



## ORIGINAL PAPER

# Some Controversial Issues of Current Romanian Civic Culture

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### Abstract:

The main premise from which my study starts is the existence of a historical and psychological continuity at the level of the Romanian political culture before and after communism. Relevant to the nature of political system in which it manifests and to the "basic personality" which spreads, civic culture is a variable whose value indicates the economic development and the high level of democratic institutions, the confidence and hope that decisions will depend of citizens. Civic culture also assume a concern for knowledge, a vocation whereby it grows even when political environment is not favorable to this preoccupation. The current economic and democratic crisis prove that civic culture exercise is almost impossible not only in totalitarian regimes. Beyond theoretical premises, this communication takes into account some historical and psychological features of the Romanian political culture on which it can be sketched the portrait of the Romanian citizen whose current "critical" activity is not taken into account by representatives of political power. In this respect, we use the procurement of political philosophy, but also those of policy compared, and we assume that the space (at least intentional) of democracy is that where the citizen may exercise loyalty and participatory skills. We find that underdevelopment of genuine civic culture, the persistence of patriarchal or dependent culture and offensive of subculture, the citizen passivity, corruption, careerism, opportunism and selfishness, amorality that privileges the circumstantially meaning of the civic culture led to a widespread democratic deception. Could the Romanian citizen find constructive solutions or alternatives in this decadent political situation through participatory democracy?

**Keywords:** *theoretical framework, historical inheritance, Romanian political culture, participatory democracy, civic culture*

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### The theoretical framework of the problem

Following the history and philosophy of citizenship, we find that behaviors and attitudes cultivated in any human organized community by rules and principles of law, including learning and challenging them are related to political participation of individuals in the community.

How citizens relate to political power, awareness and enforcement of rights and obligations, generally express political culture, and in contemporary democratic regimes, by widespread application of participatory connotation, it indicates the level of civic culture.

If we consider the theoretical framework, within a political system, situated in the "geometric locus" of the "basic" structural components, political culture expresses the "forces" more or less visible which guarantees its cohesion and defines its specifics, or on the contrary, contributes to its change when the system goes into crisis.

Through the size of participative dimension, the political culture acquires the connotation of civic culture, this being part of the cultural practices of free citizens.

The research of a Romanian political culture in the past and the continuity of a "characteristic style" in the events of today must take into account the historical, anthropological, psychological and philosophical inheritance.

According to the "classical" references, the notion of "political culture" is situated at the intersection of political science with philosophy and can be understood as "the subjective perception of history and politics, the fundamental beliefs and values, the foci of identification and loyalty, and the political knowledge and expectations which are the product of the specific historical experiences of nations and groups" (Brown, 1979: 1).

It is also a way of structuring the values and beliefs that load rather cognitively than emotionally the experiences and the waiting horizon (of the individual or of the collectivity).

The connections of political culture with what we call "culture" in the broadest sense, as a series of products and symbolic acts, values, mentalities and attitudes, are relevant to the character of the political system in which it manifests itself and to the citizens who are part of that system.

As we learn from *Political Culture & Political Change in Communist States*, edited by Archie Brown and Jack Gray, the concept "political culture" (applied in this book to the comparative study of the former communist states) has been used sporadically before being discussed as a possible concept of social sciences.

This terminology was sometime ago used by Lenin and was first used in English by Sidney and Beatrice Webb in the 1930s, when the two theorists questioned political education and the media role in the Soviet Union.

In modern political science, the concept has been developed and enriched by anthropologists such as Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict or Clyde Kluckhohn and sociologists like Max Weber and Talcott Parsons.

An important theoretical stimulus in this respect was the political events of the "Third World", when the new states began to function on the basis of new constitutions and institutions, in a way that surprised them and also dismantled the people.

A first article that contributed to clarifying the concept of "political culture" was published by Gabriel Almond in 1956 with the title "Comparative Political Systems",

where political culture is defined as "the network of orientations, attitudes, values, beliefs by which the individual relates to the political system" (Almond, 1956: 391-409).

Other significant contributions in the field belonging to Sydney Verba who signed the last chapter "Comparative Political Culture" of the volume *Political Culture and Political Development* (Verba, 1969: 512-600).

Here is emphasized the psychological side of political culture. According to this meaning, the political culture of a society consists of a system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values defining the situation in which political action takes place, providing the subjective orientation of politics.

