living Matter, at the same time it is continuing to evolve in its primal state. That is, having reached a certain inner perfection, one state of matter transitions logically into another that on the one hand, is a certain hierarchy of the previous ("mother") state of matter and continues to evolve in complete dependence of it, but on the other hand, creates a basis (space) for placement of a qualitative new ("daughter") state of matter.²

Vernadsky's model of the structure of the Universe does not deny the Standard Model. According to Vernadsky's model, the Universe and biological life are two self-sufficient structures that evolve in close interaction with each other. The Universe as Inert Matter develops according to the laws of physics, as envisaged by the Standard Model. Biological life as Living Matter (including man) develops according to the laws of biology, as it is envisaged by the synthetic theory of evolution. The main feature of Vernadsky's model lies in the fact that in it, using the example of the Earth, the main stages of the formation and development of

¹ The author considered this issue in numerous articles and books, for example, (Bazaluk & Kharchenko, 2018).

² See (Bazaluk & Kharchenko, 2018).

biological life in certain parts of the Evolving Universe are revealed. The model shows that, as a result of physical and chemical processes, macromolecules transform into biopolymers, and then into the simplest structures of life, which transforms the surface of an individual cosmic object into the sphere of its existence – the biosphere over several billion years of evolution.

After the first publication of Vernadsky's ideas about the biosphere, much has changed in the world of science. The modern scientific community recognizes the imperfection of the Standard Model and the synthetic theory of evolution. New theories are being created, in which not only the structure of the Universe is clarified, but also the models are proposed, in which the evolution of the Universe, the cosmic biospheres and noospheres are considered as a single process.

§ 3. The replacement of the geocentric world picture with Vernadsky's model "Evolving Matter" led to the formation of a new philosophy of knowledge. The Earth lost its place as the "centre" of the Universe and became an ordinary planet in the expanding Universe. Man discovered that Gods (God) had not created the world, it had constantly been changing and complicating according to the laws of physics, chemistry, biology, etc. The Universe, the biosphere, the noosphere – everything changed in a whole and in parts. For the last four centuries, the philosophy of knowledge is in the constant search, understanding and evaluation of new significative meanings of Being. Among the key thinkers of the second stage, we want to note René Descartes, Immanuel Kant, Georg Wilhelm Hegel and Martin Heidegger. We again take the liberty to denote in Laconian style the meaning of the philosophy of knowledge of the second stage in the development of the theories of education according to Plato's line by a metaphor "*Those who transform the Earth.*" The key phrase of the philosophy of knowledge of this period is the phrase of Friedrich Nietzsche: "God is dead!" Nietzsche wrote about it very impressively and emotionally in the book "The Gay Science":¹ "Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning hours, ran to the market place, and cried incessantly: "I seek God! I seek God!" <...> "Whither is God?" he cried; "I will tell you. We have killed him – you and I. All of us are his murderers. <...>Do we hear nothing as yet of the noise of the gravediggers who are

¹ Nietzsche wrote the book in the winter of 1881 and 1882 in Genoa.

burying God? Do we smell nothing as yet of the divine decomposition? Gods, too, decompose. God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him" (Nietzsche, 1990: 592).

Nietzsche's categorical statement "God is dead!" drew a line under the history of world culture in his own way, leaving the philosophy of knowledge "Created by Gods (God)", the meaning of life "the necessity of serving Gods (God)" and the cultural ideal "man of faith" in the past. Humanity needed new fundamental markers of their identification in the material world. Plato's philosophy, which had been determining the basis of world knowledge, the meaning of human life and the cultural ideal for four millennia, was replaced by a new philosophy, in which there was no place for God, the necessity to serve Him and believe in Him. We shall conditionally call the new philosophy of knowledge as Heidegger's philosophy.

Heidegger's philosophy, as a general definition of the philosophy of the Modern Age, is built on certain sets of new fundamental meanings of Being, each of which has its history. We would like to highlight the following:

1. The world around us is the Universe, the biosphere and noosphere of the Earth, which evolve.

2. The Universe, biological life and man have resulted from natural physicochemical processes, some of which have been scientifically established and proven.

3. Life and man on Earth arose as a result of abiogenesis or panspermia.

4. Modern man is a *Homo sapiens*. He has emerged from primates and differed from other anthropoid apes by a number of significant anatomical and physiological changes. For example, the brain structure and volume; bipedalism; the hyoid bone and laryngeal cartilages; the appearance of menstrual cycle; the reduction of hair cover, etc.

5. Man carries out activities that can be compared with the geological chronicle of Earth. In essence, human manifestations in the history of culture continuously and nonlinearly change the structure and appearance of the planet Earth.

The philosophy of knowledge "Those who transform the Earth" has established qualitatively new markers of human identification. Instead of an obedient, with low self-esteem, doomed to the eternal service to the Gods (God) creature, man has begun to identify himself with planetary force that is capable, in conditions of uncompromising competition with

geological and biological processes, to create a sphere of his existence on Earth – the noosphere. Or, as Moisey Rubinstein summed up in one phrase the entire essence of the book “The Vocation of Man” (in German: *Die Bestimmung des Menschen*) by Johann Gottlieb Fichte:¹ “the ultimate goal of man, in respect of himself and others, as well as in respect of the world and nature, is the accession of reason and the endless imposition and expansion of his power” (Rubinstein, 2008: 126). The philosophy “Those who transform the Earth” freed man’s worldview from dependence: “master – slave” and opened new horizons of development for man of the Modern Age.²

§ 4. From our point of view, at a given historical moment, the basis of philosophy “Those who transform the Earth” is formed by the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Without belittling the merits of previous philosophical teachings, we believe that at present Heidegger’s philosophy fully embodies the traditions of the theories of Plato’s line and establishes the fundamental markers of human identification. In his research, Heidegger not only constantly appeals to the ideas of Plato, Aristotle and other classics of Ancient Greece, but also relies on philosophical insights and generalisations of the philosophers of the Modern Age: Georg Wilhelm Hegel, Wilhelm Dilthey, Edmund Husserl and others.³ This allowed Heidegger, on the one hand, to transform philosophy into a continuous return to the initial, into the removal and destruction of everything that “conceals the truth,” into the possibility of “the restoration of the dawn’s early light at the surprising and hence *overwhelming* arrival of *Dasein* in the world.”⁴ On the other hand, constantly looking into life, in such a way, as if he was “doing this for the first time”⁵ to build a new philosophical doctrine of human, *fundamental ontology*. The meanings of Being, on which the modern educational practices of Isocrates’ line are based, follow from Heidegger’s fundamental ontology.

¹ Fichte originally published the work in 1799.

² See, for example, (Rudenko et.al., 2018)

³ In a letter to Karl Jaspers, Heidegger characterized himself as “the museum attendant, who draws the curtains aside so that the great works of philosophy should be seen more clearly” (Safranski, 2005: 565).

⁴ See (Safranski, 2005: 566).

⁵ See (Safranski, 2005: 566).

In Heidegger's philosophy, Nietzsche's phrase "God is dead!" is a borderline that separates the preceding philosophy of knowledge from new meanings of Being. In his works, Heidegger repeatedly emphasized the difference between the "old" and "new" worldviews. For example, in the "Letter on Humanism," polemicizing with rationalism and its derived forms: humanism and metaphysics, Heidegger further clarifies the previous understanding of humanism: "The *"humanum"* in the word points to *humanitas*, the essence of the human being the *"-ism"* indicates that the essence of the human being is meant to be taken essentially. <...> That requires that we first experience the essence of the human being more primordially; but it also demands that we show to what extent this essence in its own way becomes destinal. The essence of the human being lies in ek-sistence. That is what is essentially – that is, from being itself – at issue here, insofar as being appropriates the human being as ek-sisting for guardianship over the truth of being into this truth itself" (Heidegger, 1949: 262-263). Werner Jaeger wrote that the concept of "humanism", since the time of Varro and Cicero, meant the process of educating man in his true form, the real and genuine human nature.¹ In the concept of "humanism," the Romans laid the main markers of human identification, on the basis of which the educational practices according to Isocrates' line were later built. Therefore, by laying new fundamental meanings in the concept of "humanism," Heidegger further exacerbated the difference between the "old" and "new" worldviews, as well as between the "old" and "new" technologies of influencing the human brain from the social environment.

Heidegger's understanding of humanism is important for our research the fact that it focuses on the meanings of three key markers of human identification: the philosophy of knowledge "Those who transform the Earth," the meaning of human life and the cultural ideal." "Humanism" now means, in case we decide to retain the word, that the essence of the human being is essential for the truth of being, specifically in such a way that what matters is not the human being simply as such" (Heidegger, 1949: 263). In this definition of humanism, on the one hand, Heidegger emphasises the self-sufficiency of human being and the understanding of man as a powerful transforming planetary force. It follows that the philosophy of "Those who transform the Earth" has a place to be, this is a fact proven by the history of culture for the last four centuries. However,

¹(Jaeger, 1946: xviii).

on the other hand, in the definition of humanism, Heidegger emphasises that the transforming power of man has borderlines that are not dependent on the being of man.¹

The level of scientific and philosophical knowledge of the 20th century allowed Heidegger to penetrate and survey the ontology of being better than his predecessors were and, accordingly, to discover new, deeper sources of human existence. It is from the primordial depths, that is, from the fundamental ontology a true understanding of human as an idea is proceed. Therefore, Heidegger's philosophy is to convey the original destiny of human in being, the meaning of his birth in the Universe and, perhaps, the most successful attempt of this time to highlight the main markers of human presence in the Universe – Dasein's existentials.

§ 5. Philosophy of knowledge “Those who transform the Earth” defines a new meaning of human life and a cultural ideal. We denote the meaning of human life by the metaphor of “*born to create*,” and the cultural ideal as an “*intelligent person*.” First, we briefly review the history of the formation of the meaning of life “born to create.”

In the course of lectures on pedagogy, which Immanuel Kant read to students in winter semester 1776–1777,² Kant replaced the “the necessity of serving God” as the meaning of human life by a new meaning that follows from the new philosophy of knowledge. Kant wrote:

One principle of education which those men especially who form educational schemes should keep before their eyes is this – children ought to be educated, not for the present, but for a possibly improved condition of man in the future; that is, in a manner which is adapted to the idea of humanity and the whole destiny of man. ... Parents usually educate their children merely in such a manner that, however bad the world may be, they may adapt themselves to its present conditions. But they ought to give them an education so much better than this, that a better condition of things may thereby be brought about in the future [Kant, 1900].

Unlike the teachings of the Church Fathers, Kant not only allowed the possibility of man's influence the development of the world but also

¹ The author, however, develops this issue as well as Heidegger's philosophy in some of his works, for example, (Bazaluk & Kharchenko, 2018).

²The Kant Lectures were published by his student Theodor Rink in 1803 under the title of “On Education” (Kant, 1900).

argued that the ability to create and change the world depends on education:¹ “Man can only become man by education. He is merely what education makes of him” (Kant, 1900). “It may be that education will be constantly improved, and that each succeeding generation will advance one step towards the perfecting of mankind; for with education is involved the great secret of the perfection of human nature” (Kant, 1900). In the book “On the Meaning of Life,” Moisey Rubinstein revealed the transformation process of the meaning of life in the works of key thinkers of the Modern Age: from Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Georg Wilhelm Hegel and others, to Friedrich Nietzsche, Vladimir Solovyov and Henri Bergson. Rubinstein showed how “the necessity of serving God” was replaced by man’s desire to “...identify with himself, be free, active, autonomous and, therefore, moral” (Rubinstein, 2008: 127).

“Born to create,” as the meaning of human life, found its clear form already at the end of the 18th century, in the work of the German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte, who formulated it with the phrase “action for the sake of action.” Fichte presented his imperative as follows: “Act! act! it is to that end we are here. Should we fret ourselves that others are not so perfect as we are, when we ourselves are only somewhat less imperfect than they? Is not this our greatest perfection, – the vocation which has been given to us, – that we must labour for the perfecting of others? Let us rejoice in the prospect of that widely extended field which we are called to cultivate! Let us rejoice that power is given to us, and our task is infinite!” (The Christian Pioneer, 1842: 182). The new meaning of human life gave man the possibility for free realisation of the inner creative potentials. From an obedient and diligent executor of someone’s will (“the necessity of serving the Gods (God)”), man passed into “*born to create*,” to act and transform. Man “gained” freedom, which he had only to competently use. As Rubinstein’s analysis showed, it was Fichte who first discovered new perspectives of human life that followed from the new world picture and the philosophy of knowledge “Those who transform the Earth”:

...man acts as the creative power, as a builder of the essence of the world.
...nothing is given to man, he relies on himself, – his existence does not arise from essence, but, vice versa, his essence comes from his existence. Man can perfect himself by perfecting the world. However, for Fichte the existence is to

¹ See (Tytarenko & Rudenko, 2018).

act that stands at the beginning, then to act means to assert and create the moral order of the world, in which the essence of the world is laid. It is clear that man, perfecting himself and the world, creates not only his own, but its essence (Rubinstein, 2008: 129).

In 1946, the best-selling book “Man’s Search for Meaning” of the Austrian neurologist and psychiatrist Viktor Frankl was published (Frankl, 1990). The author chronicles his experiences as a concentration camp inmate and the importance of finding the meaning of life in all forms of existence to survive. Frankl introduced the concept of the “existential vacuum,” or feeling of meaninglessness into scientific literature, which was the complete opposite of “born to create.”

In reality, the meaning of life formed by Fichte at the end of the 18th century on the basis of a new world picture and the philosophy of knowledge opposes the subjective state of boredom, apathy, and emptiness, which arise from the existential vacuum. This meaning of life causes the opposite subjective states: interest, enthusiasm, passion, fullness and richness of life, purposefulness, etc. Moisey Rubinstein formulated the meaning of “born to create” as follows: “...live is to act, create, build a kingdom of reason; this meant to live with an idea, meaning conscious participation in solving global problems, participation in the infinite world creativity” (Rubinstein, 2008: 130).

§ 6. Philosophy of knowledge “Those who transform the Earth” revealed not only a new meaning of man’s existence but also formulated a new cultural ideal an “intelligent person.” The State model of education, in which the place of the Church was occupied by the State, and the place of Christ was given to the University as a social institution, moulding a free comprehensively, harmoniously developed personality, replaced Christian paideia.¹ It was in universities that scholastic thinking, which renewed the cultural ideal “man of faith” with new ideas, was replaced by the understanding of a new future human image, that was, an “intelligent person.” The need for knowledge and the cult of knowledge revived in the society again since the Enlightenment.

¹ The history of the transition from Christian paideia to the State model of education is revealed in the book of Bill Readings (Readings, 2010).

The understanding of knowledge in the Modern Age had and has its own distinctive feature. As we already know, Plato regarded knowledge as the basis of any virtue and the path to the Divine. His world of ideas and the basis of his ideal State is a certain variety of special knowledge aimed at revealing the Divine and the possibility of contact with it. In Book 7 of the "Republic," Plato listed the knowledge that "...all arts and forms of thought and all sciences employ, and which is among the first things that everybody must learn":¹ arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, music and dialectics,² or as Ilsetraut Hadot wrote: "...rather theology and philosophy of number, figure, sound and motions of celestial bodies" (Hadot, 2002: 10). In the Middle Ages, the Church Fathers encouraged only the knowledge that served to strengthen the prestige of theology and the Church as an institution of state and spiritual power. St. Augustine, inspired by Neoplatonic ideas, and then Martianus Capella, Severin Boethius and others, presented this knowledge as the Seven Liberal Arts, which formed the basis for all medieval education: arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music (sciences based on mathematical patterns), as well as grammar, rhetoric and dialectics. In Augustine's theory of education, the divine order established the order of divine knowledge.³

A new understanding of knowledge, as the basis of the cultural ideal an "intelligent person," refers to the Age of Enlightenment, when on the basis of mathematical methods the philosophy of rationalism was formed. The understanding of knowledge as *consumer knowledge* that was very close to Isocrates' understanding, i.e., the practical application of scientific achievements for the benefit of "Those who transform the Earth" and "born to create" that followed from the ideas of René Descartes, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Baruch Spinoza. "Man of faith," who used knowledge to achieve the sublime spiritual goals and to build an ideal State in the Kingdom of Heaven, was replaced by an "intelligent person," who saw a purely practical sense in knowledge. The spiritual orientation of the development of society was replaced by rationalism and freethought. An "intelligent person" needed the knowledge to become a planetary force and to expand his presence on Earth. Knowledge lost the sublime goal in the

¹ (Plato, 1994: 304).

² According to Plato, dialectics is the art of discourse through questions and answers (Plato, 1994).

³ See (Hadot, 2002: 117-118).

guide to the realm of the divine (according to Plato) and the possibility of contemplation and compliance with the divine law (according to Augustine).¹ They became a daily necessity, an attribute of daily existence. It was in the Enlightenment that Isocrates' ideas finally triumphed over Plato's ideas!

The new cultural ideal completely changed the human values and the goals of education as deliberately moulding human character in accordance with an ideal. In the emerging State models of education of the Modern Age, the need for self-realization and creativity began to be regarded as a purpose of man's life, his mission, vocation, and destiny. The mentoring institute, which originated in the traditions of the theories of education according to Plato's line, and which presupposed the dialogical form of learning, i.e. a question/ answer method that the teachers had been using nearly decades to prepare students for making their choices, in order for them to follow a certain way of life, was lost. Investigating this issue, Pierre Hadot pointed out that two important changes occurred in modern philosophy (Hadot, 2005). Firstly, philosophy has ceased to be regarded as the highest stage of education and a way of life. In the theories of education according to Plato's line of the second stage of development, practically nothing remains of the Platonic school traditions. School/university unification of training programs, which allow anyone to get a diploma in order to be an official and to make a career; teaching in the numerous student groups, i.e. to teach no one; etc. are teachings according to the Isocrates school traditions. Secondly, philosophy has turned into a purely formal research of another generalising system that further distances it from people's lives, from its true destiny, which follows from the life and death of Socrates, and Plato's theory of education *is a way of life*. Even in Heidegger's fundamental ontology, which, from our point of view, defines contemporary meanings of being, *producing discourse about philosophy* prevails over the necessity of *being a philosophy* in Socrates' understanding.

The educational theories of the second stage are devoted to continuous rethinking and reevaluation of the meaning of "born to create" and the achievement of the cultural ideal an "intelligent person." For example, starting from the theories of education by Wolfgang Ratke, Jan Amos Komensku, John Locke, Wilhelm von Humboldt, etc. and finishing with the modern theories proposed by Ivan Illich, Paulo Freire, John Bowlby, and

¹See (Augustine, 2000).

others, which developed the education technologies influencing the human brain, in order to maximize the full disclosure of his internal creative potentials. The cultural ideal of an “intelligent person” concentrated on man’s wish to realise his inner potentials in objective reality; achieve inner harmony as well as social and material benefits through a standard set of knowledge and information.

§ 7. Using the theories of education of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Johann Pestalozzi, Marie Montessori and Paulo Freire, we shall briefly consider the features of the formation and development of new fundamental meanings of human being over the last 400 years of the history of culture.

In the second half of the 18th century, Jean-Jacques Rousseau emphasized the importance of education as follows: “We are born weak, we need strength; we are born destitute of all things, we need assistance; we are born stupid, we need judgment. All that we have not at our birth, and that we need when grown up, is given us by education” (Rousseau, 1889: 12). Rousseau differentiated education into three components, among which there was no philosophy “Created by God.” Rousseau wrote in his work “Emile, or on Education”:

This education comes to us from nature itself, or from other men, or from circumstances. The internal development of our faculties and of our organs is the education nature gives us; the use we are taught to make of this development is the education we get from other men; and what we learn, by our own experience, about things that interest us, is the education of circumstances (Rousseau, 1889: 12).

In Rousseau’s theory of education, the meaning of human life was no longer connected with the necessity of serving the Gods (God), it was laid in act: “To live is not merely to breathe, it is to act. It is to make use of our organs, of our senses, of our faculties, of all the powers which bear witness to us of our own existence” (Rousseau, 1889: 15).

At the beginning of the 19th century, developing the philosophy of education “Those who transform the Earth,” a new understanding of the meaning of human life and a cultural ideal, Johann Pestalozzi formulated the basic principle of education: education should be built according to the natural course of mental development in a child. Michael Heafford, a researcher of the works by Pestalozzi, writes: “The three elements “head, heart, and hands” are inseparable from each other in Pestalozzi’s method:

“Nature forms the child as an indivisible whole, as a vital organic unity with many-sided moral, mental, and physical capacities. <...>Each of these capacities is developed through and by means of the others”, Pestalozzi argued” (Heafford, 1967).

In the 20th century, the philosophy of “Those who transform the Earth” the meaning of human life “born to create” and the cultural ideal an “intelligent person” became even more widespread and well established in the theories of education. For example, according to Montessori Method, children were given a maximum of freedom, but under the supervision of trained specialists (Montessori renamed her teacher a “directress”). In Montessori’s view, the main task of directresses was not to impose tasks or activities on children but to “guide children as they taught themselves to learn.”

The directress, an educator properly trained in the Montessori Method, was to guide children in their own self-development. Trained in the clinical observation of children and scientific pedagogy, the directress needed to be sensitive to children’s readiness and stages of development. She was to establish the prepared environment, with its appropriate apparatus and materials, and cooperate in the children’s own self-education (The Montessori, 2004: 17).

In the middle of the 20th century, Paulo Freire proposed a theory of education that was built on the opposition of a “massified” society of adjusted and domesticated human beings,¹ which reached critical consciousness. Freire introduced the term – conscientização (conscientization), that he denoted as “...*the awakening* of critical consciousness” (Freire, 2003: 34). As the basis of Freire’s theory of education was his convention that

...the role of men and women was not only to be in the world, but to engage in relations with the world – that through acts of creation and re-creation, we make cultural reality and thereby add to the natural world, which we did not create (Freire, 2003: 59).

Freire regarded education as the practice of democracy and freedom, overcoming hierarchies, the problem of teacher dominance over students, etc.

¹ (Freire, 2003: 24).

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**THE MISSING LINK BETWEEN LOGIC AND AESTHETICS.
KANT ON THE AESTHETIC-LOGICAL NATURE OF THE
PRAGMATIC I**

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Abstract: *We know today Kant's importance in founding modern Anthropology; we also know that Kant undertakes this by excising Anthropology from a metaphysical trunk, and that instead of inoculating it in another trunk, Kant rather singularly replants it in a different soil, through a different method, as its own self-sufficient trunk.*

Not so widely known, however, is the new position of this science. For, according to Kant, such a transplantation did not mean its isolation. Quite on the contrary, Anthropology is the ante-chamber of man's self-knowledge, and this makes it not a dissociating, rather an agglutinating pole of the surrounding branches of knowledge. Now, among such branches, two singularly exemplify this process: one which seems detached from Anthropology – that of Logic – and one which is now part of the Anthropology, that of Aesthetics. There is, of course, a singular relation between these three fields of knowledge. And so our question is: what is the relation of Anthropology to logic (and hence, to the critique) and to aesthetics? What aspirations may Anthropology have in fulfilling one of Kant's main designs: that of uniting such opposites and thereby claim the superior dignity of the science of man? And what role do these two domains have in the inception of Kant's anthropological thought?

The answer(s) to this, we believe, reside in Kant's proposition of a new I and the I's new pragmatic vision. Namely, Kant proposes an I in the world, an alternative, for dual, or plural form to the I's egoism, one which at once seeks to satisfy the claims of Logic, by knowing itself and the world, and those of Aesthetics, by experiencing pleasure in its knowledge of itself and its species in the world. This pluralism, we hope to prove, is to be seen not only as a factor of necessary distinction, but also as a factor of possible union between that which separates Logic and Aesthetics: logical egoism and aesthetic egoism.

Keywords: *Kant, Anthropology, Aesthetics, Logic, pragmatic I*

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I. The endogenous causes of Kant's anthropological thought

Upon searching for the causes of Kant's anthropological endeavor, one may easily see how numerous, as well as openly visible these are. Of this kind are, at least, those causes which may be said to be *superficial*, be this because they are immediately patent to all, or simply because they were stated as such by Kant himself. Among the first ones are, for instance, the inexistence of Anthropology as a scientific knowledge¹, the ambiguity of an anthropological definition as such² or the absence of Anthropology as an academic discipline³, among other external stimuli and circumstances which led to the rise of a science of man. Among the second ones, not unrelated to the first, are those which Kant evokes in the "Prooemia" and the "Prolegomena" of his *Lectures on Anthropology*, as well as in the

¹ The inexistence of Anthropology as a science may be best seen through its lexicographic proof. As such, if one seeks the term "Anthropology", or its respective foreign word, throughout dictionaries in the 17th and 18th centuries, one finds that there is no occurrence of the word: of this are examples Henisch (1616), Bullokar (1641), Blount (1656), Schottel (1663), Stieler (1691) or Steinbach (1734). Indeed, it is not until John Kersey's *Dictionarium Anglo-Britannicum, or a General English Dictionary* (1708), that the term "Anthropology" is finally considered, under the following words: "Anthropology, a discourse or description of Man, or of a Man's body" (unpag.) And in Germany, this does not take place until even later, namely, in Johann Christoph Adelung's *Versuch eines vollständigen grammatisch-kritischen Wörterbuches der Hochdeutschen Mundart* (1774-1786): "The Anthropology: from the Greek *Anthropologia*: The doctrine of men, their parts and relations both in a teological and in a physical and moral regard" (...).

² Such ambiguity is rendered patent by the very titles of anthropology, or anthropology-like manuals of the time, wherein Anthropology is still very much intertwined with Medicine, Psychology or Physiology, among others: namely, Otto Casmann's *Psychologia Anthropologica* (1594); Riolan's *Anthropographia et Osteologia* (1618); Meisner's *Anthropologia Sacra* (1619); Kyper's *Anthropologia Corporis Humanum* (1647); Sperling's *Synopsys Anthropologiae Physicae* (1659); Hartmann's *Anthropologiae Physico-Medico-Anatomicae* (1696); Teichmeyer's *Elementa Anthropologiae Sive Theoria Corporis Humani* (1719); or even Platner's *Anthropologie für Ärzte und Weltweisen* (1772), which was of great influence for Kant.

³ Kant himself states this: see AA 25.2: 856. Today, however, we know this not to be entirely true. The exception was Gottfried Polycarp Müller's course of anthropology, ministered in Leipzig, in 1719.

“Preface” to his *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*: namely, Anthropology’s subjection to metaphysics (AA 25.1: 7-8), the illusory or unnecessary character of anthropological cognitions (AA 25.2: 733), the unaccountability of anthropological knowledge (AA 7: 121), the volatility of anthropological factors in general (id.) and, last but not least, man’s natural tendency to dissimulate (ibid.).

Beyond these causes, however, there are others which are not superficial, and hence cannot be sought externally. For, let it be noted, in the period in question – the decade(s) prior to the realization of Kant’s anthropological reflection, at the beginning of the 70s –, there takes place something as a joint consideration of the several sciences, their task, their destination and, above all, their exact delimitation, in Kant’s spirit. By this we refer to a gradual, yet not at all isolated process of *reciprocal delimitation of the various scientific fields*: a general disposition of knowledges in Kant’s spirit, perhaps one never really concluded¹, but which must not be dissociated from Kant’s activity as Professor of such knowledges in the University of Königsberg². Now, from this joint disposition and the natural doubts inherent to it, which in truth tacitly contain the aforementioned superficial causes, are to be extracted endogenous, profound causes: causes of a structural, or *structuralizing* order not only regarding Anthropology itself, or Anthropology regarding other scientific fields, but especially regarding the relevant role anthropological thought would play for the great philosopher. Such

¹ The process of the mutual disposition of the various fields of knowledge in Kant’s spirit was never really consummated mainly because of two reasons. The first one is due to *the supplementary difficulty of definitively fixing rising or newborn sciences*; for, let it be noted, the 18th century is per excellence the century of the birth of the modern – i.e. scientific – conceptions of various fields of knowledge, such as that of Psychology, Aesthetics or Anthropology. The second reason is one inherent to Kant’s own manner of thinking the different fields of thought: namely, while aiming at delimitating all fields of knowledge, Kant simultaneously believed in the intimate interconnection and inter-cooperation of all fields of thought; which, quite naturally, led to an unsurmountable difficulty in establishing due boundaries between them. The natural tension between these two objectives is one patent throughout Kant’s work.

² By the end of the 1760’s, Kant was ministering lectures on Logic, Metaphysics, Geography, Physics, Moral, Law and Mathematics in the University of Königsberg.

causes, we believe, prove the connection of the origin of Kant's anthropological thought with any other science, be it naturally adjacent to Anthropology or not; and to any of these causes, and the respective connection between Anthropology and a foreign field of thought, could be devoted, despite their natural concealment, an essay such as this one.

The present article departs from this very assumption; and, because it cannot intend to ascertain more than *one* of these profound causes, it shall focus on that which is one of the germs of Kant's anthropological thought, in this case, the rise of Anthropology between the indeed akin, yet long parted *Logic and Aesthetics*. Hence, we intend to inquire for the relation of Anthropology, by then a rising science (not only in Kant's spirit), with Logic and Aesthetics; and this, we intend to do through two steps which we aim at taking while bearing in mind the fulfilment of this objective:

1) Firstly, we intend to see to what extent Kant finds traces of an anthropological soil for the study of the human being both in Logic, and also in Aesthetics; and, along with this, we aim at seeing to what extent such traces result in a pioneering vision of the science of Anthropology;

2) Lastly, we want to ascertain whether on the part of Anthropology itself, as is conceived by Kant, there may be no longer traces, but proofs of what was proposed in 1). This we aim at doing through the analysis of what Kant understands by logical and aesthetic egoism, as well as pragmatic-anthropological pluralism.

II. Anthropology, the missing link between two long-lost sisters, Logic and Aesthetics

Among the many and much-varied topics dealt with in the introduction to Kant's logic courses transcribed by Gottlob Benjamin Jäsche¹, such as the objective, the division or the different applications of Logic, a topic emerges as one of singular importance for Kant: *the relation between Logic and Aesthetics*², a topic which is not only recurrently brought to

¹ "Immanuel Kant's Logik. Ein handbuch zu Vorlesungen", the summary of more than three decades of Kant's lectures as a Professor of Logic, published by the editor of the writing, Gottlob Benjamin Jäsche, in 1800 (AA 9: 1-87).

² The present theme has indeed been approached in several of its different possible perspectives: namely, regarding the importance of Kant's thought on logic for his aesthetics; the importance of aesthetic thought within Kant's

discussion in this writing but reemerges quite frequently throughout the Kantian *corpus*¹.

The theme of the relation between Logic and Aesthetics does not arise here innocently, as innocent is not Kant's recurrent interest in it. The theme had already been proposed in Meier's *Anfangsgründe aller Schönen Wissenschaften* (1748), as well as in the *Vernunftlehre* (1752), which, not by chance, Kant would use as a support manual for his own lectures on logic, and also in Baumgarten's *Ästhetik*² (1750-1758) and *Metaphysik* (1739), which, not by chance, would be Kant's support manual for his lectures on anthropology and his later reflections on aesthetics. In all these works, which are after all intimately interconnected³, both Meier

anthropology; the anthropological nature of the Kantian *sensus communis*; Kant as one of the founders of philosophical pluralism, among others. However, we believe a topic as the one herein approached, such as *the role of Anthropology as a possible mediator between Logic and Aesthetics; as well as Logic and Aesthetics, and their mutual reflection, as a fundamental mutual ground for the inception of an Anthropology*, have not yet been thought, at least not in their endogenous nature in Kant, elsewhere. Exceptions to this, notable because they have somewhat sensed such a fact, are to be found in: GANS, Eric, "Kant's Aesthetic Anthropology", in *The Scenic Imagination: Originary thinking from Hobbes to the Present Day*, California: Stanford University Press, 2008; CAPOZZI, Mirella, *Kant e la logica*, vol. 1, Bibliopolis, 2002; KAUARK-LEITE, Patrícia, Kant, Ciência e Sensus Communis, in *Estudos Kantianos*, v. 5, n. 1, 283-294; HILL, Thomas E.Jr., "Kantian Pluralism" in *Ethics* Vol. 102, No. 4 (Jul., 1992), pp. 743-762; WILSON, Ross, *Subjective Universality in Kant's Aesthetics*, Bern: Peter Lang, 2007; SANTOS, Leonel Ribeiro, "A Concepção Kantiana da Experiência Estética: Novidades, Tensões e Equilíbrios, in *Trans/Form/Ação*, Marília, v. 33, n. 2, p. 35-76, 2010.

¹ Namely, the theme is recurrent in all of Professor Kant's lectures on logic, but most notably in "Logik-Philippi" (AA 24.1: 303-496), dated 1772, and "Logik-Dohna" (PH: 379-505), dated 1792.

² Here taken in its undeniable connection with Baumgarten's lecture on Aesthetics, as transcribed in Bernhard Poppe, *Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Seine Bedeutung und Stellung in der Leibniz-Wolffischen Philosophie und seine Beziehungen zu Kant*. Borna-Leipzig: Robert Noske, 1907, and cited hereafter as AGB.

³ The interconnection between Baumgarten and Meier should be sought not only in their professional relationship, insofar as Meier was first and foremost Baumgarten's student and also divulger and translator of his opinions; but it should also be sought in their personal relationship, in the bond of esteem which

and Baumgarten would think the contours of a relation between Logic and Aesthetics; both would agree that Logic and Aesthetic are indeed sisters, and that if Logic is the older sister regarding theory, Aesthetics is the older one regarding its exercise (AGB: 79)¹; and, what is most important, both would acknowledge the incontrovertible distance to which time had brought these twin sprouts, and which these branches of knowledge indeed had, but also and above all the need to think *the possibility of a mutual cooperation between Logic and Aesthetics* – something which would deeply influence Kant. For, so says Baumgarten, “if the understanding is to be improved, then Aesthetics must come to the aid of Logic” (id.: 66)². And – Baumgarten himself compliments – *one must be able to speak the tongue of the understanding, but also [that of] sensibility* (id.: 74).

Hence, it must come as no surprise that this very topic, and even *this very order of analysis of this topic*, reappear so precociously as well as pungently in Kant’s work – as it does, for instance, in “Logik-Jäsche”. As such, here, quite similarly to his predecessors, Kant begins by approaching *the differences between Logic and Aesthetics*, which are as necessary as they are undeniable, and are aimed at limiting the two fields of thought. Such differences are evident. For, according to Kant – who begins by analyzing *Logic* – the object of Logic is the action of the human understanding and the rules “a priori, that is, independently from all experience” (AA 9: 12) of the latter. Logic is therefore, in this sense, a “canon” (id.: 13), a “propaedeutic of the entire use of the understanding” (ibid.), a “grammar” (id.: 12) of the pure, non-empirical operations of the understanding; and as the “science of the form of our intellectual cognitions, or thought” (ibid.), and we adduce, a science which labors *in*

links both philosophers and enabled Meier to publish his Professor’s views on aesthetics *avant la lettre* (1748), that is, even prior to his Professor’s own exposition (in 1750); a bond which is demonstrated in the “Preface” to Baumgarten’s *Ästhetik*.

¹ “We designate Logic Aesthetics’ older sister with regard to theory; otherwise, with regard to the exercise, Aesthetics would be the older” (AGB: 79). See also *Ästhetik*, § 13 (Aesth I: 17, 19).

² All citations, not only Kant’s, but also from other authors, will be presented in a traditional manner (Abbreviation of work, Volume of work, number of page(s)). All citations have been translated from their original German language into English. The citations are of my own translation.

real time by simultaneously applying itself to the cognitions of the understanding; in a word, as an a priori science, Logic is above all a doctrine or a critique of the “self-knowledge of the understanding and reason” (id.: 14). Logic, thus summarizes Kant, is “no art of inventing in general, nor an organon of truth” (id.: 20); but rather “useful and indispensable as a critique of knowledge” (ibid.).

Kant then presents, without further ado, a brief characterization of *Aesthetics* (id.: 15); and, also according to this characterization, there are between Logic and *Aesthetics* essential differences, recognizable in all the previous parameters of Logic and in a certain way known to all. Namely, *Aesthetics* deals with the representations of human sensibility and the a posteriori rules of the latter: “Namely, the *Aesthetics* contains the rules of the concordance of knowledge with the laws of sensibility” (ibid.). *Aesthetics*, one could therefore say, is not a “canon (law)” (ibid.), “rather just a norm (model or plummet merely for appreciation)” (ibid.); and so, contrarily to Baumgarten, Kant says that *Aesthetics* is not, and “can never become a science or a doctrine” (ibid.), rather it is and must be designated, as is Home’s opinion, as a “critique” (ibid.), “since it gives no rules a priori which may sufficiently determine the judgment, as does Logic, rather it extracts its rules a posteriori, and renders more general the empirical laws, according to which we recognize the more imperfect and the more perfect (beautiful), only through comparison” (ibid.) And hence, we subsume, *Aesthetics deals with subjective principles on how sensibility should be felt, and not, as does Logic, with objective principles on how the understanding thinks* (id.: 16). *Aesthetics is therefore empirical, Logic pure; Aesthetics is fortuitous, non-systematizable, Logic is necessary and the system of human thought. Aesthetics is the critique of sensibility; Logic is the critique of the operations of the understanding and reason.*

Now, thus considered both Logic and *Aesthetics*, this only seems to prove that between the two *there can be only scission*; for they are not only different, but, we reiterate, they are *essentially different*: they are different in the different powers of the spirit with which they labor, they are different in their procedure and, as such, they are different in their ultimate objectives. And because of this, Kant concludes by saying, as a final definition of Logic, that it is “an a priori science of the necessary laws of thinking, but not regarding individual objects, rather all objects in general” (id.:16); namely, “a science of the correct use of the understanding and reason in general, but not a subjective one, i. e., not

according to empirical (psychological) principles” (ibid.) – thus depriving Aesthetics, which is at most *a critique of the empirical laws of sensibility*, or *a critique of the correct use of sensibility in general*, of all universality, all the purity which could elevate Aesthetics to the condition of Logic and hence renew ties with its sister.

However, despite the world of differences between Logic and Aesthetics, Kant, just as his precursors, believed that not all is different between these two critiques. Instead, there must be *a soil of approximation, a field of cooperation, though amid their disunion, between Logic and Aesthetics*. And even though Kant never quite brings this here, or elsewhere, to word, he does so almost tacitly, through half-words, not only in this writing but also in others, and especially through the whole of his own future course as a thinker.

Let us then explain Kant’s vision of *a possible approximation between Logic and Aesthetics* – firstly, from the point of view of *Logic*. Signs thereof are discernible on a structural level, that is, regarding Logic’s own position, as well as its common position, among other sciences and fields of knowledge; and hence, such signs are to be found not only in the exposition of the intent and utility, but especially in that of the “main divisions of Logic” (Log AA 9: 16). Hence, Kant states, there are several main divisions in Logic; and while one of them does not deserve special consideration from us, for it is indeed manifest and fundamental – namely, the division of Logic in Analytic and Dialectic¹ – all the other divisions merit our author’s consideration. Consideration which, let it be noted, consists first and foremost of a delimitative, for depurative correction of the concept of Logic.

Now, regarding the first one, the division of Logic in *natural or popular logic* and *artificial or scientific logic*, it is Kant’s belief that such a division is “untenable” (id.: 16), for “natural logic or the logic of common reason (sensuscommunis) is really no logic, rather an anthropological science which has only empirical principles” (ibid.), insofar as it deals only with the rules of the use of the understanding and reason *in concreto*, and not *in abstracto* – as does scientific logic. Indeed, Kant defends something quite similar regarding the second case, that of the division of Logic in *theoretical logic* and *practical logic*. Kant considers this division to be “incorrect” (id.: 17), for a logic which claims to be a canon “cannot have

¹ See AA 9: 16-17.

any practical part" (ibid.). This would be a "*contradictio in adjecto*" (ibid.), insofar as a logic would presuppose the "knowledge of a certain kind of objects to which it is applied" (ibid.); which, in turn, would mean that there had to be a dogmatic and a technical part (see id.: 18) of logic, thus further accentuating the error. And accentuate it would, namely, in the third case of a false division of Logic, its division in *pure logic* and *applied logic*. For, according to Kant, and in conformity with the previous remarks, in pure logic the understanding is, as it should be, dissociated from the remaining powers of the spirit; but in an applied logic, where the understanding cannot act on its own, it must be seen amid the other powers and hence as being influenced in its actions and proceeding according to rules other than its own¹. From this, follows – Kant says – that "Applied logic should not be designated as logic. It is a psychology in which we observe how our thinking tends to proceed, and not how it should proceed" (id.: 18). And, for this precise reason, "it [applied logic] is not propaedeutic. For psychology, from which everything in applied logic must be drawn, is a part of the philosophical sciences of which Logic must be a propaedeutic" (ibid.). And hence, Kant concludes, Logic has nothing to do neither with *common understanding (sensus communis)*, nor with *speculative understanding*². Namely, and in a word, *Logic rejects the natural, the applicative, the practical, which display how the understanding should proceed in such dimensions of its action, rather accepts the artificial or scientific, the theoretical and the pure, which show how the understanding indeed proceeds in such dimensions of its action.*

Now, to be sure, Kant's previous presentation of the main divisions of Logic, especially if seen through the point of view of its eminently circumscribing character, only seems to further separate and isolate Logic and Aesthetics. But, let it be noted, there is a different side to this question; *curiously enough, a different side which is best discerned not in the light, but when we keep it in the shade.* The explanation for such a seeming paradox is simple, and we need but return to Kant's prior expounding of the main divisions of Logic, and depart from these, in order to obtain it.

¹ "Applied Logic considers the understanding insofar as it is mixed with other forces of the spirit, which influence its actions and give it a crooked direction, so that it does not proceed according to laws which it itself perceives as being the correct ones" (AA 9: 18).

² See AA 9: 19.

For, indeed, our point of departure must be Kant's exclusion of certain parts of Logic. Some as untenable, others as incorrect. But, as an equal fundamental point in the question, stands the fact that *such parts – a natural logic, an applied logic, a practical logic – do indeed exist*; and if they do, and Kant presents them under such a name, then this must mean that Kant acknowledges in them, if not something akin to Logic as such, then *at least something which is nearest to Logic, something which necessarily borders directly on Logic, or with a less logical dimension of Logic, to the extent that both may be inter-relatable*. Hence, as it seems, in that which Logic is not, in that which marks its isolation, is nonetheless that which Kant acknowledges to be closest to what it is – that is, that which Logic is not, but is nonetheless *the first thing that it is not* – which therefore Kant recognizes as being in relation to Logic; so much so, that with time Kant, in “Logik-Philippi” and “Logik-Dohna”, would actually come to acknowledge and ascribe greater validity to such extensions of Logic – *and, what is most important, would indeed see them as (divisions of) Logic*¹. Now – and here is *the kern of the question* – that which is on the other side of Logic in general, the first thing that Logic is not, and yet for this reason precisely cannot but be, is, according to Kant, precisely that applied, natural, practical logic. But *those kinds of logic, Kant confesses, are none other than Empirical Psychology, or, in other words, the science of Anthropology, which Kant indeed expresses here as such, and which therefore Kant admits is in*

¹ Indeed, in “Logik-Philippi” as well as in “Logik-Dohna”, such divisions of Logic are not at all at once inverted, nor does Kant state precisely the opposite that he had stated in “Logik-Jäsche”. No. That is, there are still shades of doubt hanging over Kant's position, and by then Kant was still struggling with such concepts, their validity and applicability. But *there is clearly a shift in Kant's opinion*. The proof of this is first and foremost in “Logik-Philippi”, where Kant, conversely to his position in “Logik-Jäsche”, not only acknowledges a “natural use” (“natürliche Gebrauch” (AA 24.1: 311)) of logic, and uses the expression “Logica naturalis, which is the science of the rules of common and natural understanding” (id.: 314), but even acknowledges that “Under its domain [the domain of Logica naturalis] belong the fine arts, because here all depends on taste” (ibid.), thus drawing Logic and Aesthetics closer. Moreover, in “Logik-Philippi” there is also reference to the existence of a “practical” logic (id.: 318). Likewise, in “Logik-Dohna”, Kant speaks of a “Logica naturalis (natural)” (PH: 395) and even in a “Logic of sane understanding, sensus communis” (id.: 396), thus again linking Logic and Aesthetics through a third plane.

some kind of relation with Logic¹. Indeed, a positive-negative relation, one which is very difficult to ascertain and very dubious even for Kant; *but a relation nonetheless*. And hence, this is no doubt important because Kant does indeed succeed in bringing Logic and Aesthetics closer together – through Anthropology²; but this is especially important because *here, in his reflection on the relation between Logic and Aesthetics, lies one of Kant's first references to the position, the task, the objective of the Anthropology – or to Anthropology as such – and, thus, also what may be considered as one of Kant's first attempts to delineate the scientific ground of Anthropology, in its relation to other fields of thought, and in his spirit*.

But let us momentarily suspend this thought and let us now approach the *possible approximation between Logic and Aesthetics* – now from the point of view of *Aesthetics*. Signs of this are patent not only regarding the whole, but regarding the very structure of both fields of knowledge. For, indeed, it is visible that both Aesthetics and Logic are, each in its own way, *a critique*³; both are represented by powers of the mind which prevail in them; and hence, because sensibility and understanding have more than a contingent relation, then both Aesthetics and Logic depend on the efficacy of its representations, as does each of them depend on the efficacy of the representations of the other; which is why both Kant and Baumgarten always align their structure in strict consonance, namely,

¹ We cite Kant again, but now in a different light: “natural logic or the logic of common reason (sensuscommunis) is really no logic, rather *an anthropological science* which has only empirical principles” (AA 9: 16, my ital.); and: “Applied logic should not be designated as logic. It is a *psychology* in which we observe how our thinking tends to proceed and not how it should proceed” (AA 9: 18, my ital.)

² Inasmuch as this Empirical Psychology, or Anthropology, which Kant now did not distinguish from one another (but would do so from 1772 onwards) would come to be, from 1772 onwards, if not already prior to this, in intimate connection with several topics of Aesthetics – which is proved by the inclusion of such topics, as well as considerations of an aesthetic nature, in Kant's lectures and reflections on Anthropology.

³ “Aesthetics allows no doctrine, only a critique” (PH: 394; also AA 24.1: 15); “Logics is hence more than mere critique; it is a canon which later serves as critique” (AA 24.1: 15). Baumgarten, as is natural, would disagree as to Aesthetics merely critical function, as shall be expounded below, and is proved in § 5 of the *Ästhetik* (Aesth I: 13).

logical and aesthetic greatness, aesthetic and logical perfection of knowledge, logical and aesthetic clarity, logical and aesthetic obscurity and/or error or falsity, logical and aesthetic probability, logical and aesthetic truth, and so forth. Aesthetics, we could then say with Bouhours, is “la logique sans epines” (AGB: 66). And Aesthetics, we could also conclude with Baumgarten, is an “analogon rationis” (id.: 66).

However, looking beyond mere structure and once again to that which Kant and Baumgarten designate as the *main divisions of Aesthetics*, we note that not only this consonance is preserved, but it reveals something else regarding the relation between Aesthetics and Logic. For, indeed, Baumgarten says and Kant partly corroborates, just as Logic, also Aesthetics is divided in 1) natural aesthetic and artificial or scientific aesthetics, 2) theoretical and practical aesthetics and 3) pure and applied aesthetics, the latter representing, *grosso modo*, the science, the critique and self-application of sensible knowledge in general. Now, how Baumgarten justifies and accepts the reciprocal relations between these divisions of Aesthetics, how Baumgarten proves the validity and reality of all the divisions of *both these Aesthetics, and their relation to Logic*, that is stated in his *Ästhetik*, and on this fact we shall say no further¹. But here, once again, Kant differs from Baumgarten, and had Kant aligned the main divisions of Aesthetics *as did Baumgarten*, and he would once again say that such a division is “untenable” and “incorrect”, insofar as the knowledge of Aesthetics cannot obey to superior principles, it cannot be subject to rules, and hence Aesthetics cannot be a science². Now, what this division that Kant did not establish, but which may be easily subsumed from his discourse, means, is, once again, that just as in Logic, there are also *two dimensions in Aesthetics*: and if one, the artificial, the theoretical, the pure one cannot exist for the Professor of Königsberg, then this means that *the dimension which Kant acknowledges as being properly aesthetic in Aesthetics is that of its naturalness, its practicality, its applicability in nature*. A dimension which, in truth, Kant always underscores when he refers to Aesthetics, and which not by chance he inscribes not only in “Logik-Jäsche” but also in “Logik-Philippi”. For, we

¹ “Just as artificial logic relates to natural [logic], so does artificial aesthetics relate to natural [aesthetics]” (AGB: 72); and: “Just as logic as art relates to logic as science, so does aesthetics as art relate to aesthetic as science” (id.: 78).

² See AA 24.1: 15.

reiterate, Aesthetics is for Kant “norm” (AA 9: 15); and because “our sensibility is in constant activity” (AA 24.1: 353), and because “the general laws of sensibility are extracted from concrete cases” (id.), then there is no solution for Aesthetics but to be the organon of these concrete cases and this continuous sensible activity: the registry of the naturalness of human pleasure and displeasure, the plummet of the practicality inherent to human taste, the critique of the exercise of human sensibility.

Now, just as in the case of Logic, a similar exercise on the main divisions of Aesthetics does not seem to bring Logic and Aesthetics any closer than the similarity of their divisions. Yet, there is here another factor, one pertaining to that which, in Kant’s view, are *the essential characteristics of Aesthetics*. For, upon stripping it away from its scientific division, Aesthetics is left with its natural character, its practical nature, in a word, its exercising scope, all of which characterize it as such. Aesthetics, we could then say, is the manifestation of the *natural*, not only the natural in man, but of man in the natural (in Baumgarten’s words, Aesthetics is “*physis, nature*” (Aesth I: 27), thereby referring not to the artificial, not to an acquired science, but to the natural qualities in man for the aesthetic feeling, in its relation to the world); Aesthetics is *practical* for it is constituted in that very relation between interiority and exteriority, and Aesthetics is *applicative, or exercising*, because it progresses towards perfecting such practicality. But then, if the Aesthetics is – at least in Kant’s view of it – *natural*, then there is no doubt that this dimension of it, while it does not seem to connect directly with Logic, not even to natural Logic, has at least one point of affinity with it: namely, *its more than fortuitous relation with the aforementioned Empirical Psychology, or Anthropology – the one which is, as such, in some kind of relation with natural logic*. The explanation for this association, we believe, is obvious. For if we consider the “Prolegomena” and “Prooemia” of several of Kant’s Anthropology courses, as well as the initial observations of his *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798), and especially the metaphoric herein employed by Kant, we may easily perceive that *natural, practical and applicative are therein recurring and central terms: they mean precisely that which is the main design of a pragmatic anthropology – the description of the natural in men¹, the observation of men in their day to day*

¹ «Through this we shall ascertain what in man is natural, and what in it is artificial or acquired – that is the hardest, and this shall be our main object: to

*practice*¹, the comprehension of man's prudent application in the world²; the Anthropology which, to be sure, proceeds according to an empirical method which is also akin to the Aesthetics in Kantian sense. Now, in face of this new tacitly ascertained association, we thus conclude that *natural aesthetics has a more than casual relation with Anthropology, as does natural logic*, and that hence, *just as natural logic, natural aesthetics too must be thought together with Anthropology*. Blatant proofs of this are given by Kant himself: firstly, when the philosopher inscribes topics which are aesthetic in nature, as are those of genius, wit or taste, among others, in his anthropology – and this precisely is the part which Kant would designate as the *practical part* of anthropology; secondly, insofar as the aesthetic topics thus inscribed by Kant in the anthropology are not just any topics, rather those which Baumgarten himself had contemplated in the *Ästhetik's* section on “Natural aesthetics” (Aesth I: 27-39), which, according to him, are part of the character traits of the “*felicis aethetici*” (id.: 27), as are, namely, the capacity to feel (id.: 29, § 30), the power of imagination (ibid.: § 31), wit (id.: 31, § 32), memory (ibid.: § 33), the capacity to poetize (ibid.: § 34), taste (id.: 31-32, § 35), prescience (id.: 33, § 36) or the power of designation (ibid., § 37) – all of them without exception recurrently considered in Kant's Lectures on Anthropology and the Anthropology in a Pragmatic Point of View.

In sum, and to once and for all leave this structural perspective of the problem and adopt the perspective of its whole – and at the same time resume our previously interrupted line of thought – we conclude that *there is indeed a soil ripe for the approximation, a field for a possible cooperation between Logic and Aesthetics. This field is that of Empirical Psychology and/or Anthropology*, which now seems to emerge between the other two and harmonize what is opposite in them. And yet, Kant remarks and we reiterate, Logic in general and Aesthetics in general are not that *easily conciliable*; neither is the Anthropology simply the *field of dialogue* between

separate man, insofar as it is natural, from men carved by education and other influences” (...)» (AA 25.1: 8,9).

¹ “The most appropriate is the theoretical in school, but the instruction that renders us prudent is the instruction to the practical, how we are to make use of our dexterity” (AA 25.2: 855).

² “As such, not speculatively, rather pragmatically, according to rules of prudence, in applying its knowledge, shall man be studied, and this is Anthropology” (AA 25.1: 470).

both; nor the Anthropology in general simply arise between the two. Quite on the contrary, 1) *it is the empirical dimensions of both domains, namely, natural, practical, applicative logic and natural, practical, applicative aesthetics – and these only – which shall be contemplated in Anthropology and will find here common ground*¹. On the other hand, 2) if such exercising dimensions of natural logic and natural aesthetics are to coincide in Anthropology, this cannot take place in just any kind of anthropology; instead, *this can only take place in an anthropology on a pragmatic point of view, insofar as only this pragmatism – and not a physiological, or psychological, or medicinal, or any other sort of anthropology – may host the natural, applicative, practical characteristics of a natural logic and a natural aesthetics*. Lastly, 3) an anthropology in a pragmatic point of view cannot simply arise, without further explanation, between Logic and Aesthetics – as if it could fit between the two, or as if its field embraced the soils of both Logic and Aesthetics. For both assumptions are wrong; the first one because the scope of Kant's pragmatic anthropology is not that exiguous; the second one because that same scope is not that ample. Instead, the anthropology, if seen from a pragmatic point of view, links natural logic and natural aesthetics through a third intermediary path, namely, because *its scope reaches precisely from the natural dimension of Logic to the natural dimension of Aesthetics, inside of which it has its jurisdiction, but outside of which it has not*. And the reason for this is manifest. For soon, in his future² contribution towards elevating Anthropology to a science, Kant would expressly show that he founds his pragmatic conception of the latter – due to the nature of its scope – on a specific, independent and, once could say, self-subsisting field. This Kant does by subtracting Empirical Psychology, or Anthropology, from Metaphysics, thus forever

¹ Anthropology is, as such, for the younger Kant, connecting field between the critique of knowledge and the critique of taste. "Between", however, does not mean that Logic is on the left, Aesthetics is on the right, and Anthropology in-between, rather that Anthropology sets in contact certain aspects of the natural dimensions of Logic and Aesthetics; and hence, that certain aspects of the natural dimensions of Logic and Aesthetics are at the basis of Kant's understanding of a pragmatic anthropology.

² That is, since around 1772, from the beginning of his Lectures on Anthropology onward.

parting from Meier and Baumgarten¹; in doing so, Kant shall replant the Anthropology in a soil more suitable to its prosperity as *a knowledge ruled not by ultimate principles, rather by phenomena whose observation shall result in such principles*²: in a word, a soil flanked by natural logic and natural aesthetics, between which man may be seen in the natural application, in the practice, in the prudent use of his understanding, on the one hand, and of his sensibility, on the other.

Let us then see how Logic and Aesthetics may come to be applied in Kant's pragmatic anthropology; or, more specifically, let us see how well natural logic and natural aesthetics in an anthropology in a pragmatic point of view (III.1) and how Kant's pragmatic anthropology itself, and what is most essential in it, also lends itself to unite two such apparently different fields of knowledge as are those of Logic and Aesthetics (III. 2).

III. Anthropology, the natural logical-aesthetic study of man

III.1. The proof of *sensus communis*

When we refer to Logic and Aesthetics in general, we cannot but refer implicitly to *certain powers of the spirit* and their fields of action. Kant himself does not deny this and asserts that Logic deals with the actions of the *understanding* and Aesthetics with those of *sensibility*; and that as

¹ "It seems to stem from this [the reason why there was still no Anthropology as a science]: that one has considered the science of man as a part pertaining to Metaphysics (...). This mistake arose perhaps because in Metaphysics one must extract all from oneself, and so one saw all parts of Metaphysics as consequences of the doctrine of the soul. But Metaphysics has nothing to do with experiential cognitions. Empirical psychology pertains to Metaphysics as little as empirical physics does" (AA 25.1: 8). Further on Kant would also dissociate Empirical Psychology from Anthropology (see AA 7: 161).

² According to Kant, such a new pragmatic study of man, because it dealt with man's action in the world, had a propaedeutic nature – for anthropology departs from experience (of phenomena) towards principles (laws), that is, from phenomena towards the "first grounds of the possibility of modification of human nature in general" (AA 10: 145), and not otherwise; a proof that anthropology was a science in its own right, and was not under the roof of psychology, just as psychology was not under the roof of Metaphysics (as in Baumgarten or Platner). Instead, Kant says, Anthropology conveys "the subjective principles of all sciences" (AA 25.2: 734-735), even for Moral and Theology (ibid.)

such, the action of the former is eminently intellectual whereas the action of the latter is sensible¹.

An identical, perhaps even firmer conclusion may be drawn upon expanding Kant's thought not only to the main powers, but to the association of powers, the disposition of all the powers of the spirit as a whole or even the products of such fields of knowledge in general. For, indeed, Logic, if thought in a scientific dimension, approaches the understanding, the power of judgment and reason; and Aesthetics, if thought in a scientific sense, approaches sensibility, memory and the power of imagination, among others. In scientific Logic, the disposition of the powers of the mind is either rational or intellectual; in scientific Aesthetics the disposition of the powers is imaginative-ingenious. And the products of scientific Logic always have to do with judgments of the understanding, and those of scientific Aesthetics with judgments of taste. In a word, then, if thought scientifically, Logic and Aesthetics have their well-defined fields and the powers involved in them only seem to prove this.

However, in the dimensions of Logic and Aesthetics which matter to us – namely, natural Logic and natural Aesthetics –, and their respective insertion in Anthropology, the case is different. Not entirely different, for Logic is Logic and Aesthetics is Aesthetics; but different nonetheless. This may be explained, first of all, through the prism of natural Logic and Aesthetics themselves; and then definitively through the intrinsic characteristics of the field wherein they are implanted and by the knowledge that they constitute: the anthropological ones.

Let us then begin by approaching the case of Logic.

Now, upon approaching *scientific logic* (AA 9: 17), Kant does indeed state that it deserves such a name only insofar as it is “a science of the necessary and general rules of thinking which may be, and has to be, acknowledged a priori, independently from the natural use of the understanding (...)” (id.); upon referring to *pure logic*, Kant states that: “In pure logic we dissociate the understanding from the remaining powers of the spirit and observe what it does alone, on its own” (id.: 18);

¹ “Namely, the Aesthetics contains the rules of the concordance of knowledge with the laws of sensibility; instead, Logic [contains] the rules of the concordance of knowledge with the rules of the understanding and reason” (AA 9: 15).

and upon referring to *theoretical logic*, Kant limits the product of the cognition of the understanding only to itself, thus excluding from it the previous cognition of other objects (id.: 17). Hence, all this Kant does in order to describe the powers, the disposition and the product of such powers. And, quite unsurprisingly so, the results are the same that we obtained in the first paragraphs of this section: namely, that in scientific, or pure, or theoretical logic the scientific understanding cleanses itself from the natural understanding, and also from other powers and undertakes a rigorous analysis of its own procedures: in truth, a self-analysis of itself. This with regard to scientific logic.

*But upon approaching natural logic, Kant says something different; and this, once again, in a tripartite manner. Namely, upon considering natural logic, Kant deems it “Logic of common reason (sensuscommunis)” (id.: 17), while adducing that it is “an anthropological science which only has empirical principles insofar as it deals with the rules of the natural use of the understanding and reason” (ibid.); upon referring to applied logic, Kant, quite conversely to what he had said of pure logic, says that “Applied logic considers the understanding insofar as it is mixed with other powers of the spirit, which influence its actions” (id.: 18); and upon referring to practical logic, Kant says that it presupposes “the cognition of a certain kind of objects to which it is applied” (id.: 17). This means, then, that by counterposing the two dimensions of Logic, Kant distinguishes between all the important factors which we mentioned earlier. But, even more importantly so, Kant silently takes two relevant stands, which, as we shall see, will be of crucial importance in explaining the coexistence of natural logic and natural aesthetics in an anthropological field; namely, 1) Kant elects as the main power, or the power most worthy of problematization in the question of the distinction between scientificity and naturalness of Logic and Aesthetics, *the understanding*, which is surely not the only power to be seen from two such different prisms, but is indeed a central power and no doubt that which most clearly can be seen as such; and furthermore, 2) upon distinguishing between *two dimensions of the understanding and two dimensions of Logic and Aesthetics*, Kant does so by resorting to a division of the understanding, and hence of the disposition of the human spirit: namely, the division of the understanding *insensu proprio and sensus communis*. This, more specifically, by saying that in scientific logic and aesthetics and in natural logic and aesthetics *the understanding is not one and the same* – as are not the dispositions*

formed by all the powers around such dimensions of the understanding; and furthermore by saying that *the understanding sensu proprio, wherein the I considers only his own understanding*, denies the natural understanding and separates itself from all the other powers of the mind, thus acting coldly, mechanically, ascertaining in itself, and itself only, the uses, rules and laws of its actions; whereas *the understanding sensus communis, or natural understanding, wherein the I obeys its social and communitarian nature and considers the judgment of others*, embraces or renders evanescent the *sensu proprio*, it associates and is voluntarily influenced by other powers of the spirit and acts vividly, organically, thus ascertaining its uses and rules *in concreto*, in its naturalness, in its practice with and its application on the world. And hence, Kant concludes, the first one operates solely in the I and hence needs objective laws; the second one operates in the world and hence produces subjective laws. The first one, *the sensu proprio, which is required from a scientific logic, can have no place in an anthropological field, whereas the second one, the sensus communis, which rules over a natural logic, must have its place in Anthropology*¹.

Now, if we try to undertake a similar reflection in the field of *Aesthetics*, we see that this is not possible. For in his *Lectures on Logic*, as well as in general, Kant does not undertake a similar division of *Aesthetics*. Instead, as was seen, Kant accepts only the natural, applicative, practical dimension of *Aesthetics*. But, let it be noted, precisely due to such unilaterality, upon briefly approaching the *Aesthetics* in “*Logik-Jäsche*”, Kant describes it as a “norm (pattern or plummet for mere appreciation” (AA 9: 15) and hence says that it consists of a “general concordance” (id.) and proceeds “through comparison” so as to “render more general (...) the empirical laws” (ibid.). Now, in other words – Kant suggests – natural aesthetics too, just as natural logic, is akin to the *sensus communis*; natural aesthetics, just as natural logic, needs the validation of the opinion of others (general approval (id.: 15)); natural, practical aesthetics, just as natural, practical logic, hears in itself the voice of the influence of objects, of the world and

¹ As is proved not only by the presence of topic such as *wit, genius, taste*, in *Anthropology* – all topic wherein the problem of the *sensus communis* is very much present – but also by other topics where this last problem is dealt with, such as the anthropological themes of *dream, the obscure representations or even that of mental disturbance*.

other human beings, and hence deems it important to compare the latter with itself, and itself with the latter, so as to extract more general rules therefrom; natural, applied aesthetics, just as natural, applied logic, exposes the understanding to the contact and coexistence with other powers, such as sensibility, the power of imagination, wit; and hence, natural aesthetics, just as natural logic, produces communitarian and not solipsistic judgements, which instead of opening the domain of knowledge rather shut it upon itself and dig an even greater separation between natural and scientific. In a word, natural aesthetics, just as natural logic, rather offers itself to the analysis and the activity of the *sensus communis*, and hence of the anthropological soil, unlike its counterpart(s).

Hence, in conclusion, one could say that if there is something that singularizes and differentiates natural aesthetics and logic from scientific logic and aesthetics it is *the position, the status and the productivity of the understanding* amid both – and subsequently the soil in which such variants of knowledge, of thinking and feeling, may have its greatest efficacy. For in the latter the understanding is necessarily introverted, in search of itself. He exempts itself from the world and confines itself to the I so as to obtain the a priori rules of its own use. But instead, in the *sensus communis*, which prospers both in natural logic and in natural aesthetics, *the understanding opens itself to the world*; it offers itself spontaneously to the empirical, to the multiplicity of human life, to the dangers of an erroneous observation, to the consideration of the natural (but also the non-natural) in men, and of the others in the I, and seeks (its) specificity in the specificity of others, and hence its truth in the truth of others – and hence, one could say, it extracts benefits where there seems to be only disadvantage. Here, in a word, the understanding needs a feeling of belonging and community and resorts to this feeling, which is given to it by the other powers of the mind and by the application of all the latter in the world, in order to validate its judgments, be them in the scope of cognition or of taste. And because precisely this *sensus communis* is common both to the opinion which we have of ourselves, to our cognition of ourselves, and to the pleasure or displeasure which we ourselves have in the world, then this is precisely why natural aesthetics and natural logic have their ideal place in a pragmatic anthropology. This is why, for instance, in Kant's anthropology there is not a

glorification of the understanding, rather an apology of sensibility¹; this is why there is not an isolation of the understanding in and for itself, rather a treatment of the various dispositions of the understanding as something brought about by different dispositions of the powers of the mind, and vice versa; and this is why there is not a mere treatment of topics regarding the health and efficacy of the understanding, rather a consideration of topics which may be seen as seemingly non-natural for the understanding and for the dignity of the human being², among other examples. In a word, this is the reason why a possible coexistence between natural logic and natural aesthetics is to be found in Kant's anthropology.

III.2 The proof of pluralism

A final and definitive proof for the suitable inscription of natural logic and aesthetics in the soil of Anthropology, and also of the latter as a field of contact of the former, is given to us *by Anthropology itself*, as conceived by Kant.

The proof in question is mentioned, now more, now less explicitly, in the first sections of Kant's writings on Anthropology – that which Kant names the “tractatio ipsa”. Precisely one of the occasions in which this proof arises is in such a section in the *Anthropology in a Pragmatic Point of View*.

Here the question is “The consciousness of itself” (AA 7: 127-128) of the I. Namely, in Kant's opinion, the consciousness of itself, the capacity to “say I in its representation” (id.: 127), “elevates man endlessly over all the other living beings on Earth” (ibid.). Man, for this reason, is a being which distinguishes itself from the others, it is “very distinct in its stratum and dignity” (ibid.), and it is so, according to the philosopher – and in accordance with our first proof (III. 1) – through the “understanding”, “the power (namely, to think)” (ibid.).

However, at the same time, the capacity to say I and the simultaneous exercise of the understanding give place to a certain egocentrism; an “egoism” (id.: 128) which only has a tendency to grow and is expressed everywhere in the I, from its “language” (id.: 130-132) to the problem of

¹ See, for instance, AA 25.2: 738; AA 25.2: 887-888; AA 25.2: 1229-1230.

² Such as the aforementioned topics of wit, dreams, obscure representations, mental disturbances, among others.

its “observation of itself” (id.: 132-134): “From the day that man begins to speak through the I, it brings its beloved Self where he can to light, and its egoism progresses unstoppably” (id.: 128). And this egoism, Kant says quite uncoincidentally, is expressed in three different ways, two of which are quite important to us¹: under the form of a “logical egoist” (id.: 128-129) and under the form of an “aesthetic egoist” (id.: 129-130).

The “logical egoist”, Kant says, centers its egoism in his understanding. Namely, it “deems unnecessary to prove its judgment by the judgment of others” (id.: 128); almost as if “he did not need this touchstone (*criterium veritatis externum*)” (ibid.). This, in a word, is the image of a man ruled by the aforescribed *sensu proprio* of the understanding, which is characterized precisely by considering only itself, by not considering other objects and hence aims by aiming only at obtaining a priori rules – in sum, the understanding *sensu proprio* which characterizes *scientific logic*.

As to the “aesthetic egoist”, Kant says, he centers his egoism in taste. Namely, he “isolates himself with his judgment” (id.: 130) of taste – which, as is known, is also a judgment of the understanding – and “seeks the touchstone of the beautiful in art only in himself” (ibid.), thus “claiming for himself approval” (ibid.) and, in doing so, “depriving himself from the progress towards improvement” (id.: 129). He is, in other words, the spitting image of the man ruled by the aforescribed *sensu proprio* of the understanding – in sum, the *sensu proprio* which characterizes *scientific aesthetics*.

Hence, what matters here is to ascertain the following: *from the perspective of Anthropology too*, and not just from the perspective of Logic and of Aesthetics, one can acknowledge the division between the natural and scientific dimensions of both these fields of knowledge. And here too they are described in the same terms as before – in their extreme nature, in their dissociation and incompatibility with one another and the incompatibility of their domains. They are, once could say, the perfect, expectable images of scientific Logic and Aesthetics: which, to be sure, have nothing to do with an anthropology considered from a pragmatic point of view. For, according to this point of view, anthropological observation must be undertaken in *sensus communis*: namely, by esteeming and listening to the “*criterium veritatis externum*”, from

¹The other one is the moral egoist. See AA 7: 130.

which we “cannot abdicate” “to ensure the truth of our judgment” (id.: 128). And hence, if we connect our previous considerations with these last ones, which are of an anthropological nature, we may conclude that the error lies in the various egoisms, and that the solution is between both the egoisms: or, what is the same, *beyond* both. Namely, then, beyond “logical egoism”, beyond the I of scientific logic, and “aesthetic egoism”, the I of scientific aesthetics, there must surely reside an I; but, namely, a *different I*: an I altogether different, resulting from the investigational procedure of natural logic and aesthetics, hence an anthropological, yet not anthropocentric, not egoistic I, and especially not a logically or aesthetically egoistic I, but one which acknowledges the need to inquire itself and its judgments through others, and others and their judgments through its own inquiry; in a word, a different I which is not only an I, *but above all also a We*, whose understanding does not coldly and aridly analyze itself rather infinitely rediscovers itself in its analysis, whose taste does not wane in its own narrowness rather flourishes in the open field of a communitarian vision.

Now, *one such I exists*, and it is proposed by Kant in his anthropology as *the pragmatic I*. The pragmatic I, let it be noted, is indeed still the central point and end of all humanity; it is still the ground of the powers of the understanding and reason, of the superior power of knowledge and of all the remaining powers, down to sensibility. For this must be so. But, Kant suggests, the difference is not here, rather in the *prism of the observation* of the I. For, in Anthropology, the I is not taken in its isolation, nor in its singular introspection, and the powers are not products of a self-analysis which is ruled through the same laws by which the latter is being sought, thus producing judgments true only for the self. Hence, pragmatic anthropology has no interest in the I in its common introvertive stance, in *sensu proprio*; nor is pragmatic anthropology interested in dissecting the understanding in its isolation, or in ascertaining its procedure in itself and its mechanics in judgments of the intellect or judgments of taste which it, under the form of scientific Logic or Aesthetics, produces for itself. In a word, *it does not interest, nor does it concern Anthropology any form of logical egoism or any form of aesthetic egoism*. The aim of a pragmatic anthropology is to see the I in its pragmatism, namely, in its practical or prudent application in the world; and hence, it aims at seeing the understanding in its interaction between I and world (the latter taken as the community of beings which is in

communion with the I), in all the various amplitudes and metamorphoses which the understanding acquires under the influence of other powers, other circumstances, other cultures and fields of knowledge – that which Kant deems “Welt”. The aim of Anthropology is therefore to consider the understanding in its unfolding and its necessary transmutation, now in domains which are familiar to it, such as those of the distinction and confusion, of completeness and incompleteness, of popularity and erudition of knowledge – topics dealt with in the Anthropology, which very much connect it, as well as the understanding, to a *natural logic* – now in domains which are less familiar, as are those of the inferior powers of the spirit or the extreme manifestations of the fictive power – topics dealt with in the Anthropology, which very much connect it, as well as the understanding, to a *natural aesthetics*. In conclusion, then, the domains of natural logic and natural aesthetics are, to be sure, those of the pragmatic I. And hence, we subsume, *that which distinguishes the pragmatic I is precisely its non-egoistic, communitarian character, a character which liberates the I towards other, newer cognitions of itself and the world*. For, namely, *from a logical prism*, this – this socialization, this communitarian and general being of the understanding – in a word, this *sensus communis*, which has its soil in the Anthropology, shall lead the I to comprehend the true mechanics of its spirit and its powers, and to an ulterior correction and certainty of its judgments – that is, a truth of the self-cognition of man. *From an aesthetic prism*, this pluralization of the I and its powers shall lead the I to a new *cosmopolitan* condition and an ampler, truer – for shared by all – perspective of the human actions and omissions in the world; a feeling of *belonging to a species* which, according to Kant, cannot but arouse *a feeling of pleasure and self-satisfaction and is therefore of an aesthetic order*¹. And lastly, from this double prism arises a feeling of certainty in the cognition of the I which is a pleasure in the cognition of the We; a double feeling which Kant acknowledges in the Anthropology and

¹ Indeed, Kant often speaks of a self-satisfaction (AA 25.2: 734) in the consideration of concordance between ourselves and others: something like the aesthetic pleasure of belonging to a species and being aware of that unity, and hence of that pleasure: “This observation of man is however one of the most agreeable matters” (AA 25.2: 733).

which definitively brings to union the natural sides of Logic and Aesthetics.

This, this double intellectual-aesthetic experience of Anthropology, deems Kant as a “pluralism”: Egoism may be opposed only by pluralism, that is, the manner of thinking: not to conceive oneself as encapsulating the whole world, rather to consider oneself and to proceed as a mere cosmopolitan. – This much pertains to Anthropology” (AA 7: 130).

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A SKETCH OF THE NOTION OF DECLINE IN AUGUST COMTE. COMMON POINTS WITH THE CORRESPONDING BRENTANIAN NOTION¹

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Abstract: *Auguste Comte's theory on the development of the human spirit is interpreted as supporting a vision of linear, crescent movement, directed to achieve a positive stage. Given this, the interpretations in the literature are focused, mainly, on the notion of progress. In this paper, I discuss the notion of decline, the counterpart of the preferred notion, which I consider to be essential for the above-stated pursuit of the human spirit. This notion has received less attention than the positive one of progress, and my goal here is to highlight the strengths and function of the notion of decline, paying attention to similarities that can be established between Comte's "decline" and the one from the Brentanian theory of the four phases.*

Keywords: *decline, stages, development of the human spirit, philosophy, positivism*

Introduction

Auguste Comte's *Cours de philosophie positive* exposes and explains the development and progress of the human spirit, from its initial phase to the one contemporary to Comte³, which is supposed to be the final one. From this point of view, then, the core of the course, constituted by the scale of sciences and the theory of the three phases, has been largely and justifiedly interpreted as describing (in a lawful manner) a direction of the humankind that is linear, cumulative, progressive and goal oriented. Comte's discussed examples are deliberately chosen such that they support his theory (as the author himself confesses)⁴ instantiate the central notions and ideas that he proposes.

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³ I will use "contemporary" with the meaning of "contemporary to Comte".

⁴ See, for example, the methodological presentation from the beginning of the 52nd lesson: "[...] we must study exclusively the development of the most advanced nations [...]".

My proposal is that we pay attention, instead, to the notion of decline and to reconstruct the historical exposition (that is to be found in the books devoted to social physics) from the perspective of this concept. The working hypothesis is that decay (or decline) plays an essential role, advancement being grounded in the interaction between the rise of an element and the decay of another one. However, in order to provide a clear account, I will appeal to Franz Brentano's theory of the four phases of philosophy, where the notion of decline is one of the main elements. This choice is grounded also in the acknowledged fact that Brentano was highly influenced in the elaboration of his main works by the positivist philosophy proposed by Comte, as Brentano himself confesses, and the exegetes witness. It is, then, a challenge, to seek for similarities between the two authors with respect to this notion. Hence, the structure of the paper is the following: in a first section, an introductory one, I will briefly present the frames of the two theories I intend to compare; then, following Comte's detailed exposition from the 52nd to 55th lesson of the *Course*, I will focus on the notion of decline, providing an account for (i) what it means and (ii) how it actually works. The second task is the one allowing for comparisons between Comte and Brentano.

I. The Framework

In the first chapter of the *Course de philosophie positive*, Auguste Comte formulates the theoretical frame guiding the lectures on positive philosophy: the law of the three stages of development of the human spirit, and the scale of sciences. The first one states that

[...] each of our leading conceptions,– each branch of our knowledge,– passes successively through three different theoretical conditions: the Theological, or fictitious; the Metaphysical, or abstract; and the Scientific, or positive¹.

The human mind is preoccupied with explaining the external world; to each stage there will correspond a specific mode of thought (and this is the main sense of the word “philosophy” for Auguste Comte), resulting thus in three modes of philosophizing, namely a theological, a metaphysical and a positive one. In the first phase, all phenomena are explained as being produced by the immediate actions of supernatural beings, knowledge is

¹ Auguste Comte, *The Positive Philosophy*, trans. Harriet Martineau, vol. I (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2000), 27.

directed towards finding essences, first and final causes. The second one is a refined version of the first one, where supernatural beings are replaced by abstract forces (or personified abstractions), with the same power of producing phenomena. To the last phase, the positive one, absolute knowledge is given up and replaced with a view the limitations of the human nature. In his study on Comte' s positive philosophy, Mill restates the positive principles as follows:

[...] We have no knowledge of anything but Phaenomena; and our knowledge of phaenomena is relative, not absolute. We know not the essence, nor the real mode of production, of any fact, but only its relations to other facts in the way of succession or of similitude. These relations are constant; that is, always the same in the same circumstances.¹

Mill discusses, here, the idea of law. The principal feature of the positive stage is the search for laws that explain the connections between single phenomena and general facts, "the number of which diminishes with the progress of science"². Comte states that every science now in its positive stage must have had a development passing through the other ones; moreover, Comte sustains an analogy between the individual and the general mind, saying that "the phases of the mind of a man correspond to the epochs of the mind of the race", and supporting it with observation, on the one hand, ant theoretical reasons, on the other one. The main reason is that although theories rely on observations, these observations need a theoretical guidance, which was to be found, at the beginning of time, in the theological conceptions³. Comte draws attention that sciences advance at different rates, depending on the nature of the object of study, such that one can find an accessory to the fundamental law of human development in the scale of sciences. According to it,

Any kind of knowledge reaches the positive stage early in proportion to its generality, simplicity and independence of other departments Astronomical science [...] arrived first; then terrestrial Physics, then Chemistry; and, at length, Physiology⁴.

¹ John Stuart Mill, *Auguste Comte and Positivism*, Project Gutemberg, n. d., 5.

² Comte, *The Positive Philosophy*, 2000, I:28.

³ Comte, I :29.

⁴ Comte, I: 31–32.

A science not mentioned in the fourfold division is Sociology, or the science of Social phenomena. This discipline, although dependent upon physiology, requires, Comte says, a distinct classification, as the phenomena it studies are the most individual, the most complicated and most dependent on all others. Moreover, the domain has not attained its positive stage yet:

Now that the human mind has grasped celestial and terrestrial physics – mechanical and chemical; organic physics, both vegetable and animal, – there remains one science, to fill up the series of sciences of observation, – Social physic. This is what men have now most need of: and this it is the principal aim o the present work to establish¹.

The principal aim of the *Course* is, then, the following: to impress the character of positivity on sociology, fact leading to a full establishment of the positive stage. The law of the three stages, then, what Comte needs to explain and ground, in order to reach his aim. From this point of view, then, the lectures on the social physics are of great importance, as they deal directly with the central objective of the Comtean approach. This is one of the reasons we chose to focus on the 52nd to 55th lessons. Another reason is that the social frame is a very rich ground for an analysis of the phenomenon of decline, as they offer a general perspective over a given period of time. A secondary aim of Comte's work is to analyze each science in relation with the positive system and spirit; the two goals are seen as inseparable, "for, on the one hand, there can be no positive philosophy without a basis of social science, without which it could not be all-comprehensive; and, on the other hand, we could not pursue Social science without having been prepared by the study of phenomena less complicated than those of society, and furnished with a knowledge of laws and anterior facts which have a bearing upon social science."²

Franz Brentano became acquainted with Comte's positive philosophy through the works of John Stuart Mill, *Auguste Comte and Positivism* (1865). After this episode, Brentano worked extensively on and with the positivist theory– he wrote studies and held lectures on Comte (take, for instance, the 1869 study *Auguste Comte and The Positive Philosophy*), he borrowed (and also modified) Comte's scale of science, attempting to scientifically (positively) ground his psychology. With respect to the theory of the four

¹ I: 33.

² Comte, I: 34.

phases of philosophy, Roger Schmit notes¹ that the remarks and restrictions Brentano discusses in the 1865 study are the main features that separate the two authors, in Brentano's reading. The main fact that seems to be questioned by Brentano, and mentioned also in the *Four Phases*, is that Comte is interested only with the examples that verify his theory, thus neglecting the moments of decay and decline. Yet, this critique does not touch the main assumption of the three stages theory, that science has a progressive direction.

Brentano divides the history of philosophy in three cycles, each comprising four phases². The succession is the following: there is a first phase of ascending development, whose beginning is announced by two things: a purely and alive interest for theoretical research—amazement is the first emotion that determined a philosophical inquiry—, and a method which is essentially in accordance to the nature, although it might benefit from other developments also. Science evolves, hypotheses are perfected and new questions are submitted, as the research extends. The next three phases are considered to be ones of decline, and they can be characterized as follows: the second phase, first of decline, is indicated by a loosening or falsification of theoretical interest, ideas lack power and depth, and one can observe the tendency of popularizing knowledge. The third phase brings a sort of skepticism with respect to the capabilities of human mind to gain reliable knowledge. The passage to the fourth and last phase of the cycle is explained with appeal to a psychological reaction: the third stage is not one that might bring satisfaction to the human spirit, hence skepticism cannot last long, and when the time comes it is replaced with a period in which, on the one hand, there is a return to the natural means specific to the first phase yet, on the other hand, there is an appeal to unnatural means, non-intuitive, where mysticism has its part, and the general attitude is that, at that very moment, humanity has in its possession the greatest truths.

The new cycle that is to begin has no pre-established direction; this is one of the main differences between Comte and Brentano: whereas for the first, there is a progressive line of development, for the second there is no warranty that a specific direction of research will be continued. However,

¹ Roger Schmit, "Brentano et le positivisme," *Archives de Philosophie* 65, no. 2 (2002): 296–97, <https://doi.org/10.3917/aphi.652.0291>.

² For this, I have used the Romanian translation of the *Four Phases*, kindly offered by Alexandru Bejinariu.

one of Brentano's hopes is that philosophy, in his time, entered a period of positivity, which means it got closer to sciences. This is, after all, one of the keys of interpreting his endeavor to scientifically ground psychology, given the relation between philosophy, theology and psychology, on the one hand, and the positivist methodology on the other hand.

II. The General Application of the Law of the Three Stages

The novelty of this paper consists in the proposal of reinterpreting Comte's theory on the development of the human spirit from the point of view of the notion of decline. This account would seem, at first sight, counterintuitive, as, on the one hand, Comte was concerned only with those examples that sustain his theory and, on the other hand, the law is one explaining progress, not decay. However, as we shall see, when applied to the social domain, the role of decline is not just more visible, but it also proves itself to be necessary: without the appearance of the phenomenon of decay, which functions as an impetus for progress.

A reason for choosing some of the lectures on social physics (more precisely, those dealing with the first two stages) is that here, Comte analyzes society as a whole, taking in consideration all elements (intellectual, spiritual, social, military and/or political).

First, there is a wide range of notions that Comte uses in the lessons from 52nd to 55th to describe the notion of decline. The most used are decay, decadence, degeneration, disorganization, decomposition, decrease, and a provisory notion of decline (preferred for reasons of symmetry with the Brentanian notion), which can be extracted from their use, is the following: the loosening of strength of an agent which once was the main actor (be it an institution, a form or organization or a certain (sub)stage) in favor of another one. In fact, as Comte describes the transition from one phase to the next one, the general picture is, in the end, that of a struggle between the positive and theological spirits, with the metaphysical one mediating them. Mill describes the relation between the three odes of thinking as follows:

[...] the successive transition being prepared, and indeed caused by the gradual uprising of the two rival modes of thinking, the metaphysical and the positive,

and in their turn preparing the way for the ascendancy of these; first and temporarily of the metaphysical, finally of the positive.¹

and:

Thus did the different successive states of the human intellect, even at an early stage of its progress, overlap one another, the Fetishistic, the Polytheistic and the Metaphysical modes of thought coexisting even in the same minds, while the belief in invariable laws, which constitutes the Positive mode of thought, was slowly winning its way beneath them all[...]²

Brentano, in his study on Comte, mentions the coexistence of the positive and theological spirits, explaining the prevalence and necessity of the latter for the first stage of humanity. Mike Gane, for instance, discusses about an epistemological difference between the theological and positive methods, and about a too radical gap which cannot be passed directly, but via the metaphysical mediation³.

Fetishism occurs spontaneously, and it is animated by the primitive tendency of attributing life to all surrounding objects. The reason for this lies in the natural (and continuously refined) need of explaining the external worlds and its events. The primitive man, anchored in the concrete world and unable to control the surrounding phenomena, empowers the external elements with the ability of influencing his life. The need for order, for systematization has, here, a first manifestation and a primitive solution, and it is also the first mark of the positive spirit. Considered to be the necessary foundation of the theological phase, fetishism is characterized by the invariable, instinctive tendency of attributing the generation of unknown effects to passions and affectations of corresponding beings⁴. When he discusses about the features of this substage, Comte mentions the domination of imagination over reason, which becomes explicit with the use of the metaphor in language⁵. Fetishism is seen as the most intense form of theology, yet its social influence on individuals is feeble, given that the sacerdotal institution is not yet present. This fact leads to a delayed social organization, as there is no need for centralized power. In the

¹ Mill, *Auguste Comte and Positivism*, 11.

² Mill, 15.

³ Mike Gane, *Auguste Comte*, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 2006), 38.

⁴ Auguste Comte, *The Positive Philosophy*, trans. Harriet Martineau, vol. III (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2000), 12.

⁵ Comte, III:13–14.

analyzed lectures, Comte is interested in offering an explanation of the social and sociological movements in the history of humanity. However, as we shall see, the social history is intertwined with the intellectual one.

The adoration of stars is the fetishist manifestation that ensures the passage to polytheism: basically, with the slightest use of the faculty of abstraction¹, a first step from primitive theology is made. Here, a certain class, inclined to speculation, assumes a sacerdotal role and becomes an intermediary between man and divinity.

[...] There is a character of generality about the stars which fits them to be common fetiches: and sociological analysis shows us that this was in fact their destination among population of any extent. And, again, when their inaccessible position was understood (which was not so soon as is commonly thought) the need of special intermediaries began to be felt. [...] and thus, the advent of astrolatry was not only a symptom, but a powerful means of social progress in its day².

Also, the capacity of abstraction is used at its most, as it is necessary for the passage from anthropocentrism to the pantheon. Even more, fetishism alone is quite opposed to the scientific spirit– the idea of natural laws is not present at all, and “imaginary facts wholly overwhelm real ones”, there is a preponderance of the affective life over the intellectual one³. The movement to polytheism is the first moment when the notion of decline appears: it is the initial moment of decrease of the mental influence peculiar to theological thinking. From the scientific point of view, it seems that polytheism is the period when a certain feature specific to the positive thinking begins to develop and, without it, “the conception of invariable natural laws could never have been formed⁴”– the speculative activity. The relevant change is that of no longer associating the body with the entity living within. When fully developed, polytheism produces the notion of destiny or fatality, offering ground for the later idea of invariability of natural laws: there is a certain direction to be followed, events happen according to a plan. This is also a transitional element to the stage of

¹This is one of the most important properties of the human mind, whose development is followed by Comte through the history. In one sense, the development of the positive spirit can be seen as that of the faculty of abstraction.

² Comte, *The Positive Philosophy*, 2000, III:16.

³ Comte, III:17.

⁴ Comte, III:32.

monotheism, as the complement of the notion of fate is that of a god governing all gods, in spite of their own independence¹.

The human spirit is, following Comte, oriented from the very beginning towards achieving the final, scientific, positive stage, and its development is shaped by the refinement of a certain ability of grasping only what offers the means of advancement. From this point of view, then, I define the notion of decline in opposition with the progressive direction, and in correlation with the notion of stagnation. Stagnation is, for our argument, the moment preceding the decline. By this I presume that the human spirit, in its development, has reached certain degrees of refinement with respect to the features of positive thought (take, for instance, abstraction), and it is ready to take a step further. However, the circumstances are such that it stands still, with the result that a more or less conscious state of dissatisfaction occurs, which will further engage resources meant to overcome the actual state. There are, then, two correlated events: on the one hand, the fall, and, on the other one, the rise of a certain element, including here also stages or substages.

Comte analyzes most phases from different perspectives, from a cultural, a scientific and an industrial point of view, not to mention the military and political aspects. From a cultural perspective, for instance, in the theological stage, humankind witnesses the rise, the expansion and diminishing of what have called, later, fine arts. In fetishism, one encounters a necessary tendency do directly favor the arts, especially poetry and music, seen as the means by which the aesthetic development begins:

[...] Fetishism favored the poetic and artistic development of humanity by transferring the human sense of existence to all external objects [...]²

In polytheism, imagination is encouraged over reason³, thing that, Comte says, mistakenly led people to consider the poetic creation as the main attribute of this period. Instead, his argument is that fine arts were produced from the theological system, through the intellectual and social functions of poetry; this is the moment when aesthetic faculties and

¹ *Ibidem*.

² Comte, *The Positive Philosophy*, 2000, III:35.

³ *Idem*, p. 36

theological service work one for the other; later on, in monotheism, the highest office arts have is that of accessory to the act of worship¹.

Until the apparition of metaphysics, the scientific and philosophical activities are on and the same. On the one side, there is the model of astronomy, where an incipient positive attitude can be seen in the development of natural laws, which is to be translated into the more and more obvious tendency of escaping the theological system. The idea of a vague subordination of all phenomena is what philosophy (here in the narrow sense – *philosophie proprement dite*) borrows from science² – and here we have the examples of numbers and forms (“science proceeded from arithmetic to geometry, and at length comprehended both classes of ideas). The incompatibility between the metaphysical influences and the positive spirit, mostly due to the incapacity of metaphysics to be a base for organization (be it social or mental), is here explained by appeal to the critical attitude characterizing the metaphysical inquiry³:

[...] This strange issue, directly incompatible with any idea of natural law, discloses the radical antipathy between the metaphysical spirit and the positive, from the time of the separation of philosophy from science; a separation which the good sense of Socrates saw to be impending [...]⁴

The path metaphysics follows, led by its ambition (dreams of Greek philosophy about the sovereignty of intellect⁵), separates it more and more from theology and science, which are considered to be the only ones able to sustain a certain form of organization. The farther its object from the perceivable, the less and less able to provide satisfaction philosophy is. This split of science and philosophy is a common element with the Brentanian theory of the four phases. As Brentano says, “the history of philosophy is a history of scientific efforts and, for this very reason, it is

¹ *Ibidem*.

² *Idem*, p. 63

³ *Idem*, pp. 63-64. Here, Comte also mentions the fact that philosophy, considered in the special (for the terminology of the Course) sense, is an active organ of intellectual and moral anarchy, thus incompatible with any form of organization.

⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁵ “speculative ambition of the metaphysical sects impelled them to aim at absolute dominion”, *idem*, p. 70

similar in certain regards to the history of other sciences. Yet, in other points, it shows itself as different and more akin to the history of art¹.

The second form Comte analyzes is military polytheism, comprising an intellectual and a military aspect. A representative civilization, here, is the Roman one. The sacerdotal power is, in this case, subordinated to the political (senatorial) one; all means of education, direction and execution are oriented towards one and continuous goal– the expansion of the empire. The Roman Empire achieved the highest unity, for the masses as well as for the elite leaders, in accordance with its objective; the moral aspect is coordinated and dominated by politics. From the intellectual point of view, there is a filiation relation with the Greeks, although inferior in imitation. This fact is to be mirrored, late, in the decay of the Roman Empire, which occurs once the expansionist goal is reached: a process of moral degradation, unknown before and since, begins to unfold². However, polytheism, in both forms, is important for the positive spirit with respect to the development of the speculative spirit, which is one of its peculiarities.

The effect the Greek philosophy has over both systems (Greek and Roman) is that of being the main medium through which a decay of the polytheistic spirit occurs, preparing the human mind for the metaphysical stage, yet not before leading it to monotheism. Two observations require attention: Comte's interpretation of the history of humanity has multiple facets: from a social point of view, for instance, metaphysics is unable to fulfill or to control the basic need of group organization. However, metaphysics is, intellectually, a necessary step which allows for the critical spirit to rise and develop, reaching its maximum point in the second, abstract stage.

In the 53rd lecture, Comte overviews the main mechanisms that contribute, from the very first stage, to the development of the positive spirit: fetishism contributes mainly with *observation*; the movement to polytheism is possible because of the transfer of power from every object into symbolic ones (step possible within star adoration). A further, more complex generalization leads, eventually, to a reduction of supernatural forces (the notion of destiny or fatality), which will then mediate the

¹Brentano, *The Four Phases of Philosophy and Its Current State*, paragraph 3. My translation, following the Romanian version

² See p. 67.

transition to its analogous in monotheism (providence). The human spirit, Comte claims, follows this ascending path in search for theological unity; revolted by the contradictions issued by different forms enwrapping thought, the spirit becomes divided and forces to choose between the strong connection with reality (science) and the metaphysical chimeres. Then, the *doubtful attitude* will be practiced.

Returning to Brentano, as we have seen, philosophy and science share the same path in the ascending period, marked by the theoretical interest that is animated, initially, by wonder. *Speculation* and *observation* work together. The next moment corresponds to the first phase of decline, where theoretical interests are replaced by practical ones, ideas lacking strength and depth. Historically, in the first cycle, this phase corresponds to stoicism and epicureanism. Comte identifies the same moment as being the departure of metaphysics from sciences (and the beginning of a downside for the former)¹². This is another common point between Brentano and Comte. Brentano sees it as caused by a departure from the initial goal of philosophy, which is “a deeper investigation of human nature”, whereas for Comte, the decline of metaphysics³ begins with the obliteration of the spirit of unity of knowledge: philosophy aimed to be independent from sciences and theology, yet it was unable to provide the basis for social organization the latter two are capable of, since it was divided in multiple schools of thought, with divergent perspectives. All this came to contradict the urge of the human spirit for unity, forcing it to move further, to monotheism. Skepticism is the central notion, then, for Comte being the force that makes possible the passage to the new stage (which seems to be just a more refined version of polytheism, as we shall soon see), and for Brentano a feeling dominating the second phase of decline. Although the chronological placement of the cultural facts may differ for the two authors, we should pay attention to the common elements that describe their interpretation. Thus, another point the two share is the psychological fact of dissatisfaction.

¹ A similar association is to be found in Schmit, “Brentano et le positivisme.”

² [...] the continuous progress of universal and systematic doubt, leading every school from Socrates to Pyrrho and Epicurus to a denial of all external existence. (Comte, *The Positive Philosophy*, 2000, III:64.)

³ Note that what Brentano understands by “philosophy” is designated by Comte with the word “metaphysics”.

Comte distinguishes between a theory and its exemplification– from this perspective, the law of the three stages is the theory, and the selected episodes from the history of philosophy are the exemplary cases. One of his underlying assumptions is that, instinctively, the human spirit tends to achieve a specific form of social organization. In other words, there is a distinction between the abstract appreciation of essential features of a system of thought and the successive analysis of different means that are necessary for its effective realization¹. Monotheism is a further stage that was envisaged by the elite class of polytheism:

[...] it probably emanated by a kind of exceptional colonization of the sacerdotal caste, the superior orders of which, become monotheists by their own intellectual progress, were let to institute, as a refuge or an experiment, a monotheistic colony [...]²,

yet the actual realization, as Comte names it, occurs only when the socio-political form of organization begins to be unable to control the masses. Although he recognizes the merits of other monotheistic religions, such as Islam and Greek Orthodoxy, Comte will focus on Catholicism; tempted to discuss Christianity in general, he then narrows the discourse to this denomination only. Heir of the Roman Empire³, Catholicism will have two spheres of influence, intellectual and social/military.

If in the first stage of development of the human spirit one might discuss about a certain cooperation between aesthetic faculties (imagination included) and religion, in this last substage of the theological period the relation changes. The *speculative faculty* was, in fetishism, marked by spontaneity; in polytheism, it was exceedingly cultivated; yet, in monotheism, is somehow neglected, partially because it does not fit the profile of the period. The speculative spirit, which is the only one able to

¹ Comte, *The Positive Philosophy*, 2000, III:72.

² *Idem*, p. 71.

³ The Greek cultural flourishing and the Roman military power are seen as being finally achieved under Catholicism. This is important when arguing for main differences between Comte and Brentano's views on the development of intellectual ideas. Also, this ancestry line and the reference to the Greek culture will be useful for the later discussion on the moment of decline of Catholicism – following Comte, the same issue that led to the decay of the (pure) philosophy of Ancient Greeks is present also among the reasons for the monotheist decline – “le danger de la théocratie métaphysique”.

mediate the passage to the next stage, via abstract meditations, is radically misfit for the common, everyday use, and for the general orientation of the social organization¹. The Catholic Church is the medium vehiculating education of the masses, one having, in the end, practical goals (social order, morality, military and political power). Philosophers are seen as unable to govern, the results of speculative contemplation are too far away, too abstract and too indirect to be of everyday use². Comte has a large discussion on the dependence of the speculative spirit upon other dominant factors: there are times when it is reliably sustained by “society”, and there are times when it faces an imminent decay, in full Brentanian terms (see footnote 38).

Given the main function this faculty has, which is the readjustment or mediation, preparatory for the next stage, Comte notes that a principle of natural philosophy, in both physical and moral domains, is the indispensable need for convenient obstacles in order to active the impulse of real forces³. We thus see that a critical point always precedes a new (sub)stage or phase of evolution, which is another link with the Brentanian theory.

Catholicism, in the Middle Ages, has the merits of introducing and imposing the distinction between the spiritual power and the temporary one. Keeping for itself the eternal one, its division contributes to the social evolution of humanity. On the one side, there is the Church, with its universality, and on the other side, there is the sovereign. This division explains why the former lasted more than any political system: it offered a (universal and general) moral basis that is easier to control over vast lands. The decline of the Roman Empire, an instance of the temporal power, is being explained by this capacity of military and political control over conquered domains. Given that any form of government whatsoever would have to be imposed by force upon the conquered nations, domination needed a stronger link, which is to be found in religion.

¹ [...] The mass of mankind, being destined to action, sympathize most with organizations of moderate intelligence and eminent activity. The general gratitude also waits upon services which satisfy the sum of human wants, among which those of the intellect are very far from holding the most conspicuous place. Comte, *The Positive Philosophy*, 2000, III:73-74.

² Note, again, the lack of relevancy of the theoretical domain, and the domination of what Brentano named *practical interest*.

³ Comte, *The Positive Philosophy*, 2000, III:74.