In 1985 is published the work of Lucian Pye (with Mary W. Pye), *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority*, in which are discussed common aspects of disparate political cultures from Asia.

As in the major of his later works, Lucian Pye here reconfigures political development in Asia as a product of cultural attitudes about power and authority. He compares the great Confucianist traditions of East Asia with the cultures of Southeast Asia and the traditions of South Asia of Hinduism and Islam, exploring the national differences within these larger civilizations.

Against the grain of modern political theory, Pye believes that power differs widely from culture to culture.

Asia masses are oriented groups respectful of authority, while their leaders are more concerned with dignity and support collective pride, than solving problems.

As culture decides on the course of political development, Pye shows how Asian societies, facing the task of setting up modern nation-states, respond by shaping the paternalist forms of power that satisfy their profound psychological appetite for security.

This new paternalism may appear essentially authoritative in the eyes of the Westerners, but Pye argues that this is a valid response to people's needs, able to ensure community's solidarity and strong group loyalty.

He predicts that in the near future we will witness the development by accelerating the transformation of Asia into new versions of modern society that can avoid many of the tensions of Western civilization but can also produce a new set of problems.

This book revitalizes Asia-wide policy studies, enrolling them on a comprehensive dimension of the great differences between Asia and the West, and at the same time sensitive to subtle variations among several Asian cultures (Pye, 1985).

The methodological importance of this work for the study of political culture is crucial.

Thus, any research of an individual case (such as the case of Romania - to which we will refer in this study and which is not analyzed in the book cited here in the first lines, the authors only considering aspects of the USSR, Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, China and Cuba) can not avoid the hypothesis of these professionals in political science.

Yves Schemel uses the expression "political cultures" to draw attention to cultural pluralism, considering that there is no single political culture in reality, despite the fact that there may be common points of these multiple political cultures: attitude towards the political system, beliefs and meanings pertinent policies for a community (Schemel, 1985).

The most important writing that seems to stimulate the researchers is *Comparative Political Culture*, Sidney Verba's essay concluding *Political Culture and Political Development* (Verba, 1965).

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The intellectual context in which the concept of "political culture" has been used has probably been the decisive factor in which criticism has gone until its (precipitous) rejection.

But it has at a certain time been accepted as summing up all the elements by which members of a society manifest themselves in the public space, in the community, in the sphere of collective interests and the good of society or the settlement of evil, having cognitive, axiological, creative, praxiological and communicative components.

In the "Introduction" of the book *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States* Archie Brown states that the authors of this work have linked "political culture" to political change or continuity, without following Almond or Easton in defining the political system, using this term rather in the sense of "the network of political institutions and the pattern of political behaviour within a given state" (Brown, 1979: 3).

The relationship between the political culture and the political system on the one hand, and the economic development on the other, according to the authors of this volume, represents "quite a different matter" because economic development is an indicator of "political development".

A clear expression of this aspect appears in the study written by Jeffrey W. Hahn, *Continuity and Change in Russian Political Culture* published in the volume *Post-Communist Studies and Political Science. Methodology and Empirical Theory in Sovietology* "(...) Political culture is an important intervening variable between economic development and the development of democratic institutions. Specifically, economic development changes the way people think about politics; it predisposes them to be receptive to democratic ideas and institutions" (Hahn, 1993: 301).

Receptivity to ideas and democratic institutions is possible (...) "Because of increased intellectual and material resources available to an even-widening circle of citizens, there is a growing expectation that the making of decisions in society will be shared. In short, economic development fosters the emergence of something like a «civic culture», and the existence of such a culture is a precondition for the emergence and maintenance of democratic institutions" (Hahn, 1993: 301).

The hypothesis that "there is a significant connection between social structure and political culture" (Brown, 1979: 4) allows the observation that the social structure does not condition political culture to a greater extent than the specific historical experience of a people.

In the West and East there are societies with similar levels of economic development and class structure, whose differences in political culture legitimate the pertinence of the historical experience hypothesis as a decisive factor of the "civic ethos" and the specificity of the political culture.

As can be seen by carefully observing the "courses" and "recourses" of civilizations and states, "historical experience" is always marked psychologically and mythologically, and this is visible in the oscillation of individuals between the tendencies of asserting or suppressing the impulses of "negotiate" with the worldly power, to accept or overcome the inequalities, to sacrifice for an idea, to think of all of them or to suspend them (more or less "phenomenological").