Controlling at the moral level, the Church is able to impose a certain code of behavior to the masses, relying upon respect and submission. Religion is, in the Middle Ages, associated with education and culture; it is the medium where these two activities of the human spirit are able to unfold; founded upon intellectual and moral merits, it comprised a hierarchical form of organization that could resist in time, the ecclesiastic edifice being a necessary, preparatory stage for the later political order. The history of the Church offers, Comte says, a kind of fundamental history of humanity, from a social standpoint. The essential power of the Catholic Church is education, the development of the intellect:

[...] in the passage from polytheism to monotheism, the religious spirit underwent an intellectual decline; for we find Catholicism constantly employed in actual life in extending the domain of human wisdom at the expense of that, once so vast, of divine inspiration.¹

One has to consider, also, the independence of the spiritual power from the temporal, worldly one. Feudalism is the first form of political system contemporary to Catholicism. Monotheism has the great political merit of modifying the initial warrior-like attitude into a defensive one; the example of Charles the Great, who accepted Christianity in order to politically secure his domain, offers us a first glimpse of the relations between the two types of power, submitting the worldly to the religious one (acknowledging thus, the latter). So, the first political form of organization peculiar to the Middle Ages is the feudal one, marked by an initial division of the territories in smaller lands, controlled by a sovereign. The entire political and military system is developed, here, from the need to control lands, in no dependency upon the help the unitarian dogmas of the Church might offer; historians note, here, the influence over the forming of the social classes and, also, the move from slavery to serfdom.

In the 54th lesson, a very important idea is highlighted: once reaching maturity, a certain philosophical movement (understood as a style of thought) will begin a descending trajectory leading, eventually, to a new stage, where the essential achievements are retained, and the secondary ones are enhanced. Comte notices, from stage to stage, a decrease of the intensity of the religious spirit, first from fetishism to polytheism, then from polytheism to monotheism.

¹ *Idem*, 84.

Another aspect to be mentioned is the influence of monotheism, considered from an industrial point of view. Socially, its contribution is crucial (see the exemplary form of organization specific to the Catholic Church); culturally, although dependent upon religion, the domain is highly developed, yet from the industrial standpoint, one can notice a progressive tendency of saving human efforts and using technology at its best. One of the hypotheses I rely on is that this fact is influenced also by the spiritual independence gradually gained by humanity; the less dominated by exterior forces, the more inclined to master the external world and to submit it to one's own will, needs and aims.

Eventually, the decay of monotheism, from the intellectual and, later, social point of view, obeys the same principle as polytheism did: the division between the natural and moral philosophy, the rivalry between metaphysics, on the one side, and religion, with its moral and social codes. The delay of the later leads to an intellectual degradation that ends up in a revolt of the spirit and a passage towards a new stage.

An aspect that should not be neglected is that Comte's exposition of the main stages of the history of humankind has as an underlying assumption the idea that the dynamism of these movements has been sustained by a special kind of struggle. On the one hand, there is the pair of the positive and theological spirits, on the other hand, the temporal and the spiritual powers. Richard Vernon, when discussing the notion of development in Comte, distinguishes between a first, abstract conception of history, that "invites notions of immanent purpose", and a second one, "discussed in the very different language of transmission"¹. Development has, according to Vernon, multiple meanings, such as the manifestation of a growth process, or causal sequence:

"[...] conceive of development, then, as the *unfolding* of an inherent principle of growth, or as a causal *sequence* for which organic growth serves only as a metaphor, or as a process of (selective) *expansion* in which "development" bears simply the meaning of enlargement or extension."²

Secularization has its own importance here, Vernon notes in the same place, since it is seen, by Comte and his fellows, as related to the notion of development and peculiar to the positive stage, where the spirit is freed

¹ Richard Vernon, "Auguste Comte and 'Development': A Note," *History and Theory* 17, no. 3 (Oct., 1978) (1978): 325, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2504743>.

² *Ibidem*.

from the theological commitments. From this point of view, then, there is a necessary link, in Comte's view, between the development of a certain aspect and the decay of another one, for the social considerations, or for those related to the traits of the positive spirit (see the discussion on the metaphysical stage, the examples taken from the political and religious systems).

The first two substages of the theological stage offer, as seen above, plenty of material for a discussion on the cultural and intellectual development of the human spirit, in its incipient state. However, the last substage, monotheism, is one where the religious spirit dominates over all other manifestations of the human mind. Middle Ages are to be characterized by the dominance of the Catholic Church upon all other domains of activity¹. The highest and most beneficial influence it has concerns the social organization of human communities: the church-like system, with its hierarchies, is imported by the political structure. Thus, the next stage, the metaphysical or abstract one, is a critical phase in which Protestantism is the main voice, followed by a systematic method of the negative philosophy.

Protestantism is the sign, the effect of decomposition of the power represented by the Church, and its roots are to be found in the elite itself of the system it is opposed to:

[...]The revolutionary doctrine which is the agent of the change does its work by exhibiting the insufficiency of the old organization and protecting the elements of progress from the interference of old impediments. Without the impulsion of this critical energy, humanity would have been stationary [...] The Catholic constitution had, however, fulfilled its office before the end of the thirteenth century while, at the same time, the conditions of its political existence had become seriously impaired. [...] it had manifested its radical incompetency to direct the intellectual movement, which was becoming of more social importance every day².

The link between decay, stagnation and progress is clearly pointed out by Comte when explaining the changes that take place in the abstract phase: after accomplishing their objectives, the Church and the feudal system become insufficient. First, stagnation occurs, then decline. Among

¹ Catholicism is the religion chosen by Comte, although he mentions that similar observation could be made about some other monotheist theologies.

² Comte, *The Positive Philosophy*, 2000, III:116–17.

the reasons that led to decline, there are, on the one side, the internal conflicts inside the system and, on the other one, the separation itself between the spiritual and temporal powers¹

Comte considers that both temporal and spiritual systems peculiar to the Middle Ages have a transitory character. Their decline was, then, to be expected. Second, the apparition of new social elements, due to the increasing industrialization, required another approach and this is to be related to the internal conflicts, also. Protestantism, then, is to be read as the realization of this need of social organization². Even more, as Comte considers, it is to be read, along with the later negative philosophy, as in a constant opposition to the ancient system. The presence of the positive spirit is yet a subtle, weak one, as it is still undeveloped; in the second phase, however, the antitheological analysis receives rational consistence. Responsible with education, and by this I refer mainly to public instruction, the spiritual power finds itself invaded by the metaphysical spirit: not only that it infiltrates in all intellectual fields, manifesting the unavoidable tendency of departing from the purely theological tutorship, but it is also spreading at the social level. Catholicism remains unable to sustain any social function and, even more, loses its desire to do so. The temporal-spiritual distinction, strongly reinforced by the Church, produces the class of metaphysicians and of legists. Comte sees these two classes as being representative for the passage from a passive state to an active one.

At the social level, once the feudal organization is destabilized, the aristocratic class can merge with the industrial one, resulting, thus, the new social class of the Saxon nobility. The destabilization of feudalism occurs as the power is centralized, the local institutions finding themselves at a loss.

Comte characterizes the metaphysical stage as being, in the first phase, a purely protestant one, while in the second, purely deistic. Protestantism is the basis of the critical movement, spontaneous and lacking an imposed

¹ See p. 119 from Comte, *The Positive Philosophy*, 2000.

² Comte, III:117–19. Later, Max Weber writes in his *Protestant Ethic*: “ [...] it is necessary to note, what has often been forgotten, that the Reformation meant not the elimination of the Church’s control over everyday life, but rather the substitution of a new form of control over the previous one, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons, Taylor and Francis e-Library, Routledge Classics, 2005, 4.

direction, while the second, to which the negative philosophy pertains, is eminently systematized:

[...] The Protestant period had brought the ancient social system to such a state of decay that it could not guide, but only impede the formation of modern society [...] On the other hand, the system would have lasted for an indefinite time in its state of decay; and without fulfilling its professions, in virtue of its mere inertia, if the revolutionary ferment [...] had not entered in to direct the movement of decomposition towards that regeneration which is its necessary issue.¹

The negative attitude is a consequence of the intellectual liberty the spirit acquired (now less dependent upon theological commitments). One of the most important contributions to the social reformation, now, is the elaboration of the egalitarian doctrine (seen, in turns, as a doctrine about fraternity or as a manifestation of superiority, “according to the natures that entertain it”²). Comte says that

[...] In short, the mental influences which conduced to the formation of the negative philosophy were strengthened by powerful moral influences, tending in their combination to insurrectionary crises, in which there is usually a welcome ready for those who fret under the habitual restraint of social laws³.

Regarding this issue, another common point can be established with the Brentanian theory. As we know, there, the second phase of decline—marked by skepticism—appears as a reaction to the scientific relaxation peculiar to the first one. Comte notes the general inclination of engaging directly the (perturbing) elements that have a direct contribution to the satisfaction of social needs; moreover, the universal moral theory cannot be fulfilled outside a theological system⁴.

III. Conclusions

The first two stages can be interpreted in the light of a gradual development and transformation of the positive spirit. From this point of view, they are preparatory and, in the same time, explanatory for the actual

¹ Comte, *The Positive Philosophy*, 2000, III:154.

² *Idem*, p. 156.

³ *The Positive Philosophy*, 2000, III:156–57.

⁴ See, for this, Auguste Comte, *Cours de Philosophie Positive*, vol. V (Paris: Scheleir Frères, Éditeurs, 1908), 364.

state of society. Discussing the intellectual development apart from the social one is just a methodological division; as we have seen, they support each other. It might be the case that the main objective be a social, scientific organization of human communities, yet this is dependent upon intellectual and mental attitudes and abilities. Take, for instance, the revolution that took place at the social level once the discussion on human rights and liberties occurred. The later owes to the protestant reformation movement that started inside the Catholic Church; it was initiated by an elite class with intellectual privileges granted by their access to education. One can see, there, the dependency and intertwining of the evolution of the human thought and the form of social organization. As Bourdeau notes, Comte recognizes the social character of science, the dependency of scientists upon society¹, which can be seen as a contrasting point with the Brentanian theory, where science and the scientist are seen as a distinct element from the other fields of human activity.

Comte's interpretation of the history of humankind is goal-oriented: humanity is somehow designed to attain a certain state, and all its actions and cuts through history serve this objective. Brentano's theory attempts for a description of the past events, with no underlying metaphysical assumptions. Borrowing the idea of positivity and applying the label to his own time, Brentano is confident that the pattern he described will change and that the cyclicity will end. However, in this paper, I was not focusing on the "current state of affairs". Regarding the past, the notion of decline plays a special role. For Comte, it is the element whose occurrence conditions the apparition of progress (which is, after all, the general process his lectures on the positive philosophy aim to explain), along with the notion of satisfaction. These two concepts eliminate the possibility of stagnation; institutions either decay or grow, any other possibility is just an intermediary phase in the long process of development of the human spirit and society. Institutions are mentioned here as the commentaries were on

¹ Michel Bourdeau, Mary Pickering, and Warren Schmaus, eds., *Love, Order, and Progress* (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2018), 7, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv11wk0b>. Another element of contrast can be found in the Comtean idea that the development of sciences comes on a par with that of society. See, on this subject, Anastasios Brennes's discussion, "Astronomical Science and Its Significance for humankind" in the above-mentioned work (pp. 72-92).

the lectures concerning the social physics; yet, this idea of decay can be discussed also at an epistemological level¹. The aim of the entire *Course* is to sketch the plans for a new and positive social organization, required by the changes and development the human spirit faced— now it is independent from theology, which was representative for the ancient regime; the faculties of abstraction and coordination are fully developed, and science has attained a certain maturity and separation. This state of affairs is contrasting with the initial one, when disciplines were altogether. Maturity of the sciences is accepted by Brentano also, and this is what allows him to hope for a positive foundation of psychology.

Returning to the notion of satisfaction, for Brentano, one might interpret the three phases of decline of each cycle as a psychological dissatisfaction with the current state, their succession a reaction to the previous one. However, if in Comte the human spirit retains the positivist elements (incipient or developed to a certain degree), for Brentano there is no such behavior of retainment. The beginning of a new cycle does not necessarily mean improvement or more adequacy. From this perspective, then, we oppose randomness, on the one hand, to a goal-oriented process.

The significance of decay is, then, different for each author. For one, it is the means for progress, for the other it might draw along stagnation of abandonment of the course of ideas. However, the conditions of appearance are similar: satisfaction or, better said, the lack of satisfaction of the needs of humanity (intellectual, social, moral) at some point makes possible the search for a new approach. The metaphysical presuppositions seemed, then, to bear weight for the proposed account of similarities and differences between Comte and Brentano concerning the phenomenon of decline.

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¹ As it is the case in Gane, *Auguste Comte*.

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PATOČKAS BILD VON MASARYK¹

Dariusz BĘBEN²

Abstract: *In the article concerning the meaning and the continuity of Czech history Patočka referred to the history of the dispute, arguing against the opinions of Masaryk. In this context it is possible to take a wider look at the very concept of the Patočka's philosophy of history, looking at it from the angle of its national application: from the side of the philosophical and political responsibility of individuals in their social and political lives.*

Keywords: *Masaryk, Patočka, Czech philosophy, Positivism, Religion*

Jan Patočka gehörte schon zu dieser Generation der Intellektuellen in der Tschechoslowakei, die sich direkt mit dem Masaryks Werk auseinandersetzen konnte³. Wie es oft passiert, wenn wir mit Mythen zu tun haben, hat er auch auf ein künstlich erzeugtes, nicht immer der Wahrheit entsprechendes Bild, auf den Kult des Präsidenten-Philosophen, der sich noch zu seinen Lebzeiten entwickelt hat, gestoßen. Hier die Sicht von Patočka auf Masaryk in einer breiten Perspektive:

In der „konkreten Logik“ des Positivismus hat er wichtige zeitgenössische philosophische Problematik (die Natur und das System der Wissenschaft, die Beziehung zwischen der Wissenschaft und der Philosophie) angesprochen; er hat die wissenschaftliche Arbeit reorganisiert, sie philosophisch und moralisch unterstützt, er hat uns in die soziologischen und psychologischen Trends der Neuzeit eingeführt, er hat die Bedeutung des tschechischen Denkens für die heutige Welt offenbart, vor den Vor- und Nachteilen des Positivismus gewarnt. Insbesondere war er mit seiner positivistischen Gleichgültigkeit gegenüber den Fragen nach dem allgemeinen Sinn des Lebens und der Welt nicht einverstanden [...]. Die Idee des Humanismus, mit deren Hilfe er seine Philosophie der allgemein weltlichen und der tschechischen Geschichtsschreibung

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³ Ueber die Beziehung zwischen Patočka und Masaryk vgl. J. Zouhar: *O Masarykovi*. Brno 2009; E. Kohák: *Jan Patočka o T.G. Masarykovi: kritické ocenění*. In: Idem: *Zorným úhlem filosofa. Vybrané články a přednášky z let 1992–2002*. Praha 2004, S. 233–246.

zusammenzufassen versuchte, ist der letzte Ausdruck seiner Lebenserfahrung¹.

Das Ideal des Humanismus war seine versprochene Wahrheit. Die philosophische Spekulation gehörte aber nicht zu den Masaryks Stärken; prinzipiell mit Ausnahme seiner konkreten Logik hinterlässt er keine wesentlichen Spuren auf diesem Feld. Sein Beitrag in die tschechische Geschichtsphilosophie muss aber als sehr bedeutsam angesehen werden. Die tschechische Frage hat er immer als ein globales Problem begriffen, sein Ziel lag in der philosophischen Einbeziehung seiner Nation in den inneren Strom der allgemeinen Geschichtsschreibung und der Weltpolitik.

Patočka hat geglaubt, dass Masaryk als erster versucht hat, die tschechische Nationalphilosophie zu entwickeln. Viele vor ihm waren auch ähnlich inspiriert. Manchmal, so wie im Fall von Kollár, Smetana oder Palacky sind Grundrisse eines solchen nationalen Projekts entstanden. Warum wird Masaryk die erste Stellung zugeschrieben? Patočka meint, dass die Masaryks Vorgänger immer etwas übersehen haben. Mit anderen Worten, sie haben es nie geschafft, eine umfassende Vision einer solchen Idee zu entwickeln. Und so war die Philosophie von Smetana eher slawisch, aber nicht tschechisch geprägt. Die Philosophie von Palacky beschäftigte sich eher mit der Lage der im österreichischen Staat lebenden Gesellschaft. Patočka hat bemerkt:

Der Masaryks Auftritt als Politiker ist auch gleichzeitig ein Auftritt als Philosoph. Masaryk hat sich als ideologisch als viel kreativer erwiesen als die anderen, oben erwähnten Denker. Sein Verständnis der Beziehung zwischen der Politik und der Philosophie ist einzigartig; das hat dazu beigetragen, dass er als ein Gründer (oder im eigentlichen Sinne ein „Erneuerer“) des Staates zu einem besonderen Fall wurde. Philosophen haben sich oft mit dem idealen Konstrukt des Staates befasst, aber in der ganzen Geschichte hatte nur ein Einziger, nämlich Masaryk eine Chance bekommen, dieses in die Tat umzusetzen².

Ähnlich wie Palacký, hat Masaryk der Kontinuität der tschechischen Geschichtsschreibung eine wichtige Rolle zugeschrieben. Die Masaryks These lautete: Das Gebiet der heutigen Tschechoslowakei betritt die europäische Bühne des Geschehens durch das religiöse Schaffen von Hus,

¹ J. Patočka *Filosofie česká*. In: Idem: *Češi*. Sv. 1. Ed. K. Palek, I. Chvátik. Praha 2006, s. 653 ff.

² J. Patočka: *Pokus o českou národní filosofii a jeho nezdar*. In: Idem: *Češi*. Sv. 1..., s. 343.

deren Wurzel im Konflikt zwischen zwei religiösen Autoritäten liegen. Die Revolution von Jan Hus hat für die künftigen Generationen den Weg zur demokratischen politischen Form geebnet. Die tschechische Reformation im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert, die der deutschen Reformation voranging, hat ein Ideal der freien Menschheit geschaffen, die auf authentischer Nächstenliebe basiert, die für den Aufbau des Reiches Gottes auf der Erde notwendig ist. Hus, die böhmischen Brüder, Komeňski, Palacký haben diesem Geschehen einen weiteren Sinn verliehen. Nicht alle haben die Masaryks Ansichten geteilt. Die positivistisch ausgerichteten Historiker haben kritiklos die Ideen von Rousseau, Herder oder Jungmann als Grundlage angenommen. So ist es zu einem der wichtigen Auseinandersetzungen in der Geschichte der tschechischen Philosophie gekommen. Josef Pekař – der prominenteste Gegner von Masaryk – hat geglaubt, dass die tschechische Nation als Kind des 19. Jahrhunderts keinen Grund dazu haben soll, Hus und seine Epoche zu loben. Hus alleine, wenn er von seinem Grabe auferstanden wäre, würde sie wahrscheinlich nicht kennenlernen wollen. Die Nation hat sich von seinen eifrigen Idealen abgewendet. Tschechen sind nicht mehr das dem Hus bekannte Volk und wollen nicht ins Mittelalter zurück. Patočka hat das so betrachtet:

Pekař hat persönlich viele Fähigkeiten für *praeterito* vorgestellt, aber nicht begriffen, dass die tschechische Philosophie von Masaryk keine unlebendige Vergangenheit ist, sondern ein Versuch der Erneuerung [...] von Geschehnissen in der Vergangenheit, eine Perspektive der entschlossenen Handlung *sub specie aeternitatis*¹⁴.

Man muss Pekař teilweise zustimmen, wenn er über den bedeutenden Einfluss des Katholizismus auf das tschechische Gebiet schreibt. Es ist jedoch wichtig zu wissen, dass Masaryk die Reformation nicht wieder beleben wollte. Das war nicht sein Punkt. Er wollte lediglich zeigen, dass das Ideal des Humanismus bereits in der Vergangenheit verwurzelt ist.

Der Patočkas Vergleich zwischen Husserl und Masaryk war interessant und wertvoll. Der Autor hatte selbstverständlich gewusst, dass diese Philosophen – trotz der gemeinsamen Genese von Brentano – entschieden unterschiedliche Methodik verwenden und sich ganz unterschiedliche Aufgaben stellen. Die Frage, ob so ein Vergleich überhaupt einen Sinn

¹⁴ J. Patočka: *České myšlení v meziválečném období*. In: Idem: *Češi*. Sv. 2..., s. 349. Vgl. I. Holzbachová: *Filozofie dějin*. V: *Česka filozofie ve 20. století. Smery, osobnosti, problémy*. Red. J. Gabriel, L. Nový, J. Zouhar. Brno 1995, s. 270 ff.

macht, bejaht Patočka eindeutig: Es geht hier nämlich nicht um eine historisch-philosophische Parallele, sondern um ein Problem, das wir in diesem Fall aus zwei verschiedenen Perspektiven analysieren können. Patočka schreibt: „Philosophische Parallelen zu ziehen könnte also unserer Meinung nach zu lernen helfen, die Probleme von verschiedenen Seiten her zu betrachten, engstirnigen Dogmatismus zu vermeiden, uns in verschiedene persönliche Atmosphären hineinzusetzen und die Motive philosophischer Zielrichtung verschiedener Art zu verfolgen“¹.

Masaryk war ein Philosoph, der sich auf die *Praxis* bezog, während Husserl sich eher mit der abstrakten Philosophie beschäftigte. Patočka hat Masaryk als einen der größten Zivilisationsträger der heutigen Welt gesehen, Husserl betrachtete er als einen der größten (und zugleich letzten) Metaphysiker. Welches Problem, das diese beiden Persönlichkeiten des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts miteinander verbindet, kann gefunden werden? Patočka glaubte, dass die Krise so ein Thema wäre, also eine Frage, die schon in einem von den früheren Abschnitten erwähnt worden ist; ein Motiv, das Philosophen der Wende des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts förmlich glühen ließ. Die These dieses tschechischen Philosophen lautet: Der Schwerpunkt von Masaryks Überlegungen, aber auch denen von Husserl, liegt in der Krise des Menschen heutigen Europas. Masaryk spricht hier direkt über eine Katastrophe, die Europa um die Wende des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts heimgesucht hatte. Ein Anzeichen einer solchen Schwächung der Moralkraft ist sicherlich der Selbstmord². Masaryk, ähnlich wie der Schriftsteller Dostojewski, betrachtet den Selbstmord als Flucht vor der Verantwortung³. Es geht hier nicht um Beschreibung einer Erkrankung, die das Leben einzelner Menschen bedroht, sondern um einen geistigen Zusammenbruch ganzen Europas. Weitere Symptome der Krise sind Subjektivismus, Titanismus (also Glaube an die übermenschliche Macht des Menschen) sowie Pessimismus. Masaryk schrieb: „[...] der gegenwärtige Mensch [...] nimmt auf sich die ganze Schuld des Lebens,

¹ Vgl. J. Patočka: *Masaryks und Husserls Auffassung der geistigen Krise der europäischen Menschheit*. In: Idem: *Die Bewegung der menschliche Existenz. Phänomenologische Schriften II*. Hrsg. K. Nellen, J. Němec, I. Srubar. Stuttgart 1991, s. 455.

² Vgl. T.G. Masaryk: *Sebevražda hromadným jevem společenským moderní osvěty. Spisy T.G. Masaryka*. Sv. 1. Ed. J. Srovnal. Praha 1998.

³ Interessante Vergleiche zwischen Masaryk und Dostojewski finden sie in: J. Patočka [*Dostojewski–Nietzsche – Masaryk*]. In: Idem: *Češi*. Sv. 1..., s. 893–898, sowie *Kolem Masarykovy filosofie náboženství*. In: Idem: *Češi*. Sv. 1..., s. s. 382 ff.

bestraft sich so selbst; man kann auch sagen, dass der eigene Tod auch ein Delirium der Subjektivität, Zerstörung der Persönlichkeit darstellt, wenn sie ihren Gegenstand verliert, an dem sie sich halten könnte“¹. Patočka hat Masaryk mit Recht vorgeworfen, dass man dem Menschen die Objektivität nicht entziehen darf. Er kann die Welt nicht zerstören, aber die Welt kann für den Menschen die gegenständliche Bedeutung verlieren. Der tschechische Phänomenologe weist auch darauf hin, dass Masaryk die Ideen von Comte wiederholt, der bekanntlich einen großen Einfluss auf seine Philosophie ausgeübt hatte². Der Autor von *Selbstmord* akzeptiert die positivistischen Ansichten des Franzosen, dass die Krise stets ein Ergebnis der Transformation - also eines Übergangs zwischen den konkreten Abschnitten der zivilisatorischen Entwicklung ist; dass das Wesen der Krise im Konflikt zwischen der religiösen Tradition und der neuen, liberalen Weltanschauung liegt. Der tschechische Liberale konnte sich die Religion außerhalb seiner Kirche, seines Kults und der Wissenschaft nicht vorstellen, er konnte überhaupt nicht nachvollziehen, wovon Palacký spricht.

Der Begriff der husserlschen Krise wurde bereits erwähnt. Der Deutsche hat das Krisenphänomen ganz anders ausgelegt, er hat andere Anzeichen dafür erkannt, insbesondere in der Hypostase der Wissenschaften in Folge der Herrschaft der Naturwissenschaften. Dem Autor von *Logischen Untersuchungen* zufolge, konnte die Krise nur durch eine neue Gründung der Wissenschaft erreicht werden, die durch eine radikale Theorie, also Phänomenologie erfolgen kann. Die beiden Denker waren sich einig, dass die fehlende Religiosität ein Zeichen der Krise ist. Aber ihr Verständnis der Religion ist radikal verschieden. Bei dem husserlschen Konzept treten wesentliche Schwächen auf, weil dieses Thema nicht in dem Mittelpunkt seiner wissenschaftlichen Interessen lag. Masaryk hat das Thema der Religion dagegen sehr gut bearbeitet und hielt dieses Thema für außergewöhnlich wichtig für sein Verständnis der tschechischen Geschichtsphilosophie³. Masaryk ging davon aus, dass Religion etwas mit

¹ T.G. Masaryk: *Moderní člověk a náboženství. Spisy TGM. Sv. 8.* Eds. J. Zouhar, H. Pavlincová, J. Gabriel. Praha 2000, s. 31.

² Vgl. T.G. Masaryk: *Moderní člověk a náboženství. Spisy TGM. Sv. 8.* Eds. J. Zouhar, H. Pavlincová, J. Gabriel. Praha 2000, s. 31.

³ Vgl. J. Patočka: *Masarykovo a Husserlovo pojetí duševní krize evropského lidstva...*, s. 15.

dem Gefühl des Vertrautheit und der Liebe zu tun hat. Patočka macht auf diesen emotionalen Charakter des Glaubens aufmerksam (der an das Konzept des deutschen Philosophen Friedrich Schleiermacher erinnert), der einen Anreiz zum aktiven Leben darstellt, das in einem positiven Verhältnis zum universellen Wesen gelebt werden kann. Die Religion ist das Leben *sub specie aeternitatis*, dient als Veranschaulichung unserer Bindung mit der Welt. Das hat aber nichts mit der Sentimentalität zu tun.

Hat Jesus uns nicht dazu aufgefordert, dass wir unsere Nächsten lieben wie uns selbst? Der Mensch ist von Natur her egoistisch, aber die Frage bleibt, ob er nur egoistisch sein kann, oder auch Gefühle wie Sympathie oder Liebe gegenüber seinen Nächsten empfinden kann. Das religiöse Gefühl spielt also im Menschen von Anfang an bis zum Ende die Rolle des *spiritus agens*, auch innerhalb der Geschichtsphilosophie. Masaryk betont: „Diese philosophischen Bestrebungen auf der Suche nach dem Sinn der tschechischen Geschichte und der Mission der tschechischen Nation, führen uns zu einem letztendlich religiösen Problem hin; also zum Problem des tschechischen Lebens und seiner Erklärung. Das ist auch unser tschechisches Problem: Zur Idee der Brüderlichkeit sind wir durch die religiöse und moralische Entwicklung gekommen“¹. Schon in den Texten von Palacky ist eine ähnliche religiöse Begründung des Humanismus erkennbar. Patočka behauptete, dass Masaryk die Demokratie nicht nur für eine Staatsform hielt, aber auch für eine eigenartige Manifestation der theistischen Metaphysik, die dem moralischen Charakter der Religion entspricht². Diese Auslegung der Religiosität wird auch von Hus und den böhmischen Brüdern bevorzugt. Diese Art der Auslegung der Religion, also nicht scholastisch, nicht theologisch, die an erster Stelle moralische Fragen aufwirft, kann man als post-metaphysische religiöse Demokratie bezeichnen 86. Patočka hat einen gewissen Widerspruch in Masaryks Denkweise wahrgenommen und hat gemeint, dass viele Fragen und Probleme, die er in seiner Philosophie formuliert, noch nicht beantwortet beziehungsweise gelöst worden sind. Warum ist das so passiert? Patočka schreibt: „Diese Unlösbarkeit liegt in der Tatsache, dass Masaryk mit all seinem praktischen Moralismus und seinem aus der Literatur abgeleiteten Moralphysikologie (Goethe, Dostojewski) diese Begriffe in den Rahmen des

¹ T.G. Masaryk: *Česká otázka/Naše nynější krize/Jan Hus...*, s. 325.

² Vgl. J. Patočka: *Pokus o českou národní filosofii a jeho nezdar...*, s. 349.

Comte-Positivismus oder der naturalistischen Weltsicht einbezieht“¹. Es tauchen folgende Fragen auf: Tritt hier ein Widerspruch zwischen der Masaryks Psychologie des verantwortungsbewussten Menschen und seiner naturalistischen Weltanschauung ein? Gibt es einen Widerspruch zwischen Objektivität und der religiösen Weltanschauung Masaryks? Wie kann die Vorsehung mit dem positivistischen Determinismus vereinbart werden? Patočka hat darauf direkt antwortet: Das sei unmöglich, Moralismus und Positivismus lassen sich nicht miteinander vereinbaren. Die Masaryks Philosophie, die im Wesentlichen auf empirischer Moral basiert, stand im Widerspruch mit seinem Humanismus. Die Verbindung der positivistischen, methodischen Ernsthaftigkeit mit dem religiösen Gefühl der Welterfahrung ist schlicht unmöglich. Patočka fügte hinzu:

In dem entscheidenden Moment, als ein Schritt in Richtung der Nationalphilosophie fällig war und man sich für eine wirklich radikale Revision der neuzeitlichen philosophischen Tradition entscheiden konnte, hat sich Masaryk – im Gegenteil dazu – gegen die „objektivistische“, neuzeitliche und naturalistisch orientierte Geschichtsphilosophie nach Comte gewendet. Er forderte also ein objektives Recht auf Entwicklung, die auf "Ewigem" basiert, was nichts mit der Verantwortung und der Freiheit im Sinne des tschechischen Phänomenologen gemeinsam hätte, aber sogar damit im scharfen Konflikt steht².

Patočka meinte, dass das Masaryks Konzept innerlich widersprüchlich sei, auch weil er eine neue Welt aufbauen wollte, aber sein Konzept ideologisch und methodisch in der alten Welt verankert war.

Patočka hat sogar behauptet, dass viele Masaryks Analysen nicht als philosophisch zu bezeichnen seien, weil sie eher einen historischen und soziologischen Charakter aufweisen. Masaryk zeichnete sich selbst durch einen volksreligiösen Sinn für das Tschechische, er selbst hat es als „dialektisch“ bezeichnet, philosophisch mit Hume oder Comte ergänzt. Das war aber trotzdem zu wenig. Darüber hinaus basierte die antidemokratische Haltung Patočkas, sein gewisser Elitismus auf der moralischen Selbstverantwortung, er konnte an griechische *polis* erinnern, war humanistisch fremd und von der religiös etablierten Demokratie entfernt. Die Bewertung der Masaryks Haltung von Patočka war ein Gegenstand zahlreicher Polemiken. Die Vorwürfe gegen den Autor von

¹ J. Patočka: *Pokus o českou národní filosofii a jeho nezdar...*, s. 376.

² *Ibidem*, s. 377.

Ketzerische Essays... kamen von unterschiedlichen Seiten. Ihm ist es vorgeworfen worden, dass er Masaryk von seinem phänomenologischen Standpunkt her interpretiert, dass er den moralischen Aspekt von Masaryks Idee nicht begreifen kann, oder dass er ihn aus der Perspektive persönlicher politischer Erfahrung her zu eng beobachtet – anders in der Zwischenkriegszeit und anders in der Zeit des Stalinismus oder der Normalisierung¹. Černý hat das richtig gesehen: „Patočka hat keine Gabe der integrierenden und kohärenten Sichtweise und deshalb ist seine Sicht auf Masaryk nicht anziehend genug, mehr noch, er ist nicht mehr lebendig, es ist nur ein aufgeteiltes und einzigartiges Phänomen der philosophischen Entwicklung²“. Emanuel Rádl hingegen hat in der Masaryks Philosophie eine Synthese des Platonismus mit dem neuzeitlichen wissenschaftlich-kritischen Positivismus gesehen. Patočka behauptete nämlich – wenn Rádl Recht hatte, dass die Masaryks Haltung ohnehin paradox ist, weil sie selbst ein Beispiel für die gegenwärtige Krise war, gegen welche sie ausgerichtet war. Masaryk hat sich von seinem positivistischen „Gepäck“ nie befreit, das ihn bei der Entwicklung der nationalen Philosophie deutlich belastete. Die Krise als einen Übergang von der theologischen in die positivistische Phase zu begreifen, ist nicht wirklich positivistisch, man muss auch die Religiosität und Ethik einbeziehen. Die letzte kann nur in Form der gelebten sozialen Solidarität existieren, also ist ein Produkt sozialer Prozesse. Masaryk wollte das Christentum durch einen nicht kirchlichen, religiösen Humanismus ersetzen, dessen Kern in dem moralischen Leben steckt, aber – so Patočka – er hat sein Wesen nach Hume als ein Gefühl der Sympathie positivistisch interpretiert. Es gibt noch eine Frage, die wichtig ist. Der erste Präsident der Tschechoslowakei hat geglaubt, dass man Österreich nicht demokratisch reformieren kann. Der Modernisierungsprozess einer Gesellschaft ist der Übergang von einer theokratischen zur demokratischen Gesellschaft.

Die Theokratie wird in gewisser Weise mit der Herrschaft der Aristokratie gleichgesetzt: Reformation und Aufklärung sind wesentliche Schritte dieses Individualisierungsprozesses. So wie die Aufklärung den

¹ Vgl. J. Opat: *Glosy ke dvěma kritikám. T.G. Masaryk*. In: Idem: *Masarykiana a jiné studie 1980–1994*. Praha 1994, s. 31–61; V. Černý: *Dvě studie masarykovské. „Svědectví“* 1990, č. 89–90, s. 7–24; M. Bednař: *Současný filosofický význam Masarykova pojetí české otázky*. In: Idem: *České myšlení...*, s. 167–195.

² V. Černý: *Dvě studie masarykovské...*, s. 21.

Menschen mit der Natur verbindet und die Gesellschaft mit dem Fortschritt, so zieht die Reformation die innerliche moralische Verantwortung mit sich. Für Masaryk war der erste Weltkrieg ein Ereignis in der Weltgeschichte, eine Weltrevolution, ein Kampf zwischen Demokratie und Theokratie. Die Erklärung des Krieges mit Hilfe des Nationalismus würde mit einer erheblichen Einseitigkeit resultieren. Der Weltkrieg im Sinne Masaryks war ein Konflikt zwischen den traditionellen theokratischen Regimen, die auf mittelalterlich-metaphysischen Prinzipien basierten und der neuen demokratischen Macht. Durch den Krieg sind drei Kaiserreiche zusammengebrochen, die viele Nationen unterdrückt haben, und so den freien Raum für ein demokratisches Europa eingeräumt, also für Freiheit und Unabhängigkeit aller Nationen. Der Krieg hat drei große Reiche aus der Gottes Liebe vernichtet, anschließend kam die neue Epoche - die des Volkes. Masaryk hat die These, dass der erste Weltkrieg durch den Konflikt zwischen den Slawen und Germanen entfesselt ist, niemals akzeptiert; er war eher eine Wahl zwischen Goethe und Bismarck. Wie wir uns erinnern können, hat Patočka auch den ersten Weltkrieg als ein einschneidendes Erlebnis des 20. Jahrhunderts gesehen, das in gewisser Weise seinen Charakter bestimmt und das 20. Jahrhundert zu einem Jahrhundert des Krieges gemacht hatte. Der Krieg hat zur Umwertung aller Werte geführt und dies erfolgte im Namen der herrschenden Kraft der Subjektivität. Aus diesem Grund hat Patočka Nietzsche für einen wichtigeren Philosophen als Masaryk gehalten, weil er nicht nur der Philosoph des Krieges, sondern des gesamten zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts als Jahrhunderts des Krieges war. Patočka hat außerdem eingesehen, dass diese Beurteilung des Weltkrieges eher als Trost angesichts sich abzeichnender Probleme als eine ernsthafte soziologische Interpretation zu verstehen war. Patočka denkt: „Der Ursprung der Macht von Gott war doch nur ein Ausdruck der weiter anhaltenden sozialen Strukturen. Es zeigte sich bald, dass der Krieg eine Weltrevolution ausgelöst, die aber nicht mit ihm beendet war“¹.

Laut Masaryk entstand die Demokratie durch diese Revolution. Natürlich war diese Revolution in gewisser Weise eine Notwehr vor der Tyrannei, aber sie wurde erst dann aufgegriffen, als alle anderen Mittel ausgeschöpft waren. Die Demokratie kann nicht mit einer ununterbrochenen Revolution gleichgesetzt werden. Der Befürworter

¹ J. Patočka: *Pokus o českou národní filosofii a jeho nezdar...*, s. 378.

Masaryks - Rádl, der im gewissen Sinne sein Konzept radikalisiert hatte, glaubte, dass man die nationalistische Haltung aufgeben muss. Er behauptete, dass die Beziehungen zwischen Tschechen und Deutschen revidiert werden müssen, wenn die Idee Masaryks wahr werden soll. Die Nationalität muss anders definiert sein als in der Zeit der tschechischen nationalen Erneuerung.

Es muss ein rein demokratisches Programm des Staates aufgestellt werden, in dem alle Nationalitäten in Harmonie leben können. Tschechien kann aber nicht den Weg der Schweiz beschreiten und sein Ziel in der Neutralität suchen, aber – ganz im Gegenteil – seiner Tradition folgen und zu einem engagierten Staat werden, der um die Erhaltung der europäischen Ordnung vom Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts sorgt. Seiner Meinung nach, muss man sich an die Seite der Demokratie stellen und eine eindeutige moralische Position einnehmen¹. Hier glaubt Rádl, übrigens genauso wie Masaryk, dass alle politischen, gesellschaftlichen und wirtschaftlichen Probleme grundsätzlich als moralische Probleme zu bewerten sind. Diese Haltung zeigt Einflüsse von Palacky, Havlíček-Borovski, Bolzan und selbstverständlich – was Patočka eher vergessen mag – von Platon. Das Masaryks Konzept der Nation ist weder nationalistisch oder ethnisch – aber eher ethisch-politisch². Masaryk hat geglaubt, dass gesellschaftliche Ideale in der letzten Instanz nur ethisch zu begründen seien. Für ihn besteht die Geschichtsphilosophie aus der Kategorie der Moralurteile. Das kann man noch anders formulieren: Masaryk hat die Geschichte als einen sinnvollen Prozess der Verwirklichung der Idee des Humanismus verstanden, aber er meinte damit weder eine konkrete Sprache, noch eine Nationalität, sondern stets die Seele.

Im Schatten der Münchener Ereignisse hat Patočka die Frage gestellt, warum es nicht gelungen konnte, das Ideal des Humanismus Masaryks zu verwirklichen. Warum musste er eine Niederlage hinnehmen, so wie es damals ausgesehen hat³? Warum musste dieses zweifellos optimistische

¹ Vgl. J. Patočka: *Was sind die Tschechen?* In: Idem: *Schriften zur tschechischen Kultur und Geschichte*. Hrsg. K. Nellen, P. Pithart, M. Pojar. Stuttgart 1992, s. 88.

² Mehr über das Verständnis von Nation und Nationalismus vgl. J. Kilias: *Naród a idea narodowa. Nacjonalizm T.G. Masaryka*. Warszawa 1998.

³ J. Patočka: *Harmonismus moderních humanistů. Mravní problémy a hlediska současné filosofie*. In: Idem: *Pěče o duši*. Sv. 3. Eds. I. Chvatík, P. Kouba. Praha 2002, s. 355.

Projekt, wenn man das so formulieren kann, das auf dem Ideal der Harmonie und Rationalität und dem Glaube an das Gute basierte, eine Niederlage erleiden? Einerseits wirft Patočka Masaryk ein vorkritisches Glauben daran vor, dass die Welt grundsätzlich gut und in seiner Struktur geordnet bleibt und gewissermaßen von einem guten Gott geschützt wird. Der tschechische Phänomenologe glaubt, dass solche Sichtweise naiv ist. Das war eine Illusion des Tages, die überwältigende Kraft der Nacht nicht sehen will. Andererseits behauptete Patočka, dass Masaryk einem unkritischen Historismus gefolgt hatte. Man kann daran zweifeln, ob Masaryk wirklich die Philosophie der tschechischen Geschichte gründen wollte? Dies ist gar nicht so sicher. Es scheint, dass Patočka damit Recht hatte, weil Masaryk nicht beabsichtigte, die Philosophie der tschechischen Geschichte zu schaffen, sondern versuchte, die Gegenwart von Tschechen und auch anderer Nationen zu verstehen, ihre Stellung in der Welt zu ergründen und auf dieser Basis die Zukunft seiner Nation zu gestalten¹. Trotzdem bleibt die Masaryks Problemstellung weiterhin aktuell, weil er vor allem ein Denker der Demokratie war und Demokratie zur Grundidee der tschechoslowakischen Republik gehoben hat. Indem er die Existenz des Staates moralisch begründet hatte, hat er gezeigt, dass Tschechen mehr historische Kraft als andere Nationen haben. Waren die Tschechen in der Lage, diese Kraft in einem weiteren, nicht minder dramatischen Kapitel ihrer Geschichte, zu zeigen?

In dem reichen Werk von Patočka nehmen die Texte zur Person und dem Werk von Tomáš G. Masaryk eine durchaus besondere Stellung an. Die Analyse der Beziehung zwischen Patočka und Masaryk kann als ein separates Forschungsfeld fungieren. Hier sind phänomenologische, religiöse und politische Überlegungen miteinander stark verflochten – alles vor dem Hintergrund des tragischen Schicksals Mitteleuropas². Es besteht kein Zweifel daran, dass diese herausragende Stellung mit der dominierenden Rolle zu tun hat, die der erste Präsident der Tschechoslowakei für die Generation Patočkas gespielt hat. Am Masaryks Konzept kann man nicht gleichgültig vorbeigehen. Die Anknüpfung an Masaryk war immer ein Zeichen der Zeit. Patočka gehörte zu den Zeugen der Entstehung, Implementierung, Verwirklichung sowie auch der

¹ Vgl. T.G. Masaryk: *Česká otázka/Náše nynější krize/Jan Hus...*, s. 180.

² Vgl. R. Scruton: *Masaryk, Patočka and the Care of Soul*. In: *On Masaryk. Texts in English and German*. Ed. J. Novák. Amsterdam 1988, s. 119.

Degeneration und Zerstörung der philosophischen Ideale Masaryks. Vor Hintergrund der dramatischen Geschichte der Tschechoslowakei, insbesondere nach dem Münchner Abkommen (1938), über die Niederlage des Prager Frühlings (1968) bis zur Charta 77 (1977) bleibt die Frage nach der mit Idealen Masaryks grundierten Problematik nicht nur aktuell, aber unausweichlich. Die Anknüpfung an Masaryk war immer ein Zeichen der Zeit. Patočka schreibt: „Der einzige originelle Geist war Masaryk, nicht durch die Tiefe seiner Gedanken, sondern durch das Bewusstsein von seiner sittlichen Sendung und durch seinen Sinn für die wahren, drängenden Probleme. Er hat den Positivismus und die Soziologie bei uns eingeführt, zu einer Zeit auf Marx verwiesen, als man diesen in der akademischen Welt wie einen toten Hund behandelte, über die tschechische Wiedergeburt nachgedacht und Palackýs Geschichtsphilosophie wieder aufgenommen; er hat über *Russland und Europa* geschrieben, mit Weitblick Politik betreiben und aus tiefster Überzeugung zur Zertrümmerung der österreichischen Monarchie beigetragen. Lange Jahre hatte er sich für die Demokratisierung und Föderalisierung der Monarchie eingesetzt, sich aber durch eigene Erfahrung und die anderer davon überzeugt, dass dies keine Lösung war. Masaryk ist also eine ganz aussergewöhnliche Erscheinung. Aber er war gleichzeitig isoliert und hinterliess keinen einzigen neuen spekulativen Gedanken“¹.

Patočka hielt Masaryk für einen entschieden nicht spekulativen Philosophen. Sein Gedankengut basierte nicht auf Konstruktionen und Spekulationen, sondern wandte sich an die Welt, in der wir leben. Er war vom Typ her ein kritischer Forscher, der mit seinem Gedankengut nicht die Welt beschreiben, sondern real tun und leben wollte. In den 60er Jahren des vergangenen Jahrhunderts, also in Jahren des Tauwetters, wurde er wieder zum Gegenstand der Diskussionen und Analysen. Je näher das Jahr 1968 rückte, umso stärker waren die Versuche, die Ideen Masaryks mit der humanistischen Version des Sozialismus in Verbindung zu setzen. Es ist sogar eine Idee der Erneuerung des Masaryk-Instituts entstanden, dabei war Jan Patočka sehr engagiert².

¹ J. Patočka: *Was sind die Tschechen?...*, s. 91–92.

² Vgl. J. Patočka: *O potřebě obnovit činnost Ústavu u T.G. Masaryka*. In: Idem: *Češi*. Sv. 2. Ed. K. Palek. I. Chvátik. Praha 2006, s. 242–249.

Besondere Beachtung muss dem Text Patočkas *Masarykv boji proti antisemitismus* geschenkt werden¹. Er befasste sich mit dem Engagement Masaryks in die s.g. Sache von Leopold Hilsner. 1899 hat man in einem Wald bei Städtchen Polná einer ermordete tschechische Katholikin, neunzehnjährige Anežka Hružova gefunden. Der Hals des Opfers war durchgeschnitten und der Körper ist am Karsamstag gefunden worden, so richteten sich die ersten Anschuldigungen gegen einen gewissen Leopold Hilsner – Landstreicher jüdischer Herkunft. Diese Anschuldigung wegen Ritualmord führte zu einem Todesurteil, obwohl keine überzeugenden Beweise für das Verbrechen vorlagen. Die Sache wurde bekannt, weil sie mehr oder weniger versteckten Antisemitismus auf tschechischen Gebieten berührt hat². Masaryk hat gegen den Prozess eine Beschwerde eingelegt, so musste er erneut aufgenommen werden. Die Sache lief noch Jahre lang vor tschechischen und österreichischen Gerichten und viele bedeutende politische Persönlichkeiten waren daran beteiligt. Erst 1914 hat der Kaiser Karl I. Hilsner begnadigt. Patočka hat diese Sache seit 1950 untersucht, seitdem er nach dem Verlassen der Universität am Masaryk-Institut Zuflucht gefunden hatte. Dieser Text war als Vorwort zu einem Band mit Dokumenten, die den Einsatz Masaryks in den Prozess gegen Hilsner (*Antisemitismus a židovské otázky*) belegen soll, gedacht. Patočka hat eine groß angelegte Studie durchgeführt. Das Werk soll anlässlich des hundertjährigen Jubiläums des Masaryks Geburtstags veröffentlicht werden. Es ist darauf hinzuweisen, dass die Einstellung der kommunistischen Regime und marxistischen Philosophen gegenüber Masaryk nicht eindeutig war. Sie konnten ihm seine kritische Haltung gegenüber der Sowjetunion und der marxistischen Philosophie niemals vergeben.

Ende der 1950er Jahre des 20. Jahrhunderts ist Masaryk auf die Liste der verbotenen Denker aufgenommen worden, deshalb blieb das Werk Patočkas nur in Handschrift erhalten. Wirklich schade, weil das eine der ersten Untersuchungen war, die die Beteiligung Masaryks am Prozess so detailliert beschrieben hat. Außerdem hat sie den Kampf des Präsidenten gegen den Antisemitismus in einem breiteren gesellschaftlichen und politischen Kontext dargestellt. Patočka hat beweisen können, dass das

¹ Vgl. J. Patočka [*Masaryk v boji proti antisemitismus*]. In: Idem. *Češi*. Sv. 2..., s. 33–112.

² Vgl. dazu J. Kovtun: *Tajuplná vražda. Případ Leopolda Hilsnera*. Praha 1994.

Thema des Antisemitismus in Masaryks Werk beinahe vom Anfang an existiert hat und seine Beteiligung an Hilsners Prozess weder zufällig noch konjunkturbedingt war. Masaryk hat ein weiteres Mal, trotz der öffentlichen Meinung, seine unerschütterliche moralische Haltung zum Ausdruck gebracht. Erst später folgten weitere Arbeiten, darunter auch die bahnbrechende Bearbeitung von Bohumil Černý *Vražda v Polné* (1968).

CIORAN ȘI SUFERINȚA DE A EXISTA

Adriana NEACȘU¹

Abstract: *For Emil Cioran, life is unbearable, meaningless, full of errors and "bestiality." Trying to get out of the horizontal existence, to conquer eternity and infinity, man shows his incapacity to go beyond himself to merge with the Absolute or God. But drama occurs especially when it understands that God is a being more helpless than man, and the Absolute is Nothing. Therefore all the hopes collapse, and man must assume his suffering for which he has no cure and which defines his existence in all its aspects. But the suffering, effect of awareness of the mismatch between man and his own life, has not only a negative meaning, but also an eminently positive one, because it ennobles man and opens to him new ways of existential realization.*

Keywords: *individuation, suffering, existence, loneliness, sadness, boredom, fatigue, restlessness, fear, despair, disease, death, cynicism.*

Gânditor incomod și pățimaș, Emil Cioran s-a aplecat cu obstinență asupra condiției umane, căreia îi evidențiază vulnerabilitatea și precaritatea. Pentru el existența este o dramă, iar destinul omului nu se împlinește decât în lupta permanentă dintre aspirația către Absolut și constrângerile limitelor propriiei ființe. Evident, lupta nu se poate sfârși decât cu un eșec, dar în desfășurarea acesteia omul își exprimă revolta pentru ceea ce este și refuză iluziile liniștitoare privitoare la lume. Efortul lui, chiar dacă eșuat, de a-și depăși condiția, îi conferă noblețe și-i deschide noi căi de realizare existențială.

Această poziție de principiu se regăsește în majoritatea lucrărilor lui Cioran, care o ilustrează în maniere distincte, accentuând asupra unor aspecte diverse ale manifestărilor umane, și nuanțându-și neîncetat discursul, semn al unei gândiri vii, în evoluție, dar mereu solidară cu fundamentele ei ultime. Dintre aceste lucrări am ales ca suport pentru articolul de față *Amurgul gândurilor*, ultima carte publicată de Cioran în România, înaintea plecării sale definitive în Franța, acolo unde, într-o nouă limbă, la rigorile căreia și-a ajustat stilul, a impus atenției publicului universal aceleași teme de reflecție enunțate deja în spațiul cultural românesc.

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Conștiință și individuație

În *Amurgul gândurilor*, Cioran prezintă omul ca o ființă care este și, deopotrivă, nu este, aflat adică în existență dar și la marginile ei, într-un punct exterior care-i oferă perspectiva de a o „vedea”, cuprinzând-o astfel cu mintea. În măsura în care omul s-a menținut în limitele propriei ființe, el a trăit neproblematic, integrat în întregul firii, în comuniune cu Absolutul. Dar în cazul său, *procesul individuației*, care a generat toate ființele, a mers mult prea departe, astfel încât omul, orientat prea mult spre sine, și-a conștientizat limitele, iar atunci a încercat să le depășească. Lucrul acesta fiind imposibil, încercarea nu a reușit decât să-l dezechilibreze, răpindu-i fermitatea ancorării în ființă, făcându-l să nu-și mai găsească locul nicăieri în lume și sădindu-i în suflet neliniștea.

Câtă vreme omul a rămas ființă și numai atât individuația nu depășise cadrele vieții, căci el se sprijinea în tot și era tot. Dar avântul spre sine însuși, scoțându-l din centrul firii, i-a creat iluzia unui infinit posibil în granițele individuale. Și astfel omul a început să-și piardă limita și individuația a devenit osândă. Aici rezidă măreția lui dureroasă. Căci fără cursul aventuros al individuației el n-ar fi nimic.¹

Fenomenul individuației excesive se datorează *conștiinței*, care, creând distanța între om și lume, smulgându-l, practic, din ea, îl înstrăinează de aceasta, trezindu-i sentimentul vidului existențial. În felul acesta omul se dezice de materie și de natură, refuzând acțiunea în planul vieții concrete, manifestându-se ca spirit prin gândire și creație, fiind mereu în căutarea Absolutului, deși este conștient de faptul că, funciar, nu este destinat să îl atingă. De fapt, prin spirit omul ia contact cu existența într-o manieră complexă și profundă, raportând-o la sine și la propriile sale aspirații. Iar atâta vreme cât rămâne lucid, deci nu se mai hrănește cu iluzii care îi slăbesc acuitatea și vigilența, el realizează o cunoaștere autentică.

În cadrul ei, omul descoperă că viața este lipsită de sens, plină de erori și de „bestialitate”, receptând-o astfel ca insuportabilă, în dezacord cu tot ceea ce își dorește pentru sine. De aceea el rătăcește prin lume, negăsindu-și nicăieri locul și făcând din rătăcire un mod de a fi. Încercând să se smulgă însă din existența pe orizontală, pentru a cuceri eternitatea și infinitul, insul își experimentează propriile neputințe, incapacitatea de a trece dincolo de sine pentru a se contopi cu Absolutul sau cu Dumnezeu. Astfel el devine o

¹ Emil Cioran, *Amurgul gândurilor*, București, Humanitas, 1991, p.129.

ființă ratată, condamnată să oscileze veșnic între lumea sensibilă și cea spirituală, ca un „golan între pământ și cer”.

Dar drama apare mai ales atunci când înțelege faptul că Dumnezeu, spre care se îndrepta cu ardoare, nu este plinul de existență, ci „marele Ratat”, o ființă mai de plâns decât omul, și că Absolutul nu este decât Nimicul. În consecință, lumea nu este, de fapt, nimic, realitatea fiind lipsită de substanță, iar tot ceea ce ne apare nu este decât reflexul eforturilor noastre de a afla sensuri obiective prin proiectarea dincolo de noi a ceea ce ne face să vibrăm mai profund.

În zadar umbli după existență și adevăr. Nimic e totul, o horă de închipuiri lipsită de ritm. Ceea ce face ca un lucru să fie e starea noastră de febră, iar adevărurile se proiectează pe o lume de absențe prin vioiciunea căldurilor noastre. Suflul de substanță care transformă neființa lumii în realitate emană din intensitățile noastre. De-am fi mai reci sau mai domoli, nimic n-ar fi. Focurile lăuntrice susțin soliditatea aparentă a firii, însuflețesc peisajul de neant al viețuirii. Jăromatic interior e arhitectul vieții, lumea-i o prelungire exterioară a flăcării noastre.¹

Suferința

Atunci toate speranțele se prăbușesc iar omul, cu toate astea neresemnat, nu are decât să-și asume până la capăt *suferința*, pentru care nu are nici un leac. De fapt, aceasta îi definește de la un capăt la altul existența, în toate aspectele sale, atâta vreme cât spiritul nu-și creează subterfugii de a o masca și de a o menține în uitare. Dar suferința, efect al conștientizării nepotrivirii dintre om și propria sa viață, nu are doar un sens negativ, ci și unul eminent pozitiv, căci ea este o cale de cunoaștere, care înobilează omul, chiar dacă îl conduce către un impas existențial din care nu mai are nici o scăpare, căci „intensitatea suferinței este un neant mai efectiv decât existența.”²

În fond, suferința definește omul, de vreme ce ea constituie esența spiritului, căci, pentru Cioran, „spiritul este materie ridicată la rangul de suferință.”³ În lipsa suferinței, omul ar înceta să fie om, căci suferința este modul lui propriu de a exista și de a se raporta la lume și la el însuși, adică la faptul de a fi om. Omul suferă pentru că lumea este așa cum este, și

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 160.

² *Ibid.*, p. 134.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 102.

suferă pentru condiția sa existențială în cadrul ei, cu alte cuvinte, omul suferă pentru că este om, pentru că îi este „rușine” cu el însuși. Dar suferința îi proiectează spiritul dincolo de sine și dincolo de lume, făcând-o, astfel, oarecum suportabilă.

Dacă tot ce "este" nu m-ar face să sufăr, oare cum aş suferi să fiu ? Și fără excesul balsamic ai durerii, cine-ar suporta osânda la viață ? Dar încărcat și prigonit de ea, te răsfeți într-un avânt funebru spre nemurire, spre veșnicia muririi - numită și viață.¹

Așadar, nu ajungi să trăiești într-un mod autentic decât în măsura în care simți că viața este insuportabilă, iar durerea trezită astfel îți legitimează ființa în efortul de autodepășire. Integrată în substanța sa intimă, suferința este criteriul pentru tot ce este important pentru om, un semn indubitabil al valabilității sale.

Greutatea unui adevăr se măsoară exclusiv după suferința pe care o ascunde. Cât ai pățimit pentru o idee este singurul criteriu al vitalității ei. "Valorile" trăiesc prin chinul din care s-au născut ; acesta odată epuizat, ele își pierd eficiența, transformându-se în forme goale, în obiecte de studiu, mișcându-se în prezent ca *trecut*. Ce nu mai e suferință devine iremediabil istorie. Astfel se dovedește, încă o dată, că viața nu-și atinge actualitatea ei supremă decât în durere.²

Singurătatea

Suferința existențială a omului se exprimă în diverse forme. Una din ele este aceea a *singurătății*. Este adevărat că ea reprezintă și o formă de orgoliu, căci exprimă sentimentul unicității, al ireductibilului propriei persoane, iar singuraticul, dând dovadă de egoism, se poate simți uneori în siguranță în pustiul singurătății, acaparat de o liniște mormântală. Dar cel mai adesea singurătatea este o situație de disconfort extrem, căci în cadrul ei luciditatea necruțătoare a sufletului îl îndreaptă asupra sa însuși, scrutându-i întreaga slăbiciune, imperfecțiune, nimicnicie, puținătatea ființei și neputința, ceea ce nu se poate să nu-l sfâșie și să nu-i provoace durere, mergând până la „ruină și descompunere”. De aceea Cioran numește singurătatea „o exasperare ontologică a ființei noastre.”³

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 120-121.

² *Ibid.*, p. 146.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

Singurătatea este o stare de părăsire a noastră de tot, de întreaga lume, care ne e străină, închisă, incapabilă să comunice și să rezoneze cu noi. În această lume înstrăinată intră deopotrivă toți semenii, fie că ei, ignorându-și singurătatea constitutivă, mai nutresc încă iluziile ce amortesc spiritul, atașându-i de viața efemeră, fie că pășesc ferm pe calea propriei singurătăți. La Cioran nu există, deci, solidaritate în suferință și nici efort comun de a accede la un nivel superior al ființei. Pentru el, individul este, iremediabil, singur, chiar dacă performerul suferinței solitare poate juca rol de călăuză pentru ceilalți. „Oamenii să-nvețe de la tine să se înspăimânte de căile omului. Acesta-i rostul suferinței tale.”¹

În viața omului lucid, cunoscător, eliberat de iluzii, singurătatea nu este o stare pasageră ci una permanentă, care se adâncește neîncetat pe măsura desfășurării vieții lui, iar acest om ispășește cu fiecare zi, prin suferință, întoarcerea necesară către sine, înscrisă paradigmatic în actul originar al individuației, întoarcere care-l delimitează de tot și de toate, proiectându-l într-un neant derutant și înspăimântător, care reprezintă substanța reală din spatele conceptelor de Absolut și de divin, expresii ultime ale nădejdelor noastre. Astfel, datorită singurătății suntem capabili să privim lucrurile în adevărul lor esențial chiar dacă dezolant, care exercită o atracție irezistibilă pentru spirit.

Prin singurătate, tot ce iese de sub controlul simțurilor - în primul rând invizibilul - capătă un caracter de imediat. A fi fără oameni și fără lume ; a te afla adică nemijlocit în esență. (...) Singurătatea necruțătoare a duhului descoperă neantul imaculat din temelia aparențelor, puritatea divină sau demonică de la baza tuturor alcătuirilor. Și atunci înțelegi că rostul din urmă al duhului e îmbolnăvirea de infinit.²

Tristețea

O altă cale privilegiată a cunoașterii revelatoare este *tristețea* „fără motiv”, expresie și ea a profunde suferințe umane. Ca stare de acută reflexivitate, care acaparează nu doar mintea ci și corpul, tristețea ne domolește vitalitatea, pune distanță între noi și lucruri, pe care le pecepem ca într-un vis, conferindu-le un grad substanțial de irealitate. Astfel ea ne îndepărtează de lume și ne apropie de noi înșine, făcându-ne mai conștienți

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

² *Ibid.*, p. 203.

de diferența ireductibilă dintre spirit și trup. Dar, pentru că, în același timp, ne aruncă într-o stare periculoasă de delăsare, de neutralitate morală, care îmbină duioșia și cruzimea, ea este terenul propice de afirmare a răului.

Permeabilă demoniei, tristețea este ruina indirectă a moralei. Când răul se opune binelui, el participă la valorile etice ca forță negativă, când însă își câștigă autonomia și zace în sine, fără a se mai afirma în luptă cu el, atunci realizează demonia. Tristețea-i unul din agenții de autonomie a răului și de săpare a eticii. Dacă binele exprimă elanurile de puritate ale vieții, tristețea-i umbra lui incurabilă.¹

Tristețea, ca stare de indecizie, care te blochează între diverse posibilități opuse, la fel de captivante dar la fel de indezirabile, pentru că nici una nu-ți poate ostoi setea de plinătate și infinit, este zona conflictelor interioare majore, generatoare de rătăcire și suferință. De altfel, nici ea nu este un eveniment pasager în existența omului, ci îi definește în mod esențial condiția de ființă etern dezrădăcinată, jinduitoră deopotrivă după infern și paradis, care speră să fie mai mult și mai puțin decât este, îmbinând afirmația cu negația și ființa cu neființa. Această zbatere continuă, neîmpăcată, care, fără să îi înlăture suferința ci, dimpotrivă, să o potențeze, îl face pe om să întrezărească fruntariile nimicului, conferindu-i o noblețe și o măreție care îl eliberează de semeni și de lume. În felul acesta însuși statutul nostru de om se clatină și putem spera că vom putea fi vreodată mai mult. „Ești om până în clipa-n care oasele încep să-ți scârțâie de tristețe ... După aceea, ți se deschid toate drumurile.”²

Plictiseala

La rândul ei, *plictiseala* este și ea un semn al suferinței noastre existențiale, pentru că ne detașează de conținutul concret al vieții, dezvăluindu-i lipsa de sens, golul din spatele său, dar și din propria noastră ființă, fapt care ne provoacă neliniște și ne înspăimântă, în ciuda aparenței de stare plăcută, comodă, neproblematică. Plictiseala înseamnă abandonarea într-un timp dilatat la infinit, dar mecanic, mort, dominator, care ne-a acaparat izolându-ne de tot ceea ce este dincolo de noi, fără să ne ofere compensația unei rodnice singurătăți.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

² *Ibid.*, p. 113.

„Pentru a fi fericit de singurătate îți trebuie preocuparea constantă a unei obsesii sau a unei boli. Dar în simțurile mărite-n vid de plictiseală și în spiritul golit de lume, izolarea devine apăsătoare și searbădă - și zilele par absurde ca un sicriu spânzurat de un cireș înflorit.”¹

În plictiseală suntem încarcerati într-un deșert al absenței, prizonieri în noi înșine, pierzându-ne în propria inconsistență, fără să dorim acest lucru ci, dimpotrivă, să evadăm din noi. Iar gândul unei astfel de stări în viitor ne îngrozește mai mult decât plictiseala prezentă, pentru că avem în față spectrul fatalității golului nostru sufletesc, care nu face decât să ne dezvăluie lipsa de consistență a întregului univers. Astfel, prin caracterul ei de vag și de vacuitate, plictiseala dă substanță vidului ce ne înconjoară.

De altfel, omul nu se plictisește doar de lucrurile din jur, ci și de propria lui condiție, ceea ce este tot o expresie a faptului că o percepție ca insuportabilă, dezechilibrându-i cugetul și provocându-i suferința. Și-atunci singura scăpare este fuga, evadarea din lume și din sine.

Acea teamă de plictiseală ce nu poate fi asemuită cu nimic ... Un rău ciudat încălzește sângele și prevestește golul surd ce te macină apoi în ceasuri fără nume. Se apropie Urâtul, fiere a timpului turnată în vine. Și teama ce te învăluie cere fuga. Așa începi să nu mai ai pace în nici un loc.²

Oboseala

Veșnica rătăcire, refuzul rezemării, lupta insomniacă a spiritului pentru accesul la absolut și la eternitate vlăguiește omul, producându-i o *oboseală* profundă, permanentizată, care este o altă formă de suferință, căci este o oboseală „de a ființa”. Omul este obosit de semeni, obosit de lume, obosit de sine, înstrăinat de toate. Dar oboseala nu este o simplă stare de delăsare și abandon, și nu presupune suspendarea căutărilor dincolo de orizonturile firii, ci punerea în acțiune a unei sensibilități aparte, capabilă să întrezărească veșnicia și să străpungă carcasa aparențelor, pătrunzând în spațiul rarefiat al cunoașterii esențiale.

Sfredelirea lumii în oboselile halucinante despoaie lucrurile de strălucire și înșelăciune și nimic nu ne împiedică de la accesul la zona de baștină a începutului, pură ca o auroră finală. Așa dispăre tot ce timpul a adăugat virtualității inițiale. Existența ni se dezvăluie ca atare: la remorca neantului – și

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 150.

² *Ibid.*, p. 205.

nu nimicul este la marginea lumii, ci lumea la marginea nimicului. Oboseala ca instrument de cunoaștere. Cugetul scăldat în lumina nocturnă a disperării.¹

Neliniștea și remușcarea

Acestea macină și ele sufletul omului solitar, obosit și trist, dezamăgit de existență, nemângâiat de lipsa de sens a universului, conștient că nu va putea vreodată să-și ostoiască setea de Absolut și că nu are unde să-și găsească odihna, nici în lume, nici dincolo de ea. Iar privirea intens comprehensivă asupra întregului firii și asupra propriei sale soarte se convertește în nevoia de asumare a unei responsabilități cosmice și de ispășire, căci spiritul se definește prin opoziție cu nevinovăția.

Remușcarea metafizică este o tulburare fără cauză, o neliniște etică pe marginea vieții. N-ai nici o vină pe care s-o regreti și totuși simți remușcări. Nu-ți aduci aminte de nimic, dar te năpădește un infinit dureros al trecutului. N-ai făcut nici o faptă rea, dar te simți responsabil de răul universului.²

Teama

Fiind angajat într-o aventură existențială imposibilă, întreaga experiență a omului cu ființa este impregnată de *teamă*, care ajunge să capete chipul spaimei și chiar al groazei. Indiferent de formele sale particulare, teama este, esențial, o teamă de neființă. Astfel, în primul rând, omul se teme că Dumnezeu, cel către care se îndreaptă toate speranțele sale de mângâiere și împlinire, s-ar putea să nici nu existe, iar atunci el ar rămâne un biet orfan, copilul nimănui sau al nimicului înspăimântător. În al doilea rând, omul se teme că el ar putea să fie un simplu obiect, printre toate celelalte ale lumii, și că aceasta n-ar fi, în fond, decât tot un nimic. În al treilea rând, omul se teme să nu se piardă pe el însuși, să nu mai fie „unicul”, dizolvându-se fie în obiecte fie în alteritatea *celuilalt*.

În al patrulea rând, omul se teme de moarte, ca nimicire definitivă și absolută, iar spaima pe care aceasta i-o provoacă reprezintă otrava ei picurată în devenire. În plus, omul se teme ca nu cumva moartea să nu fie întreaga realitate, astfel încât el se îndreaptă cu disperare atât spre ceilalți, ca să nu mai simtă cum ea înaintea încet în întreaga lui ființă, cât și spre

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 182-183.

² *Ibid.*, p. 8.

Dumnezeu, pentru a avea garanția supraviețuirii după inevitabilul sfârșit al trupului său pieritor. „Frica de a nu fi murit de tot face moartea atât de îngrozitoare. Lâncezim după veșnicia în Dumnezeu din teama de a nu fi vii când suntem exterior stârvuri.”¹

Dar cel mai mult omul se teme de el însuși, pentru că descoperă în străfundurile ființei sale contradicții de neîmpăcat, temeuri ale destrămării de sine, cauze ale eșecului tuturor aspirațiilor sale și agenți ai prăbușirii în neființă. Și astfel, omul se dovedește a fi propriul său nemilos tortionar.

Ce este teama de moarte, de întuneric, de neființă față de teama de tine însuți ? Și există oare alta ? Nu se reduc toate la ea ? Urâtul nesfârșit al viețuirii și plictiseala lucrurilor ce devin sau nu devin, groaza unei lumi urnite în sine și uruiala timpului în simțiri gingașe - de unde pleacă ele dacă nu din fiorul care ne înstrăinează de noi înșine în mijlocul nostru ? Ca și cum oriunde ai merge n-ai da de ceva mai rău ca tine, că tu ești răul care se boltește deasupra lumii, că nu poți fi cu tine fără să fii împotriva ta ! Peșterile ascunse sunt mai puțin înfiorătoare decât golul pe care ți-l deschizi de câte ori îți ochești subteran ființa. Ce nimic se cascadează în sâmburele tău, de teama te apăra de neîndurarea ta ? Mai poți tu rămâne cu tine ? De ce arborii mai zăresc spre cer și nu-și întorc frunzele ca să-ți ascundă întristarea și să-ți îngroape teama?²

Disperarea

O existență încărcată de atâta suferință metafizică nu poate fi trăită decât la cote de intensitate maximă, în deznădejde și *disperare*. Un om deznădăduit și-a pierdut toate iluziile privitoare la lume și la viață, pe care le neagă cu putere, și de la care nu mai așteaptă nimic, ajungând la un punct limită în raportul cu sine. Dar din acest imens pustiu interior are loc saltul pe verticală, menit să-l proiecteze pe om în miezul cel mai fierbinte al firii și să-l salveze o dată pentru totdeauna de spaimă și de nefericire.

Ceea ce-i fascinant în disperare este că ne aruncă dintr-o dată în fața Absolutului; un salt organic, irezistibil la picioarele Ultimului. După aceea începi să gândești și să limpezești sau să întuneci prin reflexie situația creată de furia metafizică a deznădejdii. Despărțit de semeni prin soarta insulară a inimii, te agăți de Dumnezeu ca mărele nebuniei să nu-și înalțe valurile mai sus de singurătatea ta.³

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 130.

² *Ibid.*, p. 125.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 187-188.

Din păcate, omul descoperă că Dumnezeu este la fel de singur, disperat și neajutorat ca și el, nefiind decât un al său *alter ego* proiectat la nivel absolut, care poartă din veșnicie și pentru veșnicie aceeași cruce a insuportabilului „a fi”. Iar în umbra înșelătoare a acestui fals mântuitor se cascadează pentru om golul de necuprins al nimicului devastator.

Boala

Derulată între fuga de derizoriu și eșuarea în pragul unui cer iremediabil închis, existența umană se configurează sub semnul *bolii*, al „incurabilului”, sursă permanentă de durere, chinuri și suferință. Boala este cea care distruge armonia dintre tine și întregul ființării, generând conștiința acută a diferenței și a delimitării de orice altceva. De aceea ea este expresia exemplară a individuației originare, prin care dobândești unicitate. Boala te smulge din „raiul ființei”, căci presupune să ieși din comoditatea și siguranța oferită de ființarea gregară, viețuind calmă în curgerea indiferentă a timpului. Ea te aruncă în posibil și imprevizibil, inoculându-ți sentimentul neliniștii, al nesiguranței și chiar al lipsei de libertate, căci te constrânge prin revolta nestăpânită a cărnii și prin supunerea la exigențele propriului trup, pe care îl resimți ca fiind dincolo și mai puțin decât tine. Astfel apare spiritul în om, care nu este altceva decât boală, adică moarte care se afirmă imperios pe terenul vieții, și care ne provoacă suferința.

În același timp, dezvăluindu-ne inexorabila vecinătate a nimicului, boala ne oferă șansa unor trăiri intense, chiar dacă negative, conferindu-ne forță și cunoaștere revelatoare, proiectându-ne spre nelimitat și absolut. Ea acordă corpului transcendență, căci ascute enorm simțurile, forțându-le să meargă pe calea reflexivității, hrănind gândirea cu materialul experiențelor traumatizante și paradoxale, transformând chinurile fizice în ferment al căutării neliniștite de sine, dincolo de simpla evidență și de imediat. Transfigurată de boală și plasată astfel la limitele materialității sale, individul închide în el însuși contradicțiile cele mai profunde, dovadă a complexității sale existențiale.

Elementele care definesc boala: excesul conștiinței; paroxism de individuație; transparență organică; luciditate crudă; energie proporțională "pierderii";

respirație în paradox; religiozitate vegetativă, reflexă; orgoliu visceral; vanitate rănită a cărnii; intoleranță; delicatețe de înger și bestialitate de călău.¹

Boala înseamnă o stare de criză a naturii, pe care o neagă și față de care aduce ceva cu totul nou și opus: spiritul, angajat în actul delimitării conștiente de materie și de realizare plenară dincolo de sfera indezirabilă a devenirii. Dar ferestrele pe care le deschide spre Absolut se dovedesc tot atâtea căi eșuate într-un pustiu al deziluziilor, care reprezintă un pericol de întunecare a minții și de alunecare în nebunie.

Moartea

Din toate acestea rezultă că omul, orice ar face, nu poate fi fericit, dimpotrivă, el este un autentic „practicant al nefericirii”, predestinat acesteia, de vreme ce se află într-o situație existențială imposibilă, din care nu are ieșire, căci nu poate nici să trăiască, dar nici să accepte să pună capăt chinului și să moară, deși, aparent, *moartea* ar fi soluția cea mai logică și mai la îndemână. Căci, fără măcar să știe, oamenii nu așteaptă pe nimeni și nimic niciodată în afară de moarte, astfel încât sunt numeroși aceia care o văd ca pe o binecuvântare, care-i eliberează definitiv de tribulațiile vieții.

De n-ai ușurat pe nimeni în a nu fi, n-ai cunoscut nicicând lanțurile ființei și nici emoția dureros de rară când cineva îți mulțumește de a-l fi sprijinit în moarte, de a-i fi întărit sfârșirea și gândul sfârșirii, de a-l fi scutit de trivialitatea încurajărilor și a nădejdelor. Nici nu ne închipuim ce mulți sunt acei ce așteaptă să-i dezlegăm de fericire ...²

Dar, în realitate, prin moarte omul vrea să își satisfacă setea infinită de viață, să dobândească trăirea fără margini pe care nu i-o poate oferi existența precară, sufocată în tiparele cotidiene și supusă spectrului finitudinii. Și de vreme ce viața, așa cum ea i se descoperă, nu-l satisface câtuși de puțin și îl nefericește, omul încarcă opusul acesteia, moartea, încărcată cu nimbul eternității, nădăjduind că ea poate să-i ofere sublimul și plenitudinea existențială.

Infinitul trebuie să fie culoarea fiecărei clipe. Și fiindcă prin viață nu-l pot onora decât prin crize, ridică-mă, Moarte, la prestigiul lui neîntrerupt și îmbracă-mă în insomnia nesfârșirii!³

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

² *Ibid.*, p. 53.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

Față de actul de a fi care presupune doar suferință, omul speră că moartea înseamnă alinare, că ea îi va dizolva eul răspunzător de agonia spiritului, iar acesta va fi lăsat să se odihnească etern în Dumnezeu, înlăturându-și astfel singurătatea. Așa apare „dorul de moarte”, care atenuază frica de moarte, încercându-l de vrajă și poezie, acordându-i virtuți eliberatoare, dar acest dor nu este altceva decât „nostalgia infinitului”, nădejdea că viața poate fi proiectată în Absolut. În ultimă instanță, însă, moartea, cultivată ca o cale superioară de a fi, se dovedește și ea a fi un doar un amar surghiun, un pustiu în care omul nu-și poate găsi nici liniștea, nici locul. Căci Dumnezeu rămâne și aici o realitate prea vagă, iar omul, bătut deja de toate năpastele existenței, este în continuare condamnat la veghe, singurătate, neliniște și neodihnă. Moartea se dovedește, astfel, ca și viața, un alt chip al aceleiași existențe, în care chinul suferinței este la fel de puternic și fără leac.

Doar pentru cei ce și-au dormit viața moartea poate însemna un somn. Ceilalți, atinși de veghe, vor supraviețui treji cenușii lor sau scheletului ironic ! – Când nici o fibră n-a rămas nestrăpunsă de cunoaștere, atunci nimic nu te poate face să crezi c-ai înceta cândva a fi conștient. Ți se pare explicabil să mori, dar cine te-ar putea opri să crezi c-ai înceta să știi și să te știi ? E ca și când nu-ți vei odihni capul nicăieri și niciodată ...¹

Prin urmare, în viziunea lui Cioran nu există împlinire, nici consolare, după cum nici renunțare a omului la aspirațiile către eternitate și Absolut, care-i alimentează sfârșierea continuă. Doar, din când în când, avem de-a face cu pauze ale încordării verticale, de atenuare a lucidității spiritului, în care omul, victimă a propriei slăbiciuni și a uitării, se atașează de erorile „aromate” privitoare la viață (de ex., cele din cadrul iubirii, al artei și culturii, sau al frumuseților naturale), care-l farmecă și-i oferă clipe fugare de autoamăgire, de satisfacție iluzorie. Astfel orbit, poate el să respire ceva mai ușor și să supraviețuiască în lume.

Voluptatea de a suferi

Dar adevărata forță care îl face să reziste și să nu abandoneze lupta pentru împlinirea de sine în Absolut, în ciuda calvarului suferinței pe care îl îndură în permanență, este faptul că, ajunsă la cote ultime de paroxism, dincolo de limita suportabilului, omul o acceptă pe aceasta ca inevitabilă și

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 69-70.

necesară, înțelegând că ea este mijlocul privilegiat de a dobândi distincție și unicitate în raport oricare altă creatură, ceea ce-i conferă orgoliu și sentimentul plăcerii nemăsurate. De aceea la Cioran avem de-a face cu o adevărată *voluptate a suferinței*, care-l determină ca, în aceeași măsură cu refuzul limitelor ființării, să alerge după tot ceea ce-i provoacă sau adâncește durerea și nefericirea. Omul se definește astfel prin suferință și prin nevoia acută de a o experimenta în cele mai diverse moduri, așa încât, dacă suferința îl transformă într-o „ruină”, el este o ruină de-a dreptul „invincibilă”.

A fi "muritor" înseamnă a nu putea respira fără setea de durere. Ea-i oxigenul individului și voluptatea ce se interpune între om și absolut. "Devenirea" – implicația ei..."¹ De altfel, „...în dezrobirea cugetului de ființă, voluptatea nu mai are preferințe între durere și plăcere. Ea le încoronează pe amândouă. Perfecțiunea stranie a senzațiilor suspendă deosebirile între ele. Durere și plăcere devin sinonime.”²

Sufletul omului devine astfel un „mormânt în flăcări”, teren al tuturor contradicțiilor, în care singurătatea provoacă bucurie, tristețea este încărcată de seducție, decepțiile sunt căi spre entuziasm, dorul de moarte este identic dorului de viață, neliniștea se transformă în seninătate, plictiseala devine „plăcut insuportabilă”, disperarea se îmbină cu nădejdea, otrava provoacă delicii, chiar dacă ele sunt „amare”, sfârșeala este semn de vitalitate, descompunerea are farmec, umilința este totuna cu măreția, nefericirea se resimte ca fiind „îmbătătoare”, iar groaza devine duiosie sau extaz. Asta nu înseamnă că furtuna se potolește și chinul devine mai puțin dureros, sau că omul a ajuns cumva la un liman izbăvitor. Viața continuă să fie un martiraj, iar suferința rămâne tot suferință, căci nimic din ceea ce omul năzuiește nu se poate vreodată împlini, iar el rămâne mereu nemângâiat, copleșit de gustul zădărniceii și ispășindu-și în fiecare clipă curajul de a încerca, în propriile sale limite, să fie mai mult decât îi dictează condiția umană.

Neomul

Înaintând, însă, în mod consecvent pe această cale a eșecului și a durerii, pe care și le asumă necondiționat și în cadrul cărora își descoperă nebănuite

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

² *Ibid.*, p. 176.

satisfacții, omul poate ajunge, la un moment dat, să nu se mai simtă deloc om, îndepărtându-se de sine și de propria sa umanitate, începând să-și configureze o soartă străină, „în afară” și paralelă cu aceea specific umană. De aceea, direcția către care se îndreaptă un astfel de om înstrăinat de sine este contrarie celei pe care îl mânase atâta vreme dorința de mântuire și odihnă în Dumnezeu.

O speranță de o vitalitate drăcească ne mână spre căderi repetate, în vederea unor purificări nebanuite. Altceva va începe, după ce omul s-a copt în noi și a leșinat, ceva străin presimțirii celor rămași în urmă, pe la mijlocul umanității. Să-ți se descompună Dumnezeu în vine, să-L îngropi împreună cu resturile tale, ce le vei aduna prin amintiri, și cu stârvuri umane și divine să-ți îngrași verdețuri de nădejde și lumini de putregai să sprijine timiditatea atâtor zori ! Dar pentru a te purifica de moștenirea omenescului tău, învață a obosi, a dizolva, a corupe moartea din tine, de la răspântiile tale.¹

Abia atunci, renunțând să mai fie om, insul va depăși deopotrivă suferința și năzuința către ea, căci, părăsind orice fel de credințe și idealuri, nu va mai avea deloc iluzii și astfel va fi ferit de deznădejdi. Eliberat de orice fel de slăbiciune, care-l plasează fatal în categoria omenescului, el va înfrunța impasibil nimicul lumii și va ieși definitiv de sub constrângerile devenirii. Dar asta înseamnă că istoria, așa cum noi o știam până acum, își va încheia cursul, lăsând loc alteia, singura autentică, în care omul va începe să-și construiască adevăratul destin, configurându-se în ireductibila sa unicitate dar și într-o infinită complexitate, asemenea unui univers autonom, funcționând sub semnul Absolutului.

Când vom viețui cu sentimentul că în curând omul nu va mai fi om, atunci va începe istoria, adevărata istorie. Până acum am trăit cu idealuri, de aici încolo vom trăi absolut, adică fiecare se va înălța în propria lui singurătate. Și nu vor mai fi indivizi, ci lumi. (...) Și asta-i adevărata istorie. Suspendarea devenirii în absolutul conștiinței.²

De fapt, asimilarea suferinței până la limitele ei ultime generează „scârba” de suferință dar și de tine însuși, care te face să devii *neom*. Asta înseamnă că experimentul existențial numit om este unul complet eșuat, că el nu satisface câtuși de puțin cerințele de afirmare ale spiritului, astfel încât ființei umane nu-i mai rămâne decât să să-și afirme „voința de autodistrugere”, asumându-și condiția de neom, singura care-i oferă cu

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

² *Ibid.*, p. 124.

adevărat șansa de a fi mai mult decât ceea ce este, făcând-o să pătrundă pe terenul posibilului și al nelimitatului. Neomul se definește prin opoziție cu omul, dar el nu este nici animal nici supraom, ci este omul de după om, care a înțeles zădărnicia zbaterei sale și a găsit în sine însuși resursele necesare pentru a se reinventa, apucând pe un cu totul alt drum decât cel bătătorit de umanitate. Iar dacă omul se îndrepta cu speranță și emoție către ființă, neomul, care, în virtutea cunoașterii și a lucidității, și-a îngropat definitiv sentimentele, alege în mod deliberat neființa.

Cinismul

Forma de manifestare a neomului pe care o detectează și ne-o propune Cioran este *cinismul*. Cinicul știe că este absolut singur, că-n jurul lui sunt numai obiecte, iar el nu poate stabili punți de comunicare dincolo de sine; nu crede în adevărurile absolute și, de fapt, în nici un adevăr, pe care se simte îndreptățit să-l echivaleze oricând cu falsul; disprețuiește viața sprijinindu-se pe argumente raționale, de aceea își permite să n-o ia deloc în serios, frizând, uneori, chiar nebunia. Eliberat de orice urmă de iluzie, el privește în față realitatea dură și o dezvăluie așa cum este, cu absolută sinceritate, fără milă și fără să-i pese de nimic și de nimeni, nici măcar de sine, căci el și-a împietrit inima, rupându-se definitiv de farmecul înșelător al vieții, înțelegând că tot ceea ce este este numai o lipsă, un nimic, adică, de fapt, neființa.

Sângele scos din circulație, viața controlată fără milă, unde să se mai miște eroarea și să se încante iluzia ? Cinismul înfloarește în această evacuare, ce te dezleagă de toate și-ți îngăduie să râzi, să disprețuiești, să calci totul în picioare și pe tine însuși în primul rând, mândru de absența universală. Cinicul este spectatorul acestei universale absențe. El privește - îndurerat sau râzând - la nimic.¹

Ca atitudine asumată în mod deschis față de viață, cinismul este întâlnit la puțini indivizi, dar el exprimă conținutul experienței limită a majorității, în care decepțiile repetate și durerea înlătură vâul plăcut, mistificator ce acoperă lumea, permițând individului să-i vadă abisurile năucitoare. De aceea el este exemplar pentru a ilustra direcția în care se îndreaptă omul care a atins culmea lucidității și cea a suferinței, conștient că toate speranțele lui privitoare la existență sunt sortite, iremediabil, eșecului.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

Cinicii nu sunt nici supra- și nici sub- oameni, ci post-oameni. Ajungi să-i înțelegi și chiar să-i iubești, când îți scapă din chinul absenței tale o mărturisire adresată ție sau nimănui : am fost om și acuma nu mai sunt.¹

De fapt, cinismul este modul de supraviețuire a individului, care-l ferește să nu alunece în nebulă, atunci când înțelege că totul este pierdut. Dar prețul pe care îl plătește acesta este teribil, căci cinicul se naște doar din cenușa omului, care s-a mistuit definitiv pe sine prin suferință. Totuși, nu cumva acest act radical de autonegare înseamnă o altă cale de salvare a omului, care, dezamăgit profund de Dumnezeu, își întoarce fața de la Absolutul divin și încearcă, pe cont propriu, să-și construiască un nou destin? Chiar așa și stau lucrurile, căci dacă renunță la sine și alege să fie neom, prin această alegere ființa umană își afirmă curajul, voința, tenacitatea, refuzul de a se supune unei fatalități care-o condamnă la umilință și la eșec. Iar dacă nu poate să se împlinească în calitate de om, are orgoliul și forța de a-și genera o nouă identitate existențială, care să înlăture neajunsurile celei vechi, propulsând-o într-un alt Absolut.

De altfel, această transfigurare a omului în cadrul existenței este un rezultat firesc al evoluției sale spirituale. Căci cinismul decurge în mod direct din cunoașterea clarvăzătoare asupra lumii, fiind, în același timp, un mijloc eficace de a imuniza individul față de suferința insuportabilă legată de aceasta. A trece dincolo de om se dovedește a fi sensul evoluției umane, direcția în care omul se împlinește cu adevărat, împăcându-se cu sine. Cu alte cuvinte, destinul omului este să ajungă neom, iar umanitatea culminează cu apariția neomului. Căci alegând să nu mai fie om, omul își forțează propriile limite, lărgind enorm cadrele propriei umanități. Astfel, faptul de „a nu mai fi om e fenomenul central al experienței umane”², pe care o încununează și o desăvârșește.

Deoarece implică moartea tuturor afectelor, deci tăcerea definitivă a inimii, depășirea de sine a omului prin neom poate fi o damnare, dar ea nu mai puțin înobilează omul cu aura de sublim a celor care au tăria să-i arunce mănua destinului, reușind, până la urmă, indiferent de preț, să-l scoată din propria lui matcă, ce părea inviolabilă și implacabilă.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

² *Ibid.*, p. 160.

THE HYBRID SCIENTIFIC OBJECTS AND THE HYBRID HUMANS, INTEGRATION AND REJECTED DIFFERENCE: WHICH ARE THEIR REASONS?

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Abstract: *The paper is an epistemological fathoming of the problem of hybrids in the cultural life. But –or as a result of this goal – some conclusions have been established not only in relation with the topic, but also with the general approach of the cultural/even super-structural phenomena.*

Thus, comparing what has happened in the modern science from at least the second half of the 20th century – the consciousness and principles of inter-disciplinary, multi and trans-disciplinary approaches of cultures and certainly, of topics, and thus the construction of hybrid scientific objects – with the rejection of hybrids in the modern society, the analysis is interested in the dis-covering of the reasons of the specific treatment of hybrids in this society and including nowadays.

And the first reason is not a simple, “a-historical” and “non-social”, psychological feeling – of being disconcerted in front of them because the hybrids have not only known features but also new ones, the known features tending to make people to accept them and to annul the new aspects, they “integrating” these objects in the old, habitual representations, while the novel and even unwonted of the hybrids generating rather rejection – but a socially constructed representation/socially constructed representations. By confronting the cultural patterns of the attitudes towards hybrids (purism, multiculturalism) with the social historical conditions they have been forged, the paper highlights the complex causes of the attitudes and the necessity to surpass the convenient alignment to the patterns which oppose rationalism all the way.

Keywords: *hybrids, modern science, culture, fragmentation in scientific disciplines, trans-disciplinary approach, purism, multiculturalism, nationalism, internationalism, class interests, universal, particular, borders.*

Instead of introduction

In the present political atmosphere dominated by aggressive delimitations and closing within itself² – the borders being considered “natural” proofs of

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² Actually, this atmosphere is only a form of the old strategy of the democratic capitalism: “Culture today is infecting everything with sameness. Film, radio and

irreparable separations while the peculiarity, i.e. the visible and the cultural specific features, as absolutely covering what is general human, and the focus on identity¹ as hiding the common/the universal – the mixtures, combinations, *hybrids* are rather suspect, if simply no longer in fashion.

magazines form a system. Each branch of culture is unanimous with itself and all are unanimous together...The standardized forms, it is claimed, were originally derived from the needs of the consumers: that is why they are accepted with so little resistance. In reality, a cycle of manipulation and retroactive need is unifying the system ever more tightly. That is not mentioned is that the basis on which technology is gaining power over society is the power of those whose economic position in society is strongest", Max Horkheimer & Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment. Philosophical fragments* (1944), Translated by Edmund Jephcott, Edited by Gunzelin Schmid Noerr (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 2002), pp. 94, 95.

¹ Let's remember the etymology of this word: in Greek, ἴδιος meant what was specific, peculiar to some one or something; from where, ἰδίωσις – distinction between things, according to their peculiar features, while ἰδιωτεία was the life of a common private person, or the private life opposed to the life related to the public space, thus a life characterized by lack of education (the education being absolutely necessary for the life together with other humans). The Latin took over the root with the meaning of precise designation, but *idem, eadem, idem* being the demonstrative pronoun *that*, while *id* was the neutral form of *this*. *Identitas-atris* was thus the quality to be the *same*, an exact *this*, a certain, unmistakable *this*. Thus, this quality was that of *motionlessness*, of *stone-still permanence*, but of absolute *difference* of other things.

Consequently, the Latin origin drew our attention on the indestructible *unity* of *identity* and *community/society*, of belonging to, of sharing the conditions and destiny of Others. The sense of identity, the need and consciousness of identity means that even when we focus on a precise this/person, we re-discover the Others, since the identity is the result of observation and naming by Another one/Others. More: the quality to being a certain entity supposes the separation from the quality of other beings, a common quality that still exists. My identity presupposes the coexistence with the identity of the Other(s). The putting of identity in the foreground leaves space to the putting in the foreground of the human community, thus of every human. The subject/the individual is not suspended and omniscient, everything being reducible to the choice of the desired identity: on the contrary, the subject is *dependent* and *relational*, only in this way constituting as a *person*.

What is important is that the problem of identity – as all the problems of man – may be looked at from different points of view, which are not only *historical* but

also *social*, reflecting the class position towards the economic and political relations. For instance, during the colonial era, anthropology has searched for and insisted on the cultural identity of colonized peoples – the serious anthropologists negating the mainstream ideology of time, that of inferiority of the culture of colonized peoples, but which was seen as static, unchanged even under the colonial domination (as if racism would not have any influence) – and thus the *cultural identity was separated from the complex social, including class relations*. Then, in the process of decolonization, anthropology has observed the dynamic character of cultures (see Georges Balandier, *Political Anthropology* (1967), Translated by A. M. Sheridan Smith (1970) (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972), as well as the identity shock produced by the encounters of the colonized cultures and the colonial ones. At the same time, the science of anthropology has learned that the concepts/models forged in a certain culture (concretely, in the Western one) must not be considered as straitjackets for the real cultures, but only as tools helping to emphasize the complex causality of institutions and relations and the results of prejudices which the mainstream politics has imposed (with the help of anthropology) (for example, the inferiority of colonized people as “basis” for their use only as no more than middle employees).

In the encounters between the colonial culture and colonized one, at least two kinds of problems related to our topic arose: one is the understanding by the representatives of both cultures that *the economic and political relations of colonial domination have reciprocally veiled the uniqueness and thus necessity of every culture* (including the qualities of the Western culture which were hidden to the colonized people just because they were disguised by the colonial clichés, see Cheikh Hamidou Kane : « L’Afrique n’existe plus, elle a été dépossédée de son espace », *Le Monde*, le 31 août 2018), and the other is the relationship between *universalism* and *singularity* in each culture and the necessity of self-criticism in front of different types of universalism and peculiarity. These types are ideological standpoints about cultures.

The present mainstream focus on gender, racial, national identity *encloses* the individuals in particular communities and is opposing to both the standpoint of *every* individual and society, promoting particularism against the universal values of the human being. Actually, this focus does not represent the liberal ideal of freedom, but the neo-liberal manner to divide people in order to rarefy their ability to communicate beyond the boundaries of their framing and to understand each other. For this neo-liberal view, the borders are not spaces of crossing, but separating walls.

Because of the power of this mainstream ideology and because of the simplicity of its theory of gender, racial, national identity, a fashion of *identities studies* has developed, *covering* the research of other problems. And this process is manifested also as a specific disease of Academia. See Helen Pluckrose, James A. Lindsay and

However, and as the history of science shows, the *hybrid* characteristic of both the human *thinking* (and its intellectual results like the *concepts* and *theories*) and the human *existence* (individuals, processes, phenomena) is almost their most general mark. Everything was and is the result of transformations following from the intersections of many different experiences, and since the birth of (the human) life itself is the result of combinations of different biological parts with different functions, neither the human ontology and nor epistemology may ignore this original “big bang”. And at the same time *hybridity did not annul, just on the contrary, the identity of things and their apparently fix and specific features*. And since the tackling of this problem is historical – meaning re-conceptualizing according to the (new) experiences of societies and thinkers –, what must be retained as first warning is that *both the hybrid and the fix and specific features are stakes and hallmarks, reciprocal criteria, in the process of understanding of these aspects*.

What epistemology shows is the *model* of the present approach of cultural representations of the cultural differences. Thus, the first goal of this paper is to confront the *hybrid* cognizance as it unfolds and emerges especially from and within the *scientific thinking*, and on the other hand, the *hybrid aspects of cultures* as they appear in the habitual mainstream ideologies. Why do we start from what does it happen in science? Because: here there are *demonstrations* of the hybrid characteristic of both *facts* in the scientific thinking and in cultures and the *knowledge* about them.

Science is the system of thinking with reason and searching for the reason of things in a *consistent* manner. Because of this goal, it *rejects any infallibility of presumptions and concepts, judgments, data/information and conclusions*. Thus, science substitutes the old “authority argument” with the *critical and self-critical* argument. As a result, science is evolutionist and/for it demonstrates the *historical* characteristic of both things and the cognizance about them. Historicity means at the same time the

Peter Boghossian, *Academic Grievance Studies and the Corruption of Scholarship*, October 2, 2018, <https://areomagazine.com/2018/10/02/academic-grievance-studies-and-the-corruption-of-scholarship/>.

And see the indignation of those scholars whose alignment to the mainstream ideology has become a religion, in Eric London, *Portland State University threatens to fire Peter Boghossian for authoring “Grievance Studies” hoax*, 10 January 2019, <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2019/01/10/bogh-j10.html>.

understanding of *difference* between *cognitive models* which are “pure” and the *real things* which evolve and which result from all the different relationships between them. Finally, 1) the cognitive models as such are not only “pure”, namely pictures of static features, but also dynamic and complex, dialectic; 2) both the difference between cognitive models and reality and the dynamic character of cognitive models *do not mean relativism from the standpoint of human moral criteria*¹ (*historicity is not moral relativism*²),

¹ The moral *criteria* – as the *concept* of criterion – are *historical* and *social*, as the *values* are. However, we may nowadays estimate things not only according to the present dominant criteria, but also to the *critical* standpoint towards them and, generally, towards the *consequences* of their (virtual) application. This type of estimation has its substance in both Kant’s *methodological* principle of *universalizability* of the behaviors and criteria, and J. St. Mill’s principle of *content* (minimizing the suffering of the greatest possible number).

² Again, the human moral values are *historical*, of course, but this doesn’t mean that there would not be any importance of the choice of some values, and not of other; because there are *criteria* for judging the moral values and the choices. These criteria are the *importance of every human being* and *the attitude to treat it/humans not only as means, but always as end of our actions*. (Not only this last criterion is from Kant, obviously, but if we assume these criteria, we understand in an easy way *why* did people treat their fellow humans only as means, and whose/which interests are promoted by those who avoid the above criteria). (Showing the importance of every human being, *the idealist liberalism*/the Enlightenment has promoted the *universal education* (from Comenius to Kant’s *animal rationabile*, here letting aside the historical frame and limitations of Kant’s ideal); see Gernot Böhme, “Self-cultivation according to Immanuel Kant,” *Dialogue and Universalism*, 4 (2018) pp. 95-108).

These criteria push also to the specific behavior of transparency/emphasize the difference *between ideologies which openly declare their values* reflecting and *subordinated to the above criteria*, and *ideologies which are not subordinated to the above criteria and tend to dissolve them*.

Concerning the above focus on (every and all) human beings, we do not ignore the *animal rights* theory insisting on the rights of all sentient beings and accusing the “humanism” that confiscated the rights of humans on the animals according to its “out of date” “speciesism” (the viewpoint about this confiscation in virtue of the unique rationality/consciousness the human species has). Actually, the animal rights theory has developed within the frame of (neo-)liberal ideology, i.e. it *separates/ignores* the strong inter-connection of both the animals’ and humans’ rights and the theories of animal and human rights. Or, as the old ideologists have legitimated the human-animal relationships in the *pattern of domination-submission*

but on the contrary, the grasping of the importance of moral *criteria* and their both universal and specific manifestations in the process of knowledge.