The crossing of the psychological and mythological-symbolic factors with various other components of the inner and the social life give rise to attitudes and behaviors that express the appreciation which is given in a society to the concepts of "the city" such as: law, justice, authority, virtue, respect, dignity, freedom, rights, tolerance.

Synthesizing the intentions of those who have consecrated the concept in the 1950s and 1960s, Aurelian Crăiuțu sees in the political culture "both the product of collective history and millions of individual histories and trajectories" (Crăiuțu, 1998: 141).

It is related to "both the phenomena and the political institutions, with the traditions of their interpretation, as well as with the personal experiences of individuals" (Crăiuțu, 1998: 141), enjoying a double role: to structure the values, norms, ideals and symbols of a community to provide some guidelines for the individual's behavior in the public space (Crăiuțu, 1998: 141).

Every type of society (even the primitive one) is self-constructed by virtue of a "political culture" (ie, at least based on a mentality about mastery and obedience, respecting hierarchies, norms and rules that allow liberties), but the rudimentary or evolved aspect depends on what is called "civic vocation" (Kelley, 1979).

If, at the level of the "parochial" political culture (Almond and Verba), civic vocation tends to be null and in the case of "dependent" political culture it is barely visible, referring to the notion of "participatory political culture" (Almond, Verba, 1996: 48-49) civic vocation is characteristic.

Through its capacity as a guidelines for special social objects and processes, the political culture refers to simple citizens (who have "internalized" it in the knowledge, feelings and assessments of the political system, according to Almond and Verba) and less at the intellectual or ruling elites.

Inevitably linked to the notions of "citizen" and "knowledge", political culture implies a special interest and a concern in this direction, a vocation on which to develop even when the political environment, such as the Romanian communist totalitarian regime self-titled "democratic", ruling citizens with the right to vote but not a choice, is not favorable.

### **The Problem of Political Culture in Modern and Contemporary Romania**

In the case of Romania, the accumulated historical and cultural capital inspires both skepticism and hope.

The Romanian Revolution of 1989 and the serious consequences (the large number of deaths and injuries, the execution of the dictatorial couple) would be indicative of the incomparably more repressive nature of the Romanian Communist regime than other communist countries, and at the same time the expression of a "high level of public hostility Against this regime" (Holmes, 1997: 83).

In its spontaneous component, as I recall as a "participatory observer", the public hostility towards the Romanian communist regime represented, on the one hand, the manifestation of a social and political despair, the achievement of the maximum level of the dissatisfaction of the mass (which wants to overcome its condition) and on the other hand (in Bucharest, Cluj, Brasov, Sibiu and in all county residences), the emergence of true solidarity (with victims and fighters from Timișoara) and not of the one imposed propagandistically (with the socialist system) even in those days.

In other words, it represented a civic reaction and attitude that expressed a level of "political culture" higher than that gained during the time devoted to the "political-ideological education" and "political information" (about the important facts of the leaders), obligatory before 1989 in any field of activity.

In cultural homes or in village schools, if not in the festive hall of the City Hall, political and ideological debates were held with senior urban guests about the importance

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of the most recent events, such as the Congresses and Plenaries of the Romanian Communist Party.

Which does not mean that these things were taken seriously: in most cases, a tacit agreement was born between "propagandists" and the listeners about the fictitious dimension of things that were exposed or just stated. Forms of resistance to brainwashing were not delayed, sometimes in intelligent forms, as in the case of jokes.

The peaceful *political culture of the joke* - as an indication of creativity and implicitly of freedom of consciousness and also as an expression of the ironic detachment from a regime, a system, one or more leading characters - in the last years of the dictatorship, gradually slipped into a *political culture of resentment* towards a regime embodied in 1989 by some characters and institutions (county secretaries, secretaries with propaganda, security and militia) and collapses at the moment of killing the dictatorial couple transmitted by the Romanian Television.

Innocent in itself, what we have called the "political culture of joke" has historical antecedents, because unlike the Russians, for example, about which Stephen White assert that they manifest „a highly personalised attachment to political authority, in particular to the person of the tsar" (White, 1979: 29), the Romanians had to the ruling authority (with rare exceptions, perhaps in the case of Mircea the Elder, Stephen the Great, Michael the Brave, Constantin Brâncoveanu, Alexandru Ioan Cuza) mixed feelings, which does not resemble devotion.