Obviously, the previous paragraph has sketched a model. Science is a human, thus historical and social fact, depending on social relations and institutions, and depending in a subordinated place to them. Science is an institution framed by historical power relations, and though its specificity is the struggle against prejudices, it itself acts within the space of dominant

social relations, – and just because of this pattern the legitimating was contradictory (on the one hand, the domination of animals was “natural”/God’s will because the humans were created as images of the Almighty, but on the other hand, no one questioned the fact that although the humans were created as images of the Almighty, some of them were treated as if they were beasts), as the present animal rights theories *ignore the class relations*, the domination and exploitation of humans by humans. For this reason, the present animal rights theories are contradictory: on the one hand, they support the absolute “liberation” of animals from the tyranny of humans (giving as criterion of their standpoint the impossibility of consent given by animals, and preaching the vegan diet), and on the other hand, they are the partisans of a limited liberation, as if the consent of animals to be subordinated in a lesser manner would not be necessary. An interesting illustration of this last position is in Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, *Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights* (2011) (Oxford University Press, 2014), where the limited and *differentiated* liberation is realized through the differentiated treatment of domestic animals, wildlife, and wild “liminal” animals living in the midst of human settlements: through a “co-citizenship” given to the former, while the latter having only “universal” rights (to live), and the “liminal” ones having only some citizen rights. But this illustration shows once more the tottering position of liberals who do not see the difference between the human self-awareness and capacity of conscious responsibility and on the other hand, the animals’ peculiarity, and nor the difference between the concepts of citizenship and equality and the concept of human treatments of animals.

[See the *integration* of the *human treatment of animals* in the problem of *transformation* of the complex system of *agriculture-environment-alimentation-food wastage*, at Paul Ariès, *Une histoire politique de l'alimentation. Du paléolithique à nos jours* (Paris: Max Milo, 2016). (The present world food wastage is 40% of the food production). So see Paul Ariès, *Gratuité vs. capitalisme* (Paris: Larousse, 2018). And this integrative point of view exclude the ascetism repudiated by liberals in the name of freedom of choice: see Giuseppe de Marzo, *Buen vivir: para una democracia de la Tierra* (2009) (La Paz: Plural editores, 2010)].

ideologies and is influenced by them¹. In this respect, we need to point also 3) the frame and strong influence of politics on science². Just for this reason one felt the need to precise the norms of science³. Nevertheless, the model of science – helped by its norms – is a necessary landmark in our understanding of *cultures* and *ideologies*.

The last words require a little explanation: since the *ideologies* are conceptions about man and society which are *constructed* from the standpoint of different social/class positions, they permeate the cultures and give to the cultural creations (as myths, worldviews, religions, institutions, habits, learned theories about the cultural creations) the characteristic of being *political* cultures, in the broad sense of this attribute. Ideologies are points of view, so they underpin the cultural imagination of humans and its theorists. But if so, then once more the inadvertence of considering culture as being the cause of barbarism⁴, methodologically speaking the ignorance of class determinism (or of ideological determinism) of culture and the separation of culture from class and class ideologies, do appear.

The model of purism

Just opposite to science is the *purism* from certain ideologies. Purism ascertains that things, and more precisely cultural elements, *have a-historic*

¹ For example, because science is made by the scientific bureaucracy – paid professionals by the dominant institutions – it is not independent and its bearers struggle to being paid further. So they “publish or perish” and the result is that half of all the scientific literature is false (Arjun Walia, “Editor In Chief Of World’s Best Known Medical Journal: Half Of All The Literature Is False”, *Global Research*, May 23, 2015, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/editor-in-chief-of-worlds-best-known-medical-journal-half-of-all-the-literature-is-false/5451305>).

² See Jane Da Mosto, Caroline Fletcher, *The Science of Saving Venice* (Paul Holberton Publishing, 2004), about an interesting dialectic of scientific imagination and political barriers (erected by those whose discourse is full of benevolence, but shrunk by the costs estimated *more capitalisto*). Indirectly, this dialectic incriminates the system.

³ Robert Merton, “The Normative Structure of Science” (1942), republished in Robert K. Merton, *The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1973), pp. 267-278.

⁴ Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics* (1966), Translated by E.B. Ashton (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004) p. 367.

identity, and that these a-historic elements give the specific of a-historically *circumscribed spaces and communities*. As a result, these ancestral and a-historic communities would be the *only "original" ones and must be kept as such* as the stake and model of the human communities and relations. It is worth to note that, because the prestige of ideologies lies in the science that would demonstrate their consistency, purism has offered some so-called scientific papers which would have legitimized it. But, because of the epistemological fallacies of *dogmatism* and *circular reasoning* (the thesis is not questioned, but considered self-evident; and the conclusion is demonstrated by recourse to that thesis, while again the thesis is based now on the previous "demonstration"), they do not meet the scientific standards. Actually, they are "*ideologies*", i.e. conceptions about man and society reflecting class positions and interests, but because *they do not recognize this dependency of class positions and interests*¹ they are not able to *self-criticize* and *transform/develop*, two main characteristics of the scientific thinking.

Directly said and related to our problem, purism as *racism* was and is the specific feature of the voluntary or involuntary legitimizing ideology of *domination*,² by some intellectuals who, despite their complex views and scientific work in different areas, but because they *have opposed and oppose the modern idea of class and class struggle*, have *excluded the historical economic and social relations from the determinism of behaviors and cultures estimated as being exclusively the result of natural/psychological features*, and did not understand that the determinism of natural conditions of the appearance of humans is not unique but mixes with the *historical social determinism that is more important for the cultures and behaviors of peoples than their aspect*. Mostly understood as people, the concept of race has finally constituted as the *pure but obscure essence* of the peoples that would have allowed both the subordination of some ones by the superior ones and the raising of a nation in spite of the impure foreign enemies from inside and outside. Arthur de Gobineau has insisted not only on the inequality of races but also on the

¹ In other words, they are not transparent/they do not assume the criteria mentioned in note 3.

² But see a pre-modern form of purism: related also to domination inside a nation. As we know, royalty and nobility considered that their social position and privileges would come from their "blue blood", namely, their origin (including in different tribes which formed the national community) and hereditary lineage.

promotion of civilization by the white Aryans who, however, have become fewer and fewer¹; Hyppolite Taine has substituted the economic and social determinism with the racial one, deducing the inferiority (of Semitic) and the superiority of (Aryan) races²; Gustave Le Bon has considered that each people would have a fix mental constitution based on the *unconscious* elements, generating its position in the world, and that even inside a people there are such psychological differences (generating an inherent domination of the crowd)³; Houston Stuart Chamberlain has pointed to the Teutonic peoples as the most civilized Aryans and bearers of civilization worldwide (opposed to the Semitic ones)⁴. These intellectual aberrations, clearly moving away from the Enlightenment's rationalism/critical spirit, have continued⁵ as promoters of the *trans-national domination* of capitalism and the capitalist states which represent the most advanced capitalism and have the power to dominate, and, especially nowadays, are afraid of phenomena weakening that power.

Purism was the "argument" of both *imperialism* – the capitalist conquest and subordination, including through the form of *neo-imperialism/imperialism realized with local elites* – and *nationalism*, as both *weapon of national unity/strengthening of the bourgeois class and its state and weapon against the class oppositions and struggle*. Concerning nationalism, it and its argument, purism, were the bourgeois form of emancipation, once more *opposed to the social emancipation against class domination*. But though there was a difference between the constitution of national states in the West of Europe and the same process in the East, everywhere nationalism became an excessive purism, *xenophobia*, more or less legal and more or less practical.

¹ Arthur de Gobineau, *Essai sur l'inégalité des races* (Paris: Firmin-Didot frères, 1853-1855).

² Hyppolite Taine, *Histoire de la littérature anglaise* (Paris: Hachette, 1863, t. III) p. 616; t. I, p. XIX.

³ Gustave Le Bon, *Les lois psychologiques de l'évolution des peuples* (Paris : Félix Alcan, Éditeur, 1894); *Psychologie des foules* (Paris : Félix Alcan, Éditeur, 1895).

⁴ Houston Stuart Chamberlain, *Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*, 1899, translated, as *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, by John Lees, with an introduction by Lord Redesdale (London, New York: John Lane, 1911).

⁵ See Georges Vacher de Lapouge (1854-1936); Friedrich Ratzel *Politische Geographie*, 1897; Alfred Rosenberg (1893-1946).

[Hannah Arendt¹ has considered that in the Western Europe the states as unitary organizations, initially/ when constituted in the Middle Ages, were guardians of all the habitants which thus were equal in front of the law, but in the bourgeois revolutionary processes the states became synonym to the defenders of the nation whose members they guaranteed equal rights; consequently, a contradiction between the *rights of man* as *citizen* of the state and the *national rights* defended and represented by the state has arisen. Nevertheless, nationalism – as particularistic ideology – has remained *controlled by the state/law*. But in the East of Europe, the peoples belonged to different empires, and their national consciousness did not develop but to the level of language (and, if, religion), the local bourgeoisies were almost inexistent and the peasant masses were not emancipated, their national quality seeming to them rather a private question. (The more so as, I may illustrate with an example, in the 19th century, the Austro-Hungarian empire has accepted the local languages and cultures, thus the peasants of Transylvania have accepted the empires as inherent domination²).

Arendt has shown that, opposed to the Western type nationalism – that however has diverted the ideology of the medieval centralized states – the tribal nationalism, *despising the law*, was the product of these Eastern conditions/of the late centralization of the state, as in Germany: and that just this tribal nationalism was the source of later excesses/exclusivism, meaning fascism.

¹ *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951) (Cleveland and New York: Meridian Books, 1962) pp. 227-243, 243-249.

² See Ana Bazac, *Odiseea bravului soldat Alexa sau: glasul poporului nu poate fi amuțit*, <http://www.argumentesifapte.ro/2014/04/13/odiseea-bravului-soldat-alexa-sau-glasul-poporului-nu-poate-fi-amutit/>, a review of Claude Karnoouh's *Odiseea bravului soldat Alexa: o cronică rimată a Primului Război Mondial*, Cu o postfață de Claude Karnoouh: *Prin foc și sabie – sau gândirea Totale Mobilmachung-ului și a Weltbürgerkrieg-ului la țărani din Carpați*, Traducerea din română a *Odiseii bravului soldat Alexa* și a *Verșului lui Bonaparte* de Claude Karnoouh, Traducerea din franceză a *notelor*, a *prefetei* și a *postfeței* de Teodora Dumitru (București: Editura Muzeului Literaturii Române, 2014). [Ana Bazac, The brave soldier Alexa's odyssey or: the voice of the people can not be silenced, a review of Claude Karnoouh's *The brave soldier Alexa's odyssey: a chronicle in rhyme of the First World War, with a postface of Claude Karnoouh, By fire and sword – or the thinking of Totale Mobilmachung and Weltbürgerkrieg at the peasants of Carpathian*].

Actually, things were more complicated than in this model, because the problem is not only the relation between the state and the nation/the nationalist ideology, but at the same time 1) the relation of force between nationally different dominant layers and, obviously, between the different caliber of these layers; and 2) the relation of force between socially different dominant layers.

For example, both the English and the French medieval centralized states have been constituted including through conquering and sharing of territories of different origin and with local seniors, and thus they have been constituted before the formation of the modern concept of nation (because *the concept of nation is a creation of modernity*) and its use as cement and legitimacy of the process of centralization of the state. And certainly, the reason and legitimacy of the centralized states were just to unify the law and order on their entire territories, without any differentiation. We do not forget that these states were medieval states yet, defending and promoting feudal economic relations, and thus, no matter how lighted, only the rights of the mighty.

But, on the one hand, the bourgeois revolutions aiming at changing the feudal character of states in a modern one have legitimated their goal with the idea of *rights of (any) man*, certainly in a bourgeois meaning. Every man became free for selling its labor force or for free entrepreneurship. But the position as *citizen*, i.e. as having political rights, was something different: since these political rights were not to be given to all, at least a differentiation had to be instituted: that between nationals and aliens. However, if for the Jacobins surrounding Robespierre, the *nation* meant that all the French were to be free for *political rights* too, by universal male suffrage, exercised until the top in a republic, as well as for *social rights* based on the value of equality and on mobilization of resources for “the right to exist”; for the Girondins, the nation signified the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois French, submitted to the new bourgeois order, including in a new type of monarchy. Therefore, the bourgeois revolutions were not monochord phenomena subordinating the rights of man to that of the rights of the nation, as Arendt stated: the more so as the medieval centralized states were not at all a kingdom of rights of every alien, if we refer to her idealization of the Western medieval states as tool to explain the raising of the *ideology of the national exclusivity*.

On the other hand, the Western states as such were not at all similar. She referred only to England and France in the above model. But if we think to

Spain and to Holland, we see a very different picture. The Spanish medieval state has been constituted in a process of national liberation from the aliens, especially Moors. The slogan of the nation was the mobilizing force of this process, obviously having as background the struggle of Spanish landlords against the economic competition of Moors and Jews related to modern relations. But after the victory of the Spanish centralized state, once more because the economic relations were feudal, the exclusivist ideology has continued. We remember the proscription of *los conversos*, the Moors and Jews who abjured their religions and assumed Catholicism so as not to leave their country.

In its turn, the Netherlands/more correctly the Dutch republic have been constituted under bourgeois equality slogans as legitimacy of the struggle of Dutch against the feudal Spain. And though another cultural element of the revolt of Dutch from the northern part of the Netherlands against Spain was Protestantism against Catholicism, this element became only an attendant of the fight of modern values against the Spanish feudal rule. This is the reason of the promotion of tolerance and freedom of expression in the Dutch “Golden Age”, of which Spinoza and Descartes have benefited.

Later on, the concrete conditions of the capitalism of every Western country – including, as in the case of Netherlands, the tradition of tolerance – but especially the place in the world economy and the quantity and types of safety valves, as colonies, the country had, have explained the raising of nationalism in almost all the countries, both Western and Eastern.

And, closing this historical parenthesis, we may mention that while in the “really existing socialist” countries, racism and nationalism as xenophobia was forbidden by the law officially, and for this reason the nationalist standpoints were only subterranean (but certainly they were), after the official transition to capitalism in 1989-1991 the explicit right-wing policies have used, implicitly, elements of extreme-right. For example, in the name of freedom of expression the most explicit and brutal extreme-right slogans were admitted, and they never were countered with the arguments defending the humanist principles. On the contrary].

The present form of purism, proof of neo-conservatism but erected with the predominance of *neo-liberalism* as in fact totalitarian/single ideology of the present capitalism in its trans-national phase and at the same time system crisis, is that of racial and national differences in IQ/intelligence – with the lower intelligence of non-whites, and of the fear from the future

predominance of non-Europeans/non-Caucasians/non-white in Europe and USA, because of immigration: concretely, with the phasing out of “incompetent cultures”¹. Actually, this supposition of purism is not a question of race, but of *social conditions*. Between these social conditions, one has to mention both the *direct* and *indirect*, as the *infectious disease rates* in the poor countries, before colonized and now in neo-colonial subjugation. The lower the parasitic infectious disease – because of policies assuring the access of people to safe drinking water, sanitation, medicine – the higher is the IQ².

But a transfigured form of the present purism is the *neo-liberal* focus on and exaggeration of *identity* and the *cultural differences*. Meaning a cultural pluralism based on *separated* peculiar identities (with a xenophobic overtone), this focus allows the “defense of identity” against mixtures and immigration.

If the inter-war racism has continued the racist ideologies of the 19th century, the *neo-liberal* purism and defense of identity and cultural differences does continue the inter-war racism. Actually, all of these

¹ See Richard Lynn (1930-), writing in the last 50 years, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Lynn#Controversial_statements (accessed 2 January 2019).

The quote is from: “‘If the evolutionary process is to bring its benefits, it has to be allowed to operate effectively. This means that incompetent societies have to be allowed to go to the wall... What is called for here is not genocide, the killing off of the populations of *incompetent cultures*. But we do need to think realistically in terms of “phasing out” of such peoples. If the world is to evolve more better humans, then obviously someone has to make way for them otherwise we shall all be overcrowded. After all, ninety-eight per cent of the species known to zoologists are extinct. Evolutionary progress means the extinction of the less competent. To think otherwise is mere sentimentality’ — Review of Raymond Cattell’s *A New Morality from Science: Beyondism*, 1974, in <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/individual/richard-lynn> (accessed on 2 January 2019; my emphasis, AB).

² See the explanation in Christopher Eppig, Corey L. Fincher, and Randy Thornhill, “Parasite Prevalence and the World Distribution of Cognitive Ability”, in *The Causes and Impacts of Neglected Tropical and Zoonotic Diseases: Opportunities for Integrated Intervention Strategies* (Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2011) <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK62514/>.

ideologies belong to what we may express as *anti-universalism*¹: where the core is an explicit or tacit *hierarchy* of races /nations, and both the rights of the individuals and of the human species are infringed upon.

A false negation of purism

As well as just opposite to science is the “multiculturalism as political religion”², in other words a similar to racism *absolutist* conception that aimed at annulling the common human identity and the class identities in the name of *particular* national, gender and age identities. Far from being a way of deep mutual understanding of different cultures both at the level of their common humanity/universal character and at the level of preservation of the different and unique “languages”/means to express this universal human character, the present neo-liberal multiculturalism (in fact, the capitalist multiculturalism) is the practice of *integration of different cultures’ some features into a dominant culture*; in other words, on the one hand, a subterranean racism of the dominant culture towards the harmless exotic appearances of “not so elaborated” cultures emerges³. On the other hand, there is about a “cultural” *transfiguration of the class domination-submission relations*. Multiculturalism promotes (or rather, has promoted) cultural rights – i.e. the right to express its own culture, *however in precise limits* – and breaks them from the economic and even political relations and rights. In other words, even though the aliens born in the host country have – nowadays – political rights, and some representatives of them are elected as mayors and even in the highest positions, both the mass of foreigners and nationals have no the right to control the aggregate of economic, social,

¹ See the criticism of the French new right/*nouvelle droite* – the neo-liberal ideology – in P.A. Taguieff, *La force du préjugé. Essai sur les racismes et ses doubles* (Paris : La Découverte, 1988).

² Mathieu Bock-Côté, *Le multiculturalisme comme religion politique* (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2016).

³ This type of integration continues the colonial racism that openly declared the superiority of the colonialist culture and the inferiority of the culture of the colonized; the colonial racism has generated the inferiority complex of the colonized, manifested both by the taking over by the wealthy colonized of the white culture, and by the psychological trauma of the colonized overwhelmed by the cultural message of their villainy, given by the colonizers. See Franz Fanon, *Black skin, white masks* (1952), Forewords by Homi K. Bhabha and Ziauddin Sardar (London: Pluto Press, 2008).

political policies and rights. A result of this type of multiculturalism is the “living together” of *isolated* cultures, in fact the *separation* of cultures. When the “received” cultures intrude and seem to weaken the dominant culture – but *these cultural slogans are only political slogans* – this one feels its “right” to oppose the destruction of its traditions and singularity. When the “foreigners” occupy the jobs since they are cheaper workers than the natives, they are seen as the destroyers of “our societies”. All foreigners are suspect to having the most evil behaviours and to only mimicking the accommodation in the hospitable culture or even its assumption: they are all unreliable converts attacking the “pure” identity of the original dwellers of the country. The examples of Western countries show this continuity between the multiculturalism forged in the prosperous moments of capitalism and its extreme (extreme right) negation when a permanent critical state of things generated by the phenomena of international competition took place.

These different and, from an epistemological standpoint, simplistic extreme ideologies (of the “pure” identities specific to precise territories and giving them just the legitimacy of the pure – and unique – identity, and of the coexistence in separate mode, in fact in separate cultural spaces, of different particular identities) have corresponded/correspond to two apparently opposed forms of the same politics of domination: the first to the *conservative* form and the second to the *neoliberal* form. But as we have seen, even the neoliberal form flirts with the conservative purism, configuring an “epoch of Restoration”¹. *The purpose of both forms was/is to substitute and annul the common human identity (like the human reason, sociability and morality as mutuality) and the class interests/identities*. And not only the ultimate meaning but also the end of these forms were/are an *authoritarian* politics and a deprivation of the multitude of the ruled by their rights to critique beyond “the limit of acceptable opinion”² that preserves the system.

¹ Pierre Bourdieu, « Nous sommes dans une époque de restauration » (1996), *Variations* [En ligne], 12 | 2008, mis en ligne le 01 janvier 2012, consulté le 16 janvier 2019. URL : <http://journals.openedition.org/variations/248>; DOI : 10.4000/variations.248.

² Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent* (1994) (Montréal, New York, London: Black Rose Books, 1995) pp. 137, 179.

It is worth to note that there was a liberal political tendency and theory critiquing the extreme positions: thus, the cultural situation of multiculturalism was seen as based on the liberal citizenship¹ preserving the rights of minorities and the equality of the human rights of all citizens, irrespective of their provenance or nationality, and appropriating the political, legal and educational institutions to this political philosophy; the model is Canada^{2,3}, and though it is beautiful, it is treated by this theory *without mentioning that it works⁴ not only because of the above institutions, but also because of the economic stimuli of the social state*. Just these stimuli given to all the citizens – since the government runs health insurance/public health plans, etc. – are not only important and cogent for the majority of Canadians, as mandatory social aspects of the democratic freedom, but also

¹ The liberal theory of citizenship – discussing *only* the political rights *inside the system* and thus the rights of minorities not deranging this reduction to political rights and the circumscribing *inside the system* – is contradictory: for example, and because *the cultural minorities are not only national/racial and sexual but concern also the habits linked to activities and free time*, selling sex is legal but not purchasing sex, abortion is legal, as well as the gambling/games of chance (slot machines, casinos, lottery tickets, sports bookies, animal racing, video lottery terminals) (withal in government-run institutions) but the concrete conditions (education, employment, decent housing) for preventing the moment of abortion and for using one's own time in a creative manner are not mandatory.

² Will Kymlicka, "Canadian Multiculturalism in Historical and Comparative Perspective: Is Canada Unique?," *Constitutional Forum / Forum constitutionnel*, Vol. 13, No 1 &2, 2003, DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.21991/C9W37Q> (accessed 3 December 2018).

³ See Will Kymlicka, "Multicultural Citizenship within multination states," *Ethnicities*, 11, 2, 2011, pp. 281-302.

⁴ But *when the social state is attacked by the neo-liberalism of the trans-national capital* – and in Canada some former benefits of the post-war social state are still preserved but shrunken, because they are "too expensive" for a state that supports on a priority basis the private capital and thus it gave/gives room to private health insurance and private pension plan – *even multicultural spirit may be erased*. Other nations and states are seen in a nationalist manner, as enemies stealing the jobs of Canadians, and even "the hordes of immigrants", whilst Canada is indeed a nation of immigrants. All of these explain that multiculturalism cannot be seed outside the complex social, economic, international relations. See Shannon Jones, *Following Oshawa GM sitdown protest, autoworkers fed poison of Canadian nationalism at Windsor rally*, 12 January 2019, <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2019/01/12/auto-j12.html>.

are brakes against “motifs” of discrimination when the simple survival is endangered. However, nowadays the wealth inequality, “while not as pronounced as in the US, the same trends are at work in Canada. Stagnating incomes, loss of low-skill high-pay jobs, the growth of the gig economy, all of these are contributing to a sense of *precariousness in the middle class*. A large proportion of people are living paycheque to paycheque with no financial cushion”¹. Letting all these aside, the above liberal position was criticized because it is not different from an inter-cultural model based on the respect of diversity; but this criticism as such, which has promoted the model of hybridization, was not lesser liberal, insisting only on the *civil society constructing a democracy of possible cultural hybridizations*², but not even mentioning the economic and social features necessary to them and dissolving the *extremist opposition against the equality of cultural rights*³.

¹ *What are the most prominent social issues in Canada?*, <https://www.quora.com/What-are-the-most-prominent-social-issues-in-Canada>, (my emphasis, AB; accessed 12 January 2019).

But see John Clarke, *A tale of two austerities*, January 5, 2019, (*The UK’s brutal austerity regime is acting as a template for similar programmes across the Atlantic in Canada*), <https://www.counterfire.org/articles/analysis/20061-a-tale-of-two-austeriti> [es](#): In Ontario, the province with the largest economy and population in Canada, “In 1997, only one worker in forty was forced to accept a minimum wage job but, by 2015, that had [increased to one worker in eight](#). By 2013, among workers in the densely populated Greater Toronto and Hamilton areas, barely half were in [permanent full-time jobs](#)”.

² Paolo Gamarasca, “Multiculturalism or Hybridisation? Cultural Mixing and Politics”, *Diversities*, vol. 15, no. 2, 2013, pp. 67-80, UNESCO, www.unesco.org/shs/diversities/vol15/issue2/art6 (accessed 7 December 2018).

³ See Boyd D. Cathey, *Black & White in Culturally Marxist America*, December 8, 2017, <https://www.unz.com/article/black-white-in-culturally-marxist-america/> (accessed 7 December 2018). The author rightly criticizes the extremist color nationalism /racism, but wrongly considers that this racism is of “Marxist” origin. On the contrary, it is anti-Marxist – since it “legitimizes” the white supremacist aberrations, and, from methodological standpoint, since it excludes and covers the class interests and analysis with nationalism and racism –. And although the author considers that the “cultural Marxism” – where he mixes the above-mentioned color racism and the neo-liberal sexual freedom, while falsely describing Marxism as accusing the white Christians of all the evils of the world, even though not Marxism (the right-wing ideologists never read and quote

Actually, the problem of false negation of purism shows that the “pure” epistemological fathoming of cultural and communities aspects is intertwined with the social (class, conditions, historicity...) “impure” analysis of conceptions/theories and phenomena. For example, epistemology has arrived to the conclusion that though a word has a certain meaning common to all the users of this word – if not, they simply could not understand each other through/with that word – so, the form and even the semantic are the same for the users of a certain word, in fact the nuances and significances of the basic semantic are different according to the social positions and experiences of the users of the word¹. Wittgenstein has used the formula *language games*, including for the semiotic practices having as their core some concepts and rules. But first the socially generated nuances and significances infringe these rules by giving to concepts and their lives different meanings; however, after, just the social experiences generate new rules².

Therefore, and since our common assumption here is that the borders suggest spaces for trans-cultural contacts and mutual understanding – somehow questioning even their legitimacy and certainly emphasizing their historical character – we intend to elaborate the problem of the *kinds of cultures* and *cultural characteristic of persons developing just in the border spaces*.

Monthly Review, the American Marxist magazine) but the *petty-bourgeois color nationalism/racism do this reduction of the social problems to simple racism of whites* – is infesting today the academic disciplines, in fact just the *mix of neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism is dominant in the official academia, in media and institutions*. The dominant ideological message is right-wing. Just it is really or falsely split into a neo-conservative and a neo-liberal one accused by the former to be “left-wing” because it supports the concept of race that would have been a creation of Marxism, and the guilt of the white colonizers.

¹ “Just as the God spoken about in the Black songs is not the same one in the white songs. Though the words may look the same”, Amiri Baraka, “The Changing Same (R&B) and new Black Music” (1966), in LeRoi Jones, *Black Music* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1998, pp. 180-211), p. 183.

² See the accumulation of everyday experiences and the qualitative insight as a result of these quantitative object-subject relationships: “The extreme wealth of some, the lust for power of politicians, the ransacking of the planet by the richest and the state violence have gone too far”, in *Appel des gilets jaunes de Montreuil*, 18/01/2019,

<http://www.defenddemocracy.press/appel-des-gilets-jaunes-de-montreuil/>.

For our keyword is the *hybrid*, our assumed standpoint is that of the *dialectic* of *identity* and, on the other hand, *transformation*, *commonality*, *integration*, *hybridization*.

Methodological conclusion

But first, let summarize the elements highlighted in the previous chapters.

Nationalism is a (modern) *class ideology*, meaning that *its content is never separated from the class interests and goals*.

- As class ideology, nationalism is *first an ideology of domination*, having been initiated by owners (with economic power) from different economic and political positions, clearer – not only by big bourgeoisie but also by middle and petty bourgeois, and letting aside that they spoke in the name “of the people” and the simple workers thought that under the flag of the nation they will acquire a new/better social condition. This type of nationalism has legitimated the raising of this dominant class, even though with the help of the ruled. And later on, when it conquered the political power it needed, the dominant bourgeoisie has legitimated its struggle against the international competition with the nationalism that pictured “the country” as being attacked by the deceitful external foreigners, while when the internal social results of its power have been proved to be inexistent or tiny, the internal foreigners have become the enemies of “the nation”.

In the case of Romania, the 19th century petty-bourgeoisie – although midget and intertwined with the landlords – has insisted for the national unity as a means of its/their power on a bigger *Lebensraum*. But the national unity was capitalist – although a subordinated one, meaning boyars-bourgeois common internal power but subordinated to the Western capitalism – so without the transformation of the relations of domination. The ideology of national unity and of its preparation has thus promoted the *rupture between the national ideology and the class ideology*, where *the first has absolutely covered the latter*. And later on, the weak social-democrats have taken over just this pattern of thinking. The same was with the communists. They did not covered the class structure with the nation, and have directly supported class goals, but their representation of the classes and the nation was contradictory: on the one hand, they have equated the two concepts, since the national development was the result of the social development, while this one led to the prosperity of the nation – and this

equivalence of class and national ends was/is not absolutely wrong –; on the other hand, the common national goals were considered as more important than the purposes explained by the specific class ideology of the communists. During the epoch of Ceausescu, the famous phrase said in 1946 by Lucretiu Patrascanu, a serious and sincere communist, “before being a communist I am a Romanian”, was considered as the example of the superiority of national sentiments prior to the class/political ones. However, if we take the communist principles/doctrine (and not the concrete complex historical practice), we may observe that these principles were/are *humanist*, valuing the life and dignity of *every human person and all of them* and urging the *action* for their accomplishment. In this respect, the phrase should have been “before being a Romanian, I am a human being”. The historical concrete form of this assumption of humanism was “first I am a communist”¹, since the communist theory promotes of the human individual (every one and all) and not in an abstract manner, in a metaphysics absolutely separated from the real life², but prompting

¹ But certainly, Patrascanu could not say this, because his time was that of „socialism in a country”, i.e. corresponding to the national phase of capitalism: first, our interests, and then those common with other socialist countries.

² This metaphysical form of humanism was criticized by Heidegger.

But obviously, he criticized also both the class standpoint that was a criterion of political action in the USSR – but this class standpoint is also, tacitly and openly, a political criterion in capitalism – and the Stalinist turn. And because in Stalinism there were many deviations from the communist principles, Heidegger has considered that his critique of “all forms of humanism so far” would have been justified.

And finally, he has equated all forms of humanism, as if there would have not been any difference between the capitalist humanism – that covered/covers the domination and barbarism in “the rest” as well as in the Western countries with beautiful words as fraternity, freedom, community, a quite “strip tease of humanism”, as Sartre said – and the theory of communist humanism. Heidegger did not understand the complex historical causes of the difference between the socialist revolution practice and the communist theory – he was not interested in this – and even though he referred to Marx, he did not understand the Marxian theory. (The quote from Sartre is from his preface to Franz Fanon, *Les damnés de la terre* (1961), Préface de Jean-Paul Sartre (1961), Préface d’Alice Cherki et postface de Mohammed Harbi (2002) (Paris: Éditions La Découverte/Poche, 2002), p. 31; see *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961), Translation by Constance Farrington (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991), p. 23).

concrete actions. Or *nationalism means to consider the value of the community before the value of the individual*. (And yes, the construction of a system annulling in a revolutionary manner the anterior capitalism, had to be but valorizing the community first – thus being nationalist – and in this regard Patrascanu could but reflecting this, but his phrase must be considered more in its significance than in its simple reflective power. At the same time, not only in the communist ideology but also in the very difficult and far from being perfect concrete policies of the construction of socialism¹, the valorization of community has involved the valorization of the individual – that was, the first time in history, the individual from the broad masses of the ruled). Therefore, opposed to extreme, inherently right-wing, positions – to prioritize the national community (as devoid of any class opposition, but certainly characterized by distinctions between groups of people), or to prioritize the well-off individual in an atomized society – was the communist doctrine² of the *dialectic and double prioritization* of the individual and society. (And in the socialist practice of modernization, this dialectic was covered in certain periods and countries with the importance of the (national) community³).

In the nationalist pattern of thinking, there is also the well-known slogan of “the place our country/nation deserves” in the world or at least in the European Union/the “civilized countries”. The slogan is a form of

¹ “During the 1950s and 1960s, in the USSR there was “the beginning of a unique process of searching for a methodology and theory for the removal of alienation from the social life and human relationships, for the achieving of a free and rounded development of the personality not outside of society, but through voluntary association between people, through free creative labour... The so-called ‘stagnation era’ (from the late 1960s through the 1970s) typified by a stultifying atmosphere of bureaucratic passivity and full-blown philistinism, soon stifled this enthusiasm for seeking a new world”, Lyudmila Bulavka and Alexandr Buzgalin, “The Next Hundred Years of Mikhail Bakhtin: Dialectique of Dialogue versus Metaphysic of Post-Modernism”, in *Alter-Globalism: new roads toward new socialism* (Moscow: 2006, pp. 141-167), pp. 142, 143.

² The communist doctrine took over from the idealist liberalism of Kant the value of every human individual, but has developed it: only a normative ethics is not sufficient, but a concrete political-economic transformation of structural relations.

³ For this reason, the official history of culture of these countries has not contained the idea that all the citizens, irrespective of their nationality, have contributed to this culture, giving only few exotic examples of this contribution.

valorizing “the nation”/“community” first, but there is about a metonymy, “the country”/ “nation”/ “community” meaning the *interests of the leading stratum*. This is a sweetened form of the nationalist presupposition of the superiority/exceptionality of “our nation” and the legitimacy of actions by all means demonstrating it. But, we must not forget, this presupposition and these “all means” include the absolute domination of the population through the development of a convergent military-police force of repression. And we still must not forget, that the simple “innocent nationalism” – that “in our democracy is only a way of thinking, not troubling the normal manifestation of pluralism” as the official propaganda sounds – is indissolubly related to the support of “dog-and-eat” capitalism, of the global military-industrial system that exploits the world resources without reason and harmfully, and enthusiastically supports the buying and selling of arms in an arm race aiming at putting order in “our” world threatened by competing powers and policies.

It is very important to know that the present convergence of neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism manifests as a fake divergence between them: while *neo-conservatism*/ nationalism depicts itself as anti-globalization, as opposing to the foreign banks and investors the “national” ones, *neo-liberalism* and the neo-liberal multiculturalism are the singer of globalization and trans-national capital; but neo-conservatism advocates the trans-national capital too – certainly, “our” one –. Both political ideologies mutually attack the corruption of the adverse part and both support, noisily or silently, the power of religion. *In fact*, both wave the slogans of anti-emigration (as if migration would be a natural phenomenon, and not a social one, caused by the imperialist wars and international domination) as a manner of diverting the attention of the native many from the austerity policies directed just on them¹. For both

¹ See Cathy Augustine, *There is no refugee crisis in Britain, only a hostile environment and racist scapegoating*, January 17, 2019,

<https://www.counterfire.org/articles/opinion/20087-there-s-no-refugee-crisis-in-britain-only-a-hostile-environment-and-racist-scapegoating>: “No immigrant is responsible for the devastating underfunding of our NHS and just 0.5% of the NHS budget goes on what the right wing press trots out as “health tourism”. No immigrant is responsible for the anti-trade union legislation that has slashed workers’ rights, or for the increase in zero-hours contracts, precarious employment and in-work poverty. No refugee coming into the UK will be responsible for the

“fair is foul and foul is fair” and “war is peace”¹ and this Orwellian language once more shows the *continuity* of the respectable capitalist democracy and its totalitarian denouement.

In a very interesting call for papers of an Albanian from Kosovo workshop², a difference between a capitalist, so negative, nationalism and a positive nationalism equated with, let say, the present national liberation from Kosovo was sketched. This point of view has advanced as argument Franz Fanon who was the singer of revolutions of national liberation from colonialism. But Franz Fanon is not an argument for *this* type of national liberation imbued with nationalism as exclusivism/even ethnic cleansing. Fanon has considered that the only rational way to liberate from colonialism was/is the *socialist* revolution, whose goals may or may not being aimed at in the first moments of struggle³, but which are just those sine qua non and “refused to do (even) on the territory of the colonial country”⁴, i.e. not only some social reforms but the transformation of the capitalist structural relations. In Fanon, the national liberation revolutions clearly aim at transforming and developing the quality of life of every individual from the broad masses: before, they fought against the oppression, but after they must fight against misery, illiteracy and underdevelopment⁵.

lack of affordable housing, the catastrophe that is Universal Credit, the cuts to education funding or the rising cost of train fares”.

And again see *Appel des gilets jaunes de Montreuil*, 18/01/2019, <http://www.defenddemocracy.press/appele-des-gilets-jaunes-de-montreuil/>: “ We know that those who deprive the inhabitants of this country of a dignified life are neither immigrants nor exiles but the insolent wealth of some and this unfair system”.

¹ Gilbert Mercier, *The Orwellian Empire* (Dallas: News Junkie Post Press, 2015).

² <https://www.balkansocietytp.com/copy-of-workshop-1>.

³ Fanon, *National independence: the only possible outcome*, September 1957, <https://politicaleducation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Fanon-National-Independence-The-Only-Possible-Outcome.pdf>.

⁴ Franz Fanon, *Les damnés de la terre* (1961), Préface de Jean-Paul Sartre (1961); Préface d'Alice Cherki et postface de Mohammed Harbi (2002) (Paris: Éditions La Découver-te/Poche, 2002), p. 199.

⁵ Idem, p. 90.

Therefore, if the destruction of Yugoslavia did not have – contrary to the opinion of the organizers of Kosovo – a positive sense of national liberation because:

1) no social rights have developed after “the independence”, but just on the contrary, they have shrunk, social polarization and alienation skyrocketed, and the ideology of that national liberation and independence did not answer to the simple question of which liberties lacked before and were accomplished after, and

2) being anti-globalization, that nationalism ignored the possibility of alter-globalization and just for this reason it was negative (manifested also as separation, domination of the Serbian minority and even as ethnic cleansing),

the problem of difference as such between the two types of nationalism is very important.

- Thus, *secondly*, nationalism as class ideology is an *ideology of liberation*, a positive nationalism: *if it promotes the values of social liberation together with the national one*. The logic of this interpenetration of goals comes from the “situation” (as Sartre said) of the classes involved in the condition of submission. Discovering, because it was advanced by the French class aspiring to the dominant status, the new word and appurtenance, the popular classes have not only participated to the French Revolution from the position of equal dignity and entitlement conferred by the *nation and their belonging to it*, but have also promoted social meanings to the bourgeois slogans and directly social goals as the only ones raising the level of the nation and strengthening the patriotic feelings.

Later on, the anti-colonial revolutions, taking place in countries with one or many national origins, have indeed taken over the French meaning of nation as citizenship enjoying rights in a state, and have aimed at *both national and social liberation*: in that moment, the colonized human ²¹ “the first time, feels a *national* soil under his foot. At this moment the Nation does not shrink from him; wherever he goes, wherever he may be, she is; she follows, and is never lost to view, for she is one with his liberty”¹. Why? Because: the appurtenance to a Nation is based on specific social relations, annulling the deep alienation (and psychosis) of inferior individuals; “the

¹ Sartre in Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, p. 11 (French edition, p. 21).

minority breed disappears, to be replaced by socialism”¹. Therefore, “In order to triumph, the national revolution must be socialist; if its career is cut short, if the native bourgeoisie takes over power, the new state, in spite of its formal sovereignty, remains in the hands of the imperialists”².

In other words, *if there is no a social revolution, the nationalism of national liberation becomes a negative form of nationalism, subordinated to a politics of domination*. For this reason, it is not enough to – rightly – show that the European historical model of nationalism was transformed into an absolute model according to which the positive nationalist liberations against imperialism were labeled as populist and led by dictators³ (without separating different things and seeing the variety of historical forms of liberation), but it’s necessary to fathom how and if this positive nationalism is attacked by its own leaders just by not being in a consistent manner promoters of social liberation⁴. And certainly, this positive nationalism has to be confronted not only with the new type of (extractivist) imperialism^{5,6}, but also with the alignment of anti-imperialist liberation movements to this extractivist imperialism⁷, and thus their inconsistency and, inherently, the shaking of its mass base.

To this conclusion, a not large but prominent group of thinkers (Heidegger and Wittgenstein’s critiques of modern metaphysics, Nietzsche, the postmodern critique of modernity, Levinas, Foucault, Derrida, Rorty, Lyotard, Vattimo) has given a reasonable constellation of arguments. They are used by what was called *liberation philosophy*, but this one radicalizes

¹ *Idem*, p. 22. (French edition, p. 30).

² *Idem*, p. 10 (French edition, p. 20).

³ Emir Sader, *Le néo-colonialisme intellectuel de la gauche européenne*, 13 avril 2015, <http://www.cetri.be/spip.php?article3816&lang=fr>.

⁴ Guillermo Almeyra, *Visions d’Amérique latine*, 20/03/2018, <http://www.defenddemocracy.press/visions-damerique-latine/>.

⁵ Raúl Zibechi, « Crise économique: La nouvelle grande transformation », *Mondialisation.ca*, 04 août 2015, <http://www.mondialisation.ca/crise-economique-la-nouvelle-grande-transformation/5467145>.

⁶ James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer, *Imperialism and Capitalism: Rethinking an Intimate Relationship*, December 16, 2015, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/imperialism-and-capitalism-rethinking-an-intimate-relationship/5496284>.

⁷ François Houtart, *Vers l’épuisement du « modèle » équatorien ?*, 2 octobre 2015, <http://www.medelu.org/Vers-l-epuisement-du-modele>.

their reasoning, for they “help us as ‘destroyers’ but little as ‘re-constructors,’ where liberation as praxis is always ‘constructive’ of novelty (rationally prudent and consensual, realizable utopia, hopeful negativity in the possibility of the ‘new’), a different alternative to and beyond Eurocentric developmentalism, and a different alternative to the usual philosophical hierarchy where ontology is first; on the contrary, in liberation philosophy, “ethics¹ (and therefore politics, as first horizon) is *prima philosophia*” (including the ‘discourse ethics’ of Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas). In his approach, it “is inscribed within the popular traditions of the peripheral world and in the philosophical schools of Hamann, Schelling, Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Gadamer, Ricoeur and Levinas, without leaving to the side Kierkegaard, Marx, or Bloch. The hermeneutics of the symbol, politics and economics as cults, the utopian hope as horizon of popular praxis of liberation—this is an entirely new project for the ‘majority’ of humanity”².

Consequently, it is more than difficult to deduce the “liberation wars” in the post 1989 Yugoslavia from a liberation tradition.

But, letting aside the philosophical dreams about liberation, is the social liberation possible at all (and thus, also from the tyranny of the foreign capital)? The present phase of capitalism is transnational, what is happening in a country is so intertwined with what is happening in the whole world (and not only “in Europe”), that it seems impossible.

Besides that the leaderships of the so-called left-wing parties and unions have become instruments of the capital, absolutely subordinated to the capitalist policies and acting *within the system* and not opposed to the system, irrespective of the slogans and of the constitution of some parties as “critiques” of the former ones, the theoretical principle founding the image of impossibility is the *separation of the national from the international*.

This separation led to two extreme ideologies and policies: 1) one that *isolates* the national from the international, and *excludes* the world systemic interdependencies from the picture of the national, and 2) the other that

¹ But the opposition Dussel did between the normative ethics (of Kant, for example) and the practical one, the ethics of liberation, is not so obvious he thinks. Rather the latter is the logical development of the former.

² Enrique Dussel, *The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor and the Philosophy of Liberation* (1993) (Humanity Books, 1996), pp. 4-12.

ignores the national in the name of the international integration. Needless to say that both ideologies reflect the interests of dominant strata: the first – of the national ones and the second – of those involved in the globalization. But,

1) In order to being positive, nationalism/patriotism must be¹ *internationalist*, as long before, almost 170 years ago, have Marx and Engels demonstrated². For this reason, only to protest (against the closure of factories from one's own country, and only to call to manifestations and strikes, as general as they may be) is a *within the system* demarche – and anyway has no positive result, since the capital now is transnational – and enrolls in the “left” line of the parties and unions aligned to the interests and logic of the capital, of the system. In this regard, the goals announced by an assembly of yellow vests³ – to nationalize and socialize the activity of

¹ This unity of the national feeling and the sentiment of pertaining to the same world and classes of the working people is an *idea*, of course, and has developed with the development of capitalism as such, namely with the experience of class struggle.

² See for example (and not only the *Communist Manifesto* of 1848), Marx, *On The Lausanne Congress*, 1867, International Workingmen's Association 1867, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/iwma/documents/1867/lausanne-call.htm>: “The power of the human individual has disappeared before the power of capital, in the factory the worker is now nothing but a cog in the machine. In order to recover his individuality, the worker has had to unite together with others and create associations to defend his wages and his life. Until today these associations had remained purely local, while the power of capital, thanks to new industrial inventions, is increasing day by day; furthermore in many cases national associations have become powerless: a study of the struggle waged by the English working class reveals that, in order to oppose their workers, the employers either bring in workers from abroad or else transfer manufacture to countries where there is a cheap labour force. Given this state of affairs, if the working class wishes to continue its struggle with some chance of success, the national organisations must become international”.

³ From espacemaymana@free.fr, in *Le système n'a que la solidarité conférée par la croyance que nous sommes impuissants face à lui car il serait naturel*, 30/12/2018, http://www.defenddemocracy.press/le-systeme-na-que-la-solidite-conferee-par-la-croyance-que-nous-sommes-impuissants-face-a-lui-car-il-serait-naturel/?utm_source=Delphi+Initiative+Newsletter&utm_campaign=d3b8c8dee0-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_12_30_02_06&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_cca18be42a-d3b8c8dee0-173789881.

banks, pharmaceutical structures, the public services, the information, to organize permanent local assemblies everywhere¹, to organize the economy according to the production of use values and not of exchange values – show the necessary direction for avoiding the movement to being only “anti-neo-liberal” (as if only neo-liberalism would be harmful, and would be an accident that may be eradicated), but explicitly anti-capitalist; and just around this possible anti-capitalist turn there are nowadays the most harsh battle, that to temper this revolutionary posture².

¹ This principle of direct democracy – related to but more efficient than the referendum – is directly opposing to what we experience nowadays: “the formal bourgeois democracy in its stage of plutocratic involution”, Heinz Dieterich, “Introduction”, in Heinz Dieterich, Enrique Dussel, Raimundo Franco, Arno Peters, Carsten Stahmer, Hugo Zemelman, *Fin del capitalismo global: El Nuevo proyecto histórico* (México: Txalaparta, 1999), p. 11.

² The methods to temper the revolutionary attitude of the yellow vests were/are:

- from *police violence* – generating not only dead, but also *severely* injured (see *Recensement provisoire des blessés-es des manifestations du mois de novembre-décembre 2018*, 4 janvier 2019, <https://desarmons.net/index.php/2019/01/04/recensement-provisoire-des-blesses-graves-des-manifestations-du-mois-de-decembre-2018/>, *Gilets jaunes : éclats de grenades, brûlures, membres arrachés... retour sur 82 blessures graves*, 11 janvier 2019, https://www.liberation.fr/france/2019/01/11/gilets-jaunes-eclats-de-grenades-brulures-membres-arraches-retour-sur-82-blessures-graves_1702433; the idea of use of “non-lethal” ammunition was deconstructed in “*Gilets jaunes*” : *les réponses aux dix questions que vous vous posez sur le flash-ball et son utilisation par les forces de l’ordre*, https://www.francetvinfo.fr/economie/transports/gilets-jaunes/gilets-jaunes-on-repond-a-dix-questions-que-vous-vous-posez-sur-le-flash-ball-et-son-utilisation-par-les-forces-de-l-ordre_3138997.html, and the severely injured have launched a call for the interdiction of these “non-lethal” weapons Sophie Chapelle, *Gravement blessés, des manifestants appellent à un « acte XII » pour l’interdiction des grenades et flashballs*, 17 janvier 2019, <https://www.bastamag.net/Gravements-blesses-des-manifestants-appellent-a-un-acte-XII-pour-l-interdiction>; 21/01/2019, <http://www.defenddemocracy.press/gravement-blesses-des-manifestants-appellent-a-un-acte-xii-pour-linterdiction-des-grenades-et-flashballs/> –
- to *provocations* (to which the vests have organized their own ordination services, *Comment les “gilets jaunes” ont mis en place des services d’ordre pour encadrer leurs manifestations*, 20/01/2019, <http://www.defenddemocracy.press/comment-les-gilets-jaunes-ont-mis-en-place-des-services-dordre-pour-encadrer-leurs-manifestations/>);
- *info war*;

Therefore, the *nation* is here synonym to the *people*, and for this reason it is not nationalist in a bourgeois meaning, lesser in an extreme-right appearance (as exclusivism against the competition of inside and outside foreigners), and nor it witnesses naivety, but calls for popular and reasonable explicitly *social* transformation¹, not only against the tyranny of trans-national capital but against the relations of capital as such. Only this transformation arrives to annul the “democratic authoritarianism” that is specific to the present “liberal democracies of the human rights”, as well as the alienation, atomization and fragmentation of individuals and communities². (The right-wing nationalism uses a particular preoccupation

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- a *justice partisan of the law and order of the ruling strata* : “L’effet « gilets jaunes », Le Figaro a décortiqué les chiffres de la délinquance enregistrée par le ministère de”, *Le Figaro*, 10 janvier 2019; Régis de Castelnaud, *Gilets jaunes: quand la justice se prend pour la police; La justice est là pour rendre justice, pas pour rétablir l’ordre*, 13 janvier 2019, <http://www.vududroit.com/2019/01/gilets-jaunes-justice-rendre-justice-retablir-lordre/>, *Sévère répression des gilets jaunes : la justice française est-elle en train de préférer l’ordre à la justice ?*, <https://www.atlantico.fr /decryptage/3563628/severe-repression-des-gilets-jaunes--la-justice-francaise-est-elle-en-train-de-preferer-l-ordre-a-la-justice->; and
 - *measures of intimidation and obstruction*, as the announce that the hut erected by the vests in Commercy (where they called a meeting of Assembly of Assemblies at the end of January) will be demolished, see *Défendons la cabane des gilets jaunes de Commercy !*, 19 janvier, 21/01/2019, <http://www.defenddemocracy.press /defendons-la-cabane-des-gilets-jaunes-de-commercy/>.

¹ See Claude Karnoouh, *Les Gilets jaunes ou le renouveau de l’histoire inscrit dans une tradition*, <http://www.lapenseelibre.org/2019/01/n-161-les-gilets-jaunes-ou-le-renouveau-de-l-histoire-inscrit-dans-une-tradition.html>.

² Related to the Japanese *hikikomori*, see Tuuka Toivonen, Vinai Norasakkunkit, and Yukiko Uchida, „Unable to Conform, Unwilling to Rebel? Youth, Culture, and Motivation in Globalizing Japan”, *Frontiers in Psychology*, 2011, 2: 207, doi: [10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00207](https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00207); while in Europe – where, according to OCDE, in France there are 18,1% NEET (not in employment, education, or training) of youth between 15-34 (and there are similar figures in Austria and Belgium), while in Germany, Sweden and Switzerland have lesser ones, but everywhere it’s about thousand of hundreds, even millions – see *Trois millions de jeunes totalement oisifs, dont 40 % issus de l’immigration*, 20 janvier 2019, <http://www.lefigaro.fr /conjoncture/2019/01/20/20002-20190120ARTFIG00129-jean-pierre-robin-trois-millions-de-jeunes-totalement-oisifs-dont-40-issus-de-l-immigration.php>; but this “laziness” is not the “argument” for the present laws regarding “the freedom of choice of the professional future” where the unemployed are forced to accept any

for the destiny of immigrants as “proof” of the malign transnational lack of interest for the natives/for the nation, as if the present *general* situation would have not been created by right-wing policies, and as if the under-schooling of immigrants would not be related to the under-schooling of many natives, while the percentage of poverty at the working youth would not generate the exasperation and rejection of this system at all of these categories). And finally, if in the model of thinking proposed by the triumphant nation/nationalism the nation meant the *home* where the humans might arrange somehow somewhere within it, generally capitalism, and the more so the present one – very high from the standpoint of technologies, but very low from that of the decent life assuring to all the inhabitants of the country or planet – has transformed the countries in dwellings rented by these inhabitants and, as it is happening with the rented accommodation, the tenants may move from it when they do no longer feel good. Clearer, since the country does no longer offer a possibility to live/to decently live, people leave the country. The country suffers. But for people, that departure of the country was a form of resistance, since only by leaving could they then work, create, live: to leave the country – a manner to create, thus to resist¹. Only that in the present capitalism, they/we have no place to run. So, the only solution is to make a home from the entire world for all its inhabitants.

Consequently, if the popular call is not clear enough to show that it is efficient, thus that it has a reason to be, and that reason means call for *international solidarity* and *international spirit*, namely for world revolution²,

kind of work, even far below professional qualifications, at any distance from one's home and part-time without any health and social insurance; the “laziness” is only the sign of alienation in response to a so irrational organization that it *wastes* the human creativity and forces people to unnecessary and unique suffering; and it's not only about the lowest strata: see Christophe Guilluy, *No Society. La fin de la classe moyenne occidentale* (Paris: Flammarion, 2018).

¹ Gilles Deleuze, « Qu'est ce que l'acte de création ? » (1987), *Manière de voir*, 148, août-septembre 2016.

² See a present neo-liberal mimicry of the “left-wing radicalism” in order to deviate the consciousness of the necessity of world revolution toward the movement of municipalism (Kate Shea Bird, Marta Junque (eds.), *Fearless Cities: A guide to the global municipalist movement* (New Internationalist, 2019), where it is about women's and LGBTI rights, and working to tackle climate change, and right to housing, remunicipalize basic services and democratize decision-making, as if

it has no chances of succeeding. If this internationalist call lacks, the movement of national and social liberation of the French yellow vests is not convincing and it reduces¹ itself to that which was the first spark of the vests, the reduction of taxes and prices. To these demands, the establishment answers emphasizing the vicious circle of the capitalist economy: where to get money – ignoring obviously the unequal taxation and the unequal burden, which lay in the logic of capitalism in system crisis, when every sum is necessary in the world competition – and if the wages increase and the taxes of capital increase, it simply goes away.

Nevertheless, the problem is not insolvable. A national economy within the international one, based on market rules framed by principles of equivalence, of democratic planning of production and distribution, of computerized and transparent accounting, is possible². But the market rules here are rather those of efficiency, including in an ecological sense, than those of competition for market and of selling at all costs. Actually, today both an ardent patriotism and a generous internationalism consist in the *internal social strategy of moving away from the logic of the present system*, and not of adapting to it in the rush of “better selling what we have” and “imposing our country” in the diplomacy of war and “Holy Alliance”. And this, from a realist point of view. If in the pattern we assume we start from

these last aspects would not be social measures in order to reduce the social tensions and to give room to capital; this “movement” is, like philanthropy, a way to wound the wounds caused by the structural capitalist relations.

¹ See the same reduction both at the leaderships of British unions, Labour Party and its theorists, ex. *Costas Lapavistas: Socialism starts at home*, <https://www.redpepper.org.uk/costas-lapavistas-socialism-starts-at-home/>: defending the good national capitalism and negotiating with the EU “the best arrangement”, as well as proposing “A radical government with a programme of nationalising key resources, taking over certain banks and regulating the banking system, and an industrial policy that will change the balance of sectors in Britain” but this radical programme ...would still fall within the broad rubric of radical Keynesianism with some Marxist underpinnings. We are not talking about a Bolshevik revolution”. As a result, the call for international support is only after the solving of the interests of the country. But his is the “internationalism” of the Stalinist and national left period.

² See Arno Peters, “El principio de equivalencia como base de la economía global”, in Heinz Dieterich, Enrique Dussel, Raimundo Franco, Arno Peters, Carsten Stahmer, Hugo Zemelman, *Fin del capitalismo global: El Nuevo proyecto histórico*, pp. 17-56; and “Entrevista...”, pp. 57-69.

the position of “our country” and neglect the logic of world interdependences and processes, we risk to lagging and losing our adaptation to the newest trends.

The experience of yellow vests clarifies us. Inherently, they began their revolt in the name of some demands related to internal economic policies. But they quickly enlarged their pattern – *from demands to clear objectives* – as in the note 58 and, though these ones refer to the internal politics, they are intertwined with the *international* politics (as in the document presented in note 58 and resumed in a manifesto for a constituent assembly)¹. In this manifesto, an interesting theorization explains that since the global capitalism has unified the entire world, the class struggles too are related and continue each other. Consequently, the yellow vests movement is not “anti-globalization” – as some right-wing analyses said – and is conscious about and open to the complex character and multi-valence of globalization. At the same time, the manifesto declared that “it is not institutional reforms like the popular initiative referendum which will change the economic order that gives shape to this policy in the service of the predators and exploiters” and, as in the document of note 58, the exit from NATO, European Union and euro was underlined, as necessary condition for a new type of politics. In other words, even though these aspects concern only partially the international relations, they already question not only the national but also the international militarist policy, the arm race, the wars, thus how is possible a restructuring of production toward use values, stating that it is possible only outside and opposed to this capitalist politics. And finally, that only the above mentioned strategic transformation will annul the distinctions of origin and color².

¹ *Le Manifeste, essai constituant*, January 15, 2019, <https://www.facebook.com/notes/manifeste-des-gilets-jaunes/le-manifeste-essai-constituant/462909427574942/>, see also http://www.lapenseelibre.org/2019/01/n-163-le-manifeste-essai-constituant.html?utm_source=ob_email&utm_medium=ob_notification&utm_campaign=ob_pushmail.

² See also *Appel des gilets jaunes de Montreuil*, 18/01/2019, <http://www.defenddemocracy.press/appel-des-gilets-jaunes-de-montreuil/>: “the difference must not be a frontier: neither the color of the skin, nor the place of birth, nor gender, nor sexual orientation, nor religion, will serve as a pretext for dividing us. We must be united in our differences if we want to build a more just and beautiful world”.

It is presumable¹ that the development of the movement will assume explicitly the intertwining of national and international strategies and, thus, of international programs of systemic transformation. But the so-called left parties, as well as the unions – actually, their bureaucracies – did not assume this intertwining in a *practical* manner, i.e. they did not assert that today *the economic demands* (tax justice, social inequalities, territorial inequalities, purchasing power, public services, and ecological transition) *simply cannot perform only on national scale*. All of them have remained in the nationalism of capitalist logic, for example, taking over the standpoint of the good national ecologists who militate for the international generalization of the ecological measures so as the national producers not being penalized². And if we keep in mind that the *leaders* of these organizations have only mimicked the opposition against the dominant politics – in fact they being paid servants³ of the capital and having as task to accommodate the workers' movement with capitalism – we once more do not wonder that the yellow vests have refused the leadership of these parties and unions. Their evolution is open, obviously, but the strength of their movement is depending on the measure of the consistency of their program, including the intertwining of the national and international aspects. Anyway, their movement has already become international⁴, and this opposed both to the extreme-right parties which intended and want to confiscate it, and to the entire media of “democratic right” whose aim is to

¹ Even before, the common people have grasped the nuances: for example, although Charles de Gaulle has initiated a policy of independence (especially towards USA), he nevertheless was forced to resign. Thus it was /is a difference between a capitalist independence and nationalism and a proletarian one.

² La “Lettre aux Français” d’Emmanuel Macron, 13 janvier 2019, https://www.scribd.com/document/397381887/La-Lettre-aux-Francais-d-Emmanuel-Macron#from_embed: “How to share these choices at European and international level so that our producers are not penalized compared to their foreign competitors?”

³ See Anthony Torres, *How the French state and big business finance the unions*, 15 January 2019, <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2019/01/15/fran-j15.html>.

⁴ Again *Appel des gilets jaunes de Montreuil*, 18/01/2019, <http://www.defenddemocracy.press/appel-des-gilets-jaunes-de-montreuil/>: “In Iraq, Tunisia, Belgium, Kurdistan, Syria, Japan, Hungary, Spain, Burkina Faso, Egypt, England, Morocco, Italy and in many other places people wear yellow vests to show their anger: Our revolt has no border!”.

stopping even the knowledge about the movement. And, since the destructive consequences of capitalism on the natural environment show the necessity of a world integrated planning of resources, production and consume, thus the necessity of internationalism, all the left-wing parties and unions either assume the intertwining of the positive nationalism and internationalism or they glide toward the extreme-right, promoting a nationalism increasingly closer to the capitalist nationalist, and inherently extremist.

Thus, *internationalism is not a theoretical slogan, but a practical necessity*. And indeed, to demand (employments, increase of wages etc.) in the name of the ethics which valorizes the unique and unrepeatable individual is not enough. Ethics is an argument of the valorization of the individual – of every one and all – but practice (to demand, to protest are practices, and to remain only to these ones is discouraging for the subjects of the revolt) means also the valorization of the community. That can no longer be only national – though the appurtenance is powerful and we all start for the concrete local/national experiences – but at the same time international. It is about the *global community of human beings*. But this valorization of the human community is related to a revolutionary thinking: that does not limit itself to adapting to a social organization that imposes as individual ideal the survival (“of the fittest”), and that takes out of isolation both the internal fragmented communities and the international one¹. Thus, nowadays *nationalism is positive if it is internationalist too*. In this pattern, nationalism insists on the unique peculiarity of humanity in different cultures and spaces, while internationalism – on their common characteristics.

Finally, the positive nationalism is promoted only when the people – i.e. the ruled – acts together, clearer, as a *class of proletarians*, in order to accomplish its power². If it does not act a class, it is again atomized, a bulk of individual consumers, and resigned that “there is no alternative”. But as

¹ *Appel des gilets jaunes de Montreuil*, 18/01/2019, <http://www.defenddemocracy.press/appel-des-gilets-jaunes-de-montreuil/>: “to come out of isolation.. the Parisian suburbs... do not fall into the trap of media and power by setting limits on our movement... This is the beginning of a revolution that wants to build a more dignified and just society for us and our children. We will not stop even if it takes 100 years. It is for the people to decide for itself how it wants to live”.

² It’s significant that almost everywhere – and not only in the France of the yellow vests – a slogan is *popular/national sovereignty*.

a class, it shows that “there is an alternative”¹. For this reason is the aggression against the yellow vests so huge. *To act as a class of proletarians means to respond to the domination-submission relations in a radical manner.* First, the proletarians are only a class *in itself* (we must remember Marx’s dichotomy). But then, the experience of being a dominated class transforms their conscience, so as they struggle for their proletarian class interests; they become a class *of itself*. And the present movement of the yellow vests shows that the *accumulation of experiences lived in the last decades of neo-liberal politics does transform into a new quality of understanding and tackling the problems and the human experiences.*

2) Not even from a precautionary viewpoint of capitalism the absolute domination of the globalization policies and the deprivation of the national policies from their real power to solve some common problems of society are not good. On the contrary, “What is needed is a *responsible nationalism* — an approach where it is understood that countries are expected to pursue their citizens’ economic welfare as a primary objective but where their ability to harm the interests of citizens elsewhere is circumscribed. International agreements would be judged not by how much is harmonised or by how many barriers are torn down but whether citizens are empowered.

This does not mean less scope for international co-operation. It may mean more. For example, tax burdens on workers around the world are a trillion dollars or more greater than they would be if we had a proper system of *international co-ordination that identified capital income and prevented a race to the bottom in its taxation.* Taxes are only the most obvious area where races to the bottom interfere with the achievement of national objectives. Others include labour and financial regulation and environmental standards.

Reflex internationalism needs to give way to responsible nationalism or else we will only see more distressing referendums and populist demagogues contending for high office”. I gave this long quote in order to illustrate that a reasonable approach of the principles is in fact handicapped by the control of transnational capital over the world economy, thus on the national ones. The author deplores that “corporations have

¹ See *Appel des gilets jaunes de Montreuil*, 18/01/2019, <http://www.defenddemocracy.press/appel-des-gilets-jaunes-de-montreuil/>.

disproportionate influence in shaping global agreements”¹ and does not understand that a “lesser” one is in fact not possible just because the present stage of capitalism is the transnational one, the logical result of the concentration and centralization of capital on world scale, and that – though this new capital is stronger than all its previous forms of national concentration and centralization, it is already in its system crisis – and thus “we don’t need a new deal”, but a transformation of the structural capitalist relations².

Epistemological interference or starting point

Therefore, concluding in epistemological key,

- the *integration of* and focus on *different local points within* the global system, thus with the focus on this *global system*, is a more efficient standpoint³ than the dichotomies of extreme ideologies.
- At the same time, it’s already clear that *one cannot tackle the aspects in a separated from the context manner*⁴.

¹ Lawrence H. Summers, *Voters deserve responsible nationalism not reflex globalism*, 18/07/2016, <http://www.defenddemocracy.press/voters-deserve-responsible-nationalism-not-reflex-globalism/> (my emphasis, AB). (But see all the calls for returning to Keynesianism, as if this return would be possible).

² Frank Scott, *We Don’t Need a New Deal: We Need a Whole New Deck*, Global Research, January 24, 2019, <https://www.globalresearch.ca/we-dont-need-a-new-deal-we-need-a-whole-new-deck/5666352>.

³ See George E. Marcus, “Ethnography in/of the World System: The Emergence of Multi-situed Ethnography”, *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 24, 1995, pp. 95-117.

⁴ A counter-example is in Slavoj Žižek, *How Mao would have evaluated the Yellow Vests*, 21 Dec, 2018, <https://www.rt.com/op-ed/447155-zizek-yellow-vests-france/>, 1) who considered that the solution of giving a name to Macedonia is better, but did not say a word about the concrete consequence of giving that name (the entrance of Macedonia in NATO); 2) also, that the universal human rights are better – but did not say that the contents of this universality is socially and politically forged by the Western capitalism – and that the “the Western notion of universality of human rights contains the self-critical dimension which makes visible its own limitations”, but did not understand not only that the Eastern notion of rights makes visible too its own limitations, but especially that not the notion – in fact, never a notion as such – contains a self-critical dimension; 3) the criticism comes from outside the notion, if there is possible to express criticism; on the contrary, the Western notion of human rights transforms into a fetish the political rights within the

- Nor may we look at the national problem outside the social/class divide.
- Both the closing or opening of cultures and communities and the representations about these phenomena are intertwined with the class structures and ideologies. The nation and the culture are not separated from the class relations, and the theories about nation and national cultures reflect the class relations too.
- Finally, we cannot consider only the differences, and not at the same time the complexity and integration of aspects.

At the same time, all the above reasoning and conclusions are not only parts of a dreaming philosophy, but they correspond to the evolution and moments of the development of modern science.

Thus, we may retain the *first* scientific model: “between borders”, result of the fragmentation of knowledge /creation of modern disciplines, mostly through inductive focus on problems. The understanding of problems/scientific objects was at the beginning, the features inside of a domain/group/area had to be known; the model was based on paradigms and their ‘normal’ application; and the *second* model: *surpassing/transgressing the former borders*; in fact, the success of the first model consisted in and led to the grasping of contradictions, anomalies, shortcomings of solutions inside this first model. This meant the development of inter- and trans- disciplinary research (e.g. physical chemistry – 1860-80s; ecology; different cultural studies).

representative democracy of the interests of the ruling strata and excludes/ignores any enlargement or re-formulation of human rights; 4) the categorical imperative is an idea exterior to that of the human rights; the criticism of the human rights does not come from the idea of human rights, neither in its Western nor in its Eastern version; the notion of human rights is a modern idea; or Žižek opposes to this idea the “Eastern” version where the individual was subordinated to the social group/collectivity; but it’s not about an “Eastern” version, but about a pre-modern one; only in the modern (Western) version the individual was more important than the group, because he was a consumer, a *homo oeconomicus*; 5) in short, Žižek started from the opposition of two political positions – promoted by the above concepts – and concluded that it’s better to support the Western notion of human rights; and the manner he de-historicized the concept of human rights leads to relativism: in the name of the trivial idea that there are contradictions in every model; but he did not say a word about the clear-cut political function of the Western model: of domination and struggle between imperialism and peoples.

From an objective standpoint, Science and technology are *universal*, even though they arise from different local conditions. At the same time, they are *hybrid cultural products*, and the consciousness of this characteristic was early in natural sciences, since the scientists knew that they arrive to discoveries only by collaborating with an as large scientific community as possible.

Especially today, and with all the tradition of fragmented research and disciplines, the principle of *trans-disciplinary* research became dominant: each problem is approached from a multi, inter and trans- disciplinary perspective (*this is the "hybrid" science*, where the success of disciplines as such is bigger).

This tackling supposes new paradigms and, correspondingly, a new 'normal science': highlighting known features /specific to disciplines plus new ones. And it is far more *efficient*: because *reality* itself is *complex*.

The scientific idea of hybrid

Now we can go to what should have been at first. Indeed, our intention was to discuss some cultural theories starting *from* the scientific models.

As we know, the humans and their main spokespersons, the philosophers, have from old searched for the *essence* of things. The "what is" was transposed in "why" and, irrespective of the many causes/many types of causes (as in Aristotle), one did arrive to the first principles (the *arkhe*), to an essential logic of the existence and to the founding concepts from which the speculative philosophy has derived all that exist. We may call this type of philosophy, as an *essentialist* one.

But with the advent of *modernity*, the knowledge that has substituted the philosophical intuitions and deductions began to change their conclusions. Starting from intuitions or from banal observations, *science* has always put them to the tests, has measured and calculated parameters and indexes, has repeated the repeatable experiments, has determined its analysis by the scientific communities, has arrived to a complex, and even a hierarchy of theories which explain the *what*, the *why* and the *how* of the intertwined nets of representations about the world and of the world as such. As a result, now the difference between the philosophical intuition and the scientific one is clear now: the latter becomes a demonstrated and verified theory, not only with theoretical means (related to the measured coherence of the theoretical inferences) but also and always by the real facts. Thus,

science has developed certainly not forgetting the philosophical goal of the knowledge the essences, but directly focusing on the various facets of the existence and aiming just the understanding of these facets. Science was and *is existentialist*.

In its turn, the *modern* philosophy has evolved in at least one direction as an *existentialist* philosophy, starting from the existence within which one is immersed and is aiming to grasping both its phenomena and the human relationships with them. Consequently, the existentialist philosophy has proven to be more reliable than the essentialist metaphysics which it criticized.

And as the *modern* science has arrived to the idea that things are *hybrid*, because they are complex and imply many different aspects emphasized through and by different points of view, as the existentialist philosophy has disclosed the modal and multi-value logic that deem both the mixed, structured/harmonious/balanced and at the same time contradictory phenomena and their knowledge.

From an epistemological viewpoint, we may fathom the interdependencies between the modern science, a part of the modern philosophy, and different scientific branches in what was called “isomorphism of knowledge”¹ or a “transversal unification between epistemological domains”². One element within these interdependencies is just *the idea of hybrid*, general in all these domains *with all their specific concepts, preoccupations and laws/regularities*. However, we must not confound the “analytical” concept of hybrid – that which theorizes why and how are there hybrid features in the social relations – with the “practical” use of the concept, in fact, trespassing the ideological presumptions, as they appear in the usual slogans and clichés (I borrowed Brubaker and Cooper³’s labels – analytical and practical – related to the concept of identity).

¹ Isomorphism of Knowledge: Scientific Projections on XXth and XXIst Century Literature, 10-11 May 2019,

http://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Literature_and_Science_English_CFP-IsomorphismKnowledge-ENG.

² Christine Baron, *La pensée du dehors : Littérature, philosophie, épistémologie* (Paris, L’Harmattan, 2007).

³ Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity’”, *Theory and Society*, 29, 2000, pp. 1-47.

Ontologically speaking, we may consider the hybrid as *ontological* entity in all the human manifestations: in science, philosophy, but also in culture. Nevertheless, *it is not the only entity*: rather it is justified just in relation with the “original” entity. Consequently, there are rather groups with different original and hybrid entities. And what is important is to understand the history and logic of constitution of the original and hybrid concepts and features, as well as the history and logic of their relations¹.

And finally, we should not forget the *constructed* character of concepts², including those of *identity* (as Brubaker and Cooper have shown), and different types of identity and of mixture, as *hybrid/hybridity/cultural hybridization*³, or of processes and phenomena generating both differences and new meanings⁴. One phenomenon is that of integration of hybrids: indeed, as in nature there are the fundamental forces integrating and generating the cohesion of matter-energy-information structures, because without integration and cohesion there is no existence as such, as the hybrids too integrate, with or without losing their specificity of hybrid.

The epoch of hybrids

As it already can be deduced, the idea of hybrids is related to periods of *rupture*, of *transition* that is never rapid. But, concerning the cultures and the human communities, the idea of hybrid has appeared when big *dislocations* and *transformations* of former closed communities took place, because of the openness that has been produced and of the putting in contact of different communities.

¹ P.W. Stockhammer (ed.), *Conceptualizing Cultural Hybridization, Transcultural Research – Heidelberg Studies on Asia and Europe in a Global Context*, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-21846-0_1, Berlin, Heidelberg, Springer-Verlag, 2012.

² Ernst von Glasersfeld, “Farewell to Objectivity”, *Systems Research*, 13 (3), 1996, pp. 279-296; Ernst von Glasersfeld, “Pourquoi le constructivisme doit-il être radical?”, In: Philippe Jonnaert & Domenico Masciotra (eds.) *Constructivisme, Choix contemporains, Hommage à Ernst von Glasersfeld*, Sainte-Foy, Québec, Presses de l’Université de Québec, 2004, pp. 145–154.

³ Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (1994) (London: Routledge, 2000).

⁴ Bruno Drweski, “The Helsinki Principle of the Free Movement of People and Ideas in the Age of Globalization, Economic Inequalities, New Wars, Tensions and Terrorism – Freedom of Movement and Control of Migration”, *The Voice of Security Awareness* (VoSA), Vol. I, Issue II (2) (July-December 2017), pp. 19-29.

The most apparent epoch of these changes was the *modern* one. Modernity meant world connections of all the parts of the world, because the capitalist relations are and develop as world system relations.

Since the hybrids are the resonance of any *transitional* epoch (in knowledge/culture...), the *dominance of hybrid model is the result of the modern, inherently world system.*

In this system, the *first* meaning of hybridity – that of *construction and perception of hybrid features opposed to the “former” purity*¹ – intertwines with the application of the epistemology mentioned later: the application consists in the analysis and deconstruction of “asymmetric power relations that result from assumptions of cultural purity”². But they both intertwine with the entire history of metaphors and illusions about both purity and hybridity. Dryly speaking, the idea of construction of concepts as alternatives to other concepts/theories was difficult to be understood by laymen (and theorists) because the theorists as such, working in ideologies and ideological frames, were “programmed” to consider the concepts they forged as absolute truths/unquestionable premises, viz. a religion.

The *second* meaning is already related to the modern class differentiation and opposition, because the *hybrids are targets of the dominant ideological attacks against the enemies of the status quo*. Obviously, of old have the rulers apprehended in front of any competitor at their positions. We know the Athenian law forbidding to strangers/Metics settled in the polis to acquire real estate properties and to have political rights. The same was in the pre-modern Europe. But the Paris Commune has included the foreigners as citizens with full rights, since “the flag of Commune is that of a universal republic”³. On the contrary, and earlier, but when the power of bourgeoisie has definitely won the bourgeois revolution and it needed legitimizing ideologies avoiding by all means the class opposition that could lead to a new revolution – on the basis of the right to insurrection, proclaimed by the Constitution of 1793 –, the Jews as the *internal foreigners* were peremptorily

¹ P.W. Stockhammer (ed.), *Conceptualizing Cultural Hybridization, Transcultural Research* – Heidelberg Studies on Asia and Europe in a Global Context, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-21846-0_1, (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2012), p. 2.

² Ibid.

³ « Rapport de la commission des élections », 30 martie 1871, in *Journal officiel de la Commune de Paris*, réédition 1997, Coeuvres-et-Valsery, Renseignements, 3 volumes, but see also https://www.scribd.com/doc/58974914/Journal-Officiel-Commune-de-Paris#outer_page_206 (accessed 15 December 2018).

considered as both the villain bearers of capitalism and of the revolution¹, consequently they were rejected. But the Jews were not the single “Metics”: *all the foreigners* coming from the East, together with the bearers of *foreign religion* towards the dominant one (as Protestantism towards Catholicism) and with the *bearers of universalist values* as rationalism, democracy and fraternity: in the 19th century, the free-masons, and later the communists and socialists. Therefore, in this second meaning hybridity is *at the margins/borders* of the community of majority, it is external to this community.

A third meaning of hybridity is its tension inside/dialectical relation within the national community it is integrated. Yes, hybridity is not only strangeness – as both freak and different/strange origin – but also a group willing and wanting to integrate within the majority community, somehow inherently since it's about a necessary cohabitation.

But this will to integration is not a simple psychological, though economically and socially determined, or abstract cultural phenomenon. The hybrids want to integrate in a specific society, assuming its dominant *Weltanschauung* and adapting to its rules².

¹ See also Charles Maurras : *L'Action française*, 6 juillet 1912, and *La seule France. Chronique des jours d'épreuve* (Lyon, Landarchet, 1941).

² Continuing Hannah Arendt's interest, see Max Horkheimer & Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment. Philosophical fragments* (1944), Translated by Edmund Jephcott, Edited by Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 2002), pp. 138, 139, 149: “the successfully adapted Jews took on in exchange the cold, stoical character which existing society imposes on human beings. The dialectical intertwinement of enlightenment and power, the dual relationship of progress to both cruelty and liberation, which has been brought home to the Jews no less by the great exponents of enlightenment than by – democratic popular movements, manifests itself in the makeup of the assimilated Jews themselves. The enlightened self-control with which adapted Jews effaced within themselves the painful scars of domination by others, a kind of second circumcision, made them forsake their own dilapidated community and wholeheartedly embrace the life of the modern bourgeoisie, which was already advancing ineluctably toward a reversion to pure oppression and reorganization into an exclusively racial emity. Race is not, as the racial nationalists claim, an immediate, natural peculiarity. Rather, it is a regression to nature as mere violence, to the *hidebound particularism which, in the existing order, constitutes precisely the universal*.

Finally, opposed to the above demonstration that modernity has been the first epoch of mass hybrids – as revolutionary rupture with the past – is the theory of the present global capitalism as the epoch of hybridity¹. Together with *mobility* and *liquidity* (remember Bauman), *hybridity* would substitute the modern triangle of Auguste Comte environment-race-time², being a metaphor for the post-racist era of the digital and genetics and qualifying many forms of social processes, especially in technological and multicultural societies³. Actually, on the one hand and since hybridity is the result of concrete social relations, it certainly is more *visible* than ever⁴ because of the trans-nationalization of all the economic, political, cultural relations; but on the other hand, the multiplication, diversification and massification of hybrids/hybrid groups only continue the world characteristic of capitalism and its processes. Nevertheless, just the mass specificity, the multiplication and diversification of hybrid groups give the discontinuity of the present hybridity.

Race today is the self-assertion of the bourgeois individual, integrated into the barbaric collective. The harmonious society to which the liberal Jews declared their allegiance has finally been granted to them in the form of the national community. *They believed that only anti-Semitism disfigured this order, which in reality cannot exist without disfiguring human beings...* The persecution of the Jews, like any persecution, cannot be separated from that order... The purpose of human rights was to promise happiness *even where power was lacking*. Because the cheated masses are dimly aware that this promise, being universal, remains a lie as long as classes exist, it arouses their anger; they feel themselves scorned. They must constantly repress the thought of that happiness, even as a possibility, an idea, and they deny it all the more fiercely the more its rime has come" (my emphasis, AB).

¹ Jan Nederveen Pieterse, « Globalization as Hybridization », *International Sociology*, First Published June 1, 1994, <https://doi.org/10.1177/026858094009002003>; Marc Bernardot, « Mobilité, hybridité, liquidité : un architecte de la globalisation ? », *Variations* [En ligne], 21 | 2018, mis en ligne le 05 avril 2018, consulté le 16 janvier 2019. URL : <http://journals.openedition.org/variations/937>, DOI : 10.4000/variations.937.

² Marc Bernardot, « Mobilité, hybridité, liquidité... », p. 28.

³ Idem, p. 20.

⁴ It's about a "hyper-visibility", Sanjay Sharma, « L'hybridité à l'épreuve du capitalisme », in *Fresh-Théorie*, (Paris: Éditions Léo Scheer, 2005), pp. 351-361.

Borders as new spaces

Indeed, the advent of modernity brought about the assumption of *new spaces*, the transcending of former cultural/political borders. As we know, the whole history is in fact the history of the *movement* of humans, and obviously the modern era is more dynamic. But what does ‘the whole history is the history of the movement of humans’ mean? It does mean that the whole history is a history of human hybrids, mixtures of cultures, and permeability and coexistence of cultures; not the cultural differences, but the extra-cultural (the political and economical) interests of the ruling strata have led to intolerance and wars; the cultural differences were only “arguments”/pretexts of these malign phenomena.

From this standpoint, the 19th century was very contradictory, emphasizing the contradictoriness of capitalism as such: on the one hand, in Europe it was the century of the *nation-state* /imposition of new (narrower or stricter) borders; on the other hand, the throwing and motivations of human movements trespassing all borders grew. Capitalism meant departure from one’s village to the town, even to another country and continent. In this framework, the new political borders proved to be contradictory: they have at the same time enlarged and narrowed the human space and movement. But anyway, the importance of borders became huge, at both the ruling strata and the workforce searching for a better life outside the frontiers.

The dominant political *attitudes* shaped by “borders” became contradictory too: on the one hand, the new nationalist legitimacy of the new (national) borders has consisted in and instituted the “purism” paradigm that did not accept hybrids – even assuming the dominant national culture – inside the borders. The hybrids were considered second order citizens, if they were still granted the right to citizenship, on the argument of not being “blood” descent of nationals. And this type of *ethnic/nationalist citizenship* clashed with the *citizenship starting from citizen rights toward nationality*. In this second citizenship there are no hybrids.

On the other hand, the humans outside the own borders were considered, as in the pre-modern era, ‘enemies’ having to be conquered (integrated within the own borders¹). Obviously, as a result of the

¹ Vladislav B. Sotirović, “The Idea Of A Greater Croatia By Pavao Ritter Vitezović” (I and II), *Oriental Review*, 2018, <https://orientalreview.org/2018/09/04/the-idea-of-a-greater-croatia-by-pavao-ritter-vitezovic-i/> and <https://orientalreview.org/2018/09/>

redesigning of borders, there were strong *assimilationist* tendencies, and they continued being even stronger nowadays, according to the interest of the capitalist and imperialist ruling strata. The political decree that in the Republic of Moldova the official language is the “Moldavian” is hilarious to those who know that it’s about the Romanian language, irrespective of varieties, as in Austria the national language is not “Austrian” but German. But the above decree is naïve in comparison with the “linguistic engineering” made in order to legitimate not only with religion but also with language the Bosnia and Herzegovina new “independent” puppet state resulted in 1995 as a little confederation of two political entities (the Republic of Srpska and the Muslim-Croat Federation that is cantonized on ethnic basis)¹.

As a result, the *cultural hybridity* – though it is in fact everywhere, especially in these spaces which have always been of cultural mixtures and mutual influence – is not welcomed, and the understanding of the causes of this situation allows a better cultural hybridization².

Finally, the impossibility of economic survival of youth in subordinated countries leads to their mass migration³ an letting those counties more

[08/the-idea-of-a-greater-croatia-by-pavao-ritter-vitezovic-ii/](https://www.globalresearch.ca/history-the-grand-duchy-of-lithuania-and-the-idea-of-a-greater-croatia-pavao-ritter-vitezovic/5655427), and Vladislav B. Sotirović, “History: The Grand Duchy of Lithuania and The Idea of a Greater Croatia. Pavao Ritter Vitezović”, Part III, *Global Research*, September 28, 2018, <https://www.globalresearch.ca/history-the-grand-duchy-of-lithuania-and-the-idea-of-a-greater-croatia-pavao-ritter-vitezovic/5655427>.

Vladislav B. Sotirović, “Resolving the ‘Serbian Question’” – One 19th-Century Project (I and II), 2018, *Oriental Review* and *Global Research*, <https://orientalreview.org/2018/08/24/resolving-the-serbian-question-one-19th-century-project-i/> and <https://www.globalresearch.ca/resolving-the-serbian-question-a-19th-century-project/5652341>.

¹ Vladislav B. Sotirović, “Created by US-NATO, Linguistic Engineering: New ‘Boshnjak’ Identity and ‘Bosnian’ Language”, *Global Research*, February 16, 2015, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/created-by-us-nato-linguistic-engineering-new-boshnjak-identity-and-bosnian-language/5431024>.

² Arturo Rodríguez Morató, “Cultural hybridization in Europe”, *Social Platform on Cultural Heritage and European Identities*, <http://culturalbase.eu/cultural-hybridization-in-europe/>.

³ Lois Labrianidis & Nikos Vogiatzis, “The mutually reinforcing relation between international migration of highly educated labour force and economic crisis: the case of Greece”, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 2013, DOI: 10.1080/14683857.2013.859814, pp. 525-551.

vulnerable, while the scapegoating of immigrants as the enemy of the jobs and welfare of the natives has led to and consists in the proliferation of walls of separation¹ and, unfortunately, in premature death of thousands². However, the management of migrants was assumed by the ruling strata and inherently transfigured in a profitable business³. The cultural encounters may be delayed, may they?

A methodological conclusion

Though the cultural phenomena may and must be tackled according to their own interconnections and development, at the same time they must be related to social, political, economic states. And this is true also for concepts. They are not only cultural creations, but also reflections of social relations which may be even more clarifying for a phenomenon than the ideas people have *as if* these ideas would be arbitrary constructions (good for deconstructing them in a gratuitous play⁴).

Obviously, people judge according to the dominant ideas from a society. These dominant ideas – as all the ideas about society – are socially framed,

¹ “Borders have never been as closed as today”, Jérôme Duval, Ludivine Faniel, Benoit Coumont, *À qui profite la gestion des migrations ?* 27 octobre 2017, 23/01/2018, <http://www.defenddemocracy.press/a-qui-profite-la-gestion-des-migrations/>.

² See <https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/mediterranean>; Norisa Diaz, *The brutality of borders: Mass grave revealed at Arizona Air Force bombing range*, 18 August 2018, <http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2018/08/18/ariz-a18.html>; and Jon S. Rodriguez, *The Migration World Pact: Wishes and Realities*, 18 Dec. 018, <https://www.transform-network.net/blog/article/the-migration-world-pact-wishes-and-realities/>.

³ See Marcos Ortiz F., *Immigrant detention: a prospering business*, April 24, 2017, <http://theprisma.co.uk/2017/04/24/immigrant-detention-a-prospering-business/>; Robert Bibeau, *La crise des migrants en Europe et en Amérique (l'industrie des ONG humanitaires)*, 5 septembre 2018, <http://www.les7duquebec.com/7-au-front/la-crise-des-migrants-en-europe-et-en-amerique-lindustrie-des-ong-humanitaires/>; Jérôme Duval, Ludivine Faniel, Benoit Coumont, *À qui profite la gestion des migrations ?* 27 octobre 2017, 23/01/2018, <http://www.defenddemocracy.press/a-qui-profite-la-gestion-des-migrations/>. (And related to the NGOs, see the absurdity to have NGOs accounting the drug users, when the state legally approves this use).

⁴ Peter Sloterdijk, *In the World Interior of Capital: Towards a Philosophical Theory of Globalization* (2005), Translated by Wieland Hoban (Malden, Ma.: Polity Press, 2013).

reflecting, more than the complexity of the power relations as relations of forces within a society, the interests of the ruling strata. Since ideology is the characterisation of ideas as reflecting social positions, within the power relations, people judge ideologically. Thus, the meanings (of life) are not pure individual constructs, but *ideas* created with the ideologically coloured *concepts of society*.

Philosophy may transgress its own blindness when working with ideas if it critically looks at them not only from outside philosophy, but also from inwards¹.

The nation-state has been extended until the last decades of the 20th century, but the process of *globalization* – (that is not only cultural, but essentially economic as the trans-nationalization of capital-labor relationships) – was pushed and is pushing to *trans-national* economic, political and cultural *institutions*² and hybrid cultures, with all the national influences on the trans-national processes³: and thus, new cultural meanings do appear.

But the attitudes towards hybrid identities are only a thickening of the former tendencies: on the one hand, the 19th century rejection of hybridity (in the name of the real and imagined fix characteristics of the nation-state identity and culture) does continue (see here the foreigner-phobia and the

¹ For example, does the consideration of the Other/the alien fit with the Husserlian intentionality of consciousness?, in Žarko Paić, “What does it mean to be a lien? Bernhard Waldenfels and politics of responsive interculturalism”, *Philosophy and Society*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2018, pp. 317–474, <https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1803355P>. And Dragan Prole, “Polemology and xenology: Waldenfels and the sting of alien”, *Philosophy and Society*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2018: the European history is a shading of the alien by disciplining, manipulating and exploiting it; strangeness is a resource and it is a dimensions of all the regions of culture.

² See Keller Easterling, *Extrastatecraft: The Power of infrastructure space* (London, New York: Verso, 2014), in *zones* (which are also extrastatecraft, breeding with other enclaves/“parks”, including as regional economies), *cities*, including as doubles, and preferring non-state violence, and the “time of vacation”, while standardizing different economic identities.

³ Chan Kwok-Bun & Peter J. Peverelli, “Cultural Hybridization: A Third Way Between Divergence”, *World Futures: The Journal of New Paradigm Research*, Vol. 66, Issue 3-4, 2010, pp. 219-242; Roland Robertson, [Globalisation or glocalisation?](#), *Journal of International Communication*, Volume 18, issue 2, 2012.

attitude towards immigrant labor force). On the other hand, the *mainstream* ideology (i.e. the neo-liberal, corresponding to the interests of transnational capital) thinks to annul the national traditions by transforming some hybrid identities into fetishes (e.g. mainstream images about the unisex and the normality of sexual deviation), while ignoring other hybrid identities (e.g. the complex constitution of the social class of proletarians).

Therefore, why all of these rejections and strange interpretations?

From *epistemological* standpoint: because either the new identities are confronted with the known model and thus are erased as outlandish, or are accepted as au fond congruent with the known model¹. Both the rejection and acceptation are explainable in terms of convergence/divergence with the known model, and as assumption or ignorance of the new differences.

From *sociological* standpoint: because of the economic-political interests of the ruling strata which require mass control; the *divide et impera* principle is achieved through the separation of different national cultural identities from the class identity. There is also the theory of *intersectionality* (developed from 1989 on), i.e. the race, gender, sexual differences and struggles for liberation intersect but must not be subsumed under the class differences and struggle. In other words, neo-liberalism imposes the same *divide et impera* principle, countering to the “out of date” Marxian theory of “flattening” of the human diversity the idea of separated identities which may intersect but it’s all².

These two standpoints must be united. Thus, why did/even do people reject the hybrid cultural elements? Because: and since people consider them as absolutely opposed to “their” identity, they imagine the identity as based on some absolute immutable features. But since there are different “original” features, how do people equate all these features as being immutable?

The questions emphasize the necessity to thinking on culture *not isolated from its contexts*, and the *contents of the contexts of culture are social and class*.

¹ Georges-Louis Baron, Eric Bruillard, Christophe Dansac. European project REPRESENTATION : *Representations, models and modelling; implications in educational strategies and learning process*: bibliographical synthesis. 1999. <edutice-00000371>.

² On the contrary, the Marxian theory has included the categories of diversity (gender, race, sexual) and their intersection, but at the same showed their interdependence in and with the class relations. See Kevin B. Anderson, “Karl Marx and Intersectionality”, *Logos*, Vol 14, no. 1, Winter 2015.

Consequently, to the above questions we also add: who imagine? The old theory that the dominant ideology is that of the dominant class (Marx) proves to be infallible. The subaltern classes take over, in their way, the ideas of the dominant strata. They arrive to reject the hybrid cultures because the dominant strata consider them jeopardizing their position and the legitimating of status quo. They arrive to have an “identity rage or the reign of anomy”, becoming also new types of cannon fodder for the present actors of international politics¹. They arrive to reject “modern” ideas as globalization because they were conveyed the idea that the nation is an immutable and pure essence. In this essence, the habits are equated with the language (and religion), *as if* no one of these elements would be the result of a complex dynamics, mobility and hybridization, and *as if* the keeping of habits would be tantamount to the keeping of the national language.

Or, they arrive to rejecting the integration of differences, because they do not see but the particular and despise the universal.

People do separate the understanding of things and do not go on the line of reasoning *all the way*: because they are educated to proceed in such a manner.

Finally, this cognitive pattern (of unilateral focus on the unity/nation or on the differences/only on trans-national communities) is related to the transformation of the state in the present process of globalization: it moves from its superposition with the nation, i.e. the community of citizens, to a *net-state* of arbitrary management of a “civil society” divided in groups, cherishing the particular and rarefying the values of the democratic state’s cohesion: separation of powers, crisis of public institutions, personalization of rights and the substitution of Justice with these rights².

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¹ Fethi Garbi, « La rage identitaire ou le règne de l’anomie », *Mondialisation.ca*, 18 juin 2018, <https://www.mondialisation.ca/la-rage-identitaire-ou-le-regne-de-l-anomie/5626306>

² Jacques Wajnsztein, *État-réseau et souveraineté* (2014), 2017, <http://www.mondialisme.org/spip.php?article2559>.

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ANALYTIC APPROACH TO THE NORMATIVENESS OF MEANING RULES AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

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Abstract: *The performative character of linguistic norms and social institutions is considered in this paper through comparison of selected theses of the “late” Ludwig Wittgenstein and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (a Polish analytic philosopher of renown), especially theses of the latter’s conception of language in the thirties of the 20th century. The philosophical ideas of both of them are interpreted as paradigmatic patterns of the so-called „directive theories of meaning”. The directive theories of meaning stipulate that linguistic meanings are constructed on the basis of definite normative rules. Such rules in the natural languages can be defined as conventions upheld by a respective linguistic community. Its collective decision supports the normative force of these rules. An impossibility of communication defines the sanction. The functioning of a respective linguistic community as a normative authority defines the performative character of the language-rules. The problem of the genesis of public meanings is the bottom-line problem of the directive theories of meaning. How could one overcome antirealism at this level? The arbitrary nature of signs and their accidental correlation with objects are arguments favouring conventionalism and antirealism. Personal meanings are determined by rules applied by a linguistic community and by accepted meanings of words and sentences. A natural language is closely intertwined with varied human activities; a linguistic community’s traditions are determined by a complex totality of objective and subjective factors.*

Keywords: *performatives, meaning rules, L. Wittgenstein, K. Ajdukiewicz, social institutions*

The performative character of linguistic norms and social institutions is considered in this paper through comparison of selected theses of the “late” Ludwig Wittgenstein and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (a Polish analytic philosopher of renown), especially theses of the latter’s conception of language in the thirties of the 20th century. The philosophical ideas of both of them are interpreted as paradigmatic patterns of the so-called „directive theories of meaning”. They are representative for the analytic tradition, which is dominant in contemporary practical philosophy. At the same time,

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they are consistent to some ideas for the interpretation of social institutions through speech act theories.

The directive theories stipulate that linguistic meanings are constructed on the basis of definite normative rules. The normativeness of „the meaning-rules“ can be understood in the light of an idea of performativeness of norms and social institutions. Comparative analysis is made in respect of the great transformation of the contemporary philosophy of language - from abstract formal studies of language to a pragmatic turn in their development. The idea of performativity of norms and social institutions enables us to understand better in analytic context the unity of philosophical studies of language, society and human relations. It could be a basis for an analytic understanding of social sciences: they are based on normative and value systems and it is an important research task to present their most important characteristic features. Norms and values may be considered as performatives: a difference is justified between an act of forcing an authoritative will or evaluation through their propositional expression.

1. Contemporary Philosophy of Language in Analytic Perspective

As a discipline with a domain of its own, the philosophy of language seeks to spotlight and define the nature of language by means of interpreting it in the context of its relation to reality. Being one of the spheres of contemporary philosophical studies, it is now marking a very dynamic development, accounted for by its interdisciplinary and applicability character. Generally, progress in many important (in a practical aspect) spheres is tied up to the solution of its problems. Such problems in the field of philosophy of language are, for instance: machine translation, indeterminacy of translation, artificial intelligence, intercultural dialogue, electronic communication, cross-cultural communication etc. The solution of such problems involves the use of exact means (instruments) of logic and mathematics, but also such of psychology, sociology, philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences. Language is the main object of analytic philosophy as dominating contemporary philosophical tradition.

The development of the philosophy of language in the twentieth century is of particular interest. It began with abstract formal studies of language and an express striving for shelving psychologism; the semantic approach to problems was holding sway then – much as it is doing now, too –

manifesting, the while, an obvious syntactical deviation. A pragmatic turn in the philosophy of language came about after the publication in 1953 of L. Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*. It became clear then that the attainment of an objective knowledge of language was only possible via mastering it in direct relation to the study of mentality, mind and human activity in every field of its use. This conceptual transformation spelt out a change in the modes and instruments used and in the results achieved in the contemporary theories of language. The explanation of the nature of meanings by means of using conventional rules, suggested by L. Wittgenstein, has played a foremost part in the aforesaid transformation.

Pragmatics is a branch of semiotics in which language is considered as a tool of communication of a language community. Pragmatic research includes investigation of some relationships between a language and the minds and behavior of its users. After Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* the pragmatic orientation dominates the contemporary philosophy of language. Language is analyzed in relation to mind and social communication.

The stir in the interest now taken in problems of consciousness, human activity, causality etc. has run parallel with a qualitative growth of conceptual and formal means. In their essence, these means differ substantially from the ones of traditional metaphysics and epistemology, because they don't rely on psychological intuition alone; they have been evolved in the sphere of the philosophy of language by means of employment of better precision. The result from this transformation has not been a limitation of the potential of philosophical research: on the contrary, it has brought about a tracing of new pathways ahead. All that makes it possible to look for and find out better solutions to such topical problems in discussions today as: relationships between language and mind, language and reality, and knowledge and action. It makes possible also the development of the philosophy of psychology on the basis of analysis of language and human activity.

It would be fair to say here right off that Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, the great Polish philosopher of the world famous Lvov-Warsaw School, had already developed – as early as in the thirties of the 20th century – prerequisites for the realization of the above-said transformation. Wittgenstein's conception of meanings and "rule-following" has in fact brought a new import into K. Ajdukiewicz's ideas of language which have been undeservedly underrated even to the present day. It is an interesting

fact that the conceptions of the Polish philosopher are based on pragmatic consideration. They are connected with the relationship between content of communication and its context. He takes into account the active role of the members of a linguistic community as creators of communicative instruments or participants in a linguistic communication. But these ideas of “early” Ajdukiewicz’s can be considered as a semantic analysis of language in a pragmatic packing. It laid particular stress on a special sort of languages – closed and connected ones per the pattern of deductive theories.

L. Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations* is the basic source for reconstruction of his “late” philosophy of language and his philosophy of consciousness. Relations between language and consciousness, and social uses of language means, are in the focus of his theoretical interest.¹ They are considered in a pragmatic aspect – consciousness can be explained on the basis of language communication in a linguistic society and its rules; an adequate understanding of language requires a model of consciousness. Linguistic rules are interpreted as social institutions from a self-referential and performative type. These key ideas lead to a possibility for creation of new philosophy of psychology based on an analysis of human linguistic activity. Some ideas of K. Ajdukiewicz are very close to the theses of Wittgenstein. Both of them are influenced by G. Frege, but in a different manner.