The Romanians' skepticism about the political class is so entrenched that even good deeds are regarded with suspicion and irony. Within the (nationally declared) Christian faith of moral restoration and hope, public opinion (also manifested by its most authoritative representatives, media professionals) drastically penalizes politicians attending religious ceremonies.

However, the presence of politicians at religious ceremonies, even admitting that it does not reflect authentic religious thirst, but just a desire to win electorally through the pious image - is simply a good thing, because there are countless stories about people who are being worn as though they were believers, even came to believe. It is perhaps a characteristic of the Romanian "political culture" *the inadequacy*, the disproportion between the combative reaction and the gravity of the incriminated fact.

Here it should be added that the lack of respect for institutions in principle is a characteristic of a man without participatory civic culture, holding a minimal political and resentamental political culture.

The violence of the refounding act of the Romanian democracy (culminating in the death of Elena and Nicolae Ceausescu on the Birth of the Lord on December 25, 1989 - at least according to official "transparent" data) raises a big question mark regarding the Christian paradigm of Romanian culture (as defined by Father Dumitru Stăniloae among others in a series of articles from the 1930s).

And it converts into the tragic, the benign caragelian feeling of Romanian "political being" stigmatized by indecision. Dumitru Stăniloae considers that for the Romanian people the Christian Religion „is the cultural foundation of all living laws in a coexistence of mutual appreciation and collaboration that ensures its unity and identity" (Stăniloae, 2004: 12).

The above quote expresses first of all Father Stăniloae's Christian love: the author of the article has the same tone as in the articles on this issue published between 1930-1945 in *The Romanian Telegraph*, as as though the campaign of imposing atheism 45 years did not would have achieved its purpose.

The cultural-political consequences of the radical revolutionary moment perceived by the active, passive or contemplative Romanian citizen show that even after they stepped into the "Garden of Delights of Democracy" (Philippe Braud), Romanian politicians, like most of citizens watching TV or listening to them on the radio have the same primal impulses to destroy their adversary (real or imaginary).

Or to dismantle them politically, legally, socially and if possible even physically; the fair competition, the sincere dialogue, the substantial debate of ideas, the serious polemic, the loud pamphlet seem far removed, although the Romanians only rarely touch the stages of violence tending to irremediably (Braud, 1993).

In this sense, the most significant in the negative sense are the "participative" attitudes manifested in the three arrivals of miners in Bucharest: one against the civilian population (June 1990), and two against the government (September 1991, January 1999).

Other manifestations of the language violence of the Romanian political culture are the controversies within the Provisional Council of the National Union, then between the legitimate power installed in May 1990 and the historical parties.

Also it manifests in the civic precariousness of electoral campaigns and contestations of candidates in elections (in the electoral years 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2009, 2014, 2016), the media war between the representatives of the power (the Justice and Truth Alliance vs. the Social Democratic Party, the Liberal Democratic Party vs. the Social-Liberal Union, the Social Democratic Party along with the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats vs the National Liberal Party and the Union Save Romania).

### **Psychological factors**

And these recent events are not only the result of the accumulation of negative emotions and resentments towards "political", "adversary", "the other", due to the tremendous historical conditions, but they represent elements in the structure of the Romanians' consciousness (as in a certain way the theoretical model of Lucian Pye suggests).

The lucid assessment of the Romanians' faults, independent of the dissolving role of aliens accused in a vulgar manner –according to Emil Cioran - of all the shortcomings of the country, is found in the Chapter IV (Collectivism and Nationalism) of the book *Romania's Transfiguration*, First Edition and Second Edition (1936, 1941), missing from the final edition, reduced to six chapters.

The fact that Romania must first have a revolution in moral, cultural and civic order (Cioran, 1941: 142) (from which only a few flashes were seen in December 1989) is equally "eternal" (just like the problems of justice in its own meaning and in social meaning) in the present phase of the Romanian wild capitalism called postdecembrist, as well as when Emil Cioran wrote *Romania's Transfiguration*.

Licheism, baronism and clientelism (notions that should be studied separately as components of the specific Romanian political culture) provide the paradoxical image of a "restoration" on the notion of the "national revolution".

A fundamental reference in this respect is represented by C. Rădulescu-Motru's work, *Vocația. Factor hotărâtor în cultura popoarelor (Vocation. Decisive factor in peoples culture)* (1932).

The aspect of the Romanians' vocation, "people in the process of cultural formation", was still not sufficiently researched in the 30s-40s, being instead speculated by the politicians" (Rădulescu-Motru, 1997: 147).