It is worthwhile noting here that in this comparative analysis Ajdukiewicz and Wittgenstein are representatives of the analytical tradition. One can hardly challenge the statement that this tradition was one of the most influential trends in philosophical thinking in the 20th century. It was not a particular school – it was a trend, a movement with different thinkers and schools in it. Therefore, the identity of analytical tradition continues to be a moot point. L. J. Cohen seems to have justifiably arrived at the conclusion that its unity arises out of intensive dialogue between analytical thinkers, the basis of which are philosophical problems, not methods of their solution. „The normative problems of justification and reasoning” are the best exponents of analytical thought². In his voluminous

¹ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Izbrani suchinenia* [Selected Papers], Sofia, Naukai i zkustvo (in Bulgarian), 1988;

² Lawrence J. Cohen, *The Dialogue of Reason: An Analysis of Analytical Philosophy*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987, p. 11;

History of British Analytical Philosophy, N. Milkov, a Bulgarian author, notes that the analysis of different variants of human understanding is the general theme of its prominent representatives. The latter is perceived of as built up by atoms, ordered in a familiar scheme¹. Jan Wolenski points out that analytical philosophy can be identified not so much through content of theses, but on the basis of philosophical methods and common problems: subject of philosophy, relationships between philosophy and sciences, epistemological status of philosophy etc.² I would add here two more aspects: logical analysis of language and justification.

The philosophy of Wittgenstein has some features (antimetaphysical attitude, nonconsistent character) that are not well accepted in Polish tradition. His analysis of “rule-following” is an instrument in an antimetaphysical argumentation. The representatives of the Lwow-Warsaw School, K. Ajdukiewicz in particular, are more tolerant to “the first” philosophy. They try to resolve all philosophical problems by means of analysis of language and cognitive structures. Owing to this fact there is no a noticeable influence of Wittgenstein’s ideas on the Polish analytic school.

2. Language Rules as Norms of Social Communication

The directive theories of meaning stipulate that linguistic meanings are constructed on the basis of definite normative rules. L. J. Cohen considers G. Ryle and L. Wittgenstein as originators of the so-called *de jure* directive theories for the natural languages and A. Church - for the formal ones³. H. Skolimowski stresses the fact that K. Ajdukiewicz was the first author to formulate a *de jure* theory of meaning for formal languages (deductive theories) in 1921 and for natural languages – in the late twenties and the early thirties of the 20th century⁴. The meaning of a linguistic expression is

¹ Nikolay Milkov, *The Varieties of Understanding (English Philosophy since 1898)*, Vol.1, Peter Lang GMBH, 1997, p. 25;

² Jan Wolenski, *Z zagadnień analitycznej filozofii prawa* [Problems of Analytical Philosophy of Law], Warszawa: PWN, 1980, s.33;

³ Lawrence J. Cohen, *The Diversity of Meaning*, London, 1962;

⁴ Henryk Skolimowski, *Polish Analytical Philosophy. A Survey and a Comparison with British Analytical Philosophy*, London: Routledge&Kegan Paul, 1967, pp.137-138;

determined by the rules of its use. According to A. Church the rules of a formal analysis embody a definite theory, or system, of the logical analysis¹.

Such rules in the natural languages can be defined as conventions upheld by a respective linguistic community. Its collective decision supports the normative force of these rules. An impossibility of communication defines the sanction. The functioning of a respective linguistic community as a normative authority defines the performative character of the language-rules. In order to be norms, they should regulate certain social relationships in a concrete form; they should establish patterns of correct (linguistic) behaviour and should suggest sanctions for their violation. The collective decisions of their validity are made in a self-referential mode.

What is the ontological and logical status of a normative decision or performative? In what sense can we regard normative decisions and respective normative regulations as rational ones? The performative act of promulgation of norms by competent authority does not elucidate its binding force. It can be gleaned out via interpretations of a respective statute-book or moral codes, and its existence is mental. In order to be a norm, it should regulate certain social relationships in a concrete form; should establish patterns of correct behavior and should suggest sanctions for their violation. A norm can be disregarded and derogated. If it is an artificial construction running counter to social requirements, traditions and intuitive law, or if it cannot be performed - it will be scrapped. Thus, social reality ensures a specific mechanism of checking up on a norm, evincing its adequacy (veracity) and the other way about. The acceptance of norms is determined by their social benefits. They give values and manage range of preferences towards achievement of definite individual or social aims.

In his *Philosophical Investigations* L. Wittgenstein formulates his conception of language, rejecting the possibility of existence of a personal (private) language. A shared agreement that a given linguistic action is – or is not – “following a rule” exists within the framework of a linguistic community. Wittgenstein claims that it is practice, social practice in particular, incorporating the characteristics of a custom or a habit. But

¹ Alonso Church, *Vvedenie v matematicheskiju logiku* [Introduction to Mathematical Logic], Moskva: Int. lit. (in Russian), s.48;

D.Bloor is correct in his daring trial to reveal the original Wittgenstein's thought as relying on a self-referential and performative model:

thus the rule 'exists' in and through the practice of citing it and invoking it in the course of training, in the course of enjoining others to follow it, and in the course of telling them they have not followed it, or followed it..."; and he concludes: „in standard sociological parlance, the rule is an 'actor's category'.¹

Wittgenstein's arguments relate to all mentalist theories of meaning. It is a fact that in his early works Ajdukiewicz also draws a line of demarcation between his own conception of meaning and the so-called „associationism” interpreted as a form of psychologism². In his demarcation of associationism the Polish philosopher relies on a phenomenological conception of the meaning intention. But it hardly guarantees development of a realistic and non-subjective theory of language. “Unlike Quine, Ajdukiewicz raised no objections against accepting the intentional existence of notions, meanings, or judgments; – notes J. Wolenski in his paper comparing the views of these philosophers – whereas in Quine's opinion the necessity to accept an ontology which tolerated such objects was the outcome of mentalism in semantics”³. Ajdukiewicz's critical attitude to psychologism is not as strict as Quine's one. Owing to its incoherence, the theory of meaning of the Polish philosopher cannot uphold empiricism and realism convincingly.

To be sure, Wittgenstein is a realist when he says, dwelling upon public meanings, that the meaning of words and expressions accepted by a community do not depend on the will of a concrete person. However, neither he, nor his followers have proved successful in the search for a path leading to the extralinguistic basis of the acceptance and upholding of such rules by a linguistic community. To a certain extent this fact justifies the somewhat skeptical conclusions in S. Kripke's analysis of Wittgenstein's conception of language-rules⁴. He draws attention to the circumstance that the agent cannot verify the correspondence of his action to a rule, because the linguistic community's activity is the only criterion of comparison

¹ David Bloor, *Wittgenstein on Rules*, Routledge. 1997, p.33;

² Jan Wolenski, *Filozoficzna Szkoła Lwowsko-Warszawska* [Lvov-Warsaw Philosophical School], Warszawa, 1985 PWN, s. 233. (in Polish);

³ Jan Wolenski, H. Jakubiec, “Ajdukiewicz and Quine”. In Wolenski, J., *Essays in the History of Logic and Logical Philosophy*, Dialogikon, Jagiellonian Un. Press, 1999, p.86;

⁴ Saul Kripke, *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*, 1982, Oxford;

connected with it. Kripke's reasoning thereby gives rise to a problem – of the internalization of rules. We will see further on in this paper that Ajdukiewicz has also come up against the same problem in his investigations. He has analogical intuitions for his solution.

Now, is it really possible to find out external objective facts and to specify, on the basis of such fact, whether an action, assessed as correct by a linguistic community as a whole, is correct in reality? R. Martin gives a negative answer to this question. He contends that in the context of a linguistic community we cannot overcome antirealism as regards public meanings¹. In fact, the same view is also upheld by Wittgenstein. Where does a linguistic community get the meanings of words and sentences from and why do these remain intersubjective for the individual? We can look for a feasible way out of difficulties here by means of availing ourselves of the concept of social practice, in its broadly interpreted nature, and also via an analysis of communication conditions in different linguistic communities. Ajdukiewicz also offers certain heuristic potentialities here.

3.K. Ajdukiewicz's Theory of Meaning

In his remarkable study *'Sprache und Sinn'* of 1934, K. Ajdukiewicz² sets out his directive theory of meaning. As he puts it, meanings are not referents of expressions or their truth values; rather they are related to definite rules of behavior, calling for the acceptance, by users of a language, of certain sentences in definite circumstances. Meaning directives, or rules of sense, are criteria by which we are guided in our acceptance or rejection of sentence. It is very important to highlight the fact that meanings determine meaning directives and not the other way about. Directives imply the acceptance of certain sentences, the while also justifying their acceptance. Application of a directive is the condition for its justification.

Ajdukiewicz considers three types of meaning directives: Type One – empirical directives conducive to acceptance of certain sentences on the basis of sense data (internal and external experience). These are normative rules of behavior requiring acceptance of sentences of a given kind as a

¹ Robert Martin, *The Meaning of Language*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1982, pp. 48-49;

² Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, „Jezyk i znaczenie (orig. Sprache und Sinn)”. In: *Jezyk i poznanie [Language and Knowledge]* T I, wybor pism z lat 1920-1939, PWN, Warszawa, 1985, s. 145-174 (in Polish);

result of perceptions. Type Two includes axiomatic directives specifying unconditional readiness to acknowledge certain sentences and hence – acceptance of the truth of a sentence: “If today is Monday, tomorrow is Tuesday”. Such directives pay heed to the aprioristic elements in language and knowledge. They require acceptance of sentences without reference to any reason. Type Three are deductive directives spelling out acceptance of a given judgment on the basis of judgments accepted earlier. Deductive directives are bolstered up by formal logical schemes. Ajdukiewicz does not consider this grouping of directives as inclusive.

The possibility for determination of rules of sense is related to definite characteristics of a given language. What is necessary is not only a specification of its vocabulary and its syntactic rules, but also a correspondence between meaning of words and meaning of sentences. This correspondence is a determinant of meaning directives. Ajdukiewicz is interested in languages in an exact sense, languages closed and languages connected. His original conception of radical conventionalism arises out of, and is justified by, such languages. This conception is not only syntactical one. It searches for a justification of some aprioristic aspects in empirical knowledge.

Ajdukiewicz’s theory of meaning directives could be understood in the context of making a distinction between activities and results (creations), offered by Fr. Brentano and K. Twardowski¹, the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School. The connection between language and human actions, considered by Wittgenstein as very important, cannot be neglected. Ajdukiewicz’s ‘autonomous’ conception suspends the problem of the genesis of language and takes it in as a creation only. Its shape is modeled by deductive systems, the characteristics of which are transferred onto empirical languages as well. Language cannot be independent of its creators – it does not correspond to the Ajdukiewicz’s intuition of that language meanings are in language.

Certain elements of his theory of language can be compared with such in recent directive theories. They can lead to important innovations. He uses pragmatic terms (acceptance and justification of sentences) and considers these meaning directives as rules of behavior; if a user of a given language wants to act correctly – he ought to comply with the meanings related to

¹ Jan Wolenski, *Filozoficzna Szkoła Lwowsko-Warszawska* [Lvov-Warsaw Philosophical School], Warszawa, 1985 PWN, s. 132. (in Polish);

them. These ideas can attain a real sense in understanding the nature of a meaning in use. Correct linguistic actions lead to understanding and successful human communication.

The conception of K. Ajdukiewicz may be called “procedural”¹. It treats the user of language as a machine – a robot picking up impulses from its surroundings having some dispositions of linguistic behavior in certain situations. This robot uses some completed language instruments. The agent in Wittgenstein’s ‘*PI*’ takes after this robot – he learns meanings from the community in their communal usage. He does not create rules of communication – they are objective for him. The nature of communication is not explained correctly – it is analyzed from an individual’s perspective.

Connected with “concentrating attention on the problems of communication and not on epistemological problems” K. Ajdukiewicz’s theoretical perspective of conception as a whole, is a real “Trojan horse...in the stronghold of empiricism”². It relates to the logical empiricism. . Ajdukiewicz does not draw a conclusion on the relativity of truth as per the accepted totality of meanings (conceptual apparatus), whereby his theory differs from the methodological conception of T. Kuhn. The antiempirical consequences of Ajdukiewicz conception lead to a broader interpretation of rules – cognitive schemes and models take an important part in the determination and justification of meanings.

The causal theory of reference of S. Kripke and H. Putnam develops this line of thought independently. In their view, linguistic competence calls for knowledge of an object plus causal connection with an “act of Christening” (introducing event). Knowledge is preserved and transmitted in linguistic cooperation, becoming an element of a term’s meaning. However, meanings are not in our heads only, but are partly specified by the world (objective laws of nature) and also by the collective use of words in a linguistic society. General terms are related to certain natural kinds. The reference of natural kinds to terms is direct. According to Kripke and Putnam meanings are determined by empirical findings on the inner structure of things and by the history of transmission of names in a linguistic society³. This theory is very close to the directive theories of

¹ RyszardWojcicki, *Ajdukiewicz’s Theory of Meaning* (MS), 1997, p. 10;

² RyszardWojcicki, *Ajdukiewicz’s Theory of Meaning* (MS), 1997, p. 28;

³ Saul Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*, Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982;

meaning considered above. The causal theory of reference can be considered as an attempt to resolve an important difficulty of these theories: the fact that meaning directives cannot demarcate referents in an unequivocal way.

4. The Directive Theories of Meaning – Problems and Prospects

The problem of the genesis of public meanings is the bottom-line problem of the directive theories of meaning. How could one overcome antirealism at this level? The arbitrary nature of signs and their accidental correlation with objects are arguments favouring conventionalism and antirealism. Personal meanings are determined by rules applied by a linguistic community and by accepted meanings of words and sentences. A natural language is closely intertwined with varied human activities; a linguistic community's traditions are determined by a complex totality of objective and subjective factors. As regards public meanings there is an important evidence backing up realism – the possibility to attain a successful realization of extralinguistic actions on the basis of linguistic communication. Different languages are correlated with one and the same reality, they have one and the same ontological basis – it determines their common structure and their principles of constructions of meanings. Putnam is correct in saying that semantics is a social science¹, in spite of the fact that the causal theory of reference has not succeeded in justifying this thesis. The nature of linguistic norms can be justified through the study of social cooperation and its determining factors. Wittgenstein's theory of meaning-rules as social institutions can be considered as a continuation of the conception of K. Ajdukiewicz; it overcomes the abstract character and some subjectivist shortcomings of the latter.

It would seem that speaking about a revival of the directive theory of meaning (in his note of 1964) Ajdukiewicz has in mind precisely such problems, but with a view to the genesis of subjective meanings². In his '*Pragmatic Logic*' he makes an attempt to solve these problems on the basis of a denial of conventionalism and apriorism, forwarding realism and empiricism. He introduces the analysis of meanings into the pragmatic

¹ Hillary Putnam, *Mind, Language and Reality*. Philosophical Papers Vol.2, Cambridge University Press, 1975, p. 152;

² Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, *Jezyk i poznanie* [Language and Knowledge] T II, PWN, Warszawa (in Polish), 1965a, s. 400;

concepts of communication, understanding, linguistic community, belief, assertion and empirical behavior, spotlighting thereby the real boundaries of every logical conception of language. He says that the meaning of an expression remains selfsame for the users of language when their thoughts fall in with the notion for one and the same object¹. His interest already covers the genesis of linguistic meanings and the study of language in terms of activity and communication.

Through this brief comparative analysis, I would like to stress that the directive theory of meaning, developed by K. Ajdukiewicz, is not only the first one in the context of history, but that it, too, has a huge heuristic potential. Jan Wolenski is correct in saying that Ajdukiewicz's theory of language ranks among the very best achievements of the Polish Analytical School; that it is an "anticipation of important ideas" and "deserves to be known"². Its development falls in with the general tendency in the development of the philosophy of language of our day – from an abstract logical analysis of formal languages to a pragmatic study of natural languages in the context of different models of consciousness, understanding and social communication.

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¹ Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, *Logikapragmatyczna* [Pragmatic Logic], PWN, Warszawa (in Polish), 1965b, s.20;

² Jan Wolenski, "The Reception of the Lvov-Warsaw School". In *The Lvov-Warsaw School and Contemporary Philosophy* (eds. K. KjanianPlacek, J. Wolenski). Kluwer, 1998, p.15.

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THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY AND THE INFORMATION SOCIETY IN THE CONTEXT OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

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Abstract: *The main goal of the article is to take a synthetic look at the difference between the knowledge society and information society in the context of the methods of political communication in these two types of modern societies.*

The article assumes that political communication between the governors and the governed in the knowledge society aims at reaching agreement and cooperation of achieving public weal. This agreement is reached through mutual interactions. In such as society the governors and the governed make an attempt to convince the other party and if this proves impossible to search a "third way". On the contrary, the political communication strategy used between governors and governed in the information society does not aim at convincing the other party but at persuading acceptance of "one's own solutions" perceived as the only right ones.

Keywords: *political communication, knowledge society, information society, political programme, electoral platform*

1. Introduction

Since Aristotle human being has been perceived as *zoon politikón*, a socio-political animal. Since then nobody questions that humans are capable of political actions. This human activity in the political zone is supposed to lead to "a better life" and thus distinguish a human being from other living organisms that only aim at survival and do not desire a better life. The problem is that this "better life" is described differently in both scientific literature and in political practice. To a large extent the way "better life" is perceived depends on initial assumptions. For centuries both political thought and political practice have been fundamentally polarized around whether this better life should take the interest of an individual or the interest of a community into account.

As far as the interest of an individual does not give rise to much trouble in interpretation and it does make a reference to liberal tradition, the good of the community does, because the community needs to be identified first. Does the notion of common good make any sense in political practice?

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What community are we talking about: is it a nation (if so, what criteria need to be met to be included in a nation, is it a real or imaginary community), or is it a family (if so, is it a family only based on marriage or partnerships should also be included), or maybe any social group (if so, this would lead to a kind of social stratification with some social groups being “better” than other). To put it short, even when using the notion of common good there will always be the individual in the background with various social conditions¹.

This is exactly the dilemma that, under many forms, will always keep accompanying the humanity and is absolutely unavoidable. Some would be dogmatic proponents of any of these two variants, whereas others would rather search for the Aristotelian golden mean. Obviously both parties, depending on the initial assumptions made, would use various arguments. Of course these could include force arguments that actually do not convince but impose a certain point of view. However, even in totalitarian states dictators and oligarchs are not able to totally ignore rational arguments. Each political power will always strives to actually or just illusory legitimate their actions. All political activity encompasses intentions, goals, aspirations and targets that may remain secret in political practice but some of them require openness to be implemented. It is thus obvious that all political actions require some form of communication to convince to or force relevant behaviours and attitudes both in the governed and in the governors. This article discusses political communication in contemporary democratic society.

2. The issue of communication in political zone

It might seem natural that if we are to discuss communication in political zone, the discussion will be centred around political communication. However, this is not obvious. Researchers in communication in the political zone define it differently and they accentuate other components as worth in-depth analysis². It is surprising that political communication only gained esteem as a subject of research analysis as late as in the 20th century³. However, this does not mean that the process of communication was not of

¹Cf. Holmes [1989], p. 239-242.

² Cf. Dobek – Ostrowska [2009].

³ Dobek – Ostrowska, Wiszniowski [2007], p.105.

interest before. It was an object of research but political communication did not stand apart as a subject of research.

We might ask ourselves a question what actually gave rise to the need of setting political communication apart as an object of research. The answer to this questions actually seems banal. Mass media developed in the 20th century due to which political communication ceased to be perceived as an unilateral relation i.e. the process of passing communication by state authorities and decision makers to the society. In Europe, at the turn of 1930s and 1940s it was treated exclusively as one of the elements of social communication and researched so¹. Political communication as a separate object of research developed mostly in the American background in the 1950s.

At the first glance it might seem that this difference is not quantitative. However, the difference is colossal, especially in the context of political communication. At this time the difference between European and American approach to researching communication in political zone was that the American research method was based in the tradition of "sociology of mass communication", whereas the European on in "sociology of knowledge". In other words, the American way of researching political communication consisted in grasping the nature of what is currently happening on the political scene. The European approach, on the other hand, consisted in attempts to research the methods of political communicating in large historical periods with social backgrounds of philosophic, social, religious, moral or scientific thought taken into account. In this context we need to stress that both approaches to researching political communication process are characterized by a completely different stand on how the society is construed and what the society should be.

The notions of knowledge society and information society are often treated as synonyms for the modern society in literature. Please note that the European method of researching communication in the political zone assumed that the society in question is a knowledge society, which means that the citizens need to have a pre-defined level of knowledge on mechanisms of the political world to be able to be the subject of political communication processes. The American approach assumed that in order to become subject of political communication processes citizens do not

¹ Cf. Goban-Klas [1999], p. 91-92.

actually need specific knowledge but information; so for them the society is not a knowledge society but information society.

Depending on how political decision-makers perceive the society they select an appropriate political communication strategy. What is thus the difference between knowledge society and information society in the context of political communication? If the society is perceived as knowledge society then politicians concentrate on strict presentation of their political programme. If they perceive it as information society and not knowledge society, then they content themselves with a limited political programme called “electoral platform”.

3. Political communication in the knowledge society

In the knowledge society each political organization intending to take power should dispose of a clear political programme. Let us thus start with a definition of a political programme. It is a thought-through political action strategy taking into account the majority of social life dimensions i.e. the political, social, economic and cultural and, above all, ideological dimension. In other words, the political programme should present a full picture of the assumed social world vision together with a proposal for using measures to implement this vision. It is thus a formal expression of the group realizing its objective situation, direction and possibilities of actions in converting the social, economic and political structure¹.

If the candidates for power perceive the society as knowledge society they will try to present it with their own political programme. Their communication with the society also consists in arguing for it, trying to convince the citizens that their political programme is better than that of competitors. Clarity of the political programme is crucial as its general understanding would increase chances of getting more support for it. Knowledge society is nothing else as a society of competent citizens. The citizens in knowledge society are convinced that their liberty makes sense when it is strictly connected to the reality, the knowledge of rules of conduct in changing the reality i.e. when citizens perceive and treat their liberty as equivalent to a field of possibilities that the system of institutions gives them and a field for improvement/revival of these institutions². This

¹ Żmigrodzki [1996], p. 175.

² Goćkowski, Machowska [2003], p. 94.

means that they can differentiate values from interests, needs from caprices, goals from tools, risky reform proposals from safe ones, reliable reform proposals from demagogy, reliable information from pseudo information etc. In other words, clarity of the political programme allows for searching relevant rational arguments that would talk to competent citizens in favour of their implementation.

However, legitimizing a given political programme for implementation does not mean that the governing class may blindly reform the state without taking into considerations the signals from society. In the knowledge society we are dealing with reliable public opinion that the governing class should take into account if they want to efficiently introduce any changes in the state. This is because since legitimization of specific assumptions included in the political programme the situation could have changed, new facts could have appeared that would delegitimize implementation of specific solutions in the eyes of the society. Here, it should be stressed that reliable public opinion is not the opinion of the majority of the society, but the opinion of specialists in specific areas where reforms are envisaged. Public opinion as such is characteristic for democratic systems but this is not to say that each democratic country has public opinion. It is only possible in such a democratic country in which there is a specific political culture in which public life values and mechanisms are not only declared but actually implemented. They include: freedom of expression and existence of free media independent of the governors implementing the idea of "forth power" (i.e. a control function informally called "watchdog journalism").

Taking into account signals from public opinion allows the governing class to keep social order. In other case, if these signals are discredited, it increases the probability of social unrest, social destabilizations which could finally lead to a revolution and change of the political system. This is connected with the facts that in knowledge society citizens are active and not passive. They try not only to use their knowledge in the workplace, but also in broadly understood social activities, engaging in various initiatives, creating or cooperating with various organizations outside the governing centres. It means that knowledge society, as Peter F. Drucker rightly pointed out, is a society where knowledge and organization interdepend on one another as the majority of educated people being the leading class but staying outside the governing class would use their

knowledge for activities in an organization of any kind¹. Citizen organizations created outside the political power centres constitute a kind of expert database for the political class. They are responsible for drafting expert opinions for the political class on how to resolve a given problem. The political class in a knowledge society depends on the leading class of experts creating reliable public opinion. In such a moment a good competence of the political class includes a synthesis of expert opinions from various branches of knowledge. None of the expert opinions delivered by the leading class may claim a right to exclusiveness. There is no universal expert, they all have specialized knowledge². We should all agree with P. Drucker that: *“In the knowledge society there is no place for a « queen of sciences ». All the branches of knowledge are equally valuable, and using the works of St. Bonaventure, a great philosopher, they all lead to truth to the same degree”*³. Competent political class in a knowledge society may thus not let economy take the lead over social life or the other way round. We may not state that social problems such as right to abortion, euthanasia, civil unions are red herrings, pseudo-problems and only economic development matters. In other words, mental health of citizens as just as important as their wealth and the assumption that the more wealth, the less problems, thus the better life is, is just false. On the other hand, the economic development may not be neglected because of “meeting social expectations” because the “immediate pleasure” gives nothing if later it turns out that the economy is in ruins and the majority of the society has not means to make ends meet.

The resume, a responsive political class in knowledge society first communicates with experts in this society, then makes a synthesis of these expert opinions and creates its own political program on this basis. Once it is created, then the political class starts communication with the society, trying to convince people that their political programme is the actual “golden mean” of various truths and not a single truth. This means that in a given period some goals take a priority, which is equivalent to say that what is our second rank goal now, wouldn't turn to first rank in a near future. Change in priorities of goals to be implemented by the governing class may result from communications received from public opinion that

¹ Cf. Drucker [2002], p. 425-452.

² Cf. Toffler, Toffler [2007], p.20.

³ Drucker [2002], p. 436.

some goals as a result of appearance of new variables or a new situation discredits previous legitimation for some changes.

Political communication between the governing class and public opinion allows for defining a situation, setting “expectation horizons” and creating strategies for state reforms. Defining a situation requires a diagnosis, opinion and decision¹. Situation examination starts with a diagnosis. Political and governing class takes the diagnosis from the leading class, the experts. The diagnosis includes information on “what is and what is not there” and “what would probably follow current situation”. With a diagnosis already in place, opinions of elected experts should be gathered to judge “to what extent this corresponds to the accepted model condition”. Only on this basis a final decision is made as to whether take actions to change the current situation into what it should look like². Once a decision is available, one should move to setting “horizons of expectations”. This includes selection of the most desirable values to be implemented in a society and giving them priority. First it might seem that with diagnosis in place this shouldn't give rise to any major problems. But there is no single “horizon of expectations” as the society consist of various social groups with contradictory interests so they have various expectations as to which goals should be prioritized. This means that the governing class needs to balance these interests and then judge which ones promise success in implementation. Thus, the hierarchy of goals marked as priority by the governing class does not necessarily need to coincide with the hierarchy of goals expected by the society. With this in mind, the governing class need to run information policy to make sure that citizens are well informed that not all the expectations have been deemed priority or fell outside the implementation plan for a given term. Implementation strategy should actually depend on the degree to which competent citizens are convinced to implementation of specific goals. In other words, political programme presented before coming to power can be later significantly modified as a result of political communication between the governing class and the society. In the knowledge society such a modification shall meet with understanding. A citizen in the knowledge society does not necessarily need to be delighted with the assumed state reform strategy deviating from the previously advertised political

¹ Cf. Goćkowski, Machowska [2003], p. 90.

² *Ibidem*.

programme, but if s/he is well informed, s/he will be able to understand the government's premises for taking such a modification.

4. Political communication in the information society

Information society is a society where production, processing, storage, transfer and application of information are the basic form of activities¹.

In a modern information society political elites seeking power depart from constructing political programmes and mostly concentrate of creation of an “electoral platform”. Contrary to a political programme within *strict* understanding, an “electoral platform” is not a proposal for strategic state reforms. It does not contain a coherent, comprehensive vision of the country, but very often it consists of a set of contradictory slogans that is sold to the society as a planned state reform strategy. It is not created on the basis of diagnosis of the leading class i.e. experts. Just one professional group, political marketing specialist, are predominantly occupied with creation of an electoral platform. The goal of this “electoral platform” is to create a judgment in a possibly wide spectrum of voters that their expectations will be met. Creation of this judgment aims at taking the largest possible number of elective positions by a given political option. In other words, a political programme called “electoral platform” is nothing else than just a form of political communication considered political propaganda. It is geared not so much towards passing information to the society on planned undertakings at the moment of taking political power, but rather at persuading voters to choose a given political option.

Abandoning creation of political programme in favour of an “electoral platform” is a consequence of society not being perceived by these elites as a society of competent citizens but a consumer mass. The recipient of political propaganda, the “voter citizen”, is not treated as an equal partner, but as an object susceptible to manipulation². This is also due to the fact that modern mass media abandoned their control function and concentrate on transforming information in a commodity to be sold to recipients. When not implementing the fourth power idea, mass media *defacto* become political institutions. The intermarriage between politics and mass media contributed to what is called in social science mediatisation of politics³. Let

¹ Chmielewska [2004], p. 12.

² Cf. Fras [1997], p. 97-98.

³ Cf. Przybyszewski [2013], p. 79-90.

us have a closer look at this marriage and its consequences for political communication between the governors and the governed.

Progressing commercialization of the media zone lead to mediatisation of politics, which means that the political zone becomes more entertaining. In their information and journalistic programmes contemporary commercial media are not just limiting themselves to passing on information, but their main goal is to provide news. The difference between information and a news is that the former is characterized by objectivity and neutrality; it is just a piece of information passed in the context of available knowledge resources. Information is characterized mostly by significance, timeliness and continuity. It activates cognitive functions in the recipient of information. News, on the other hand, is supposed to be a piece of “attractive information”, a commodity to be sold to the recipient. This means that news sells when it includes a high dose of conflict, negativism, surprise and, in the best possible case, it should be personalized¹. Its main goal is not to activate cognitive functions in the recipients, but emotive functions: it is mostly supposed to induce dislike, outrage, more rarely admiration.

Therefore, the political class responds to media request for news. They thus leave the role of traditionally perceived politicians and become actors and celebrities. They are well aware of the fact that in information society the more controversial you are, the more media attention you get, which in turn translates into recognisability among voters. Mass media, especially commercial mass media, become political institutions in a sense that they decide on which politician makes his or her way to the news, is invited for journalistic programmes that rather resemble a theatre performance. Politics becomes a kind of a plebiscite in which political actions, for fear of media de-legitimization (lack of access to media) concentrate on staying attractive in their message which very often translates into departure from the so-called high culture towards popular culture coupled with entertainment².

Thus, in information society dominated by mediatisation of politics, i.e. departure from information towards news, there is no place for public opinion coming into existence within the understanding indicated when discussing knowledge society. Political elites and mass media actually do

¹ Cf. Allan [2010], p.73-74.

² Cf. Nowak [2009], p. 201-202.

use the term “public opinion”, but what is actually meant is social opinion, and to be more precise poll results. We may thus say that in information society, public opinion is just a mirage. This means that it is not an entity whose opinions the political power should take into account. It might seem that political communication between political elites and the society is unilateral because the first group is not interested in feedback, in what the society thinks about the planned or already implemented reforms. However, this judgment is false. In information society, citizens actually do not concentrate on reaching an agreement with political elites (such drive is characteristic for knowledge society), but on persuasive influence on the political elites. Technological changes in the area of information flow lead to changes in the way citizens operate. To a much lesser degree do they associate in organizations trying to become a partner for the governing class in making state operation smoother, in working together on the concept of “public weal”. The governed act and communicate with the governors not really on the basis of rational arguments, but through exerting persuasion on the governors to introduce or abandon specific changes in law or methods of implementing specific legal norms in social life. This happens when the planned changes or implementation methods rise social opposition caused to a large extent by negative emotions.

Contemporary communication methods fan the flames. This is especially true for the Internet and various social media. As M.Castells rightly pointed out, we are then dealing with a counter-power characterized by turning emotions into actions¹. Actions and communication strategy of the governed is short-lived and pertains to a specific issue, and not to a whole vision. This gives birth to two social movements, proponents of the governing class and the solutions advocated by them (the defence movement) and opponents of the governing class and their solutions (the opposition movement). These movements do not have a defined formal organizational structure. This is thus not a typical civil society that constitutes a kind of community, but a network society characterized by low level of formal organization and high level of spontaneity in taking initiatives. Citizen in the information society actually move from one event to another without reflection, refusing to transform information into knowledge².

¹ Cf. Castells [2009],p.147, and Castells [2013], p.16-17.

² Goćkowski, Machowska[2003], p.100.

Political communication between the governed and the governors in information, network society is mostly in the symbolic dimension; we could venture to say that it is a form of fight for impressions and winning a narration. Such communications aims at selecting the winner and the loser.

5. Summary

Information society is not able to create reliable public opinion, whereas the knowledge society has the opportunity to create it. Information society may only dispose of public opinion which is merely the opinion expressed in polls. This means that in information society there is no conceptualization zone for what is the common good for this community. We might say that appearance of mass media and new communication methods, together with increased commercialization of various life domains, made the common good idea for the whole society an anachronism.

In information society citizens communicate with political power through protest movements if they assume their private interest in danger. Common good in information society is achieved by realization of private interest¹. When private interests of citizens are put in danger, this stirs emotions in them that are expressed on Internet forums. Further it translates into various persuasive initiatives. These movements are not a contribution to creation of any kind of formal organization that would be permanently engaged in solving problems being the immediate reasons of the protest.

In other words, information society is a society of individualized citizens that only use their citizen rights in emergency cases. We might thus say that the governing class is deprived of an identified partner for consultations. When organizing their protest movements, citizens in the information society strive at it being attractive for mass media. Political elites actually do the same, especially during electoral campaigns when they renounce a strict programme in favour of an "electoral platform". Lack of strict programmes in political elites also leads to citizens not perceiving these political elites as consultations partners for conceptualization of the common good.

¹ Cf. Barber [1984],p. 143.

On this basis we might venture a hypothesis that mass media in information society are no longer the fourth power; they became the first power. They decide on how the governors and the governed perceive the world, on what is important and what it not, on who is right and who is wrong. They are thus no longer an intermediary in communication between the governors and the governed, but directors in a film. They do not strive at citizens being well-informed through information anchored in knowledge, but only at citizens staying informed. They create a culture of news, producing plenty of information causing the so-called information noise. In such a case over-production of news not anchored in knowledge (it lacks cohesion, it is fragmentary and chaotic) does not contribute to explaining the world, but makes a citizen lost in the public zone. The number of news produced by mass media exceeds cognitive powers of a human. As a consequence, he or she is no longer able to transform the news in information and thus see any sense in it. This translates into failure to understand the world.

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RECONSTRUCȚIA ARGUMENTELOR CU PROPOZIȚII CATEGORICE CA ARGUMENTE DE ORDINUL AL DOILEA

Cătălin STĂNCIULESCU¹

Abstract: *This paper is a short application of the theoretical background for characterizing arguments as formed by two categorical (subject-predicate) propositions/assertions recently proposed by Jean H. M. Wagemans. According to Wagemans, any argument can be reconstructed either as an argument with simple categorical propositions or as an argument with assertions, where an assertion is simply a sentence containing a proposition as one of its terms. This paper extends the scope of the arguments virtually reconstructible as sets of assertions by adding a class of arguments which while do not have at least one term in common, they are not completely different either.*

Keywords: *arguments with categorical propositions, first-order arguments, second-order arguments*

Introducere

Una dintre încercările recente de a construi o abordare unitară a caracterizării argumentelor îi aparține lui Jean H.M. Wagemans. Ideea centrală a acestei abordări este că orice argument formulat în limbaj natural poate fi descris printr-o structură formată din două propoziții (premisă și concluzie) de tip subiect-predicat care au cel puțin un termen comun, iar relația dintre premisă și concluzie, relația de inferențialitate a argumentului, depinde de relația dintre termenii care sunt diferiți. Spre exemplu, argumentul: *Pasărea măiastră este un obiect de artă; prin urmare, Pasărea măiastră este expresia autorului său*, este definit prin faptul că premisa și concluzia au în comun termenul „Pasărea măiastră”, care este subiect în ambele propoziții, iar relația dintre premisă și concluzie depinde de relația dintre termenii care sunt diferiți, „obiect de artă” (predicatul premisei) și „expresia autorului său” (predicatul concluziei).

O trăsătură importantă a acestei abordări este că propozițiile pot fi, de asemenea, termeni în cadrul unor propoziții (asertiuni). Spre exemplu, în argumentul *Institutul de Meteorologie și Hidrologie a anunțat că mâine va ploua, prin urmare, mâine va ploua*, propoziția „mâine va ploua” este un termen în propoziția premisa „Institutul de Meteorologie și Hidrologie a anunțat că

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mâine va ploua” (și anume, este subiect dacă scriem premisa ca Propoziția „Mâine va ploua” a fost spusă de IMH). Astfel de argumente pot fi analizate reconstruindu-le ca argumente cu propoziții de tip subiect-predicat, în care predicatul concluziei este valoarea de adevăr „adevărat”: *Institutul de Meteorologie și Hidrologie a spus „Mâine va ploua”, prin urmare, „Mâine va ploua” este adevărată* (sau cel puțin probabil adevărată). În acest exemplu, relația dintre premisă și concluzie depinde de relația dintre predicatul „spus de IMH” și „adevărat”. Desigur, în unele argumente premisa și concluzia nu au niciun termen comun, ca în exemplul: *Am plecat de la ședință, pentru că managerul nu era prezent*. Astfel de argumente pot fi reconstruite ca argumente de tip subiect-predicat, prin adăugarea predicatului „adevărat” atât la premisă cât și la concluzia argumentului inițial: *Propoziția „Managerul nu era prezent” este adevărată, prin urmare, propoziția „Am plecat de la ședință” este adevărată*. Relația dintre premisă și concluzie în acest argument va depinde de relația dintre premisa și concluzia argumentului inițial, care poate fi condiționalul: *dacă managerul nu este prezent, voi pleca de la ședință*.

Astfel de reconstrucții pornesc, de regulă, de la argumente cu propoziții de tip de subiect-predicat care nu au cel puțin un termen comun, adică fie nu au niciun termen comun, fie nu au forma de tip subiect-predicat (cum este cazul argumentelor de tipul celui analizat anterior, în care concluzia este conținută în premisă). Dar cum pot fi reconstruite argumentele în care propozițiile, deși nu au niciun termen comun nu sunt nici complet diferite, ca în exemplul: *Baschetul contribuie la dezvoltarea personală, pentru că practicarea unui joc de echipă dezvoltă abilitățile de comunicare?* În astfel de argumente, premisa și concluzia nu au un termen comun, dar termenii nu sunt complet diferiți, cum este cazul, în exemplul anterior, al termenilor „baschet” și „joc de echipă”, pe de o parte, și „abilități de comunicare” și „dezvoltare personală”, pe de altă parte. În continuare voi prezenta succint noțiunile teoretice ale modelului lui Wagemans, apoi le voi aplica în formularea unei soluții la problema reconstrucției argumentelor din acest ultim tip.

Propoziții, aserțiuni, argumente

Cadrul teoretic pentru descrierea argumentelor se bazează pe o caracterizare formal-lingvistică a argumentelor ca fiind alcătuite din două propoziții - o premisă și concluzia – ce exprimă, fiecare, o relație dintre un

subiect și un predicat în care predicatul spune ceva despre subiect. Regula generală pe care trebuie să o respecte două propoziții pentru a forma un argument este că ele trebuie să aibă cel puțin un termen în comun. Astfel, în următoarea formă argumentativă, premisa și concluzia au în comun subiectul: S este M, prin urmare, S este P, iar în forma argumentativă următoare, premisa și concluzia au în comun predicatul: N este P, prin urmare, S este P.

O altă caracteristică a argumentelor se referă la relația de inferențialitate dintre premisă și concluzie. Aceasta depinde de sau este exprimată de relația dintre termenii care sunt diferiți. În forma argumentativă S este M, prin urmare, S este P, relația de inferențialitate este dată de relația dintre M (predicatul premisei) și P (predicatul concluziei). În forma argumentativă N este P, prin urmare, S este P, relația de inferențialitate este dată de relația dintre N (subiectul premisei) și S (subiectul concluziei).

Ținând seama de această caracteristică, argumentele care au în comun subiectul se numesc *argumente predicative*, iar argumentele care au predicatul comun se numesc *argumente subiective*. Spre exemplu, în argumentul predicativ: *Andrei este inteligent, prin urmare, el va rezolva această problemă*, relația de inferențialitate depinde de relația dintre predicatul premisei - „inteligent” - și predicatul concluziei - „va rezolva problema” -, care este o relație definițională (a fi inteligent înseamnă, printre altele, a rezolva probleme). În argumentul subiectiv: *acest oraș este mic, prin urmare, acest cartier (din acest oraș) este mic*, relația de inferențialitate dintre premisă și concluzie depinde de relația dintre subiectul premisei - „acest oraș” - și subiectul concluziei - „acest cartier” -, care este o relație dintre întreg și parte.

Analiza argumentativă bazată pe relația dintre termenii premisei și concluziei poate fi extinsă la ceea ce Wagemans numește analiza aserțiunilor¹, în care unul dintre termeni este o propoziție, iar celălalt, un termen evaluativ, cum este „acceptabil” sau „adevărat”. Spre exemplu, propoziția „Maria va merge mâine la teatru” poate fi parte a unei aserțiuni, cum este „Propoziția «Maria vrea să meargă mâine la teatru» este adevărată”, sau „Este adevărat că Maria vrea să meargă mâine la teatru”. Dacă simbolizăm „adevărat” prin A, „Maria” prin M și „vrea să meargă” prin V, atunci aserțiunea se poate scrie ca (M este V) este A. Dacă înlocuim

¹ Jean H.M. Wagemans, „Four basic argument forms”, *Research in Language*, 2019, vol. 17:1, pp. 62-64.

M este V prin T, atunci aserțiunea se poate scrie ca o propoziție de tip subiect-predicat, în care subiectul este o propoziție mai curând decât un termen. Argumentele care conțin aserțiuni în acest sens, în care un termen este evaluativ, se numesc *argumente de ordinul al doilea*, spre deosebire de cele care conțin numai termeni, care sunt *argumente de ordinul întâi*.

Pentru că argumentele de ordinul doi conțin propoziții de tip subiect-predicat (în care un termen reprezintă o propoziție), ele pot fi, ca și argumentele de ordinul întâi, argumente predicative și argumente subiective. Spre exemplu, argumentul *Maria a spus că vrea să meargă mâine la teatru, prin urmare, Maria vrea să meargă mâine la teatru*, se poate scrie ca un argument predicativ în felul următor:

Premisă: [Propoziția] „Vreau să merg mâine la teatru” a fost spusă de Maria.

Concluzie: [Propoziția] „Maria vrea să meargă mâine la teatru” este adevărată.

Acest lucru se poate vedea mai ușor dacă simbolizăm argumentul astfel: (M este V) este R, prin urmare, (M este V) este A, și apoi T este R, prin urmare, T este A, unde R este „spus de Maria”, iar A este „adevărat”. Astfel, argumentul inițial se poate scrie ca un argument predicativ, în care termenul comun, subiectul premisei și concluziei, este o propoziție. În acest argument, relația de inferențialitate se bazează pe relația dintre aceste predicate, care este o relație între ceea ce spune o persoană și adevărul a ceea ce spune. Cu alte cuvinte, concluzia argumentului se bazează pe faptul că ceea ce a spus Maria este adevărat.

Pe lângă cazurile, cum este cel precedent, în care premisa și concluzia unui argument de ordinul al doilea conțin, ca termen comun, de regulă ca subiect, o propoziție, argumentele de ordinul al doilea pot conține, ca termeni, propoziții complet diferite, ca în exemplul: *A sunat clopoțelul, prin urmare, copiii vor ieși în pauză*. În astfel de cazuri, argumentele sunt de regulă subiective (întrucât, predicatul este de regulă termenul evaluativ, cum este „adevărat”).

În exemplul considerat, dacă simbolizăm premisa „A sunat clopoțelul” prin L este S, iar concluzia „Copiii vor ieși în pauză” prin C este I, și considerăm ambele propoziții subiecte ale unor propoziții al căror predicat este A (adevărat), atunci argumentul de ordinul al doilea reconstruit din argumentul de ordinul întâi inițial, va fi: (L este S este A), prin urmare, (C

este I) este A. Apoi, dacă simbolizăm L este S prin Q, și C este I prin R, argumentul se poate scrie ca un argument subiectiv: Q este A, prin urmare, R este A. Astfel, argumentul inițial cu premisă și concluzie diferite, poate fi reconstruit ca un argument subiectiv de ordinul al doilea, în care relația de inferențialitate este dată de relația dintre Q și R, care poate fi o relație implicativă, un condițional: dacă P, atunci Q (*dacă sună clopoțelul, atunci copiii vor ieși în pauză*).

Regulii potrivit căreia, într-un argument, premisa și concluzia trebuie să aibă cel puțin un termen comun, i se supun și cazurile de argumentare circulară, care pot fi descrise în termenii argumentelor de ordinul întâi cu premisă și concluzie identice.¹ Acesta este cazul, justificării prin repetare a unei reguli morale: *A-ți ține promisiunea este moral, pentru că este moral* (a cărui formă este: P este M, pentru că P este M). Dar argumentele circulare pot fi scrise și ca argumente de ordinul al doilea. Spre exemplu, ultimul argument se poate scrie *Este adevărat că a-ți ține promisiunea este moral, pentru că este adevărat că a-ți ține promisiunea este moral* (a cărui formă este: (P este M) este A, pentru că (P este M) este A, sau R este A, pentru că R este A).

Dacă importanța clasificării argumentelor în argumente predicative și subiective de ordinul întâi este în primul rând aceea de a oferi o descriere unitară a tipurilor de argumente formale și cvasi-formale cu propoziții categorice (de tip subiect-predicat), importanța argumentelor de ordinul al doilea este în primul rând de a oferi o descriere unitară a argumentelor cu propoziții atomare (ca în logica propozițiilor) și a argumentelor informale și, implicit, a argumentelor falacioase, cum sunt *ad hominem, ad baculum, ad verecundiam* etc.² O descriere unitară înseamnă că, cel puțin în principiu, orice argument poate fi tratat ca o structură ce conține o premisă și concluzie ce au cel puțin un termen comun.

¹ Jean H. M. Wagemans, „Argument Schemes, Topoi, and Laws of Logic”, în: F.H. van Eemeren, B.J. Garssen, D. Godden, G. Mitchell (Eds.), *Proceedings of the Seventh Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation*, (ISSA), 29 June-2 July, Amsterdam: Rozenberg/ Sic Sat, pp. 1934-1939.

² Jean H. M. Wagemans, „Constructing a Periodic Table of Arguments”, în: Pat Bondy, Laura Benacquista (eds.), *Argumentation, Objectivity, and Bias: Proceeding of the 11th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA)*, 18-21 May 2016, Windsor, ON: OSSA, pp. 1-12.

Reconstrucția argumentelor în care propozițiile nu sunt nici identice nici complet diferite

Una dintre condițiile modelului lui Wagemans este, așa cum am văzut, aceea că, în cazul argumentelor de ordinul întâi, cel puțin un termen trebuie să fie comun (regula termenului comun). În cazul în care fie nu există niciun termen comun (premisea și concluzia sunt complet diferite), fie concluzia face parte din premisă (ca în exemplul *Maria vrea să meargă mâine la teatru, pentru că a spus că vrea să meargă mâine la teatru*), argumentul poate fi cel mai bine analizat prin reconstrucția sa ca argument de ordinul al doilea, în care premisea și concluzia sunt de tip subiect-predicat și au cel puțin un termen comun (termenul evaluativ, de regulă predicatul, în primul caz; termenul care reprezintă propoziția, de regulă subiectul, în al doilea caz). Cu alte cuvinte, sunt posibile următoarele situații:

Argumente de ordinul al doilea (reconstrucții)			
Reconstrucție	Forma argumentului	Reconstrucție	Forma argumentului
„Spectatorii au aplaudat îndelung” este adevărată, prin urmare, „piesa era la sfârșit” este adevărată.	M(= X este Y) este A (adevărat), prin urmare, N (= Z este W) este A (adevărat).	„Vreau să merg mâine la teatru” a fost spusă de Maria, prin urmare, „Maria vrea să meargă mâine la teatru” este adevărată	(X este Y) este R, prin urmare, (X este Y) este A (adevărat).
	Subiectivă		Predicativă
Relația inferențială		Relația inferențială	
Faptul că spectatorii au aplaudat este un semn că spectacolul se apropie de sfârșit.	Depinde de relația dintre M și N.	Dacă a spus Maria, atunci este adevărat.	Depinde de relația dintre R și A.
	(argument bazat pe semne ¹ : M este indiciu sau semn pentru N)		(argument al credibilității ²)
Argumentul inițial		Argumentul inițial	
Cu premise și concluzia complet diferite		Cu o propoziție comună premisei și concluziei	
În limbaj natural	Forma	În limbaj natural	Forma

¹ Vezi Douglas Walton, Chris Reed, Fabrizio Macagno, *Argumentation Schemes*, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 329.

² Vezi Douglas Walton, Chris Reed, Fabrizio Macagno, *Argumentation Schemes*, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 309.

	argumentului		argumentului
<i>Spectatorii au aplaudat îndelung, prin urmare, piesa era la sfârșit.</i>	X este Y, prin urmare, Z este W	<i>Maria vrea să meargă mâine la teatru, pentru că a spus că vrea să meargă mâine la teatru.</i>	(X este Y) este R, prin urmare, X este Y

Tabel 1. Reconstrucția argumentelor formulate în limbaj natural ca argumente de ordinul al doilea (1)

Există însă situații în care termenii premisei și concluziei, deși nu sunt identici, nu sunt nici complet diferiți. Cum pot fi tratate astfel de cazuri?

Fie spre exemplu, următorul pasaj argumentativ:

În perioadele de hiperconsum, visăm mereu, ni se spune, la ceea ce nu avem, la ce e mai frumos și mai scump: în loc să se bucure, fiecare suferă că nu poate accede la bunurile de care se bucură alții. Chiar așa să fie? A nu avea o vilă somptuoasă te condamnă să nu-ți iubești apartamentul în care trăiești?¹.

Unul dintre argumentele centrale din acest pasaj pare să fie următorul:

Nu este adevărat că fiecare suferă că nu poate avea acces la bunurile pe care nu le are, pentru că nu este adevărat că a nu avea o vilă somptuoasă te condamnă să nu-ți iubești apartamentul în care trăiești.

Argumentul poate fi scris astfel:

Oamenii nu suferă că nu pot avea acces la lucrurile pe care nu le au, pentru că a nu avea o vilă somptuoasă nu te condamnă să nu-ți iubești apartamentul în care trăiești.

Sau, explicit și formulat într-o formă afirmativă:

Premisă: A nu avea o vilă somptuoasă este un lucru care nu îi face pe oameni să nu-și iubească apartamentul în care trăiesc.

Concluzie: A nu avea acces la lucrurile de care se bucură alții este un lucru care nu îi face pe oameni să sufere.

Subiectul premisei este „a nu avea o vilă somptuoasă”, iar predicatul este „un lucru care nu îi face pe oameni să nu-și iubească apartamentul în care trăiesc”. Subiectul concluziei este „a nu avea acces la bunurile de care se

¹ Gilles Lipovetsky, *Fericirea paradoxală. Eseu asupra societății de hiperconsum*, Iași: Polirom, 2007, p. 161.

bucură alții”, predicatul fiind: „nu îi face pe oameni să sufere”. Subiectul premisei nu este nici identic cu nici diferit de subiectul concluziei, pentru că a nu avea o vilă somptuoasă este un caz particular, un exemplu de ceea ce poate fi descris prin „a nu avea acces la bunurile de care se bucură alții”. De asemenea, a fi un lucru care nu îi face pe oameni să nu-și iubească apartamentul în care trăiesc este un exemplu de situație care nu îi face pe oameni să sufere. Prin urmare, predicatul premisei nu este nici identic cu nici diferit de predicatul concluziei și astfel argumentul pare să nu poată fi reconstruit ca un argument de ordinul întâi care să respecte regula termenului comun. Pentru că între termenii premisei și cei ai concluziei există totuși o relație (termenii nu sunt complet diferiți), și în baza acestei relații concluzia este sprijinită de premisă, singura posibilitate de a reconstrui argumentul astfel încât să fie respectată regula termenului comun, este de a-l scrie ca un argument de ordinul al doilea. Pentru aceasta, vom considera argumentul inițial un argument cu premisa și concluzia diferite, adică un argument de forma: X este Y , prin urmare, V este W , și vom construi premisa și concluzia argumentului de ordinul al doilea ca aserțiuni, adăugând premisei și concluziei predicatul „adevărat” (A). Vom obține astfel forma unui argument subiectiv de ordinul al doilea - (X este Y) este A (adevărat), prin urmare, (V este W) este A (adevărat), sau M este A , prin urmare, N este A – a cărei relație de inferențialitate este dată de raportul dintre M ($= X$ este Y) și N ($= V$ este W), care este o relație de la particular la general.

Concluzii

Adăugând și posibilitatea reconstrucției ca argumente de ordinul al doilea a argumentelor cu premise identice, tabelul 1 poate fi completat astfel:

Argumente de ordinul al doilea (reconstrucții)	
<i>Reconstrucție</i>	<i>Forma argumentului</i>
„A nu avea o vilă somptuoasă este un lucru care nu îi face pe oameni să nu-și iubească apartamentul în care trăiesc” este adevărat, prin urmare, „A nu avea acces la lucrurile de care se bucură alții este un lucru care nu îi face pe oameni să sufere” este adevărat.	(X este Y) este A , prin urmare, (V este W) este A ; sau M este A , prin urmare, N este A
	Subiectivă
<i>Relația inferențială</i>	

A nu avea o vilă somptuoasă este un lucru care nu îi face pe oameni să nu-și iubească apartamentul în care trăiesc, prin urmare, a nu avea acces la lucrurile de care se bucură alții este un lucru care nu îi face pe oameni să sufere.	Depinde de relația dintre M (= X este Y) și N (= V este W)
Argumentul inițial	Relație de la particular la general.
<i>Cu premisa și concluzia nici identice nici complet diferite</i>	
<i>În limbaj natural</i>	<i>Forma argumentului</i>
Oamenii nu suferă că nu pot avea acces la lucrurile pe care nu le au, pentru că a nu avea o vilă somptuoasă nu te condamnă să nu-ți iubești apartamentul în care trăiești.	X este Y, prin urmare, V este W.

Tabel 1. Reconstrucția argumentelor formulate în limbaj natural ca argumente de ordinul al doilea (2)

Pentru că relația de la particular la general este specifică multor tipuri de argumente uzuale, cum este argumentul bazat pe exemple¹ (argumente de forma: *acest lucru care are proprietatea F are și proprietatea G, prin urmare, în general, lucrurile care au proprietatea F au și proprietatea G*)², acestea pot fi, în general, tratate în acest fel.

Avantajul practic al acestui mod de tratare a argumentelor cu propoziții care nu sunt nici identice nici complet diferite formulate în limbaj natural este mai ușor de văzut dacă îl comparăm cu cel al altor tipuri de argumente, cum este argumentul bazat pe analogie³. Deși argumentele bazate pe analogie sunt, de asemenea, generalizări, ele sunt mai ușor de reconstruit pentru că sunt mai ușor de recunoscut în practică, fiind în general folosite în forme care au un termen comun, cel mai adesea în forma argumentelor de ordinul întâi: X este Z, prin urmare, X este Y (pentru că Z seamănă cu Y), ca în exemplul: *Practicarea baschetului contribuie la dezvoltarea abilităților de cooperare, prin urmare, practicarea handbalului contribuie la dezvoltarea abilităților de cooperare* (pentru că ambele sunt sporturi de echipă). Dacă această analiză este corectă, atunci cel puțin o categorie de

¹ Vezi Constantin Sălăvăstru, *Discursul puterii. Încercare de retorică aplicată*, București: Editura Tritonic, pp. 207-213.

² Vezi Douglas Walton, Chris Reed, Fabrizio Macagno, *Argumentation Schemes*, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 314.

³ Vezi Constantin Sălăvăstru, *Mic tratat de oratorie*, Ediția a II-a, Editura Univeristății „Alexandru Ioan Cuza” Iași, pp. 155-157.

argumente – argumente în care relația dintre premisă și concluzie se bazează pe un tip de relație de la particular la general, dar în care premisa și concluzia nu au un termen comun, poate fi reconstruită prin modelul lui Wagemans.

EL PERDÓN Y LA MISERICORDIA COMO CONDICIONES DE POSIBILIDAD DE LA PAZ DESDE DIFERENTES ENSEÑANZAS. PROPUESTA DE INTERVENCIÓN EDUCATIVA EN LA ASIGNATURA DE RESPONSABILIDAD SOCIAL

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Abstract: *Pope Francis, over the years has traveled, especially, seeking reconciliation among peoples and raising the voice for the most disadvantaged and excluded. The Pope's message is one of forgiveness, reconciliation and compassion, because the Mercy of God is the hope of the world and will always be greater than our sins. Before the urgent call of Pope Francis to mercy and forgiveness we must think of young people as the witnesses of future generations who are the hope of the world. Education, according to Francisco, must be a generator of hope and considers that the role of an educator is that of a mother and a father who transmit a life full of future; hence the need for the inclusion of knowledge of the path of forgiveness towards peace in the educational task. The objective of this work is to transmit the teachings of the Pope to young people, through an educational intervention. To expand the search we have used two explanatory models of forgiveness, one exclusively focused on the teachings of Pope Francis, another, with a non-denominational nuance addressed to all people, regardless of their religious beliefs and ideas, based on the work of Gianfranco Testa, founder of the University of Perdón of Turin; In this model, Francisco's teachings have been treated as those of one more author along with other experts in the subject. The intervention was developed within the subject of Social Responsibility, second year of the degrees of Early Childhood Education, Primary Education and Physiotherapy of the Francisco de Vitoria University of Madrid (Spain). As a resource has been used to view different scenes of films in which characters and scenes are presented full of emotion and meaning in relation to the concepts developed.*

Keywords: *forgiveness, mercy, peace, compassion.*

Introducción

Desde el momento en que decidimos no vengarnos de la persona que nos ha hecho daño, comenzamos el proceso del perdón, con una perspectiva de futuro en la que se vislumbra la paz y, en algunos casos, la reconciliación.

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Este será el punto de partida de este trabajo. El Papa Francisco nos habla de las heridas que arrastra la humanidad y cada uno de nosotros; pues bien, afrontaremos mejor el perdón abriendo la puerta a la esperanza.

Esta reflexión, en nuestra opinión, es suficientemente sólida como para reconocer que llevamos la carga pesada de la historia que ha enfrentado países, pueblos, vecinos y familias. Ha llegado, quizá, el momento de la misericordia y del perdón, y no nos podemos quedar indiferentes.

Francisco dice: "Que la palabra del perdón pueda llegar a todos y la llamada a experimentar la misericordia no deje a ninguno indiferente". (Francisco, 2016, pág. 131). Hoy asistimos a muchas iniciativas que tratan de acercar el perdón a diferentes situaciones; como es el caso de Gianfranco Testa quien considera que el perdón se ha abierto a diferentes ámbitos, además del religioso, como son el antropológico, psicológico, médico y filosófico. Esta idea ratifica que se ha realizado en un intento por mostrar a los jóvenes la necesidad del perdón que anhela el ser humano en todas sus dimensiones.

El perdón desde diferentes perspectivas

En este punto se recoge el contenido base de la intervención. Se comenzará con una presentación de la visión del perdón centrada en las enseñanzas de Francisco para después exponer la propuesta no confesional.

En la experiencia de vida comprobamos que el perdón es algo que el ser humano necesita para ser feliz porque de lo contrario las heridas van minando la esperanza y la ilusión por vivir. Podemos hablar del perdón desde diferentes ámbitos y sea de la idea que sea el perdón siempre es una liberación, es un punto de arranque para comenzar un proceso que nos llevará a la paz.

La necesidad de perdón en la persona humana como posibilitadora de encuentro

La idea de explicar el perdón desde un doble punto de vista, aconfesional por una parte y desde la perspectiva del Papa Francisco por otra, nace de la percepción de que ambas responden a una necesidad humana con un marcado fundamento antropológico. Si pensamos que el perdón es dejar cerrar una herida, buscando paz y excluyendo la venganza, aunque no siempre seamos conscientes de ello, estamos reconociendo al otro como persona humana con dignidad, por encima de sus fallos y debilidades. Es

muy interesante cómo Francisco transmite esta idea cuando comenta la sensación que percibe cuando acude a la cárcel:

Tengo una relación especial con aquellos que viven en prisión, privados de su libertad. He estado siempre muy unido a ellos, precisamente por esta consciencia de mi condición de pecador. Cada vez que cruzo la puerta de una cárcel para una celebración o para una visita, me viene siempre a la cabeza este pensamiento: ¿Por qué ellos y no yo? Sus caídas hubieran podido ser las mías, no me siento mejor que quien tengo delante. Y es así como me encuentro repitiendo y rezando: ¿Por qué él y no yo? Esto puede escandalizar, pero me consuelo con Pedro: había renegado de Jesús, y a pesar de ello, fue elegido. (Francisco, 2016, pág. 58).

El considerar y saber lo que significa la dignidad de la persona humana puede ser relevante a la hora de hablar de perdón y de cómo mirar al otro. El hecho de perdonar, en general, nos libera y eso hace que reduzca estrés en el organismo y sus beneficios psicosomáticos, obviamente, son increíbles. La sensación de dolor e injusticia ante una ofensa grande quita la alegría, la creatividad y produce una sensación grave de desamor. La gravedad de la ofensa determinará la posibilidad de encuentro con el ofensor; en ocasiones puede no ser necesario ni prudente.

Lo que enriquece a la dimensión trascendental de la persona en su más profunda interioridad, fundamento de su dignidad, es el saberse amado y perdonado por Dios, El Evangelio, en la *Parábola del hijo pródigo*, describe cómo fue ese encuentro: “Cuando el joven estaba cerca de su casa, su padre lo vio de lejos y corrió hacia él y lo abrazó” (Lucas 15:11-32). Por eso ante la violencia que vive la humanidad, decía el Papa Juan Pablo II:

Un compromiso de este tipo por parte de las religiones no puede dejar de adentrarse en la *vía del perdón*, que lleva a la comprensión recíproca, al respeto y a la confianza. El servicio que las religiones pueden ofrecer en favor de la paz y contra el terrorismo consiste precisamente en la *pedagogía del perdón*, porque el hombre que perdona o pide perdón comprende que hay una Verdad más grande que él y que, acogiéndola, puede trascenderse a sí mismo (S. S. Juan Pablo II, 2002).

La misericordia y la aceptación del perdón en las enseñanzas del Papa Francisco

Si buscamos, la definición de la Real Academia Española encontraremos: "Virtud que inclina el ánimo a compadecerse de los sufrimientos y miserias

ajenas", y también una definición religiosa: "Es un atributo de Dios, en cuya virtud perdona los pecados y miserias de sus criaturas" (Real Academia de la Lengua, 2014)

En las enseñanzas de Francisco se hace hincapié en que: "Jesucristo es el rostro de la misericordia del Padre (...) Jesús de Nazaret con su palabra, sus gestos y toda su persona revela la misericordia". (Francisco, 2016, pág. 109).

Jesucristo ha venido a la tierra a salvarnos y mostrarnos el amor infinito del Padre. Lo vemos en la parábola del hijo pródigo, donde el padre le echa tanto de menos que sueña con su vuelta porque en esa añoranza, ya le ha perdonado y, cuando lo tiene delante, le recibe con el mayor abrazo que puede dar un padre a un hijo.

El padre no le condena ni le reprende; el deseo de verlo y acogerlo es más fuertes que todas sus faltas; así es la Misericordia de Dios.

Participar de la misericordia

¿Cómo puedo yo participar? Esta es la pregunta que nos gustaría que se hiciesen los jóvenes, que tienen ante ellos un futuro lleno de ilusiones y de proyectos. Sin embargo, la realidad de este mundo globalizado, complicado, relativista y fragmentado no siempre permite cumplirlos. Las consecuencias de una larga crisis económica, social y familiar, provocada, en lo fundamental, por la falta de valores éticos, el desconocimiento de testimonios y especialmente por el desamor, conforman la herida de la que nos habla el Papa.

Cuando pensamos en la misericordia es muy frecuente proyectarla en la ayuda al otro. Hablar de misericordia, sin embargo, es algo más, porque se puede ser misericordioso y practicar las obras de misericordia pese a tener dolor en el corazón.

Por eso, el Papa insiste y nos anima a que empecemos de nuevo un camino desde cero, y nos miremos a nosotros mismos, veamos nuestra miseria y seamos capaces de aceptar que necesitamos ser sanados y perdonados.

Cuando una persona es adicta al alcohol, al juego o a las drogas, sabemos que desde el momento en que reconoce su dolor y la necesidad de ayuda, comienza el primer paso hacia la sanación. No obstante, no es necesario ser adictos, o criminales para necesitar curarnos las heridas. Todos guardamos recuerdos en nuestro corazón de los que no nos sentimos

orgullosos, buscamos excusas en la ignorancia, inseguridad o desconsuelo. No debemos justificarnos, Francisco recuerda que todos somos pecadores.

Aceptar el perdón

El primer pasosería sentir remordimientos, culpa, intranquilidad o vergüenza. A pesar de lo que nos muestra la sociedad, no son sentimientos negativos. Francisco lo aclara: "Vivimos en una sociedad en la que se nos acostumbra cada vez menos a reconocer nuestras responsabilidades, y a hacernos cargo de ellas. Siempre tienen la culpa los demás (...) Y nos gusta la actitud de condenar más que acoger". (Francisco, 2016, pág. 12).

Francisco habla de la vergüenza como una gracia, una luz que nos ilumina el alma, especialmente cuando llegamos a sentir la misericordia de Dios y nos avergonzamos de nuestros pecados y faltas. Todos somos pecadores, aunque no todos seamos corruptos.

La diferencia la explica el Papa: "La corrupción es el pecado, que en lugar de ser reconocido como tal y de hacernos humildes, es elevado a sistema, se convierte en una costumbre mental, una manera de vivir. Ya no nos sentimos necesitados de perdón y de misericordia, sino que justificamos nuestros comportamientos y a nosotros mismos". (Francisco, 2016, pág. 92).

El hecho de ser corrupto no quiere decir que sea un pecado más, porque no es solo una falta, implica un estado o estilo de vida. El Papa matiza: "Se generan costumbres que limitan la capacidad de amar y llevan a la autosuficiencia (...) El corrupto oculta lo que considera su tesoro, lo que le hace esclavo, y enmascara su vicio con la buena educación, logrando siempre salvar las apariencias". (Francisco, 2016, pág. 93). El corrupto no siente remordimiento

La misericordia y la compasión

Conviene aclarar la relación entre el sentido de la misericordia y la compasión.

El Papa Francisco explica la diferencia: "La misericordia es divina, tiene más que ver con el juicio sobre nuestro pecado. La compasión tiene un rostro más humano. Significa sufrir con..., sufrir juntos, no permanecer indiferentes al dolor y al sufrimiento ajenos, lo que sentía Jesús cuando veía a las multitudes que le seguían". (Francisco, 2016, pág. 101)

Francisco insiste en la “globalización de la indiferencia” (Francisco, 2016, pág. 101) que estamos viviendo y podemos combatir con la compasión. El Papa, a menudo, comenta la actitud de indiferencia ante el sufrimiento de los pobres, los olvidados, los refugiados y los indigentes.

La necesidad de la misericordia

Los hombres cuando nacemos necesitamos de una madre y un padre que nos esperan llenos de amor, desde el momento en que nos concibieron y supieron que íbamos a llegar. Francisco dice que la familia es la primera escuela del perdón, donde se nos quiere como somos. Si esto no ocurre, producirá mucho dolor el resto de la vida. La falta de amor recibido puede sanarse con la misericordia.

La necesidad de amar y ser amados es algo natural del hombre. Esta necesidad vital muestra al hombre como un ser de encuentro. Al nacer nos encontramos con la vida y con el otro. Vamos reconociendo el amor cuando abrimos los ojos al mundo. Desde la fe cristiana creemos que fuimos amados antes de nacer, porque Dios pensó en nosotros.

Creemos que uno de los secretos de los santos es que han conocido lo que Dios los quiere, y ante ese amor, se han dejado querer.

Sabemos que no todos estamos dispuestos a buscar a Dios, la fuente de la misericordia, porque nos falla la fe, o no nos interesa. Encontraremos cantidad de argumentos para convencernos a nosotros mismos y sentirnos llenos de razón. Algunas veces no tenemos conciencia de pecado y otras veces, sí. Sin embargo, es fácil abandonarlo por miedo a la verdad y a ser amados y perdonados. Es frecuente que luchemos por callar la voz de la conciencia y del corazón.

El regalo del sacramento del perdón. La confesión

Francisco nos anima a que vayamos al sacramento del perdón que será la medicina que nos curará. Podemos preguntarnos, ¿por qué la confesión? Francisco dice: "Si tú no eres capaz de hablar de tus errores con tu hermano, ten por seguro que no serás capaz tampoco con Dios y que acabarás confesándote con el espejo, frente a ti mismo" (Francisco, 2016, pág. 42)

Cualquiera puede plantearse ¿por qué hay que contarle a un sacerdote, si es algo privado? La contestación es, porque es bueno contarle y desahogarse sabiendo que Dios va a perdonar.

Entendemos que un joven pensará que se lo cuenta a su novia, o un buen amigo. Esto es bueno y necesario para vivir la verdadera amistad, pero la confesión es diferente. El sacramento del perdón aporta algo más, el perdón y la gracia. Dios mismo abraza y entrega su misericordia.

¿Y qué ocurre si no se siente ningún arrepentimiento? Es bueno saber que, aunque no nos sintamos arrepentidos, Dios aprovecha cualquier grieta del corazón para curarnos. Francisco nos explica que la confesión no es la tintorería; se puede caer en la rutina o en la costumbre. La confesión es un lugar de sanación, el pecado nos produce una herida en el alma que hay que curar o medicar, por eso, debe llegar al corazón.

Tampoco es una sala de tortura, ni un interrogatorio. Se dicen las palabras necesarias y apropiadas con el respeto que requiere ese momento.

Puede ser que hayamos vivido una mala experiencia por una confesión desagradable o violenta, en ese caso es bueno dejarlo a un lado, perdonar y continuar. Igual que los jóvenes por haber tenido una mala experiencia en una relación amorosa, no renuncian a encontrar el amor de la vida, en la confesión ocurre lo mismo: no hay que cerrarse a la gracia por un mal recuerdo, porque se recibe una paz diferente.

Otra actitud para rechazar la confesión es creer que todo se hace bien y no se necesita del perdón de Dios. Vemos cómo una gran parte de la sociedad piensa de esta manera y actúa con indiferencia ante el amor y el perdón de Dios.

La pedagogía no confesional del perdón

Para empezar a hablar de perdón desde una perspectiva amplia consideramos conveniente empezar por reflexionar acerca de lo que significa el conflicto. Todos vivimos en conflicto; unos son más relevantes que otros; estos pueden ser permanentes o puntuales, pero, al final, de todos necesitamos liberarnos.

Hablar de conflicto no significa hablar de guerras o violencia, como apunta Testa (2016); es algo presente en las relaciones humanas y difícil de eliminar completamente; la clave sería que puede ser tanto destructivo como infinitamente creativo y enriquecedor. Ello dependerá de nuestra actitud ante el conflicto y en la búsqueda de las alternativas de solución y mejora. Para dicho autor, esta sería la base de la educación para la paz.

Si se considera que el conflicto se genera, en muchas ocasiones, por una ofensa recibida, se puede ver cómo el perdón aparece en forma solución. En este punto, convendría clarificar qué es el perdón y qué no lo es.

¿Qué es el perdón?

El perdón sería la liberación que me produce de la rabia y los deseos de venganza. Considerado el perdón como un proceso o recorrido, hace falta para comenzar, cambiar la percepción: “Como resultado de este cambio nace una mayor comprensión hacia nosotros mismos y hacia los demás (...) El perdón se vive como un sentimiento de gozo, de paz y de amor. (...) Tener rabia no es un problema, no depende de nosotros; vivir con rabia, sí” (Testa, 2016, pág. 19). Desde el perdón, el pasado no se puede cambiar, pero, sí comenzar a proyectar el futuro.

Como apunta Crespo (2016), el perdón no se fundamenta en el mal infligido sino en la persona que, en su actitud, busca una solución moralmente buena y noble. Reconocemos, continua Crespo: “que el ofensor tiene un valor superior que <<transciende>> el mal objetivo infligido y el disvalor moral de la acción de infligir éste. Perdonar a alguien es ver con <<con nuevos ojos>> la indestructible plenitud de valor que reside en cada persona” (2016, pág. 117).

Testa (2016) apunta que la persona siempre debe estar en el centro “porque tiene dos rostros, el de la víctima y el del culpable” (pág. 72).

Perdonar no significa olvidar, idea que más adelante trataremos, sino “purificar la memoria”; es un proceso que se dirige más hacia la liberación y al abandono del resentimiento (Crespo, 2016).

Hay situaciones en las que la cancelación de la culpa va a acompañada del arrepentimiento del ofensor (Crespo, 2016) pero esto no sucede siempre; cuando ocurre este tipo de cooperación, el ofensor tiene un futuro más abierto, porque el arrepentimiento es una liberación también para él.

Cuando no ocurre esta cooperación, nos dice Testa (2016) “Este esfuerzo no nos debe llevar necesariamente a algún tipo de simpatía o de confraternización, sino a <<humanizar>>, incluso a pesar de sus aberraciones, a aquella persona. Nadie es su delito” (pág. 44).

Perdonarse a sí mismo

Cuando hemos cometido un acto del que nos sentimos culpables, e incluso, hemos sido perdonados o hemos recibido la pena o el castigo, a pesar de

ello, en ocasiones continuamos sin aceptar nuestro perdón. Según Crespo (2016) “El perdonarse a sí mismo es más bien la aceptación de la propia culpa y la confianza en el perdón. Ello lleva a no torturarnos más a nosotros mismos con duros e implacables reproches” (pág. 38).

Perdonarse a sí mismo implica el dejar de autodestruirse y aceptarse con la esperanza de mejorar en todos los sentidos. Según, M.R. Holmgren (1998), perdonarse a sí mismo requiere de seis tareas: recuperar el respeto por uno mismo como una persona valiosa-reconocer la culpa y asumir la responsabilidad, reconocerse persona con todo su status, reconocer en sí mismo los sentimientos de la ofensa, conocer los sentimientos o deseos que le llevaron a la ofensa y enmendar el mal hecho.

¿Qué no es perdón?

Es muy difícil entender el perdón sin identificar claramente lo que no es. El perdón no significa olvidar, podemos considerar “purificar la memoria” como nos apuntaba, Crespo anteriormente, pero ese concepto no es olvido.

El perdón no es condonar, ni decir: *aquí no ha pasado nada*, esta actitud sería lo mismo que quitar el valor moral a un hecho inmoral e inaceptable (Crespo, 2016). A veces la observamos esta reacción en los malos tratos y en los abusos. Unas veces las víctimas, otras los responsables piensan que tapar o esconder es un mal menor, y lo que ocurre es que crece la magnitud de la ofensa y de las responsabilidades. Para el perdón, la reconciliación y la paz, es necesario conocer la verdad, no se puede prescindir de ella, como se mostrará posteriormente.

Podemos advertir en la actitud apática ante el mal y la conducta inmoral al no sentir ninguna compasión ni empatía por el dolor ajeno. Lo mismo que nos enseñaba el Papa Francisco de la actitud del corrupto ante el mal. Lo que, realmente, perdemos es el reconocimiento de la dignidad de la persona.

¿Qué es la compasión?

Recordamos como decíamos, anteriormente, que las personas vivimos en un continuo conflicto Este puede ser creativo y enriquecedor y llevarnos hacia la compasión y el perdón o bien, nos puede destruir. Ello depende del camino que sigamos, por lo tanto, la compasión podemos llegar desde el conflicto. Desde el punto de vista del cristianismo, la compasión significa sufrir con los demás; no podemos quedarnos impasibles ante el dolor ajeno.

El proceso del perdón hacia la paz y la reconciliación

En el desarrollo de este camino son necesarios unos requisitos que nos plantea Testa (2016):

- **Memoria y verdad**

El perdón tiene memoria y no se trata de olvidar los hechos o las ofensas. Cuando se trabaja para encontrar soluciones a conflictos internacionales se necesita conocer toda la verdad y para eso hace falta memoria. Cuando dos grupos sociales han luchado en una guerra civil entre hermanos, es necesario conocer todo lo que ha ocurrido y de qué manera han actuado las dos partes. De esta forma se puede dar el arrepentimiento porque ambos saben que han tenido culpa. Véase el ejemplo de Sudáfrica donde se daba la violencia de las dos partes. Para la reconciliación hay que buscar la verdad de los hechos, pero siempre teniendo en cuenta que las dos partes tienen algo de verdad.

Esta situación se puede extrapolar a cualquier conflicto, por ejemplo, en los existentes en las relaciones afectivas, familiares de pareja, en las que cada uno expone su visión particular de los hechos.

- **Reconciliación, justicia y pacto**

Para construir la reconciliación necesitamos de la justicia que puede desembocar en el pacto. A veces confundimos la justicia con el castigo.

Testa (2016) hace hincapié en la justicia restaurativa y la define así: “La justicia restaurativa no es simplemente una alternativa a la justicia retributiva o reeducativa, sino que es una modalidad nueva de intervención sobre la conflictividad social.” (pág. 73)

En realidad, este tipo de justicia lo que pretende es recuperar a las personas, Este proceso se facilitará si intervienen los mediadores. Cada vez se está insistiendo más en este tipo de justicia.

Las principales ventajas que aporta son:

- La justicia restaurativa favorece a toda la sociedad.
- Cada uno asume su responsabilidad social
- En lugar de un castigo, hay que buscar la armonía
- Para ello hay que sentirse parte de una comunidad

Ejemplos:

La ONU en 2002 aprobó un documento que recomendaba las prácticas restaurativas en los sistemas judiciales de los países miembros.

En la película española de *Campeones* (2018) dirigida por Javier Fesser, se trabaja la justicia restaurativa.

La memoria, verdad, la justicia miran al pasado, el pacto o acuerdo mira el futuro (Testa, 2016, pág. 81).

La última etapa del camino que emprendimos, desde el momento que decidimos no vengarnos del ofensor, será el pacto o acuerdo. El pacto no es lo mismo que la reconciliación porque el pacto es posterior al perdón.

En el acuerdo es necesaria la figura del mediador, en los procesos de las parejas, en los conflictos internacionales entre países y en general en los problemas que pueden representar las relaciones humanas.

En el cristianismo como proyecto de vida que Dios ofrece al ser humano, la figura del mediador sería el confesor a través del Sacramento del Perdón.

Finalmente, observamos que el ser humano desde una visión u otra anhela la paz y la armonía en su vida.

Propuesta de intervención educativa

Objetivos:

1. Tomar conciencia de la importancia del perdón como camino a la paz y al crecimiento personal
2. Distinguir los conceptos de perdón, misericordia, compasión y paz
3. Comprender el mensaje y el valor del perdón y la paz desde la perspectiva de las enseñanzas del papa por un lado y desde una visión aconfesional por otro
4. Integrar el perdón y la misericordia como fundamento de la paz en las relaciones humanas y los conflictos que se producen en estas
5. Enriquecer el valor de la paz dentro de la asignatura Educación para la Responsabilidad Social como elemento distintivo de la formación integral de la Universidad Francisco de Vitoria.

Actividades

Para el desarrollo de la intervención se seleccionaron cuatro grupos de alumnos de tres grados en la asignatura de Responsabilidad Social que se cursa en 2º de todos los grados de la Universidad Francisco de Vitoria de Madrid.

Dos cursos de 2º de Fisioterapia.

El curso de 2º de Educación Infantil y el de 2º de Educación Primaria.

En los cuatro grupos, la intervención se insertó dentro del tema 5. Dicho tema trata de los valores y la mirada al otro y concretamente dentro del valor de la paz.

La intervención se desarrolló de acuerdo al siguiente calendario

Tabla 1 Calendario de la intervención

Fecha	Grupo	Medición	Contenido	Duración
18 de marzo	2º C Fisioterapia	Pretest	Enseñanzas del Papa Francisco en torno al perdón (A)	90 min
	2º A Educación Primaria	Pretest	Enseñanzas del Papa Francisco en torno al perdón (A)	90 min
20 de marzo	2º A Fisioterapia	Pretest	El Perdón Aconfesional (B)	90 min
	2º A Educación Infantil	Pretest	El Perdón Aconfesional (B)	90 min
25 de marzo	2º C Fisioterapia	Postest		
	2º A Educación Primaria	Postest		
27 de marzo	2º A Fisioterapia	Postest		
	3º A Educación Infantil	Postest		

Fuente: elaboración propia

A continuación, se expone el desarrollo de la intervención.

1- Explicación de la actividad.

a. Se aclaró que el contenido que se iba a explicar no era materia para el examen, ni se calificaría.

2- Complimentación del cuestionario pretest.

3- Explicación del contenido dependiendo de la programación de la intervención, tal y como se indica en el cuadro anterior. Se utilizó una presentación en Power Point.

En la siguiente tabla se resume el tratamiento que se dio a cada uno de los conceptos clave de acuerdo al enfoque fijado.

Tabla 2 Tratamiento de conceptos en función del enfoque temático

PAPA FRANCISCO	ACONFESIONAL
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Aceptar el perdón • Pecado, debilidad y conflicto • Corrupto estilo de vida • Confesión, examen de conciencia y remordimiento y confesor • Misericordia, atributo de Dios y amor incondicional a sus criaturas <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • La paz que Dios concede con la gracia • Amor de Dios al ser humano • Perdón divino absoluto • Propósito de mejora; propósito de enmienda; conversión 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Perdonarse a sí mismo • Falta, ofensa, debilidad y conflicto • Corrupto, estilo de vida, apatía moral • Verdad, memoria y mediador • Misericordia o compasión con rostro humano <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • La paz, algo que se aprende con esfuerzo • Vivir y crear la dignidad de la persona • Perdón como proceso que tiene memoria y a veces esta se puede purificar • Pacto o acuerdo, mirada al futuro

Fuente: elaboración propia

Escenas de películas

Se trabajaron en ambas exposiciones los tres personajes:

- El corrupto: El Padrino III
- La persona que no acepta el perdón o el que no se perdona a sí mismo:

La Misión

- La llamada a la compasión desde la búsqueda o el conflicto de un personaje: Teresa de Calcuta

• Se visionaron las mismas tres escenas de diferentes películas en los cuatro grupos. Cada una de ellas simbolizaba la luz de una llamada y una sesión de reflexión.

La primera llamada es la del corrupto que se da cuenta de la vida tan destructiva y vacía que ha llevado.

La segunda llamada simboliza al corrupto al que el remordimiento le ha hecho reconocerse pecador, pero no acepta el perdón de Dios ni de nadie. Cree que no hay redención para él, ni siquiera se perdona a sí mismo.

La tercera llamada es un personaje de una vida ejemplar que recibe una llamada hacia la compasión más absoluta hacia los demás, pero esta llamada le supone un conflicto anterior.

- **El corrupto que recibe la luz para ver lo que ha sido su vida**

La película, *El Padrino III*, dirigida por Francis Ford Coppola, en el año 1990, muestra la última etapa de la vida de Michael Corleone, al que interpreta Al Pacino. Michael continúa el legado que le ha dejado su padre, jefe de una de las familias mafiosas italianas instaladas en Estados Unidos durante la década de los 50.

Michael Corleone ha cometido muchos crímenes, a lo largo de su vida, entre ellos, dar la orden de matar a su hermano por un ajuste de cuentas. Ello le provoca tal remordimiento y dolor en el alma que acude a un cardenal para contarle su pena. Aunque el cardenal le confiesa, Corleone no se cura porque no se medica contra las heridas del alma (cómo explicará más adelante el Papa Francisco sobre la confesión) y por lo tanto no cambia de vida.

El padrino ha vivido del dominio y la posesión. No ha valorado la dignidad de las personas, a las que ha tratado como objetos. Cuando su hija se enamora de su sobrino, Corleone rechaza esa relación y la corta amenazando a su sobrino, sin antes haber hablado con su hija. La escena final de la película está llena de simbología, Corleone sale feliz de la ópera con su familia. Su hijo ha hecho la primera presentación de tenor y lo van a celebrar. Saliendo de la ópera, en la escalinata, de repente, un asesino dispara al padrino, pero mata a su hija y ésta cae muerta en sus brazos. El grito de dolor de Corleone acalla los llantos y sollozos de los demás, ¿qué le ha ocurrido? ha descubierto cómo es el dolor. En un segundo siente la muerte y el odio que ha sido su vida.

Y en ese momento, la película muestra unas escenas donde recuerda lo que verdaderamente fue bueno, bello y verdadero en su vida. Podemos ver a Corleone celebrando su boda, y bailando con su hija, todo bajo la música maravillosa, del *Intermezzo* de la ópera de Mascagni, *Cavalleria Rusticana*. La película termina mostrándonos al padrino muriendo sólo en el jardín de su casa.

- **El corrupto que se reconoce pecador a través del remordimiento, pero no acepta el perdón, no se perdona a sí mismo**

La película, *La Misión*, dirigida por Roland Jofee, en el año 1986, nos muestra al actor Robert De Niro que da vida al capitán Mendoza, un mercenario que mata y secuestra a los indios guaraníes, para venderlos como esclavos. La historia se sitúa en 1740, cuando España y Portugal se

disputan las tierras de Paraguay, Brasil y Argentina y los jesuitas han fundado varias misiones.

Mendoza descubre que su hermano mantiene una relación amorosa con su mujer, le reta a un duelo y le mata. La ley no le condena porque el duelo no se considera delito. Pero él se condena a sí mismo quitándose el amor y el perdón de su vida.

A partir de ahí, va a vivir con los jesuitas de san Carlos. Ha decidido encerrarse sólo en una celda y cae en una profunda depresión: Mendoza no encuentra consuelo y quiere morir.

El padre superior jesuita está preocupado y se siente impotente ante la grave situación de Mendoza. Llama al padre Gabriel, al que da vida el actor, Jeremy Irons que es el superior de la misión de las cataratas. Le pide que vaya a ver al capitán y le ofrezca irse con él a su misión, para su recuperación con el cambio de aires.

Mendoza acepta la propuesta del padre. Varios jesuitas acompañan al padre Gabriel y emprenden el viaje, que será largo y costoso, escalando hacia las cataratas.

El capitán se coloca una bolsa llena de peso en la espalda para que su esfuerzo sea más grande porque necesita hacer penitencia. El camino es difícil, los jesuitas sufren viendo a Mendoza con semejante carga y le ruegan al padre Gabriel que le libere de ella, pero este respeta la decisión de Mendoza.

La escena de la llegada es muy bella. Mendoza rompe en un llanto de dolor, y son los indios guaraníes los que le cortan la cuerda de la bolsa, a pesar de haberle reconocido. La música del oscarizado, Ennio Morricone envuelve la escena de absoluta misericordia y belleza.

La carga pesada que Mendoza lleva en la espalda al no aceptar el perdón simboliza a los hombres cargándose de evasiones, como el alcohol, las adicciones, la tristeza, la soledad y la angustia. La llamada que recibe el capitán Mendoza es hacia la sanación y el perdón a través de la misericordia de Dios.

- **La tercera: la llamada hacia la compasión**

La película, *Madre Teresa de Calcuta*, dirigida por Fabrizio Costa, en el año 2003, nos muestra a la actriz Olivia Hussey, que da vida a la Madre Teresa, una monja de la Orden de las Hermanas de Loreto de Irlanda que llevaba veinte años de profesora en la India. La película muestra a la religiosa dando clases a niñas en el Colegio de Santa Ana de Calcuta.

La India se había independizado de los ingleses y eran unos momentos difíciles con conflictos callejeros. La escena nos sitúa en 1946, comienza cuando la multitud llama a la puerta del Colegio a pedir auxilio para un joven hindú herido y la madre Teresa les abre, sin darse cuenta de que está poniendo en peligro la vida de las niñas del Colegio. Ante este hecho le recomiendan que vaya a hacer unos ejercicios espirituales al Convento de Loreto en Darjeeling. Este viaje en tren va a cambiar su vida. La escena muestra la impresión que recibe al ver la grave pobreza que hay en las calles y en la estación. En el andén, justo antes de coger al tren, le sorprende un moribundo tirado en el suelo, a través de esa visión, siente una fuerte llamada de Jesucristo hacia la compasión viendo la soledad de esa persona. La Madre Teresa oye una voz en el alma que le dice: *Tengo sed*, y ella se arrodilla y le acompaña. La escena se convierte en un momento de contemplación, la bella música de, Guy Farley la acompaña. Este testimonio es muy enriquecedor, porque la Madre Teresa ya había sentido una llamada cuando decidió consagrar su vida a Dios, pero recibe otra a la que, más tarde, ella llamará: *la llamada dentro de la llamada*

Evaluación de los resultados de la intervención.

Descripción de la población

Los estudiantes participantes en la investigación cursan el segundo curso de los grados de Fisioterapia, Educación Infantil y Educación Primaria. Se recogieron un total de 218 cuestionarios. Los cuestionarios se distribuyen del siguiente modo en la variable sexo:

Tabla 3 Distribución de los cuestionarios por sexo

	Sexo
Total	218
Mujeres	124
Hombres	63
NC	31

Fuente: elaboración propia

Por grupos, los cuestionarios se distribuyen del siguiente modo:

Tabla 4 Distribución de los cuestionarios por grupo de clase

	Mujeres	Hombres	NC	Total
2º A Fisioterapia (B)	25	23	18	66
2º C Fisioterapia (A)	15	28	2	45
2º A Educación Infantil (B)	59	8	6	73
2º A Educación Primaria (A)	25	4	5	34
Total	124	63	31	218

Fuente: elaboración propia

La edad media de los participantes es de 20,8 años; en el caso de las mujeres es 20,4 años y en el de los hombres 21,2.

La evaluación de los resultados de la intervención se realizó a partir de la información recogida a través de un cuestionario que se elaboró para tal fin. El cuestionario citado consta de tres partes:

- Identificación de los conceptos *misericordia*, *perdón* y *paz* con términos con significados semejantes o que, comúnmente, pueden relacionarse con los mismos. Se debían seleccionar aquellos más relacionados con los conceptos en estudio a juicio del alumno. Los términos utilizados fueron los siguientes:

Misericordia: corazón, perdón, empatía, miseria, bondad, sufrimiento, fe, mirada, Dios

Perdón: paciencia, amistad, amor, olvidar, fallo, pecado, imposible, dios, comprensión, humildad, misericordia

Paz: armonía, conflicto, guerra, silencio, amor, ceder, orden, amistad, perdón, humildad

- Cuestiones con las que los alumnos debían manifestar su grado de acuerdo en una escala Likert con 6 opciones de respuesta (1 a 6). Estas cuestiones se elaboraron teniendo en cuenta situaciones en las que las personas se encuentran en posición de dar o recibir misericordia, perdón o paz

- Valoración de la importancia de determinadas actitudes en la persona en una escala Likert con 6 opciones. Las actitudes presentadas fueron *empatía*, *bondad*, *fe*, *mirada*, *paciencia*, *amistad*, *amor*, *olvidar*, *comprensión* y *humildad*

En función del segmento del cuestionario se optó por un diseño de investigación diferente para el análisis. Así, se optó por seguir un diseño pretest-postest para comparar las respuestas de los alumnos antes (pretest) y después (postest) de la intervención. También se dividió a los participantes en dos grupos en función del tipo de intervención desarrollada para poder comprobar la incidencia real de la en el cambio de respuesta.


Se pidió a los alumnos que se identificasen en el cuestionario con un seudónimo con el fin de poder realizar comparaciones sujeto por sujeto y verificar la existencia de diferencias significativas entre el pretest y el postest de cada uno de los grupos.

Análisis de los resultados

a. Identificación de conceptos misericordia, perdón, paz


Se realizó un análisis comparativo de las respuestas a la identificación de conceptos y términos. Se valoró el porcentaje de estudiantes que seleccionó cada uno de los términos propuestos en el cuestionario. Los resultados se reflejan en los siguientes gráficos

Gráfico 1: Diferencias pretest-postest en la selección de términos con el concepto "misericordia (Grupo completo)




Fuente: SPSS

Gráfico 2 Diferencias pretest-postest en la selección de términos con el concepto "misericordia" (Grupo 1)



Fuente: SPSS

Gráfico 3 Diferencias pretest-postest en la selección de términos con el concepto "misericordia" (Grupo 2)




Fuente: SPSS

En el concepto *misericordia*, se observa que los estudiantes seleccionan los conceptos relacionados más en el postest que en el pretest. Llama especialmente la atención el aumento que se produce en el grupo de control

frente al grupo experimental en el que la variación es muy pequeña (10,42 puntos de media).


En concreto en el grupo de control, se considera importante reseñar el aumento muy considerable en la valoración en términos como *corazón* (35,49 puntos), *Dios* (29,52 puntos) o *bondad* (28,32 puntos). En el caso concreto del término *Dios*, el porcentaje de alumnos que lo seleccionaron relacionado con el concepto *misericordia* en la medición pretest fue del 24,32%; en el postest, lo seleccionaron el 53,85%.

Gráfico 4 Diferencias pretest-postest en la selección de términos con el concepto “perdón” (Grupo Completo)




Fuente: SPSS

Gráfico 5 Diferencias pretest-postest en la selección de términos con el concepto “perdón” (Grupo A)



Fuente: SPSS

Gráfico 6 Diferencias pretest-postest en la selección de términos con el concepto "perdón" (Grupo B)




Fuente: SPSS

Se observa, en el caso del concepto perdón, que las diferencias entre el pretest y el postest son pequeñas en el caso del grupo experimental, inferiores a 17 puntos en todos los casos.

Se observa incluso que en algunos de los términos propuestos – amor, pecado y comprensión – el porcentaje de alumnos que los seleccionan es mayor en el pretest que en el postest.


En la valoración del grupo de control se observan porcentajes de selección superiores en todos los conceptos; se considera relevante resaltar las diferencias postest-pretest en los conceptos Dios (26,3 puntos), comprensión (23,66 puntos), amor (19,65 puntos) o paciencia (19,54 puntos).

Gráfico 7 Diferencias pretest-postest en la selección de términos con el concepto “paz” (Grupo Completo)




Fuente: SPSS

Gráfico 8 Diferencias pretest-postest en la selección de términos con el concepto “paz” (Grupo A)



Fuente: SPSS

Gráfico 9 Diferencias pretest-postest en la selección de términos con el concepto “paz” (Grupo A)



Fuente: SPSS

La valoración de las respuestas en el concepto paz, son muy similares a las respuestas de los dos conceptos anteriores. En el grupo experimental las diferencias postest-pretest no son especialmente marcadas; la mayor de ellas es de 18,49 puntos (orden). Las diferencias en el grupo de control son más altas; creemos importante reseñar las existentes en el caso del término armonía (32,89) o amor (26,36).

b. Valoración de cuestiones

Para la valoración de las diferencias entre los grupos experimental y control en las respuestas a estas cuestiones se procedió a realizar un contraste de hipótesis.

La hipótesis a contrastar es la de existencia de diferencias significativas entre las valoraciones postest del grupo experimental y del grupo de control. Para el contraste, comprobados los supuestos de normalidad, independencia y homogeneidad de varianzas, se optó por utilizar el test “t” de Student, prueba sobradamente robusta para el contraste de dos grupos independientes.

El resultado del análisis lleva a rechazar la hipótesis planteada en todas las cuestiones; por tanto, se afirma la no existencia de diferencias significativas entre el grupo A y el grupo de B.

c. Valoración de la importancia de determinadas actitudes

Como en el apartado anterior, se optó por llevar a cabo un contraste de hipótesis, en este caso trabajando con muestras pareadas para lo que se procedió a comparar las respuestas pretest y postest de los alumnos que se pudieron identificar. La muestra en este caso quedó reducida a 56 alumnos, 30 del grupo experimental y 26 del grupo de control. Dado que se trata de grupos relacionados, se decidió utilizar como estadístico de contraste la prueba de los rasgos con signo de Wilcoxon.

La hipótesis para contrastar es la existencia de diferencias significativas entre pretest y postest tanto en el grupo experimental como en el grupo de control.

Los resultados del análisis muestran que, en el caso del grupo experimental, no existen diferencias significativas entre pretest y postest en ninguna de las cuestiones. Asimismo, se observa que en la mayoría de las cuestiones del postest no existen diferencias significativas; solo se dan en las cuestiones bondad y fe.

Conclusiones del análisis

Atendiendo a los resultados del análisis, hay que señalar que la intervención diferencial desarrollada en el grupo experimental no ha producido los efectos esperados. Sin duda esto debe llevar a rediseñar la intervención, si bien hay que señalar algunos aspectos que pueden justificar en parte lo observado.

En primer lugar, no se ha podido asegurar la estabilidad de los grupos en las mediciones pretest y postest; este hecho puede haber aumentado la varianza intragrupo y, por tanto, el error, de modo que las diferencias observables a simple vista no han resultado significativas.

Otro aspecto importante a señalar es las altas valoraciones obtenidas en todas las cuestiones, iguales o superiores a 4 sobre 6 en la mayoría de las preguntas. Conseguir mejorar estos valores a partir de una intervención como la planificada y que esta mejora sea significativa es altamente complicado.

Finalmente se considera interesante señalar algo en relación con las diferencias tan importantes existentes en el grupo de control entre el postest y el pretest. Sin duda, la intervención ha dado resultado; los estudiantes del grupo de control tienen una percepción diferente de los conceptos de misericordia, perdón y paz; el trabajo desarrollado con ellos ha hecho cambiar su forma de entender estos conceptos y, teniendo en

cuenta en qué conceptos se encuentran estas diferencias (amor, perdón, humildad, comprensión, Dios, paciencia, bondad y corazón), podemos señalar que su visión ha ganado en trascendencia, espiritualidad y humanidad.

Conclusiones

Este trabajo ha tratado de responder a la llamada del Papa a humanizar la educación a través de la *cultura del diálogo*, frente al individualismo y, como él mismo indica en estas palabras “a la aldea global con múltiples procesos de interacción” (Francisco, 2017).

Mostrar el perdón a los jóvenes les abre a una perspectiva de futuro y esperanza. Este aspecto está estrechamente relacionado con el sentido y misión de la Universidad Francisco de Vitoria y concretamente con la preocupación por despertar la responsabilidad social y el compromiso de los alumnos.

Se puede comprobar en los resultados del estudio que los jóvenes investigados han llegado de una forma más fácil, cercana y eficaz al logro de los objetivos desde la visión aconfesional del perdón, siempre teniendo en cuenta que, en esta, se han mantenido las enseñanzas de Francisco como un autor que muestra la compasión con la riqueza que el cristianismo ofrece desde la gratuidad de la caridad. Se podría decir, por tanto, que la visión, digamos, aconfesional allana el camino para la asimilación de las enseñanzas del Papa.

En estos momentos en que asistimos al triste *espectáculo* de una humanidad doliente, los educadores cristianos, debemos reflexionar sobre el modo en que se transmite este mensaje para conseguir más frutos de conversión de los corazones y paz.

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