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By enumerating the already common places, such as the vocation of Romanians as mediators between Western and Eastern civilizations, the vocation of the Romanians for the continuation of the civilization of Byzantium, or the agricultural vocation of the Romanians, or "the predilection of many Romanians for politics, for poetry, for sports", Rădulescu-Motru his own hypothesis in the statement:

"The Romanians' vocation starts from where the psychology of the Romanians ends" (Rădulescu-Motru, 1997: 150).

Thus, the philosopher notes that the Romanian people are poor in "individual geniuses" and rich in "national common sense" and given that "individual vocations are the levers necessary for human progress", and "increasing the functioning of consciousness" (absolutely necessary for the progress of culture) involves the role of personalities, a resuscitation of the individualist spirit in Romanian culture is necessary. It is about true individualism, based on vocation - and we could specify, based on civic vocation - and not selfishness, the pursuit of personal interests, as happened in Romania after the "Europeanization" of the year 1848:

"All the institutions of the country have been dressed in new forms, but have not been enlivened by a new breath. The institutions were not taken seriously. Each individual as he could, tried to make them domineering instruments. Western policy has been transformed into Romanian politicalism" - what we find to be also the case today. The Romanians, as Maiorescu already had stated, "borrowed only the façade of Western individualism without borrowing the institutional fund.

While in Western Europe the individual's initiative was under the control of moral conscience, in Romania, after 1848, the initiative was left to the will of the moment and of the powerful individuals' temperament" (Rădulescu-Motru, 1997: 156, 157, 158). Today is the same, when quackeries and frauds are hailed as "free initiatives" (Rădulescu-Motru, 1997: 156, 157, 158).

Nevertheless, the brief incursion (during the interwar period) marked by thinkers representative of Romanian culture opens a way of penetrating at present, by studying the psychological and historical depths of the Romanians, based on the respect of the tradition of interpreting the political culture as a significant element of the power of culture.

The free movement of thought is a good start for political culture, in its highest dimension, namely civic.

But claiming an organized "political culture" would resemble too much with the return to the old propaganda skills, replacing "scientific socialism" with "scientific capitalism" and cultivating a "political culture of generality" (Rosanvallon, 2004: 122) no matter how noble its objectives would be (such as, for example, awareness of the role of citizens as an expression of the functioning of a rational democratic society).

Ultimately, the notion of "political culture" comes first and foremost with the work well done by everyone in its field of activity, the facts that ensure a balanced civic cohabitation.

Romania's population is not only made up of corrupt politicians and interlopers, but also from professionals at European standards, working not from the desire to get up or from a blind sentiment of debt, but simply from the belief that this is a good thing. It also implies an adequate political attitude, even when the discrepancies between the politicians' language and the referent of reality are far from political culture.



### **The new spirit of democracy as civic participation**

Being a culture of freedom, participatory political culture (equivalent to civic culture) is also a "tool" by which the citizen probes the depths of politics, but also an "apparatus" through which he sees himself better in life policy.

Returning to the spirit of the initial definitions, concerning the post-revolutionary situation of the meaning of participatory political culture in Romania, it can be said that the process of developing well-grounded options that allow every citizen rational choice is more late than in other countries.

Instead, as social networks show it, it evolves and refines itself on the level of an increasingly large sample of a population from different social backgrounds, the language of civic culture: that of contesting, approving, supporting, commenting, claim.

The frequent and virtual encounter of such language creates attitudes and manifests itself through attitudes, which implies a culture of participation in the life of the community, whether it is narrower or wider.

Unlike the meaning of culture in general that can be individual despite being formed within or with the help of social "messages", civic culture is not an individualistic, solitary one, but one of communion and collective resonance, of broad-based broadcasting.

Once the rules have been internalized, they must be externalized.

But to do this, the post-revolutionary enthusiasm of the reconstruction is needed, to rid the apathy, the disgust, the despair of those who feel stolen, deceived, exploited by the wild capitalists who create their own political culture of egoism, cynicism and resentment towards the opposing potential.

Any revolution, after destroying an old system, built another new one. Historical examples abound.

The Romanian Revolution of December, we can say, has the reputation of being just destructive - at least economically and socially. If politically, apparently, things are good from a democratic point of view, in terms of economic life, productive infrastructure and social level, forces are polarized between wealth and poverty.

On this background, it is difficult, but not impossible, to abandon the feeling of nonsense that leads to apathy in favor of a culture of involvement, knowledge and recognition of own interest, proper to the free citizen.

Thus, for example, the January-February 2017 Victory protests against the 13th Government Emergency Ordinance of the Government of Romania expressed the peaceful revolt of those who have a minimum respect for civic dignity - and it is offensive to them to assert that they would have forced an institution, a group, a firm, an individual.

These people first came out to express their disagreement with those who give the tone of corruption and abuse in all institutions, against a spirit of arbitrary and discretionary leadership, against a feudal mentality of the rulers, against those still committed to robbery, and who were expecting from a crooked law the freedom to steal even more, to deceive even more, to lie more and more, to be even more unjust, defended by such a law.

It is also about the cultural practices of the free citizen after almost 30 years of democracy, of finding the civic spirit that does not restrict the participation and the illusion of its own power to the "ideal" level of the virtual debate.

The numbness and even the "sleep" of the civic sense have been knowingly maintained and even cultivated by political leaders, "managers" of institutions or opinion

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formers, who have all the interest of governing a population or some employees dominated by fear and mistrust (Stuparu, 2015: 97).

That is why those who protested in January 2017 express the ideal of civic participation that illustrates the explicit part of the deliberative democratic culture, more or less "agonistic", more or less classical.

The oscillation between the obligation and the freedom to be "civic" engaged, between duty and the right to be indifferent is thus resolved by the practical demonstration that the Romanian citizen exists and he (or she) is interested in the fate of the community and finally of himself, that he counts, despite his landlessness.

Even if the "critic" activity of the individual is not very much taken into account by the political power, if an injustice is taken into account in any state institution only if the "reactionary" is supported by someone strong, it is a normal democratic phenomenon, and we can see only those who are eager for power at all costs, those lacking in the spirit of justice, sincerity and humankind, those who have hidden dishonest facts are afraid of direct participatory democracy.

Political culture, especially in its civic-participatory dimension, is shaping, active and open to creation at the collective level, belonging to the synthesis of the spiritual life of a people and contributing, at this level, to the realization of the cultural condition that politics shares in democratic systems.

In a recent work, Loïc Blondiaux shows that contemporary democracies are looking for a new spirit, new foundations, and this because, despite the survival of the classical forms of political representation, their legitimacy "narrows" and their effectiveness is declining (Blondiaux, 2008: 5).

If the traditional structures of representative democracy are weakened in today's world, instead, the project of "democracy itself" does not seem to suffer, but on the contrary, as Blondiaux noticed :

"On the scene of the frequent political conflict, the ability of simple citizens to mobilize, to resist, to interfere with authorities outside traditional political circles and organizations has undoubtedly never been so strong" (Blondiaux, 2008: 5).

Thus, the echo of these multiple manifestations is the "increase of the word's power in the public space" manifested through "blogs, forums, participatory journalism" which gives the impression that "today the material and symbolic costs of access to public political power reached the point where whoever is allowed to make his voice heard".

Although participative value is independent of the deliberative one, the contemporary participatory views of democracy underline, as we have seen, the importance of deliberation.

As in the deliberative view, participatory democracy as seen by Benjamin Barber, can be conceived in the classical values of values: self-government, political equality, rule of law.

Against the distributed and delegated institutions, Barber argues that citizens must take part directly, not necessarily at every level and in any circumstance, but quite frequently, and especially when deciding on basic policies and when the power that matters is implemented" (Barber, 1984: 151).

Regarding the participatory status of citizenship, beyond the rights and their "redistribution" in *Citizenship and Identity*, signed by Engin F. Isin and Patricia K. Wood, citizenship is described as a set of practices (cultural, symbolic and economic) and a series of rights and obligations (civil, political and social) that define the quality of individual membership in a political system (Isin and Wood, 1999: 4).

Alternative political culture should be addressed or spoken by those who might lead the country by criteria of general interest and mobilize those who are deceived.

### Conclusion

We can synthesize that in Romania we are dealing with a mixed political culture (Almond and Verba), on the various levels of conscious positioning of the citizen over the values of the city (law, justice, authority, virtue, norms, respect, dignity, Rights, tolerance).

Also, we can speak about a political culture of inadequacy mixed with unexpected moments of "punctuality".

But it can also be observed a culture of obedience (towards history and politics), mingled with a political culture of opportunism; a political culture of renunciation and passivity mixed with heroism; a passive political culture, mixed with a participatory one that still seems a luxury.

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